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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The harmonisation of rules on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in the Southern African Customs Union 
 
 
Mandi Rossouw 
 
LLD Thesis, Department of Private Law, University of the Western Cape 
 
 
The Member States of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) have set as their 
objectives, amongst others, the facilitation of cross-border movement of goods between the 
territories of the Member States and the promotion of the integration of Member States into 
the global economy through enhanced trade and investment.  
Different approaches to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by Member 
States and the risk of non-enforcement may lead to legal uncertainty and increased transaction 
cost for prospective traders, which ultimately act as non-tariff barriers to trade in the region. 
Trade is critical to Southern Africa, and the ideal is that barriers to trade, of which uncertainty 
concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments among Member States is 
one, should be removed. Certainty, predictability, security of transactions, effective remedies 
and cost are important considerations in investment decision-making; and clear rules for 
allocating international jurisdiction and providing definite and expedited means of enforcing 
foreign judgments will facilitate intraregional as well as interregional trade. In addition to 
trade facilitation, a harmonised recognition and enforcement regime will consolidate 
economic and political integration in the SACU. An effective scheme for the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments has been regarded as a feature of any 
economic integration initiative likely to achieve significant integration.   
While the harmonisation of the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
has been given priority in other regional economic communities,  in particularly the European 
Union, any similar effort to harmonise the rules on recognition and enforcement of Member 
States have been conspicuously absent in the SACU – a situation which needs to receive 
immediate attention.  
The thesis considers the approaches followed by the European Union with the Brussels 
Regime, the federal system of the United States of America under the ‘full faith and credit 
clause’; the inter-state recognition scheme under the Australia and New Zealand Trans-
Tasman judicial system; as well as the convention-approach of the Latin American States. It 
finds that the most suitable approach for the SACU is the negotiation and adoption by all 
SACU Member States of a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, comparable to the 1971 Convention of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law; the EU Brussels I Regulation and the Latin-American Montevideo 
Convention, as complemented by the La Paz Convention.   
 
 
 
 
 iv 
It is imperative that a proposed convention should not merely duplicate previous efforts, but 
should be drafted in the light of the legal, political and socio-economic characteristics of the 
SACU Member States. The current legislative provisions in force in SACU Member States 
are compared and analysed, and the comparison and analysis form the basis of a proposal for 
a future instrument on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for the region. A 
recommended draft text for a proposed Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments for the SACU is included. This draft text could form the basis for future 
negotiations by SACU Member States.   
 
May 2013 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the inauguration of the European Economic and Monetary Union,
1
 questions about 
whether countries in Africa should work towards a single currency and whether the European 
Union can be a model for Africa have been coming to the forefront.
2
  
 
The history of regional, and even continent-wide, integration and cooperation initiatives in 
Africa is fairly long, albeit with very little success.
3
 With the launch of the European 
                                                 
1
  On January 1,
 
1999 the Euro, the new currency for the eleven Member States was introduced, and at the 
same time a new single monetary policy was introduced under the authority of the European Central Bank, 
thus heralding a full fledge European Economic and Monetary Union.  
2
  Aziakpono MJ ‘Financial and monetary autonomy and interdependence between South Africa and the other 
SACU countries’ (2008) 73(2) South African Journal of Economics 189.  
 
 
 
 
  
2 
Economic Monetary Union in 1999, there has been a rising regional and continent-wide 
cooperation, and as a mark of this renewed enthusiasm, the African Union (AU) and its 
implementation plan, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was launched 
in 2002, with a view to, amongst others things, increasing African integration.
4
 
 
A long standing example of regional monetary integration
5
 in Southern Africa is the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA), dating back to 1921, of which Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland are Members.
6
 In terms of membership, the monetary arrangements in 
Southern Africa are closely association with a common customs area, the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU).
7
 Together with Botswana
8
 these five States together form the 
Member States of the SACU.
9
 
 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has been a central part of regional 
economic development in the European Community.
10
 A unified recognition and 
enforcement regime was deemed necessary as it was believed that free circulation of 
judgments
11
 could enhance market integration and legal certainty in the European Economic 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
  Oyejide TA ‘Policies for regional integration in Africa’ (2000) Economic research papers No 62, Abidjan: 
African Development Bank 7. 
4
  Aziakpono (note 2) 189. 
5
  Monetary integration can take different forms, ranging from an informal exchange rate union, formal 
exchange rate union to a full monetary union. Other forms include adoption of another country’s currency: 
see Masson P & Patillo C The Monetary Geography of Africa (2004) 7. 
6
  Aziakpono (note 2) 190. 
7
  Wang J, Masha I, Shirono K and Harris L 2007 ‘The Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa: Shocks, 
adjustments and policy challenges’ International Monetary Fund IMF Working Paper WP/07/158 7 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07158.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013).  
8
  In 1921, after the establishment of the South African Reserve Bank, the South African currency (initially the 
pound, since 1962 the rand), became effectively the sole medium of exchange and legal tender in South 
Africa, Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. There were no internal restrictions 
on movements of fund within the area and virtually all external transactions were effected through banks in 
South Africa and subject to South African exchange controls. The situation continued after Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland gained political independence in the 1960s. The currency union was formally 
established on 5 December 1974, with the signing of the Rand Monetary Area Agreement. Botswana, 
however, opted to withdraw from the Rand Monetary Area in 1975, mainly because it wanted to retain the 
ability to formulate and implement its own monetary policy and to adjust the exchange rate, if necessary, in 
response to shocks affecting its economy. However, Botswana has maintained a close link with its national 
currency and the rand: see Wang et al (note 7) 8.  
9
  See para 2.2 below.  
10
  See para 4.2 below.  
11
  The EU Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters [2001] Official Journal L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’) provides that, for the purposes 
of the free movement of judgments, judgments given in one Member State (bound by the Brussels I 
Regulation) should be recognised and enforced in another Member State, even if the judgment debtor is 
domiciled in a third State: Recital 10. 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
Community (EEC).
12
 A similar regime governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments among the SACU Member States is conspicuously absent.
13
  
 
The thesis argues that the SACU needs a harmonised recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments regime,
14
 and that a harmonised recognition and enforcement regime will not only 
facilitate regional economic integration, but it will also facilitate trade in the region.
15
  
 
The thesis provides a comparative investigation of selected private international law regimes, 
focussing specifically on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and 
incidentally jurisdiction, in the SACU. The aim of the investigation is to determine whether 
the differences between these regimes can be reconciled to create a harmonised set of rules 
that would apply within the region. The conclusions drawn from the comparison are used to 
determine an appropriate strategy for the harmonisation of the rules relating to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the SACU.  
 
Certain key concepts are discussed before the rationale of the study is considered.  
 
2 KEY CONCEPTS 
 
The key concepts that are discussed in this section include regional economic integration, as 
regional economic integration on the African continent forms part of the origin and 
background of the study and the SACU, the specific regional integration initiative and 
geographical context within which the study takes place. Next, private international law, the 
field of law of which the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments takes place, as 
                                                 
12
  Huang J Interregional Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: Lessons for China 
from US and EU Laws (unpublished SJD Thesis, Duke University School of Law, 2010) 21 available online 
at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/etd/1/; Fitzpatrick J ‘The Lugano Convention and Western European 
Integration: a Comparative Analysis of Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe and the US’ (1992-1993) 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 699; see also the Preamble to the Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 Official Journal (L 229) (‘Brussels 
Convention’) (‘… desiring to implement the provisions … to secure the simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals’); and Jenard P 
‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)’ (1979)  Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 59/1 
(5 March 1979) (‘Jenard Report’) 38.  
13
  See para 3.2 below.  
14
  See para 4 below. 
15
  See para 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
well as the concepts of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are discussed. 
Finally, the concept of legal harmonisation, which is the objective of the study, is discussed. 
 
2.1 Regional Economic Integration  
One of the first definitions of integration was given by Tinbergen
16
 who distinguished 
between negative integration or ‘the removal of discriminatory restrictions and the 
introduction of freedom for economic transactions’ and positive integration, ‘the adjustment 
of existing and the establishment of new policies and institutions endowed with coercive 
powers’.17 Jovanovic18 suggests that it is easier to advance in the direction of ‘negative’ 
integration (removal of tariffs and quotas) than towards ‘positive integration’ because the 
‘positive’ approach deals with sensitive issues of national sovereignty.19 Anderson and 
Blackhurst
20
 define regional economic integration as ‘the process of reducing economic 
significance of national political boundaries within a geographical area’. Pelkmans21 defines 
economic integration as ‘the elimination of economic frontiers between two or more 
economies’.22 Balassa23 in turn defines regional economic integration as ‘the removal of 
obstacles to cross-border trade allowing for the free movement of persons, goods, services 
and capital across national boundaries’.  
 
Regional economic integration generally passes through four stages before it reaches 
completion namely: free trade area, customs union, common market and economic union.
24
 
El-Agraa
25
 refers to international economic integration as the discriminatory removal of all 
                                                 
16
  Tinbergen J International Economic Integration (1954) 122. 
17
  Tinbergen (note 16) 122. 
18
  Jovanovic MN The Economics of International Integration (2007) 16. 
19
  Jovanovic (note 18) 16. 
20
  Anderson K & Blackhurst R Regional integration and the global trading system (1993) 1. 
21
  Pelkmans J ‘The institutional economics of European integration’ in Cappelliti M & Seccombe M (eds) 
Integration Through Law: Europe And The American experience (1989) 318. 
22
  Economic frontiers are separations, often in the form of geo-political and national boundaries, through which 
the flow of goods, labour and capital is restricted: see Pelkmans (note 21) 318. 
23
  Balassa B The Theory of Economic Integration (1962) 2.  
24
  In a free trade area, tariffs between participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own 
tariff against non-participating countries. In a customs union the tariffs of all the member states are equalised 
against non-participating countries. In a common market, which is a higher form of integration, not only 
trade restrictions, but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as distinct 
from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with 
some degree of harmonisation of national economic policies in order to remove discrimination due to 
disparities in these policies.
 
Complete economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, 
social and counter-physical policies and requires the setting up of a supra-national authority whose decisions 
are binding on member states: see Balassa (note 23) 2.  
25
  El-Agraa A The Economics of the European Community (1985) 93. 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
trade impediments between participating nations and the establishment of certain elements of 
coordination between them. For present purposes the latter definition will be used, as the 
definition is wide enough to cover all trade impediments, including the focus of the thesis, 
namely diverse rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as an impediment 
to trade;
26
 and the proposals made towards the harmonisation of the rules on recognition and 
enforcement would also be covered by ‘elements of coordination’.27  
 
Legal integration is critical to the progress of integration and consolidates economic and 
political integration.
28
 Complete economic integration presupposes the unification of 
monetary, fiscal, social and macroeconomic policies and requires the setting up of a supra-
national authority
29
 whose decisions are binding on Member States.
30
 Economic integration 
results in the unification of both States and legal systems, and, therefore, private international 
law, which deals with issues arising from the interaction of legal systems, should form an 
essential part of integration.
31
  
 
2.2 The Southern African Customs Union 
The world’s oldest custom union,32 the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), dates back 
to a 1889 Customs Union Convention between the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope 
and the Orange Free State Boer Republic. A new agreement, signed on June 29, 1910 was 
extended to the Union of South Africa and the British High Commission Territories, namely 
                                                 
26
  See para 4.1 below.  
27
  See Chapter 4 below.  
28
   Conflicts and divergences arising from the laws of different Member States in a Regional Community in 
matters relating to trade, arbitration and enforcement of judgments rank among the major areas to intra-
regional cooperation and integration that Member States will confront as they move towards of integration. 
The achievement of a number of the objectives of a specific community, such as the elimination of customs 
duties and adoption of common external customs tariff, and the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, 
will require the taking of legal measures. Differences in linguistic, political, legal and administrative systems 
must be addressed and solutions sought. The implementation of these solutions will require an effective 
regulatory framework: see Ndulo M ‘The need for harmonisation of trade laws in the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC)’ (1996) 4 African Yearbook of International Law 195, 209; see also para 
4.2 below.  
29
  See para 2.5 below.   
30
  Balassa (note 23) 2.   
31
  Oppong RF ‘Private International law in Africa: the past, present and future’ (2007) 55 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 677.  
32
 SACU SACU Information Brochure (2008) available online at 
http://www.sacu.int/publications/brochures/2008/information.pdf (accessed 20 February 2013); Draper P, 
Halleson D & Alves P ‘SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa: From 
Spaghetti to Cannelloni?’ (2007) South African Institute of International Affairs Trade Policy Report No 15 
16. 
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Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Swaziland.
33
 The primary goal of the 
Agreement was to promote economic development through regional coordination of trade.
34
 
This agreement lasted until the British Protectorates received independence in the mid-1960s. 
It was then renegotiated with the South African apartheid government, culminating in the 
signing by representatives of the Governments of Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and 
Swaziland of a Customs Union Agreement
35
 on 12 December 1969, replacing the 1910 
Agreement.
36
  
 
The Negotiating Parties to the 1969 Agreement, ‘being desirous of maintaining the free 
interchange of goods between their countries and applying the same tariffs and trade and 
regulations to goods imported from outside the common customs area’37  recognised that the 
1969 Agreement required modification to provide for the continuance of the customs union 
arrangements ‘in the changed circumstances on a basis designed to ensure the continued 
economic development of the customs area as a whole’.38 
 
With the passage of time, all members of the SACU came to consider the 1969 Agreement 
seriously flawed.
39
 The 1969 Agreement provided for South Africa alone to determine the 
                                                 
33
  High Commissioner Notice 65 of 29 June 1910: Customs Agreement: Union of South Africa – Territories of 
Basutoland, Swaziland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The preamble of the 1910 Agreement provided 
that ‘whereas it is desirable that an agreement should be entered into between the Government of the Union 
of South Africa … and the Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate … 
under which - 
a) the territories shall maintain a tariff similar to that which exist in the Union of South Africa; 
b) an equitable share of the duties collected on goods passing through the Union to the Territories shall be 
paid over to them and vice versa; and 
c) there should be a free interchange of South African products and manufacturers and the between the 
Union and the Territories’: see 1910 SACU Agreement (note 33) Preamble.  
34
  South West Africa was a de facto Member since it was administered as part of South Africa before it became 
a de jure Member: SACU Brochure (note 32) 3. 
35
  See South Africa Government Notice No R3914 – 12 December 1969 Customs Union Agreement between 
the Governments of the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho and the 
Kingdom of Swaziland; Botswana Government Gazette (Gaborone), dated 12 December 1969: Agreement 
Between the Government of the Republic of Botswana, the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa, and the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland Terminating 
the Customs Agreement of 1910 and Concluding a new Customs Agreement, Together with a New 
Memorandum of Understanding Relating Thereto.  
36
  Landell-Mills PM ‘The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement’ (1971) 9(2) Journal of Modern 
African Studies 264.   
37
  1969 SACU Agreement (note 35) Preamble.  
38
  1969 SACU Agreement (note 35) Preamble.  
39
  Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland expressed their concern with the following three issues: a) there was no 
joint decision-making processes – prior to 2002 SACU was administered on a part-time basis by annual 
meetings of the Customs Union Commission and there were no effective procedures to ensure compliance or 
disputes; b) revenue sharing formula – the issue of most concern in the 1969 Agreement was the Revenue 
Sharing Formula, which determined each country’s share of the Common Revenue Pool; and c) the question 
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external tariff policy of the customs union.
40
 The SACU itself was administered on a part 
time basis by annual meetings of the Customs Union Commission and there were no effective 
procedures to ensure compliance or to resolve disputes.
41
 
 
Although there had been numerous discussions on the 1969 Agreement prior to 1994, these 
lacked serious commitment from South Africa and were largely aimed at resolving technical 
aspects of the 1969 Agreement. The renegotiations of the Agreement in its entirety only 
began in November 1994, and after eight years of negotiations, South Africa, Botswana, 
Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland signed a new Agreement
42
 on 21 October 2002.
43
 
 
The objectives of the SACU Agreement are to
44
 -  
(a) facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of the Member 
States;  
(b) create effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure equitable trade 
benefits to Member States;  
(c) promote conditions of fair competition in the Common Customs Area;  
                                                                                                                                                        
of external (outside SACU) trade – Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland argued that South Africa consistently 
entered into preferential agreements which benefited only one of five members: SACU Brochure (note 32) 2. 
40
  All changes to customs tariffs, rebates, anti-dumping and countervailing duties were affected by the South 
African Minister of Trade upon the recommendation of the South African Board of Tariffs and Trade. Excise 
policy was determined by the South African Minister of Finance. The Agreement did require consultation on 
excise changes but these seldom took place and the four other Member States, namely Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland, usually learned of SACU excise rates during the delivery of the South African 
National Budget: Kirk R & Steyn M ‘The New South African Customs Union Agreement’ (2005) 28(2) The 
World Economy 175. 
41
  Kirk & Steyn (note 40) 175. 
42
  2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of 
Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa and the 
Kingdom of Swaziland signed on 21 October 2002 in Gaborone, Botswana. The 2002 SACU Agreement 
addressed the following three issues: a) Joint decision making processes – art 3 established an independent 
Administrative Secretariat to oversee SACU, while art 7 created several independent institutions (see notes 
22-27 below); b) revision of the Revenue Sharing Formula to include a customs excise and development 
component; and c) on the question of external (outside SACU) trade, they identified the need to develop 
strategies that enhance the political, economic, social, and cultural integration of the Southern African region 
without jeopardizing the economies of the smaller states: SACU Brochure (note 32) 3.   
43
  The 2002 SACU Agreement has been criticised that it did not deal with some of the more fundamental 
obstacles to economic integration in the region, and deals with very little of the world trade agenda: for 
example, some attempt to incorporate services or the movement of labour within the SACU would have been 
appropriate. Finally, little progress was made on industrial policy issues and tax harmonisation, meaning that 
Member States will continue to compete with each other for investment through tax incentives. Given the 
extent of free trade within SACU, and the fact that all Member States share common customs and excise tax 
rates, further tax harmonisation is possible and necessary: Kirk & Steyn (note 40) 188. 
44
  Political integration is not mentioned as one of the objectives of the SACU Agreement. This is not 
anomalous, as a customs union, traditionally the second stage of regional integration, focusses on the 
equalising of the tariffs of all the member states against non-participating countries (see note 24 above). The 
Treaty of the African Economic Community includes as the sixth stage of integration ‘integration of all 
sectors … political, social and cultural’ (art 6(f)(ii)): see note 175 below. 
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(d) substantially increase investment opportunities in the Common Customs Area;  
(e) enhance the economic development, diversification, industrialisation and 
competitiveness of Member States;  
(f) promote the integration of Member States into the global economy through enhanced 
trade and investment;  
(g) facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs, excise and additional 
duties levied by Member States; and  
(h) facilitate the development of common policies and strategies.45 
 
Since the independence of Namibia from South Africa in 1990, the SACU Member States 
are therefore South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.
46
 The SACU 
consists of a number of institutions,
47
 namely a Council of Ministers,
48
 the Customs Union 
Commission,
49
 Secretariat,
50
 Tariff Board,
51
 Technical Liaison Committees
52
 and an ad hoc 
Tribunal.
53
  
 
                                                 
45
  2002 SACU Agreement (note 42) art 2. 
46
  Although these States share a common Roman-Dutch legal heritage, their laws on recognition and 
enforcement in a number of instances reflects the English common law position: see Chapter 4 below. 
47
  2002 SACU Agreement (note 42) art 7. 
48
  The Council of Ministers consist of at least one Minister from each Member State and is the supreme 
decision making authority of SACU Members. The Council is responsible for the overall policy direction 
and functioning of SACU institutions, including the formulation of policy mandates, procedures and 
guidelines for the SACU institutions; appoint an Executive Secretary of SACU and the members of the 
Tariff Board; approve the budgets of the Secretariat, the Tariff Board and the Tribunal; oversee the 
implementation of the policies of SACU; and approve customs tariffs, rebates, refunds or drawbacks and 
trade related remedies: see 2002 SACU Agreement (note 42) art 8. 
49
  The Commission consist of senior officials at the level of Permanent Secretaries, Directors-General, 
Principal Secretaries or other officials of equivalent rank, from each Member State. The Commission is 
responsible to and report to the Council, on the implementation of the SACU Agreement; the 
implementation of the decisions of the Council; and supervise the work of the Secretariat: see 2002 SACU 
Agreement (note 42) art 9. 
50
  The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day administration of SACU, including to coordinate and 
monitor the implementation of all decisions of the Council and the Commission; to assist in the 
harmonisation of national policies and strategies of Member States in so far as they relate to SACU; and 
coordinate and assist in the negotiation of trade agreements with third parties: see 2002 SACU Agreement 
(note 42) art 10. 
51
  The Tariff Board consist of experts drawn from Member States, and is an independent institution made up of 
full-time or part-time members or both. The Tariff Board makes recommendations to the Council on the 
level and changes of customs, anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties on goods imported from 
outside the Common Customs Area, rebates, refunds or duty drawbacks based on the directives given to it by 
the Council: see 2002 SACU Agreement (note 42) art 11. 
52
  There are four Technical Liaison Committees to assist and advise the Commission in its work, namely: 
Agricultural Liaison Committee; Customs Technical Liaison Committee; Trade and Industry Liaison 
Committee; and Transport Liaison Committee: see 2002 SACU Agreement (note 42) art 12. 
53
  Any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement, or any dispute arising thereunder at 
the request of the Council, is be settled by an ad hoc Tribunal, composed of three members, except as 
otherwise determined by the Council: see 2002 SACU Agreement (note 42) art 13. 
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Despite the fact that SACU is the most advanced form of regional integration on the African 
continent
54
 and the world’s oldest customs union, the SACU is not one of the eight regional 
economic communities (RECs) recognised by the AU for the purposes of establishing the 
African Economic Community (AEC).
55
 Formal non-recognition by the AU for the purpose 
of establishing the AEC does not wish the SACU away. The fact that it is the world’s oldest 
custom union means that its experience with co-operative mechanisms must have some 
value. Non-recognition of the SACU has raised questions of how seriously the AU processes 
and objectives should be taken, and whether they resonate with national and regional 
concerns.
56
 Given the SACU’s impressive record of longevity, the fact that that it already 
represents an effective functioning regional trading arrangement, and that it includes South 
Africa, the region’s economic powerhouse, it is necessary for the SACU to be explicitly 
recognised as a fast-track building block of southern African economic integration.
57
 The 
SACU also has other strengths when compared to other RECs, including a built-in 
compensation mechanism through its revenue sharing scheme for the less advanced 
economies, which is absent from other RECs, who have neither the consensus nor the 
resources to establish such an arrangement; collective negotiating strength with external 
partners; and provision for new democratic institutions based on ‘consensus’ decision-
making to manage potential conflicts.
58
  
 
The SACU is nevertheless officially recognised to be a building block in the development of 
a customs union for the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
59
 The SADC, 
in turn, is envisaged, together and after consolidation with other continental integration 
                                                 
54
 Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) ‘An overview of SACU’ 5 June 2008 available at 
www.tralac.org/2008/06/05/an-overview-of-sacu/ (accessed 28 March 2013).  
55
  At the Banjul Summit in Gambia in 2006, the AU decided to suspend, until further notice, the recognition of 
new RECs, with the exception of the following eight, each established under a separate regional treaty: 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Common Market of East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Southern African Development 
Community (SADC); Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU); Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD); and East African Community (EAC): 
Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session, 1-2 July 2006, Banjul, The Gambia Decision on 
the Moratorium on the recognition of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) DOC.EX.CL/278)IX) 
Assembly/AU/Dec.112(VII): see para 3.4 below.  
56
  Draper, Halleson & Alves (note 32) 3. 
57
  Draper, Halleson & Alves (note 32) 3, 18. 
58
  Draper, Halleson & Alves (note 32) 31. 
59
  McCarthy C ‘The Southern African Customs Union: Case study prepared for the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations’ (February 2003) available at www.hubrural.org/fao_etude_sacu.pdf 
(accessed 28 March 2013) 5. 
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efforts, to play an important role in the development of the AU.
60
 The SACU, it has been 
argued, ‘is likely to form the core of a variable geometry regional trading arrangement 
covering the whole of southern Africa’.61 
 
2.3 Private International Law 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments form part of private international 
law.
62
 Private international law is not a distinct branch of law
63
 and does not deal with one 
particular topic, but comes into operation whenever the court of a particular State is faced 
with a claim which contains a foreign element.
64
  
 
Private international law facilitates the settlement of international disputes between private 
citizens or non-State organisations, including situations in which States act as private 
individuals.
65
 
 
Private international law has three main objects: first, to prescribe the conditions under which 
the court is competent, i.e. have jurisdiction, to hear a claim containing a foreign element. 
Secondly, to determine the particular national system of law by reference to which the rights 
and duties of the parties must be determined. Thirdly, to specify the circumstances in which 
                                                 
60
  McCarthy (note 59) 5; Ngwenya S ‘Fair deal: the new SACU (Southern African Customs Union) Draft 
Agreement’ The Department of Trade and Industry: South Africa (March 2002) 26.  
61
  Gibb R ‘Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid South Africa: the Case of renegotiating the South African 
Customs Union’ (1997) 23(1) Journal of Southern African Studies 68. See also McCarthy (note 59) 5; 
Draper, Halleson & Alves (note 32) 18. 
62
  Forsyth CF Private International Law: The Modern Roman-Dutch law including the jurisdiction of the High 
Courts 5 ed (2012) 418; Cheshire CG & North PM Cheshire & North’s Private International Law 14 ed 
(2008) 3; Symeonides SC American Private International Law  (2008) 16; Agrawal KB & Vandana S 
Private International Law in India (2010) 54; Collier JG Conflict of Laws 3 ed (2001) 3; Myass A Principles 
of Conflict of Laws 3 ed (1999) 1-2. 
63
  In Dynamit Actien Gesselchaft v Rio Tinto Co Ltd [1918] AC 260 it was observed that: ‘Every legal decision 
of our own courts consists of the application of our own law to the facts of the case as ascertained by 
appropriate evidence. One of these facts may be the state of some foreign law, but it is not the foreign law 
but our own law to which effect is given… As has often been said private international law is really a branch 
of municipal law and obviously there can be no branch of municipal law in which the general policy of such 
law can be properly ignored.’  
64
  Cheshire & North (note 62) 3; Noronha FE Private International Law in India: Adequacy of Principles in 
Comparison with Common Law and Civil Law Systems (2010) 2; O’Brien J Conflict of Laws 2 ed (1999) 5-
6. Though being a branch of municipal law, private international law is not supposed to furnish direct 
solution of a dispute as is being done in the case of municipal law. It possesses the unity of a branch through 
it deals with all the branches: see Agrawal & Vandana (note 62) 54.  
65
  Ritaine EC ‘Harmonising European private international law: A replay of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps?’ 
(2006) 32(2) International Journal of Legal Information 419.  
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(a) a foreign judgment can be recognised as decisive of the question in dispute, and (b) when 
the right vested in the creditor by a foreign judgment can be enforced by action.
66
  
 
The reason for being of private international law is the existence of separate systems of 
national law, whose rules that regulate the various legal relations arising in daily life, differ 
greatly from each other.
67
 Unlike public international law where there is a uniform 
understanding within the international community as well as a single system, private 
international law varies among nations, each of which has its own system.
68
  
 
2.4 Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
The rules for recognition and enforcement of judgments specify both the circumstances in 
which a judgment rendered by a court outside the geographical boundaries of a State (foreign 
judgment) will be recognised in the courts of that State (domestic court); and when a foreign 
judgment will be enforceable in a domestic court.
69
 The distinction between recognition and 
enforcement rests essentially upon whether the local court, faced with a foreign judgment is 
required to order the performance, or non-performance, of a particular act in order to give 
effect to the foreign judgment.
70
 Stated differently, recognition implies that the domestic 
court acknowledges that the judgment has, within the court’s own jurisdiction, the legal effect 
which the foreign court intended it to have, while enforcement requires that the local court 
will in addition ‘compel the judgment debtor to comply with the foreign judgment’.71 The 
enforcement procedure is usually left to domestic law and varies greatly among legal 
systems.
72
 
 
                                                 
66
  Cheshire & North (note 62) 3-4; Stone P EU Private International Law (2010) 3. Foreign judgments become 
relevant in litigation not only regarding matters of recognition and enforcement but also regarding the 
defences (or exceptions) of res judicata and issue estoppel: see Barnett PR Res Judicata, Estoppel and 
Foreign Judgments: The Preclusive Effects of Foreign Judgments in Private International Law (2001) 183-
4. 
67
  Cheshire & North (note 62) 4; Stone (note 66) 4.  
68
  Sooksripaisanrkit P ‘Harmonisation of private international law – Is it possible at all?’ (2012) 1(1) Journal 
of Civil Legal Science 1. 
69
  South African Law Reform Commission Project 121 - Consolidated Legislation Pertaining to International 
Judicial Co-Operation in Civil Matters: Report (December 2006) (‘SALRC Report’) 30. 
70
  Forsyth (note 62) 418. 
71
  Silberberg H The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa (1977) 6. 
72
  Michaels R ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments’ Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law (2009) 2. 
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While recognition is, therefore, always a condition sine qua non for enforcement the converse 
is not necessarily true; judgments may be recognised without being enforced.
73
 Declaratory 
orders and judgments dismissing claims, for example, do not require enforcement.
74
 
 
The rules on enforcement of foreign judgments developed over 200 years ago to deal with the 
problems of the ‘absconding debtor’.75 If a judgment debtor fled the jurisdiction in which a 
judgment had been delivered, a judgment creditor could take the judgment to the jurisdiction 
to which the debtor had fled and attempt to have it satisfied there. Courts treated foreign 
judgments as evidence of a debt and allowed the judgment creditor to bring the proceedings 
to recover the debt. Enforcement of foreign judgments was consequently limited to those for 
a sum of money.
76
 
 
Today, the enforcement of foreign judgments is an area of significant practical importance. 
The progress of globalisation, including the increased ease with which people and property 
move across traditional state borders, has led to a corresponding rise in transnational 
litigation.
77
 Dispute resolution does not end with the obtaining of a paper judgment; a 
plaintiff may have to enforce the judgment in another jurisdiction to obtain an effective 
remedy.
78
 Enforcement of foreign judgments is the application of the local court’s powers to 
give effect to the foreign court’s decision, without the plaintiff having to re-litigate the merits 
of the dispute.
79
   
 
States belonging to the same REC mitigate these disadvantages by concluding bilateral and 
multilateral treaties.
80
 There has been a significant movement in recent years towards the 
harmonisation of private international law rules between groups of countries, but the process 
has been rather slow.
81
 Africa has generally not participated in this process - no bilateral or 
                                                 
73
  Schulze C On Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments (2005) 17. 
74
  SARLC Report (note 69) 30. 
75
  Mortensen R ‘Judgments Extension under CER’ 1999 New Zealand Law Review 239 (‘CER’ in this context 
refers to ‘Closer Economic Region’, similar to a Regional Economic Community).  
76
  Pham K ‘Enforcement of Non-Monetary Foreign Judgments in Australia’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 
664. 
77
  McLachlan C ‘International Litigation and the Reworking of the Conflict of Laws’ (2004) 120 Law 
Quarterly Review 580–582. 
78
  Ho HL ‘Policies Underlying the Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Judgments’ (1997) 46 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 457; Pham (note 76) 664. 
79
  British Columbia Law Institute (‘BCLI’) Report on the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments from Outside 
the Province, Report No 8 (1999) 6. 
80
  Such as those in Europe, North America and South America. 
81
  Sooksripaisanrkit (note 68) 1. 
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multilateral convention has yet been concluded on the continent as a whole, nor in the 
SACU.
82
 Consequently, recognition and enforcement is governed by the national laws of the 
respective States.  
 
2.5 Harmonisation 
Conflicts between different legal systems can be mitigated through a process of unification of 
laws, through adoption of uniform rules that are devised by a supranational
83
 or international 
authority
84
 and adopted by separate States. Alternatively, differences between legal systems 
can be mediated by a process of harmonisation.
85
 
 
International unification refers to the adoption of one agreed set of rules, standards or 
guidelines for application to transnational transactions.
86
 Harmonisation in its most complete 
sense means absolute uniformity of legislation among the adopting jurisdictions.
87
 This is 
also the most difficult to achieve since it presupposes not only unanimity about policies and 
goals but also on means of implementation, and assumes a continuing willingness to agree on 
future changes in the uniform legislation and not to adopt unilateral changes in the 
meantime.
88
 International traders achieve this by custom, international practice or by 
international agreement within the framework of professional organisations,
89
 or between 
States by an international convention.
90
 
                                                 
82
  Thomashausen A ‘The enforcement and recognition and of judgments and other forms of legal cooperation 
in the SADC’ (2005) 35(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 34.  
83
  Such as the European Union (EU) or the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa 
(OHADA). 
84
  Such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
85
  Also referred to as ‘approximation’ or ‘legal integration’; Zamora S ‘NAFTA and the harmonisation of 
domestic legal systems: the side effects of free trade’ (1995) 12 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 403. 
86
  Zaphirou GA ‘Unification and harmonisation of law relating to global and regional trading’ (1993-1994) 14 
North Illinois Law Review 407. 
87
  Ziegel J ‘Harmonization of private laws in federal systems of government: Canada, the USA, and Australia’ 
in Cranston R (ed) Making Commercial Law: Essays In Honour of Roy Goode (1997) 133. 
88
  Ziegel (note 87) 133. 
89
  An example of the attainment of unification by the operation of custom, commercial practice and the activity 
of professional organisations is the rules that apply to the carriage of goods by sea under bills of lading. 
Some customs created in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic affected worldwide carriage by sea. 
Commercial practice contributed to the use of standard clauses in time and voyage charter parties and in bills 
of lading. Building on these foundations and national legislation, the International Law Association and the 
Comité Maritime International (International Marine Organisation) drafted a set of rules which were adopted 
at The Hague in 1921, known as the ‘Hague Rules’. They can be incorporated, as such, in any time or 
voyage charter or bill of lading, and regulate the rights and liabilities of carriers and cargo owners and 
provide for minimum standards that have to be observed. This led to the International Convention for the 
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The level of harmonisation is reduced if the adopting jurisdictions are allowed to omit some 
of the more controversial features, or areas where consensus is less likely to be achieved, of 
an otherwise acceptable legislative package.
91
  
 
Harmonisation, as distinct from unification, can be loosely defined as ‘making the regulatory 
requirements or government policies of different jurisdictions identical or at least more 
similar’.92 In its most common modern form harmonisation brings about a convergence or co-
ordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating the major differences 
between them.
93
 Harmonisation can involve the voluntary or compelled adoption of one legal 
system in place of another. Alternatively, harmonisation may require that all State parties to 
an agreement are obliged to amend their laws to conform to their mutual agreement, whether 
such agreement is unanimous, as is the case in the Organisation for the Harmonisation in 
Business Law in Africa (‘OHADA’),94 or approved by a majority, which is the method 
applicable to some forms of legislation in the European Union.
95
  Harmonisation, therefore, 
does not lead to a settled set of agreed rules;
96
 but rather refers to the search for common 
                                                                                                                                                        
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading Aug 25, 1924, 54 Stat. 233 UNTS 155: see 
Zaphirou  (note 86) 408.  
90
  Such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Vienna, 1 April 
1980 1489 UNTS 3; see Zaphirou (note 86) 407. 
91
  Ziegel (note 87) 134. 
92
  Leebron D ‘Claims for harmonization: A theoretical framework’ (1996) 27 Canadian Business Law Journal 
66. He also suggests that the term ‘harmonisation’ is a misnomer insofar as it might be regarded as deriving 
from the musical notion of harmony, for it is difference, not sameness, which makes for musical harmony.  
93
  Backer LC Harmonizing Law in an Era of Globalization - Convergence, Divergence and Resistance (2007) 
13; Zaphirou (note 86) 71; Elbati B ‘The role of the reciprocity requirement in the harmonization of 
standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments’ (2008) Faculté des sciences juridiques, 
politiques et sociales de Tunis - Mastère en Common Law available at 
http://www.memoireonline.com/12/08/1678/m_The-role-of-the-reciprocity-requirement-in-the-
harmonization-of-standards-for-the-recognition-and-en0.html#fn5 (accessed 12 April 2012). 
94
  See para 3.2 below.  
95
  Directives are important harmonising instruments, as they used to bring different national laws in line with 
each other.  EU directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, but leaves it to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods: Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 30 March 
2010, C83/47 [‘TFEU’] art 288. A Member State is required the incorporate the EU directive into its 
domestic legal system before it will become effective. However, when a State fails to incorporate a directive 
within the specified time limit, the directive will have direct effect in its territory, and individuals will be 
able to derive rights from the directive despite the fact that it still has to be incorporated. Directives are 
particularly common in matters affecting the operation of the single market: see Mistelis LA ‘Regulatory 
Aspects: Globalization, harmonisation, legal transplants and law reform – some fundamental observations’ 
(2000) 34 The International Lawyer 312; Backer (note 93) 13-14. 
96
  Harmonisation does not entail the adoption of a single, model set of rules, but instead implies a wide range 
of ways in which legal concepts in different jurisdictions are accommodated. This accommodation can take 
place by a process of law reform in one or more countries, incorporating influences beyond the jurisdiction’s 
borders; mediating on private law concepts of two different legal systems for parties caught in between; or 
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rules which can eliminate differences and create minimum requirements or standards.
97
 
Harmonisation, therefore, focuses on the means of attaining substantive ends which can lead 
to the coordination of different policies.
98
  
 
Harmonisation in relation to laws affecting trade is said to have two distinct objectives: the 
first is to create a separate legal regime that would apply to international transactions while 
preserving national laws for purely domestic transactions, while the second is to facilitate a 
common market or political or economic grouping by harmonising the national laws 
governing domestic transactions, so that State boundaries do not affect commerce either 
within the specific grouping, or internationally, as is the case with initiatives seeking 
international harmony such as the International Organisation for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).
99
  
 
There are at least nine methods by which harmonisation may either be effected or in some 
measure induced, namely:
100
 
i) A multilateral convention without a uniform law as such;101 
ii) A multilateral convention embodying a uniform law;102 
iii) A set of bilateral treaties;103 
                                                                                                                                                        
other contact points between legal regimes, from academic writings, the conceits of law professors, to visits 
by government officials to neighbouring countries: see Zamora (note 85) 403. 
97
  Zaphirou (note 86) 407; Bhatia KL Textbook on Legal Language and Legal Writing (2010) 234. 
98
  Backer (note 93) xiii. 
99
  Goode R ‘Reflections on the harmonisation of commercial law – Part I: Activities concerning the unification 
of Law’ (1991) 9 Uniform Law Review 54. These organisations are discussed in Chapter 2, para 2.2.1 
(UNCITRAL) and para 2.2.2 (UNIDROIT). 
100
  Goode (note 99) 57.  
101
  See for example the Hague Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: see Chapter 2 para 2 below. 
102
  Such as the UNIDROIT Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (1964), 
and the UNIDROIT Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1964). 
103
  Before the coming into effect of the Brussels Convention in the EU, for example, a number of bilateral 
treaties were concluded between Member States to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments between them, and which were subsequently repealed by the Brussels Convention, including, 
amongst others, the following: the Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands on jurisdiction, 
bankruptcy, and the validity and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, 
signed at Brussels on 28 March 1925; the Convention between France and Italy on the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on 3 June 1930; the Convention between the 
United Kingdom and the French Republic providing for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, with Protocol, signed at Paris on 18 January 1934; the Convention between the United 
Kingdom and the Kingdom of Belgium providing for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, with Protocol, signed at Brussels on 2 May 1934; the Convention between Germany 
and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome 
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iv) Community legislation – typically, a directive;104 
v) A model law;105 
vi) A codification of custom and usage promulgated by an international non-governmental 
organisation;
106
  
vii) International trade terms promulgated by an international non-governmental 
organisation;
 107
 
viii) Model contracts and general contractual conditions;108 and 
ix) Restatements by scholars and other experts.109 
 
Different regions have followed different approaches, or a combination thereof, to achieve 
regional or international harmonisation or unification of the rules on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. These conventions typically take the form of double 
conventions, which address both the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and direct jurisdiction in one instrument; and single conventions, addressing only 
                                                                                                                                                        
on 9 March 1936; the Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Belgium 
on the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments in 
civil and commercial matters, signed at Bonn on 30 June 1958; the Convention between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Italian Republic on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed at Rome on 17 April 1959; the Convention between the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed at Bonn on 14 July 1960; the Convention between the Kingdom of Greece and 
the Federal Republic of Germany for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments, settlements 
and authentic instruments in civil and commercial matters, signed in Athens on 4 November 1961: see 
Brussels Convention (note 12) art 55.  
104
  Directives are important harmonising instruments, as they used to bring different national laws in line with 
each other. EU directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, but leaves the choice of form and 
methods to the national authorities: see TFEU (note 95) art 288. A Member State is required the incorporate 
the EU directive into its domestic legal system before it will become effective. However, when a State fails 
to incorporate a directive within the specified time limit, the directive will have direct effect in its territory, 
and individuals will be able to derive rights from the directive despite the fact that it still has to be 
incorporated. 
105
  See, for example, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; and 2002 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation.  
106
  See, for example Hague Rules on the carriage of goods by sea under bills of lading. Some customs created in 
the Mediterranean and the Atlantic affected worldwide carriage by sea: see note 89 above. 
107
  For example, the Incoterms (International Commercial Terms) drafted by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC)  which is an internationally recognised standard that are used worldwide in international 
and domestic contracts for the sale of goods. Incoterms rules provide internationally accepted definitions and 
rules of interpretation for most common commercial terms, such as FOB (free on board) and CIF (cost-
insurance-freight). 
108
  See, for example, the International Trade Centre’s (ITC) Model Contract for the International Commercial 
Sale of Goods; ITC Model Contract for the International Long-term Supply of Goods; ITC Model 
International Contract Manufacture Agreement; ITC Model Contract for the International Distribution of 
Goods; ITC Model Contract for and International Commercial Agency; and ITC Model Contract for the 
International Supply of Services, available at 
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Exporters/Exporting_Better/Templates_of_cont
racts/3%20International%20Commercial%20Sale%20of%20Goods.pdf (accessed 8 March 2013). 
109
  See, for example the Restatement of the Law, Second: Conflict of Laws, St Paul: American Law Institute.  
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recognition and enforcement and only indirect jurisdiction.
110
 Some of these approaches are 
discussed in Chapter 2 below, with a view to identifying the most appropriate approach to 
harmonisation and/or unification in the SACU.  
 
3 ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY  
 
This study originates from the following aspects: the lack of a global recognition and 
enforcement regime; the lack of a regional recognition and enforcement regime; recent 
international developments in the field; and regional integration efforts on the African 
continent, which are now discussed.  
 
3.1 The lack of global recognition and enforcement regime 
It is generally agreed that a universal judgment recognition and enforcement regime would be 
beneficial to and enhance international trade, as well as the free movement of people and 
goods.
111
 There is no single international instrument that regulates recognition and 
enforcement, despite several comprehensive failed attempts to bring about international 
regulation of this matter, especially in the last three decades.
112
 
 
The absence of a multilateral instrument available for worldwide recognition and 
enforcement of judicial decisions
113
 at a time when the various economic regions in the world 
are becoming more interdependent on each other, and when the 1958 UN Arbitration 
                                                 
110
 ‘Direct jurisdiction’ refers to the jurisdiction of a court adjudicating the merits of a case, as opposed to 
‘indirect jurisdiction’, which is used only where a requested court has to ascertain whether the rendering 
court had jurisdiction: see Chapter 3, paras 2 and 3 below for a detailed discussion of single and double 
conventions as well as direct and indirect jurisdiction.  
111
  Juenger FK ‘Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (1988) 36 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 1; Juenger FK ‘The recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters’ Selected Essays on the Conflict of Law (2002) 284; see para 4.1 below. 
112
  Oestreicher Y ‘”We're on a Road to Nowhere" – Reasons for the Continuing Failure to Regulate Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2008) 42 The International Lawyer 69. The situation would have 
been different if the Hague Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters had become a success. But it has not, most probably for two 
main reasons: (1) the success of the Brussels Convention (which built to a large extent on the Hague 
Convention and was negotiated in part by the same persons), followed by the 1988 Lugano Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, and (2) its 
unusual, complex form: Convention, Protocol of the same date and Bilateral Supplementary Agreements 
required by the Convention: see Hague Conference ‘Some Reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a general 
convention on enforcement of judgments’ Preliminary Document No 17 of May 1992 (1992) 231. This is 
discussed in more detail Chapter 2, para 2.1.  
113
  Hague Conference (note 112) 231. 
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Convention
114
 demonstrates the viability of worldwide legal frameworks in the commercial 
area, is certainly anomalous. The anomaly is especially acute when viewed from the 
perspective of an international businessman who must now sometimes choose between 
arbitration, with an option of the award being enforceable in over 140 countries,
115
 and 
litigation in a national court without any comparable enforceability option, except if the 
litigation is concentrated in countries which are parties to a multilateral instrument, such as 
the EU which is party to the Brussels I Regulation.
116
 
 
Notwithstanding the failure to regulate the problem internationally, several tendencies in the 
field have been identified in recent years.
117 
The law concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments is growing in importance, and in response to this growing 
importance, the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties has grown quickly.
118
 However, 
the failure of negotiations for a worldwide Hague Judgments Convention
119
 suggests that 
concluding international agreement in this area has not become easier. Domestic and 
convention law have diverged more and more from each other, with contemporary laws 
neither rejecting nor requiring the recognition of foreign judgments; instead, detailed rules for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have emerged in international 
instruments dealing specifically with recognition and enforcement. Finally, there is a general 
tendency towards more liberal recognition of foreign judgments, with more treaties requiring 
recognition and enforcement, and exceptions in treaties and domestic laws being interpreted 
more narrowly. In response, States appear to rely increasingly on the public policy exception 
where they regard foreign judgments as incompatible with domestic law.
120
 
                                                 
114
 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New 
York, 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (‘New York Convention’). 
115
 UNCITRAL ‘Status’ available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (accessed 10 
October 2012). 
116
  Hague Conference (note 112) 231. The Brussels I Regulation (see note 11) is discussed in detail in Chapter 
3, para 4. 
117
  Michaels (note 72) 2. 
118
  For example the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements; the Brussels I Regulation (note 
11); and the 1983 Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Co-operation (see note 137 below). 
119
  This attempt is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, para 2.1. 
120
 Michaels (note 72) 2. The public policy exception aims to provide countries with a mechanism that will 
enable them to refrain from recognising and enforcing foreign judgments, even though all other requirements 
were met: see Oestreicher Y ‘The Rise and Fall of the “Mixed” and “Double” Convention Models Regarding 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review 339. This does not enhance legal certainty for legal traders, as they will be uncertain as to what 
exactly will constitute public policy in a specific State, and therefore whether their judgment will be 
recognised and enforced. See Chapter 4, para 4.4.3 for a discussion of public policy as a ground for refusal 
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
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Arbitration is a popular mechanism for settling disputes arising from cross-border 
agreements; in some specific sectors and transactions, it is in the interest of the companies or 
individuals involved to have the option of pursuing litigation as a reliable and efficient 
dispute settlement mechanism.
121
 While arbitration will continue to play an important role in 
dispute resolution for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely to be an adequate substitute for 
courts.
122
 The expense involved in privately financed dispute resolution is bound to keep 
arbitration largely beyond the reach of individuals and small businesses.
123
 For individuals 
and small business, the State sponsorship and State regulation of national courts may 
ultimately make litigation a more affordable, accessible and reliable means of dispute 
resolution than international commercial arbitration in international transactions.
124
 
 
It is often asserted that international commercial arbitration is the most popular method for 
resolving international business disputes.
125
 Much credit for this situation must be given to 
the New York Convention
126
 which provides a near universally accepted framework for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements and awards.
127
 The aim of the 
Convention is to drastically limit the grounds, under national law, on which an arbitration 
agreement or award may be denied enforcement.
128
 
 
International commercial arbitration is not without its critics or disadvantages, in particular 
the cost in the large institutional arbitrations. This fact, combined with the problem that a 
                                                 
121
  With particular reference to the reasons why businessmen prefer to resort to arbitration in the resolution of 
their problems instead of the machinery available in the regular courts, ‘there is a category of disputes for 
which the courts seem poorly designed: when two businessmen dispute about a breach of contract, often 
neither of them wants vindication, or to assuage a feeling of injustice. What they may want is a speedy 
sensible readjustment of their relations, so that they can resume or maintain their usual mutual business 
transactions. Because of the difficulty of precise ascertainment by a court of the actual past factors out of 
which their disputes arose, it may well be that the best mode of settling it is not a court decision in a law suit 
but arbitration in which the disputants agree to abide by the decision of arbitrators: see Tiewul SA & Tsegah 
FA ‘Arbitration and the settlement of commercial disputes: A selective survey of African practice’ (1975) 24 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 393.   
122
  Dammann J & Hansmann H ‘Globalizing commercial litigation’ (2008) 94(1) Cornell Law Review 25. 
123
  Walker J ‘The utility of the ALI/UNIDROIT Project on principles and rules of transnational civil procedure’ 
(2001) 6(4) Uniform Law Review 803. 
124
  Walker (note 123) 804.  
125
  Garnett R ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much ado about nothing?’ (2009) 
5(2) Journal of Private International Law 162. 
126
  UNCITRAL (note 115). 
127
  Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa are the only SACU States to have ratified the Convention: see 
UNCITRAL (note 115). 
128
  Garnett (note 125) 169. 
 
 
 
 
  
20 
number of transnational disputes cannot be submitted to arbitration,
129
 means that the need 
for a uniform global system of jurisdiction and judgment rules remains critical.
130
 
 
While litigation may hold the promise of becoming a more suitable means of dispute 
resolution for individuals and small business, it has at least two major drawbacks. First, 
unlike arbitral awards, which, pursuant to the New York Convention are enforceable in more 
than 140 countries, there is no parallel international convention facilitating the enforcement 
of foreign judgments.
131
 Second, unlike international commercial arbitration, which affords 
the parties the opportunity to establish a neutral and mutually acceptable forum for their 
disputes, the differences between national laws can compromise the neutrality of the dispute 
resolution process, by enabling parties to make outcome-determinative choices of fora (forum 
shopping). The role of national courts in the new global economy may depend on the extent 
to which the impact of these two drawbacks can be reduced or eliminated,
132
 for example by 
concluding an international recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments Convention 
similar to the New York Convention, with clear jurisdiction rules that would limit forum 
shopping.  
 
3.2 The lack of a regional recognition and enforcement regime 
The problems created by diverse private international law regimes, including diverse rules on 
recognition and enforcement, have been resolved within RECs or regional groupings by 
creating regulating instruments providing harmonised or unified private international law 
rules for their Member States.
133
  
 
Some of the instruments which have sought to address the problem, are the Brussels I 
Regulation adopted by the EU;
134
 the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and recognition and 
                                                 
129
  New York Convention (note 115) art 5(2)(a) provides that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
may be refused if the competent authority in the country were recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country. 
This is determined by the national law of each country. Examples may include personal injury, consumer 
and employment cases: Garnett (note 125) 162. 
130
  Garnett (note 125) 162. 
131
  See para 3.1 above.  
132
  Walker (note 123) 804. 
133
  Oppong RF ‘Private international law and the African Economic Community: a plea for greater attention’ 
(2006) 55 International Comparative Law Quarterly 911-912. 
134
  The Brussels Convention (note 12) was concluded between Member States of the European Economic 
Community in 1978. The Brussels I Regulation (note 11) on the same topic replaced the Convention as 
between Member States, except in limited instances where the Convention continues to apply. The 
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enforcement adopted by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Member States;
135
 the Inter-
American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards
136
 (‘Montevideo Convention’); the Middle East Inter-Arab Convention on Judicial 
Co-operation;
137
 and the Australia-New Zealand Treaty on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings 
and Regulatory Enforcement.
138
 There have also been proposals for a recognition and 
enforcement regime between Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao.
139
  
 
The SACU Member States have, however, been unable to draft and propose, or conclude any 
regional agreement for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments among 
themselves. This is in contrast with West and East Africa, for example, where some progress 
in the field of private international law, and specifically the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, has been made by the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in 
Africa (OHADA).
140
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Convention/Regulation regulates the jurisdiction which the courts of Contracting States are permitted to 
exercise, providing Member States with a relatively detailed set of jurisdictional rules according to which a 
court in a Member State may assert jurisdiction over a defendant who is domiciled in another Member State, 
and in what situations it should decline to do so; as well as the conditions upon which judgments are to be 
recognised and enforced. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, para 3.1.1. 
135
  In the European Economic Area (EEA), the Brussels Regime is supplemented by the Lugano Convention, 
which is in substance largely similar to the Brussels Convention. The Lugano Convention also facilitates the 
mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments handed down by the national courts of Contracting States. 
The rules applicable in EFTA Contracting States to this Convention and EU Members, party to the Brussels 
I Regulation will therefore be largely similar. This is discussed in Chapter 2, para 3.1.2. 
136
  Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 
1979, OEA/Ser.A/2818 ILM 1224 (1979). The Montevideo Convention is currently in force in nine 
countries in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.  The purpose of the Convention is to ensure the extraterritorial validity of judgments and arbitral 
awards in the Member Countries.  The Convention applies to all judgments and arbitral awards rendered in 
civil, commercial or labour proceedings in one of the State Parties. The instrument contains a set of 
conditions that, if met, gives the judgment extraterritorial effect in all the member countries. This is 
discussed in Chapter 2, para 3.4.1. 
137
  The Inter Arab Convention on Judicial Co-operation was signed in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
1983 (known as the Riyadh Convention) is one of the most commonly used treaties in the Middle East for 
the recognition and enforcement of both court judgments and arbitral awards between Arab nations. The 
signatory States to the Convention are Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1. 
138
  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Trans-Tasman 
Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement (done at Christchurch, 24 July 2008) (‘Trans-Tasman 
Treaty’). In terms of the agreement, the proposed regime for the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
between the two States will be modelled on the Australian inter-state scheme, the Service and Execution of 
Process Act (1992). In short, the Australian model provides for the absolute free circulation of any judgment 
made in any federal, State or territory court, or tribunal anywhere in the Australian federation. See Chapter 
2, para 3.3. 
139
  See Huang (note 12).  
140
 OHADA Legis ‘About OHADA’ available at http://www.ohadalegis.com/anglais/presohadagb.htm#3 
(accessed 11 October 2012). 
 
 
 
 
  
22 
In the early 1990s, a number of Central and West African countries, who were facing a 
reduction in investment, concluded that a lack of judicial and legal security as well as a lack 
of governance created an unattractive investment environment. To solve this problem, they 
proposed the creation of a new business law. They intended this new business law to be 
modern, harmonised, and interpreted by lawyers well trained in business law, while a unique 
supranational court would secure the application of the law. This idea led to the signing of the 
Port-Louis Treaty in 1993, which created OHADA, with the purpose of establishing common 
rules that would be simple, modern and adapted to each country’s situation. The OHADA 
Member States for example adopted a Uniform Act on Arbitration Law, which is directly 
applicable and mandatory in all Member States; and replaces and overrules any domestic 
legislation which is contrary to the provisions of the OHADA Treaty.
141
 The Act includes 
provisions for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in Member States.
142
  
However, this Uniform Act is only applicable to OHADA Member States, which at this stage 
are mostly civil law states, namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and Togo.
143
 
 
The SACU Member States have furthermore, not become part of any of the international 
agreements and conventions aimed at the unification of private international law - in fact the 
continent as a whole has been relatively isolated from international developments in the 
field.
144
 The lack of participation in the international sphere is problematic as SACU States 
need adequate and modern laws which are indispensable to gaining equality in international 
trade.
145
  
 
                                                 
141
 Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (JO OHADA N° 4), 1 November 1997 available at 
http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/HTML/legal_review/Annexes/Annexes%20III/Annex%20III-
06.pdf  accessed on 17 April 2013 [‘OHADA Treaty’] art 10. 
142
 Rudahindwa JB International Commercial Arbitration in Africa: The Organization For Harmonization Of 
Business Law In Africa (OHADA) Sets The Tone (unpublished LLM Thesis, Indiana University School of 
Law (2011) 7. 
143
  OHADA Legis (note 140). 
144
  For example, no Southern African State is party to the 1971 Hague Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (HCCH Status Table, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=78 (accessed 17 September 2012)) or the 
2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (HCCH Status Table, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (accessed 17 September 2012)). 
145
  Sempasa SL ‘Obstacles to International Economic Arbitration in African Countries’ (1992) 41 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 380. 
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The diversity of laws and the resultant need for the harmonisation of private international 
laws in Southern Africa has been identified on several occasions.
146
 A plea has also been 
made for greater attention to the subject in the economic community and for greater 
cooperation with the Hague Conference on Private International Law (hereafter Hague 
Conference) but despite these pleas little progress has been made in this regard.
147
 Various 
authors have identified the need for research and development in this field:
148
 Forsyth
149
 
described the underdevelopment of the field as ‘the Cinderella subject seldom studied [and] 
little understood’. Leon150 also observed that it is not a subject which command great 
attention amongst South[ern] African lawyers, and remains largely unfamiliar to the older 
generation of practicing lawyers. Oppong
151
 has also on a number of occasions raised the 
need for greater international engagement with African perspectives on the subject, as well as 
a need for more research and writing on the subject.   
 
In the absence of a regional instrument the doctrines of comity
152
 and respect for party 
autonomy
153
 with regard to choice of applicable law and forum agreements
154
 provide the 
national courts of the different States with the principles for regulating conflicting private 
international law rules in international commercial litigation. These private international law 
issues are currently governed by the relevant common law principles, statutory provisions 
and case law.
155
   
 
                                                 
146  Bamodu G ‘Transnational law, unification and harmonisation of international commercial law in Africa’ 
(1994) 38 Journal of African Law 125; Ndulo M ‘Harmonisation of trade laws in the African Economic 
Community’ (1993) 42 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 107-108; Ndulo (note 28) 211-12. 
147
  Oppong (note 133) 911-912; Oppong RF ‘The Hague Conference and the development of private 
international law in Africa: a plea for greater cooperation’ (2006) 8 Yearbook of Private International Law 
189-212. 
148
 There is also a lack of writing and activity on the subject, with few commentaries, articles, cases and 
engagement with the international community for the subject’s development is minimal: Oppong (note 31) 
678. 
149
  Forsyth (note 62) 46-7. 
150  Leon PSG ‘Roma non locuta est: the recognition and enforcements of foreign judgments in South Africa’ 
(1983) 16 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 325. 
151
  Oppong RF Relational issues of law and economic integration in Africa: perspectives from constitutional, 
public and private international law (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia, 2009) 326; Oppong (note 133) 911. 
152
 Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative, executive or 
judicial acts of another. See para 5.1 below for a discussion of comity.  
153
  The principle according to which parties to an international business contract are free to choose the 
governing law: See Watt HM ‘”Party Autonomy” in international contracts: From the makings of a myth to 
the requirements of global governance’ (2010) 6(3) European Review of Contract Law 251. 
154
  Oppong (note 31) 706. 
155  
Thomashausen (note 82) 30. 
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3.3 International developments in the field 
There have been a number of developments in the field of private international law in recent 
years, and especially with regard to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
Recent developments and instruments, some of which will be discussed later in the thesis, 
include:
156
  
i) The revision of the EU Brussels I Regulation.157 The Regulation lays down rules 
governing the jurisdiction of courts and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters in European Union (EU) Countries and supersedes the 1968 
Brussels Convention, which was applicable between EU Countries before the Regulation 
entered into force. The Convention continues to apply with respect to those territories of 
EU countries that fall within its territorial scope and that are excluded from the 
Regulation. The proposed revision extends the Regulation's jurisdiction rules to third 
country defendants. In terms of the present Regulation, if the defendant is not domiciled 
in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts will be determined by the law of that 
Member State.
158
 This amendment will generally extend the possibilities of companies 
and citizens to sue third country defendants in the EU because the special rules of 
jurisdiction which, for example, establish jurisdiction at the place of contractual 
performance become available in these cases. More specifically, the amendment will 
ensure that the protective jurisdiction rules available for consumers, employees and 
insured will also apply if the defendant is domiciled outside the EU.
159
 
ii) The replacement of the 1988 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (‘Lugano Convention’)160 between Members 
of the European Free Trade Area, by the 2007 Lugano Convention
161
 (‘New Lugano 
Convention’).162   
                                                 
156
  Hague Conference ‘Ongoing work on international litigation and possible continuation of the Judgments 
Project’ Preliminary Document No 5 (2012) 10-11, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap12pd05e.pdf (accessed 15 October 2012). 
157
 Brussels I Regulation (note 11). See Chapter 2 para 3.1.1 for a discussion of the Regulation.  
158
 Brussels I Regulation (note 11) art 4. 
159
  EUR-Lex ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast)’ (2010) 8 available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0748:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 7 
February 2013).  
160
 16 September 1988. 
161
 30 October 2007.  
162
  The New Lugano Convention entered into force on 01 January 2010. The objective of the Convention is to 
unify the rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and expand the applicability of the Brussels I 
Regulation (containing a set of rules that create a unified system in this regard) to the relations between 
Member States of the EC on the one hand and Norway, Iceland and Switzerland on the other. The 2007 
Lugano Convention is open to accession by any State subject to the unanimous agreement of Contracting 
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iii) The consideration by the Commonwealth States163 of model legislation on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments.
164
  
iv) A renewed focus on international litigation within the League of Arab States as part of the 
development of a mechanism to improve the implementation of the 1983 Riyadh Arab 
Agreement for Judicial Co-operation.
165
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Parties, therefore, it could also be considered as a potential global scheme on international jurisdiction and 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
163
  The Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth, is an intergovernmental 
organisation of 54 independent Member States. Member countries come from six regions: Africa (19); Asia 
(8); the Americas (3); the Caribbean (10); Europe (3); and the South Pacific (11). All members except 
Mozambique and Rwanda were part of the British Empire, out of which the Commonwealth developed: see 
Commonwealth ‘The Commonwealth Secretariat’ available at 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/subhomepage/191086/ (accessed 09 October 2012). 
164
  At a meeting of Senior Officials of Commonwealth Law Ministries in 2007, there was general agreement 
that the present legislation found in most Commonwealth member states required updating, and that serious 
consideration should be given to the principles found in more recent legislation and reflected in the work of 
the Hague Conference. Senior Officials identified a number of important and interrelated issues: the place of 
reciprocity in Commonwealth arrangements; the importance of registration as a part of the recognition 
procedure; and the scope of recognition in terms of the nature of the foreign court and of the judgment itself. 
Attention was drawn to further work done in recent bilateral negotiations and by law reform bodies in 
several member states: see Commonwealth Secretariat ‘Meeting of Senior Officials of Commonwealth Law 
Ministries London, 1-3 October 2007 – Record’ available online at 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/GFSR.asp?NodeID=176438.  At a meeting of Senior 
Officials of Commonwealth Law Ministries in London on 18-20 October 2010 the Meeting recommended 
that work should proceed towards the preparation of a draft Model Law on the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments, taking into account the work already undertaken, together with any written comments 
submitted to the Secretariat and a draft bill prepared in Ghana on the basis of the paper considered by Law 
Ministers. It was suggested that the draft Model Law include provisions for enforcement of judgements of 
courts chosen by the parties. It was agreed that a draft Model Law would need careful preparation for 
consideration by Law Ministers at their 2014 Meeting. Senior Officials noted with gratitude an offer by 
Canada to host a further meeting to consider developing work on the draft Model Law in the meantime: 
Commonwealth Secretariat ‘Meeting of Senior Officials of Commonwealth Law Ministries, Marlborough 
House, London, 18-20 October 2010 Communiqué’ available at 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/london/lgbt_rights/SOLM_2010_Communiqu%20-
20_%20Oct[1](1).pdf 10. 
165
  Hague Conference (note 156) 10. The Inter Arab Convention on Judicial Co-operation was signed in Riyadh, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1983 (known as the Riyadh Convention) is one of the most commonly used 
treaties in the Middle East for the recognition and enforcement of both court judgments and arbitral awards 
between Arab nations. Recognition and enforcement without re-examination of the merits is conditional 
upon leave to enforce being granted by the competent court in the country of origin of the judgment or 
award.  Recognition of a judgment or award may only be refused on certain grounds including: the judgment 
or award is contrary to Shari’ah or the constitution, public policy or good morals of the country in which 
enforcement is sought; if there were certain procedural irregularities in the case, such as the losing party not 
being properly notified of the hearing so that it could not defend itself; if the parties were not properly 
represented at the hearing in accordance with the laws of the country in which enforcement is sought; or  if 
the dispute has already been the subject of a judgment or award between the same parties on the same facts 
in the country in which enforcement is sought (or another country if that judgment has been recognised), or 
if proceedings are ongoing. The signatory States to the Convention are Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen: see Herbert Smith LPP 
‘Guide to dispute resolution in the Middle East 2010/11’ (2011) available at 
http://ghazzawilawfirm.com/files/Guide_to_dispute_resolution_in_the_Middle_East.pdf (accessed 09 
October 2012). (English translation of the Convention available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html (accessed 09 October 2012)). 
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v) The continued work by the Hague Conference on the Judgments Project166 for the 
drafting of an international convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.
167
 
 
It is noteworthy that none of these developments took place within a Southern African, or 
even African, context or with African participation. The thesis, therefore, discusses the 
problem of recognition and enforcement with specific reference to the SACU.
168
  
 
The effort of the Hague Conference to create a new international convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (‘the Judgments Project’)169 resulted in the 
resurfacing of the very same problems that have been occupying the private international law 
world for hundreds of years.
170
 This was not the first attempt to address this issue from an 
international perspective and most likely not the last one.
171
  
 
3.4 Regional integration on the African continent 
The harmonisation of private international law with specific focus on recognition and 
enforcement rules in the SACU, takes place against the background of the current regional 
economic integration efforts on the African continent.  
 
The Heads of State of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the AU, 
adopted the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (‘AEC Treaty’),172 which 
provides for the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC) to be through a 
                                                 
166
  The ‘Judgments Project’ was a project by the Hague Conference on Private International Law dealing with 
cross-border litigation in civil and commercial matters in general, which was discontinued in 2002 when the 
Hague Conference decided that the then ongoing negotiations should focus only on international litigation 
relating to choice of court agreements, and which resulted in the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of 
Court Agreements (‘the Choice of Court Convention’). The 2011 Council meeting of the Hague Conference 
concluded that a small expert group should be set up to explore the background of the Judgments Project and 
recent developments with the aim to assess the possible merits of resuming the Project:  Hague Conference 
(note 156) 5. 
167
  Hague Conference (note 156) 10-11. 
168
  See para 2.2 above.  
169
  This is discussed further in Chapter 3 para 2.1.2 below. 
170
  Oestreicher Y Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Intellectual Property Judgments: Analysis and 
Guidelines for a New International Convention (Unpublished SJD Dissertation, Duke University School of 
Law, 2004) 7.   
171
  Oestreicher (note 170) 7.   
172
  Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (concluded in 1991) 30 ILM 1241 (‘AEC Treaty’). 
The Treaty came into force in 1994. 
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gradual process of six stages,
173
 by harmonising and progressively integrating the activities of 
the existing RECs in Africa.
174
 The ultimate goal of the AEC is to transform the 54 
economies of the AU into a single economic and monetary union, with a common currency, 
free mobility of capital and labour.
175
 It is envisaged that when the AEC is fully functional, it 
will have an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Fund and an African Investment 
Bank.
176
  The objectives of the AEC are to be achieved through the liberalisation of trade by 
abolishing non-tariff barriers to trade
177
 in order to establish a free-trade area; the relaxation 
and eventual abolition of qualitative and administrative restrictions; the gradual evolution of a 
common trade policy; and the gradual removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
goods and services.
178
 The final stage will entail the integration of all sectors of society, 
                                                 
173
 The Community will be established gradually in six stages over a period not exceeding thirty-four years. At 
each stage, specific activities will be assigned and implemented concurrently as follows: 
(a) First Stage: Strengthening of existing regional economic communities and … establishing economic 
communities in regions where they do not exist; (b) Second Stage: (i) At the level of each regional 
economic community …, stabilising Tariff Barriers and Non-Tariff Barriers, Customs Duties and internal 
taxes; (ii) Strengthening of sectoral integration at the regional and continental levels in all areas of 
activity; and (iii) Co-ordination and harmonisation of activities among the existing and future economic 
communities. 
(c) Third Stage: At the level of each regional economic community …, establishment of a Free Trade …  and 
the establishment of a Customs Union by means of adopting a common external tariff. 
(d) Fourth Stage… co-ordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems among the various 
regional economic communities with a view to establishing a Customs Union at the continental level by 
means of adopting a common external tariff. 
(e) Fifth Stage: … establishment of an African Common Market. 
(f) Sixth Stage: … (i) Consolidation and strengthening of the structure of the African Common Market, 
through including the free movement of people, goods, capital and services…; (ii) Integration of all the 
sectors namely economic, political, social and cultural; establishment of a single domestic market and a 
Pan- African Economic and Monetary Union; (iii) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of 
an African Monetary Union, the establishment of a single African Central Bank and the creation of a 
single African Currency; (iv) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of the structure of the 
Pan-African Parliament and election of its members by continental universal suffrage; (v) 
Implementation of the final stage for the harmonisation and co-ordination process of the activities of 
regional economic communities; (vi) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of the structures 
of African multi-national enterprises in all sectors; and (vii) Implementation of the final stage for the 
setting up of the structures of the executive organs of the Community. 
174
 See note 55. 
175
  Constitutive Act of the African Union 11 July 2000 reproduced in (2005) 13 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 25 art 6. 
176
  AEC Treaty (note 172) art 19. 
177
 The main barriers to international trade were originally the high tariffs which various states applied to 
imported goods. As a result of various rounds of negotiations by the World Trade Organisation tariffs were 
reduced but this resulted in states reverting to non-tariff barriers (barriers that restrict import but are not in 
the usual form of a tariff) to protect their home industries. By introducing arduous custom procedures and 
deliberate custom delays, for example, a state can effectively prevent the importation of foreign goods. In 
such a way home industries can be protected against international competition, but ultimately the consumers 
will have to pay the price for the protective measures. Dumping (the introduction of products of one country 
into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products) is a common example of 
a non-tariff barrier to trade: Booysen H Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (2003) 
375-8.   
178
  AEC Treaty (note 172) art 4; Ndulo (note 146) 102. 
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namely economic, political, social and cultural; and the establishment of single domestic 
market and a Pan-African Economic and Monetary Union.
179
  
 
The implementation of the above measures will require the development of normative rules 
to give effect to the decisions, and these rules will, in turn, have to be assimilated into the 
laws of Member States. This will require a great effort in the harmonisation of the trade laws 
of all Member States, and the modernisation of trade laws that obstruct trade.
180
  
 
The need for harmonisation of the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
in order to facilitate trade forms part of the rationale for the study, which is now discussed.  
  
4 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
The rationale for the study of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the SACU 
is two-fold.  
 
Firstly, a harmonised system of rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
will increase trade in the region, by removing some of the non-tariff barriers to trade.
181
 The 
different approaches by SACU Member States to recognising and enforcing foreign 
judgments, and the risk that a judgment given in one State may ultimately not be enforced in 
another State may lead to legal uncertainty and increased transaction cost for prospective 
traders. These ultimately act as non-tariff barriers to trade which harmonisation may remove, 
thereby facilitating trade.
182
  
 
Secondly, a harmonised recognition and enforcement regime will consolidate economic and 
political integration, and is necessary for the development of the common market, the final 
stage in the regional integration process.
183
 
                                                 
179
  AEC Treaty (note 169) Art 6(2)(f)(ii) and (iii). 
180
  Ndulo (note 144) 103.  
181
  Traders seek the security provided by the enforcement of legal rights and the provision of an adequate 
remedy. Without secure means by which that remedy may be given effect, exporters may undervalue the 
gains from trade. Consequently, they may fail to take advantage of trading opportunities that would 
otherwise be beneficial: Perez AF ‘The international recognition of judgments: The debate between private 
and public law solutions’ (2001) 19 Berkeley Journal of International Law 44.  
182
  See para 4.1 below.  
183
  Ndulo (note 28) 195.   
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The first aspect of the rationale, namely trade facilitation, is now discussed, followed by the 
second aspect, namely the facilitation of regional economic integration.  
 
4.1 Trade facilitation 
The importance of judgments for free trade was recognised as early as 1911 but its 
importance was invigorated by the formation of what was then the European Community.
184
 
The Commission of the European Economic Community was concerned that the economic 
life of the Community may be subject to disturbances and difficulties, unless it was possible 
to ensure the recognition and enforcement of the various rights arising from the existence of a 
multiplicity of legal relationships.
185
 The Committee similarly felt that the differences 
between the bilateral conventions that were in force at that stage
186
 would hinder the ‘free 
movement’ of judgments.187 One of the primary aims of the Brussels Convention was to 
ensure that by difficulties in enforcing judgments would not negatively impact on the 
economy of European Community.
188
  
 
The preamble of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
189
 (the ‘Hague 
Choice of Court Convention’) indicates that its purpose, amongst others, is to promote 
                                                 
184
  Mortensen (note 75) 238–9. 
185
  Note sent by Commission of the European Economic Community to Member States on 22 October 1959, in 
Jenard Report (note 12) 3. The relevant legal relationships at this time were those of the six Member States 
to the European Economic Community, as follows:  In Belgium, the relevant provisions as regards 
enforcements were Article 10 of the Law of 25 March 1876, which contained Title I of the Introductory 
Book of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Germany, foreign judgments was recognised and enforced on the 
basis of reciprocity, and laid down in paragraph 328 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). 
In France, Article 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that judgments given by foreign courts and 
instruments recorded by foreign officials can be enforced only after being declared enforceable by a French 
court (Articles 2123 and 2128 of the Civil Code). In Italy, the Code of Civil Procedure in principle allowed 
judgments to be recognised and enforced (Articles 796 and 797 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The 
Luxembourg Code of Civil Procedure provided that judgments given by foreign courts could be enforced 
only after being declared enforceable by a Luxembourg Court (Article 546). In the Netherlands, the Code of 
Civil Procedure laid down the principle that judgments of foreign courts were not enforceable in the 
Kingdom. Matters settled by foreign courts were allowed to be reconsidered by Netherlands courts (Article 
431 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The national laws of the Member States thus varied considerably: 
Jenard Report (note 12) 5-6. 
186
  Article 55 of the Brussels Convention included a list of 18 bilateral treaties dealing with recognition and 
enforcement amongst the Member States which the Convention superseded: see Brussels Convention (note 
12) art 55. 
187
  Jenard Report (note 12) 7.  
188
  Mortensen (note 75) 238–9. 
189
  Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements June 30, 2005 
(2005) 44 ILM 1294. 
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international trade and investment through uniform rules on jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement in civil and commercial matters.
190
 
 
The internationalisation of trade, investment and financing in the last few decades has led to a 
dramatic increase in the need for foreign judicial assistance, or the administration of justice 
across a number of jurisdictions.
191
 The increased number of international trade transactions, 
along with increased risks
192
 led to an increase in legal disputes which in turn enhanced the 
need for a satisfactory means of dispute resolution.
193
 International trading relations 
increasingly give rise to the possibility of transnational debts, and the security of commercial 
transactions calls for a speedy, cheap and uncomplicated process for ensuring that judgments 
properly obtained against a debtor can be satisfied, even though his assets may be situated in 
another jurisdiction.
194
  
 
Rules on enforcement of foreign judgments decrease international transaction costs in two 
ways. First, they reduce the costs required for businesses to secure legal rights: if a company 
cannot enforce a judgment in a foreign court, it incurs additional costs in bringing separate 
actions in each state in which it operates to re-secure legal rights and remedies.
195
 Second, 
liberal enforcement laws decrease risk, and, therefore, costs, by increasing certainty and 
consistency of legal rights: under a liberal enforcement scheme the parties’ obligations 
remain the same in every participating country.
196
 
 
                                                 
190
  Hague Convention (note 189) Preamble.  
191
  Amado JD ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Latin America: An overview and update’ 
(1990) 31 Virginia Journal of International Law 99. 
192
  The presence of a variety of legal systems and rules can burdens and risks, including  uncertainty about 
the ability to enforce legal rights; additional costs of enforcement; the risks arising from unfamiliarity with 
foreign legal process; risks arising from unknown and unpredictable legal exposure; risks arising from 
judicial corruption; risks arising from lower levels of professional competence, including judicial 
competence; and risks arising from inefficiencies and delays in the administration of justice. Such increased 
transaction costs impede mutually beneficial exchange by means of trade and investment: see  Spiegelman JJ 
‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention and International Commercial Litigation (2009) 83 Australian Law 
Journal 386-7. 
193
  Brand, RA ‘Enforcement of foreign money judgments in the United States: In search of uniformity and 
international acceptance’ (1991) 67 Notre Dame Law Review 255; Dammann & Hansmann (note 123) 3; 
Spiegelman (note 189) 386. 
194
  Reed A ‘A new model of jurisdictional propriety for Anglo-American foreign judgments recognition and 
enforcement: Something old, something borrowed, something new?’ (2003) 25 Loyilane Los Angeles 
International & Comparative Law Review 243.  
195
  Childs L ‘Shaky Foundations: Criticism of Reciprocity and the Distinction between Public and Private 
International Law’ (2005-2006) 38 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 221, 226 
196
  Mortensen (note 75) 240-1. 
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Dispute resolution in domestic courts requires the respective parties to consider not only the 
likelihood of a favourable judgment, but also the ability to collect on that judgment.
197
 When 
a judgment creditor fails to obtain satisfaction in the country where it has been granted, the 
important question for an international trader is whether it is enforceable in another country 
where the defendant may be found.
198
 Collecting on a defendant’s extra-jurisdictional assets 
requires that the second jurisdiction (called the requested court) be willing to recognise and 
enforce the first jurisdiction’s (called the rendering court) judgment.199  
 
If investors and traders are not convinced that the law of a particular region gives real 
protection and remedies, they will not invest or trade there.
200
 Traders seek the security 
provided by the enforcement of legal rights and the provision of adequate remedies.
201
 If 
traders are unable to assert their legal rights through the effective enforcement of judgments, 
this would distort incentives for trade.
202
 It was similarly suggested
203
 that as contract law 
across the EU shows significant diversity on many fundamental points, for traders in the 
internal market to acquire essential knowledge about foreign law in various Member States 
always entails the danger of substantial loss of claims or unsuspected liabilities.
204
 
 
Efficient dispute resolution processes are also important for encouraging foreign direct 
investment.
205
 Governments interested in attracting foreign direct investment need to improve 
the rule of law, including their country’s dispute resolution mechanisms.206  
 
                                                 
197
  Brand (note 193) 255. 
198
 Cheshire & North (note 62) 405. 
199
  Reed (note 194) 244. 
200
  Mistelis (note 95) 1057. 
201
  Perez (note 181) 44. 
202
  Perez (note 181) 44. 
203
  On 11 July 2001 the European commission published a Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on European Contract Law, among other things inviting responses from experts in the field of 
European legal studies to, inter alia,  problems for the functioning of the internal market resulting from the 
co-existence of different national contract laws’. The Commission on European Contract and the Study 
Group on European Civil Code jointly submitted the above response: Joint Response of the Commission on 
European Contract Law and Study Group on a European Civil Code ‘Communication on European Contract 
Law’ 29 November 2001 (2001) available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.23.pdf (accessed 25 
February 2013).  
204
  Communication on European Contract Law (note 203). 
205
  World Bank Group ‘Investing across Borders 2010: Indicators of foreign direct investment regulation  in 87 
economies’ (2010) Investment Climate Advisory Services available at 
http://iab.worldbank.org/~/media/FPDKM/IAB/Documents/IAB-report.pdf (accessed 30 August 2012). The 
Report specifically discusses the importance of clear and accessible arbitration procedures in promoting 
foreign investment and the need for national courts to facilitate and support such procedures.  
206
  World Bank (note 205).  
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Legal certainty and predictability stemming from a harmonised private international law 
regime are, therefore, essential for the promotion of commercial activity within the region: 
research shows that there is a direct relationship between the legal framework and the 
attitudes of foreign investors and traders.
207
 Certainty, predictability, security of transactions, 
effective remedies and cost are important considerations in investment decision-making.
208
 
Rules which provide certain and expedited means of enforcing foreign judgments are an 
essential part of a private international law regime which is meant to facilitate trade.
209
 A 
jurisdiction where the judicial system is fast and efficient and where security is guaranteed is 
attractive to local and international investors and traders.
210
 In international trade, 
predictability can be achieved only if the courts of all countries strive to establish private 
international law rules which are aimed at providing uniform results.
211
  
 
In addition to increasing international trade, harmonised private international law rules - and 
specifically the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments - will also 
facilitate regional economic integration, which is now discussed.  
 
4.2 Facilitation of regional economic integration 
‘In order for an economic union to function efficiently, a legal judgment ... must not 
have its value impaired merely by crossing a geographic border within the union … 
the legal mechanism for enforcing rights in that property interest, must be respected 
throughout the union.’212 
 
A developed private international law regime is an indispensable part of economic integration 
- an economic community does not function solely on the basis of economic or substantive 
rules; the procedural rules for resolving issues arising in cross-border transactions are equally 
                                                 
207
  Mistelis (note 95) 1057. 
208
  Oppong (note 133) 915. 
209
  Oppong (note 151) 285. 
210
  Mistelis (note 95) 1057. However, it has also been argued that people who make decisions about doing or 
continuing to trade, have a host of immediate concerns. These decisions are often tied to quality, quantity, 
cost, time of delivery, and other concrete aspects of the transaction. Determining what will happen if 
something goes wrong is usually a secondary concern. Franklin JA & Morris RJ ‘International Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments in the Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of, Goals for and comments on 
the current proposals’ (2001-2002) 77 Chicago Kent Law Review 1222. 
211
  Hay P Lando O & Rotunda R ‘Conflict of Laws as a Technique for Legal Integration’ in Cappelletti M, 
Secombe M and Weiler J (eds) Integration through law, Europe and the American federal experience (1985) 
167. 
212
  Brand RA ‘Recognition of foreign judgments as a trade law issue: The economics of private international 
law’ in Bhandari JS & Sykes AO (eds) Economic Analysis of International Law (1997) 593. 
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important.
213
 Perez
214
 argues that interregional economic integration and recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments should accompany each other so that all participating 
regions can achieve the best comparative advantages. True integration should, therefore, not 
aim not only at the removal of barriers to the movement of persons, goods, services and 
capital, but also the strengthening of the legal infrastructure for settling cross-border disputes. 
A developed private international law regime is a key aspect of this infrastructure.
215
  
 
An effective recognition and enforcement scheme must, it has been argued, be a feature of 
any regional economic integration initiative that is ‘likely to achieve significant 
integration’.216 The founders of the United States of America (USA) clearly understood this 
proposition, as both the Articles of Confederation
217
 and the Constitution of the USA
218
 
contained Full Faith and Credit clauses, requiring that a judgment of a Sister-State must be as 
conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that court where the judgment 
was rendered.
219
 
 
To illustrate the importance of the harmonisation of private international law for the 
facilitation of economic integration, the examples of two different regions are now discussed, 
namely the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Central American Common 
Market. 
  
The regime governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the European 
Community was deemed necessary as it was believed that free circulation of judgments
220
 
could enhance market integration and legal certainty in the EEC.
221
  
                                                 
213
  Oppong (note 151) 235. 
214
  Perez (note 181) 44-6. 
215
  Oppong (note 151) 235. 
216
  Casad RC ‘Civil Judgment Recognition and the Integration of Multi-state Associations: A Comparative 
Study’ (1980-1981) 4 Hasting International & Comparative Law Review 1. 
217
  Article IV of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of 1777 provided that ‘full faith and credit 
shall be given in each of the States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates 
of every other State’.   
218
  The United States of America Constitution Art IV section 4 provides that ‘full faith and credit shall be given 
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State and the Congress 
may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and 
the effect thereof’. 
219
  Casad (note 216) 1; Huang (note 12) 15. 
220
  The Brussels I Regulation provides that, for the purposes of the free movement of judgments, judgments 
given in one Member State (bound by the Brussels I Regulation) should be recognised and enforced in 
another Member State, even if the judgment debtor is domiciled in a third State: Brussels I Regulation (note 
11) Recital 10. 
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The EEC was founded upon the principle of developing closer economic and political bonds 
between Member States. The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC
222
 did not contain an 
express arrangement for judgment recognition among the Member States. However, the 
Treaty of Rome recognised that the development of a stable economic union would be 
seriously hampered if enforcement of claims arising from economic transactions were 
uncertain, time-consuming and complicated.
223
 The requirements of the Brussels Convention 
have been compared to the ‘full faith and credit’ clause in the Constitution of the United 
States of America and which requires States to give full effect to judicial proceedings of 
Sister States.
 224
  
 
The Community set itself the objective of maintaining and developing an area of freedom, 
security and justice to ensure the free movement of persons and to offer a high level of 
protection to citizens.
225
 The architects of the EEC were concerned that business confidence 
would be harmed and economic integration discouraged if a uniform interregional 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments system was absent.
226
 The EEC, in order 
to offer an adequate level of protection to its citizens, deemed it necessary to adopt, amongst 
other things, measures relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters for the sound operation 
of the internal market, in order to progressively establish the Common Market.
227
 The 
simplification of formalities and the consequent achievement of a more rapid and simple 
system for the recognition and enforcement of judgments among Member States, was 
regarded as essential.
228
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
221
  Huang (note 12) 21; Fitzpatrick (note 12) 699; Preamble to the Brussels Convention (note 12); Jenard Report 
(note 12) 1, 38.  
222
  The Treaty Establishing the European Community signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 (1957) 298 UNTS 11 
(hereafter ‘Treaty of Rome’). 
223
  Bartlett LS ‘Full faith and credit comes to the Common Market: An analysis of the provisions of the 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (1975) 24 
International and Comparative Law quarterly 44.  
224
  Bartlett (note 223) 44.  
225
  Treaty of Rome (note 222) arts 2 and 3. It covers policy areas that range from the management of the 
European Union’s external borders to judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, including the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The creation of the area of freedom, security and justice 
is based on the Tampere (1999-04), Hague (2004-09) and Stockholm (2010-14) programmes. It derives from 
Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which regulates the ‘Area of freedom, 
security and justice’. 
226
  Fitzpatrick (note 12) 699; Jenard Report (note 12) 38. 
227
  Brussels I Regulation (note 11) Recital 1; see also para 3.1. 
228
  Brussels I Regulation (note 11) Recital 2.  
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The architects of the EEC, therefore, relied on Member States to negotiate treaties with each 
other to provide for the ‘simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition 
and execution of judicial decisions and arbitrational awards’.229 The Commission, however, 
decided in favour if the conclusion of a multilateral convention between the countries of the 
EEC.
230
 This resulted in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. Consequently, the development of the EEC interregional 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments mechanism was designed to parallel with 
European economic integration.
231
  
 
The framework within which the analysis takes place is now discussed.  
 
5 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
The framework of this analysis is two-fold: First, in accordance with the principle of 
territorial sovereignty of states, states are free to choose whether or not to recognise and 
enforce foreign judgments. When they do decide to recognise and enforce foreign judgments, 
this recognition is generally based on one of three theories, namely obligation, comity or 
reciprocity. Secondly, irrespective of the theory on which states’ recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments are based, states may have certain interests in recognising and enforcing 
foreign judgments.  
  
5.1 Territorial sovereignty, obligation theory, comity and reciprocity 
Due to the rise of territorial sovereignty, judgments were seen as ‘governmental acts [rather 
than mere resolutions of private disputes] whose compulsory effect was limited to the 
Sovereign’s territory’.232 A sovereign is supreme within its own territory and has exclusive 
jurisdiction over everybody and everything within that territory and over every transaction 
that is effected there.
233
 The result of the principle of territorial sovereignty is that in the 
absence of international agreements, countries are under no obligation to recognise and/or 
                                                 
229
 Treaty of Rome (note 222) art 220; Jenard Report (note 12) 3. 
230
  Jenard Report (note 12) 7; see Chapter 2, para 3.1 below. 
231
  Huang (note 12) 22. 
232
  Juenger (note 111) 6. 
233
  Cheshire & North (note 62) 4. 
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enforce foreign judgments.
234
 Therefore, a foreign judgment has no effect extraterritorially, 
unless and until it is given effect by a local court, and local courts are free to decide not to 
enforce any foreign judgments, but to retry all disputes within the jurisdiction.
235
 A key area 
in which sovereignty is reflected is that courts will generally not enforce a judgment if to do 
so would be to enforce foreign penal, revenue or other public law,
236
 or if it is based on 
revenue laws that apply extraterritorially.
237
  
 
In Commissioner of Taxes, Federation of Rhodesia v McFarland
238
 the acceptance of this rule 
was based on the ‘argument from sovereignty’.239 The Court held that fiscal power is an 
attribute of sovereignty, an assertion of state authority, and its exercise therefore is to be 
distinguished from a patrimonial claim brought under the ordinary law of the land.
240
 
Leslie
241
 criticises this approach and points out that all law may be considered as the 
sovereign’s command whether it relates to tax or not. But if one sovereign voluntary permits 
another sovereign’s law to apply, it involves no loss of sovereignty; therefore, if local courts 
were permitted by their sovereign to gather taxes for a foreign sovereign, there would be no 
loss of sovereignty.
242
 Forsyth further argues that the local sovereign commands the 
application of foreign law in his court in certain circumstances for the protection of 
individual interests; and it is not part of his tasks to protect the interest of a foreign sovereign 
qua sovereign. Penal laws and revenue laws fall into a different category to the ordinary 
application of foreign law. While enforcement of foreign revenue and penal laws will be 
denied, such laws will be recognised.
243
 In Regazonni v K C Sethia Ltd
244
 it was held that  
‘it does not follow from the fact that … the court will not enforce a revenue law at the suit of a 
foreign State, that … it will enforce a contract which requires the doing of an act in a foreign 
                                                 
234
  Cheshire & North (note 62) 405; Michaels (note 72) 3. 
235
  Ho (note 78) 448. 
236
  The rationale for the exclusion of these laws is that they concern key governmental interests or the exercise 
of governmental power and should, therefore, not have extraterritorial operation: Pham (note 76) 673. In 
Huntingdon v Atrill
 
[1893] AC 150 the Privy Council held that the rule has its foundation ‘in the well-
recognised principle that crimes … are local in this sense that they are only cognizable and punishable in the 
country where they were committed’. The penalty must, therefore, be one exacted, directly or indirectly by a 
foreign State. Contractual penalties, or even statutory penalties imposed in favour of private parties are not 
‘exigible by the State in the interests of the community [but by] private persons in their own interests’ and 
are thus not struck by the rule: Jones v Krok 1996(1) SA 504(T) at 515-517H per Kirk-Cohen J. 
237
 Kahn E ‘Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims’ (1932) 46 Harvard Law Review 193.  
238
 Commissioner of Taxes, Federation of Rhodesia v McFarland 1965 (1) SA 470 (W).  
239
 Commissioner of Taxes v McFarland (note 238) at 474 A-D. 
240
 Commissioner of Taxes v McFarland (note 238) at 473H.  
241
 Leslie RD ‘Non-enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws’ (1976) 93 South African Law Journal 46. 
242
 Forsyth (note 62) 124. 
243
 Forsyth (note 62) 124-5. 
244
 Regazonni v K C Sethia Ltd [1958] AC 301. 
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country which violates the revenue law of that country. … This may be seen if for revenue law, 
penal law is substituted. For an English court will not enforce a penal law at the suit of a foreign 
State, yet it would be surprising if it would enforce a contract which required the commission of 
a crime in that State’.245 
 
The Dutch Scholar Ulrich Huber, created the notion of ‘comity’ or ‘courtesy among political 
entities… involving [especially] mutual recognition of legislative, executive and judicial 
acts’246 to explain how a country’s law or judgments could have force outside their own 
territory despite strict territorial notions of sovereignty.
247
 His explanation of the implications 
of sovereignty for conflict laws are epitomised in three now well-known axioms, as translated 
by Davies:
248
  
1. The laws of every sovereign authority have force within the boundaries of its state, 
and bind all subject to it, but not beyond. 
2. Those who are found within a sovereign authority’s boundaries are held to be subject 
to it, whether they are there permanently or temporarily. 
3. Those who exercise sovereign authority acts from comity, that the laws of every 
nation having been applied within its own boundaries should retain their effect 
everywhere so far as they do not prejudice the powers or rights of another state, or its 
subjects.
249
  
 
Taken together, these axioms are to the effect that acts of foreign sovereigns should, when 
appropriate, be given effect within another state’s territory and that courts of all nations 
should indulge a presumption against the extraterritorial impact of law.
250
 The third axiom 
emphasises the practical necessity for the forum to recognise appropriate rules to facilitate 
international economic intercourse.
251
 Huber argued that although the laws of one country 
can have no direct force in another country, ‘nothing could be more inconvenient to the 
                                                 
245
 Regazonni v Sethia (note 244) at 322. 
246
  Paul JR ‘Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 14-15; Yntema HE 
‘The comity doctrine’ (1966) 65 Michigan Law Review 1, 9; Stevens SL ‘Commanding International Judicial 
Respect: Reciprocity and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments’ (2002-2003) 26 Hastings 
International & Comparative Law Review 117-121 provides a historical perspective of the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  
247
  Stevens (note 246) 119. 
248
  Yntema (note 246) 306. 
249
  Davies L ‘The influence of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum on English private international law’ (1937) 18 
British Yearbook of International Law 57; Maier HG ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction at a crossroads: An 
intersection between public and private international law’ (1982) 76 American Journal of International Law 
281; Yntema (note 246) 306. 
250
  Maier (note 249) 282. 
251
  Maier (note 249) 282. 
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commerce and general intercourse of nations than that transactions valid by the law of one 
place should be rendered of no effect elsewhere owing to a difference in law’.252  
 
Huber did not believe that sovereigns were required to apply foreign law, but that they did so 
as a matter of international courtesy.
253
 He argued that ‘recognition and enforcement rests 
upon comity and that it would be declined when the interests of the forum or its subjects are 
impaired thereby’.254 Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one 
of practice, convenience and expediency.
255
 Although more than a mere courtesy and 
accommodation, comity does not achieve the focus of an imperative or obligation - rather, it 
is a nation’s expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard to both international 
duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws. The comity 
principle was originally developed to explain how a sovereign state, absolutely powerful 
within its own territory, could give recognition or effect in its courts to another nation's laws 
without diminishing or denying its own sovereignty.
256
 Recognising judgments as res judicata 
enabled sovereigns to minimise the time and inconvenience associated with re-litigating 
disputes and accorded foreign court decisions respect.
257
 To retry cases that has been 
authoritatively decided ‘violates fundamental tenets of judicial economy’;258 and moreover, it 
would be presumptuous for the courts of one country to review the judgments of another.
259
  
 
Many legal systems of the world accept that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country 
may be recognised elsewhere, provided certain requirements are met.
260
 Although there is no 
specific requirements acknowledged and accepted internationally and outside Treaties, most 
States will generally require that the rendering court (court of origin) must have had 
jurisdiction; that the judgment debtor must have received sufficient notice of the proceedings 
and that the judgment must not have been obtained by fraud and the enforcement of the 
                                                 
252
  Translated in Davies (note 249) 56-7. 
253
  Paul (note 246) 15; Stevens (note 246) 120. 
254
  Naddelman KH ‘Non-recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and what to do about it’ (1957) 42 
Iowa Law Review 237. 
255
  Somportex Lt. v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971). 
256
 Maier (note 249) 281. 
257
  Stevens (note 246)120; Paul (note 246) 16; Juenger (note 111) 5. 
258
  Juenger (note 111) 4.  
259
  Juenger (note 111) 4. He argues further that such duplication is not only wasteful but that it punishes private 
litigants and exacts a toll from international commerce. To protect their interests, parties engaged in 
multinational transactions must either resort to arbitration or insist on advance payments or guarantees, 
which increases the transaction costs of doing business abroad: see para 3.1 above.  
260
  Forsyth (note 62) 417. 
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judgment should not be contrary to the public policy of the recognising state.
261
 Authors 
generally identify three theories governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments: the obligation theory, reciprocity and comity.
262
 The obligation theory is defined 
in Schisby v Westenholz
263
 as follows: ‘the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over 
the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay … the sum for which judgment is 
given, which the courts in [the country of enforcement] are bound to enforce’.264 In other 
words, the foreign judgment amounts to an obligation, and the foreign judgment creditor 
enforces a legal obligation which is recognised and enforced by the court hearing the 
application for recognition and enforcement.
265
  
 
The premise underlying the second theory, the reciprocity theory, is that the courts of 
Country A should recognise and enforce the judgments of Country B if, mutatis mutandis, the 
courts of Country B recognise and enforce the judgments of Country A.
266
 Reciprocity, or 
‘the mutual concession of advantages or privileges for the purposes of commercial or 
diplomatic relations’267 was introduced in both civil and common-law countries as a more 
advanced form of, or in some instances, a foundation for comity.
268
  
 
The third theory is based on the general notion of ‘friendly dealings between nations at 
peace’ and as such applies not just to the judiciary, but also the policy making bodies of the 
nation. The best-known definition of comity is arguably given in the US Supreme Court case 
of Hilton v Guyot:
269
 
‘Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, 
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one 
                                                 
261
 See Chapter 4 para 5.2 f or a general discussion of these requirements.  
262
  Reed (note 194) 246-8; Von Mehren AT & Trautman DT ‘Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey 
and a Suggested Approach’ (1968) 81 Harvard Law Review 1602; Casad RC ‘Issue Preclusion and Foreign 
Country Judgements: Whose Law?’ (1984) 70 Iowa Law Review 58; Roodt C ‘Recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments: still a Hobson’s choice among competing theories?’ 2005 Journal of South African 
Law 18.  
263
  Schisby v Westenholz QB 1870 6 Eng. Re. 155 at 159. 
264
  Schisby v Westenholz (note 263) 159. 
265
  Roodt (note 247) 20; Reed (note 194) 246. 
266
  Reed (note 194) 248. There is no consensus on what reciprocity really means and how it should be 
established, and statues that include this requirement usually do not define it: see Juenger (note 111) 31. See 
for example Botswana: Chapter 4 para 3.2.2 below and Namibia: para 3.4.2 below.  
267
  Stevens (note 234) 119. 
268
  While civil foreign judgment recognition and enforcement jurisprudence required reciprocity, early English 
common-law and US statutory and common-law did not require reciprocity: Juenger (note 111) 7-11. The 
reciprocity requirements in the statutes of the selected Southern African States are discussed in Chapter 3, 
para 4 below. 
269
  Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 (1895) 162. 
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nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’270 
 
According to Story,  
‘The true foundation on which the administration of international law must rest is, that 
the rules which are to govern are those which arise from mutual interest and utility, from 
a sense of inconvenience which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of 
moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return.’271 
 
Comity, as used by Story in this context, described an appropriate judicial approach for 
arriving at private international law decisions.
272
 Beale wrote that the doctrine of comity 
seems to mean only that in certain cases the sovereign is not prevented by any principle of 
international law, but only by his own choice, from establishing any rule he pleases for the 
conflict of laws. In other words, it is an ‘enabling principle rather than one which in any 
particular case would determine the actual rule of law’.273 
 
Cheshire and North
274
 are critical of the notion of ‘comity of nations’, suggesting that the 
word itself is incompatible with the judicial function, as comity is a matter for sovereigns, not 
for judges required to decide a case cording to the rights of the parties.
275
 Their conclusion is 
that the application of a foreign law implies no act of courtesy, no sacrifice of sovereignty, 
but that it merely derives from a desire to do justice.
276
  
 
Whether one nation should ever give effect to the judgments of other nations depends on 
whether or not it serves that nation’s interests.277 States’ interest in recognising and enforcing 
judgments is now discussed.  
 
                                                 
270
  Hilton v Guyot (note 269) 163-64. 
271
  Story J Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1883) 33. 
272
  Maier (note 249) 285. 
273
  Beale JA A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) 1965. 
274
 Cheshire & North (note 62) 5. 
275
  The authors suggest that if the word is given its normal meaning of courtesy it is scarcely consistent with the 
readiness of English courts to apply enemy law in time of war. Moreover, if courtesy formed the basis of 
private international law a judgment might feel compelled to ignore the law of Utopia on proof that Utopian 
courts apply no law but their own, since comity implies a bilateral, not unilateral relationship. If, on the other 
hand, comity means that no foreign law is applicable in England except with the permission of the sovereign, 
it is nothing more than a truism: see Cheshire & North (note 62) 5. 
276
  Cheshire & North (note 62) 5. 
277
  Casad (note 216) 6. 
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5.2 States’ interest in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments 
Every nation has an interest in seeing to it that justice is done between competing litigants, 
but that does not mean that every nation has an interest in trying in its own courts the merits 
of a case that has been adjudicated elsewhere.
278
  
 
Maier
279
 suggests that international considerations fall into two general categories: the first 
category bears on the maintenance of amicable external relations with other nation-states and 
stresses the importance of extending courtesy to other sovereigns and reciprocal recognition 
of national government interests. The second category relates to the forum state’s self-interest 
in making choice-of-law decisions that will further the development of an effectively 
functioning international system. 
 
This situation in which there is uncertainty as to whether a particular judgment will be 
enforced is often unsatisfactory as parties are interested in having transnational legal certainty 
and in avoiding repeated litigation and conflicting decisions. The general public has an 
interest in avoiding resources spent on re-litigation and in international decisional harmonies. 
States likewise have a common interest in promoting international transactions. On the other 
hand, States sometimes have valid reasons for denying foreign judgments the same force they 
grant their own judgments, since the foreign procedure may be viewed as deficient or the 
outcome of the foreign litigation may be viewed as objectionable, or against the public policy 
of that State requested to enforce a specific judgment.
280
  
 
Self-interest may play an important role in the enforcement of foreign judgments.
281
 The core 
of that proposition is that enforcing foreign judgments is universally beneficial, and on the 
contrary, that it is a disadvantage if countries do not enforce each other’s judgments.  
 
                                                 
278
  However, the Special Commission to the Hague Conference has suggested that it seems mistaken to believe 
that enforcement on a territory other than that on which a judgment has been rendered is a challenge to State 
sovereignty. Most of the time, the only interests involved are private ones. Usually, the effect given to a 
foreign judgment on a territory will have no consequences except for the party who has lost the case abroad. 
Public interests are rarely in issue: see Hague Conference ‘International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters’ Preliminary Document 7 (Apr. 1997) 47. 
279
  Maier (note 249) 283. 
280
  Michaels (note 72) 1. 
281
  Reed (note 194) 248. 
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6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following research questions have been formulated on the basis of the background 
provided: 
 
1. What approaches have been followed in other regions to harmonise their recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgment regimes, and what lessons can be learnt from their 
experiences?  
 
2. What is the current statutory recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments regime 
applicable in SACU Member States and is there a) a need for harmonisation; and b) 
enough common ground between SACU Member States to render feasible the 
harmonisation of their recognition and enforcement regimes? 
 
3. What would the content of an appropriate harmonisation instrument for the SACU be?  
 
These are the questions the thesis answers, within the scope of the thesis which is now set 
out.  
 
7 SCOPE AND EXCLUSIONS FROM SCOPE 
 
The study focuses only on the harmonisation of one of the three objects of private 
international law, namely the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and deals 
with jurisdiction incidentally. The inclusion of choice of applicable laws would have taken 
this study beyond manageable proportions.  
 
The study focuses on the recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments, given in 
civil or commercial proceedings. The enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and 
matters of parental responsibility are, therefore, excluded from the scope of the study. This is 
firstly because there are existing international instruments on the topic,
282
 and secondly the 
study is situated within the context of the SACU,
283
 a regional economic community.
284
 
                                                 
282
  See, for example, the Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
Relating to Maintenance Obligations; and the Convention of 15 November 1965 on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions; Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, 
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The second exclusion is arbitral awards, because of the existing framework in place by virtue 
of the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
285
 
 
The thesis does not deal with procedures of attachment
286
 or other procedures by which the 
decision in the award will be carried out.
287
 
 
8 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
This chapter presented the origin of and rational for the study; the problem statement and 
research questions which the thesis discusses, as well as the framework of analysis and scope 
of the study.  
 
Many of the challenges that will be experienced in the harmonisation of private international 
law rules, and specifically the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are 
likely to have already been experienced in previous attempts to harmonise these rules on an 
international or regional level. Chapter 2 therefore considers some past and present 
international and regional efforts. The international efforts include the 1971 Hague 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the 2005 Hague 
Choice of Court Convention as well as the on-going Judgments Project of the Hague 
Conference. The regional developments that are discussed include the Brussels/Lugano 
Jurisdiction Regime in Europe; the full faith and credit clause requirement in the Constitution 
of the USA; the bilateral Trans-Tasman Judicial Arrangement between Australia and New 
                                                                                                                                                        
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children.  
283
  See para 2.2 above. 
284
  See para 2.1 above.  
285
  See note 127 above. 
286
  Having obtained a judgment in his favour, the judgment creditor will want to obtain satisfaction of it from 
the debtor. The process which enables him to enforce a judgment is known as execution. Execution may be 
effected against the property of the person of the judgment debtor. The appropriate manner of execution in a 
particular case depends on the type of judgment and the nature of the debtor’s available assets. A judgment 
sounding in money is enforceable by the attachment and sale in execution of the debtor’s property – 
movable, immovable and incorporeal. Herbstein J, Cilliers AC, Loots C, Van Winsen LD & Nel HC The 
Civil Practice of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume 2 (2009) 1020. 
287
  For example, debts, wages, salary and emoluments owing by or accruing from a third person to the judgment 
debtor may be attached in the hands of the judgment debtor and executed on by means of a ‘garnishee 
order’; or if no (or insufficient satisfaction for a judgment sounding in money is obtained in the ordinary 
way, the judgment creditor may in certain circumstances apply for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate: 
Herbstein et al (note 286) 1021. 
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Zealand and finally the multilateral convention approach adopted by the countries of Latin 
America. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the possible instruments for the harmonisation of recognition and 
enforcement rules. The examination includes an overview of the traditional types of 
convention, namely single, double and mixed. These are analysed to determine what would 
be suitable for the Southern African context.  
 
Chapter 4 considers the statutory instruments on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments currently in force in the SACU Member States
288
 by providing an overview and 
comparison of the respective statutes, the scope of each instrument, the requirements and 
procedure for enforcement, the grounds on which registered judgments
289
 may be set aside, 
and finally the requirement of reciprocity present in the respective statutes. After a 
comparison of the relevant statutes the Chapter makes proposals for a draft instrument for 
recognition and enforcement for the SACU Member States, including a draft text for a SACU 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments.  
 
Chapter 5 draws together each chapter’s findings on the central research questions into a set 
of conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
288
  Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. 
289
  None of the statutes on recognition and enforcement of the States compared provide for the automatic, or 
quasi-automatic, enforcement of relevant judgments from designated countries. The statutes require the 
registration of the foreign judgment in the local (enforcing) court.  See Chapter 3, para 4.2. 
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CHAPTER 2  
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:  
OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HARMONISATION EFFORTS 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, efforts towards the development of harmonised law on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments have taken place on two levels, dating back to the 19
th
 
century,
1
 namely regional and global.
2
 Local law often impeded enforcement of money 
                                                 
1
 As early as 1826 a motion was proposed at the Congress of Panama for the preparation of a draft code of 
international law: see Lorenzen EG ‘The Pan American Code on Private International Law (1930) 4 Tulane 
Law Review 499. 
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judgments from foreign states and bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties have 
consequently been concluded in a number of regions to remove some of the obstacles.
3
 It has 
been suggested that the treaty law established in this way has become a guide to the 
principles which should govern recognition and enforcement.
4
 
 
This chapter considers the past and present international and regional harmonisation efforts, 
with a view to identifying a suitable approach for Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
It considers both the global efforts by the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(hereafter ‘Hague Conference’),5 and regional developments such as the Brussels/Lugano 
Regime in Europe;
6
 the full faith and credit clause approach adopted by the federal system
7
 of 
the United States of America (USA);
8
 the bilateral Trans-Tasman Judicial Arrangement 
between Australia and New Zealand
9
 and finally the multilateral convention approach 
adopted by some countries of Latin America.
10
 
 
Aside from the full faith and credit clause in the USA Constitution, the facilitation of the 
rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments amongst the Member States of regional 
communities have been achieve by means of bilateral,
11
 or multilateral agreements or 
conventions,
12
 as will be illustrated below. The desire to protect litigants and international 
commerce from the problematic consequences of an insistence on juridical sovereignty 
motivated States to enter into numerous bilateral arrangements for the mutual enforcement of 
judgments. This gave rise to an entire network of treaties.
13
 Two possible approaches for 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
 Zeller B ‘The Significance of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods for the 
Harmonisation and Transplantation of International Commercial Law’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 
475. 
3
 Nadelmann KH ‘Jurisdictionally improper fora in treaties on recognition of judgments: the Common Market 
Draft’ (1967) 67(6) Columbia Law Review 995. 
4
  Nadelmann (note 3) 995. The specific treaty provisions which would form this ‘guide’ is discussed in 
Chapter 4 below. 
5
  See para 2.1 below. 
6
  See para 3.1 below. 
7
  It has been suggested that the rules of the treaty law are also largely in line with the rules developed in 
federal systems for inter-state recognition purposes under constitutional provisions or through uniform 
legislation: Nadelmann (note 3) 995. In this regard, see, for example discussion of the ‘full faith and credit’ 
in para 3.2 below.  
8
  See para 3.2 below. 
9
  See para 3.3 below. 
10
  See para 3.4 below. 
11
  See the Trans-Tasman Judicial System, para 3.3 below. 
12
  See EC Brussels Convention/Regulation (para 3.1 below); and OAS Montevideo Convention (para 3.4 
below).  
13
 Juenger FK ‘Recognition of money judgments in civil and commercial matters’ (1988) 36 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 8. This was for example the case in Europe before the adoption of the Convention on 
 
 
 
 
 47 
SACU Member States to harmonise their rules on and facilitate the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments may therefore be for Member States to negotiate and adopt 
either a set of bilateral treaties inter-partes or a single multilateral treaty by all Member 
States. These alternative approaches are now discussed and a recommendation of the most 
suitable approach for the SACU is made in the concluding parts of this Chapter.
14
 
 
1.1 Bilateral Treaties as Means of Harmonising Enforcement Rules  
Negotiating a bilateral treaty may be significantly less complicated than negotiating a single 
multilateral one, as the participants need only adhere to the wills and interest of two parties. 
Negotiating a single international instrument on the recognition and enforcement has proven 
to be extremely complicated;
15
 partly because each participating country has its own agenda 
and each country has different interests at stake.
16
 In addition, negotiating a bilateral treaty 
rather than a multilateral treaty narrows the scope of controversy and the number of disputed 
points. Since each country involved in international negotiations tries to promote the 
inclusion of its own interests in the final draft, it is harder to bridge the gaps between more 
than two participants and consider all of these interests. Furthermore, in bilateral negotiations 
there is a better opportunity to address specific issues and gaps, and in certain situations even 
an opportunity to solve the problems by making certain adjustments in the substantive laws of 
the negotiating parties. This is more complicated to do in multilateral negotiations.
17
 
 
Bilateralism is, however, not an unmitigated blessing. A series of bilateral treaties would 
require several rounds of negotiations with each State. Each treaty finally adopted would 
differ in at least some of its provisions from the treaties on the same subject concluded with 
each State. This would confront lawyers with a different text for every country that is adopted 
and enters into force. Every such bilateral treaty would need to be ratified and each might 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 Official Journal (L 
229) (‘Brussels Convention’): Article 55 of the Convention included a list of 18 bilateral treaties dealing 
with recognition and enforcement amongst the Member States which the Convention superseded: see 
Brussels Convention art 55; Chapter 1 para 4.1 above. 
14
  See para 5 below. 
15
  See, for example, the Judgments Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which 
attempted to conclude a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil and 
commercial judgments: para 2.1.2 below.  
16
 Oestreicher Y Recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments: analysis and 
guidelines for a new international convention (Unpublished SJD Dissertation, Duke University School of 
Law, 2004) 202. 
17
 Oestreicher (note 16) 203. 
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require enactment of its own implementing legislation.
18
 The human and other resources that 
would need to be devoted to the adoption of a series of bilateral treaties and obtaining 
authorisation for the ratification of each treaty would be very great.
19
 For similar reasons the 
USA deemed the effort to negotiate a series of bilateral judgment treaties too resource 
intensive and not worthwhile.
20
 
 
The bilateral negotiation processes are also likely to produce diverse standards for the 
recognition of judgments from different countries. Creating a single international instrument 
to regulate the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may require 
participating countries to compromise on some of the issues about which they have very 
strong feelings. It would require the participants to be attentive to the needs of others, 
knowing that others would be attentive to theirs. This will not be easy because ‘better the 
devil we know – and have learned to live with – than the devil we do not know’.21 Once 
bilateral treaties flourish, inconsistencies and complexities are unavoidable - only multilateral 
conventions can truly assure uniformity.
22
 Even negotiations between two countries that 
presumably share similar ideas and values are not always likely to succeed because there will 
be some differences between even the most similar countries that under certain circumstances 
may be impossible to bridge.
23
 A weakness of international conventions is, therefore, that the 
degree of unification achieved is often restricted, as they result from compromises between 
negotiating States.
24
 
 
1.2 Multilateral Conventions as Means of Harmonising Recognition and Enforcement 
Rules 
A further possibility for harmonisation is a multilateral recognition and enforcement 
agreement or convention, which may offer a feasible possibility for harmonisation or 
                                                 
18
 Pfund P ‘The Project of The Hague Conference on Private international Law to Prepare a Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition/enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (1998-1999) 
24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law  10. 
19
 Pfund (note 18) 10. 
20
 Pfund (note 18) 10. 
21
 Von Mehren T ‘Drafting a Convention in international jurisdiction and the effects of foreign judgments 
acceptable world-wide: can the Hague Conference project succeed?’ (2001) 49(2) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 201. 
22
 Juenger (note 13) 8. 
23
 Oestreicher (note 16) 204. 
24
 Mistelis LA ‘Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, harmonisation, legal transplants and law reform: Some 
fundamental observations (2000) 34 The International Lawyer 1060. 
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unification in SACU. The approach of a multilateral convention has been particularly 
successful within a Common Market, as the European Brussels Regime demonstrates,
25
 but 
has also been successful in the context of lesser integrated communities such as the European 
Free Trade Area
26
 and Organisation of American States.
27
  
 
Although it may have some disadvantages,
28
 a multilateral instrument on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments would have three advantages for all parties concerned.
29
 
First, a convention would roughly ensure equality between the practices of the contracting 
States. Secondly, a recognition and enforcement convention could deal with the practice of 
permitting the use of unreasonable or exorbitant jurisdictional bases against persons not 
domiciled in a contracting State, and requiring that other contracting States recognise and 
enforce any resulting judgment. Thirdly, treaty regulation would clarify and simplify 
recognition and enforcement practices and procedures, and as a result a party holding a 
judgment rendered in, or contemplating initiating litigation in, a contracting State could 
ascertain relatively quickly and easily the effects that a judgment would have in another 
contracting State if recognition or enforcement were sought in its courts.
30
 
 
Many challenges that SACU will experience in the harmonisation of the rules on recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments are likely to have already been experienced, and 
possibly addressed, by previous attempts to harmonise such rules on an international or 
regional level. The rich jurisprudence in these areas may be able to provide insights for 
SACU in its efforts to establish a multilateral recognition and enforcement regime.  
 
                                                 
25
 Juenger is however cautions that such regional schemes can be faulted for discriminating against outsiders: 
see Juenger (note 13) 9. 
26
  See Lugano Convention, discussed in para 3.1 below. 
27
  See Montevideo and La Paz Conventions, discussed in para 3.4 below. 
28
  Like any instrument of international law-making process, multilateral treaties has to be negotiated, signed 
and ratified by the participating States. Reservations and denunciation, to which it may be subject, may make 
it less attractive as a vehicle of legal integration, and there is also run the risk of it being compromised in the 
course of its transformation into national law: Lasok D & Stone PA Conflict of Laws in the European 
Community (1987) 85. 
29
 Von Mehren AT ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague 
Conference?’ (1994) 57(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 278. 
30
 Von Mehren (note 29) 279. 
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2 HARMONISATION OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
2.1 The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (‘the Hague Conference’) is an inter-
governmental organisation with 72 Members: 71 States and one Regional Economic 
Community, the European Union and was established more than 100 years ago.
31
 The Hague 
Conference was organised to promote the progressive unification of the rules of private 
international law.
32
 It achieves its purpose by negotiating and preparing draft international 
conventions on private international law matters,
33
 including rules on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.
34
 The Hague Conference has traditionally been a 
professional and non-political forum of experts in the area of private international law.
35
 
 
One of the most significant developments by the Hague Conference with regard to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is the Hague Judgments Project. 
 
                                                 
31
 Hague Conference ‘Parties’ available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing (accessed 30 
August 2012). 
32
 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 31, 1951 (1951) 220 U.N.T.S. 121. 
33
  Examples of conventions concluded by the Hague Conference Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil 
procedure; Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of goods; Convention of 
15 April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the selected forum in the case of international sales of goods; 
Convention of 15 June 1955 relating to the settlement of the conflicts between the law of nationality and the 
law of domicile; Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages; 
Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency; Convention of 25 October 1980 on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; Convention of 25 October 1980 on International Access to 
Justice; Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children; Convention of 
23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance; and the Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations: 
see Hague Conference ‘Conventions’ available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.listing 
(accessed 10 February 2013). 
34
  See, for example the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, (1971) 1144 U.N.T.S.249, Chapter 3, para 2.  
35
 Murphy SD ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’ (2001) 95 American 
Journal of International Law 420. 
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2.1.2 The Hague Judgments Project 
The Hague Conference concluded its first multilateral international judgments convention in 
1971, but this Convention was not widely accepted and ratified.
36
 In 1992, more than two 
decades after the completion of the 1971 Hague International Judgments Convention, there 
was a renewed interest in negotiating an international judgments Convention, which was 
largely due to the initiative of the United States of America (USA).
37
 The USA proposed that 
the Hague Conference take up a negotiation of a convention that regulates recognition and 
enforcement of judgments on a multinational basis.
38
 The USA was at that stage not a party 
to any bilateral or multilateral convention on the recognition of foreign judgments.
39
 They 
accordingly sought to create a basis on which parties could enforce American judgments 
without American litigants having to re-litigate abroad.
40
 
 
Negotiations at the Hague Conference started at the beginning of 1993 towards the creation 
of an international convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.
41
 The Hague Conference identified three options which would be open to 
Member States of the Conference that saw the need for a convention on jurisdiction and 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The options were: (a) acceding to the 
Lugano Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments, which 
is in force between the European Free Trade Area Members, and open to accession by any 
third State;
42
 (b) becoming a party to the 1971 Hague Convention and its Protocol;
43
 or (c) 
                                                 
36
  See note 34 above. This Convention is discussed in Chapter 3, para 2 below, including the possible reasons 
for the failure of the Convention.  
37
  Schulze C ‘The 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements’ (2007) 19 South African Mercantile Law Journal 
140. 
38
 Hague Conference ‘Some reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a general convention on enforcement of 
judgments’ Preliminary Document No 17 of May 1992 (1992) 231.  
39
 The USA is not a member of either the Brussels or Lugano Conventions. This raised concerns in the 
American government that US citizens could be sued in US states while American judgments are not 
recognised and enforced abroad, thus putting Americans at a disadvantage: see Murphy (note 35) 418-19; 
Berlin M ‘Note and Comment: The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Creating an 
International Framework for recognising foreign judgments’ (2006) 3 Brigham Young University 
International Law and Management Review 43; Weintraub RJ ‘How substantial is our need for a judgments 
recognition convention and what should we bargain away to get it?’ (1998-1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 167-8. 
40
 Teitz LE ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating party autonomy and providing an alternative 
to arbitration’ (2005) 53 The American Journal of Comparative Law 544.  
41
 Schulze (note 37) 40; Woestehoff K The drafting process for a Hague Convention on jurisdiction and 
judgments with special consideration of intellectual property and e-commerce (Unpublished LLM Thesis, 
University of Georgia School of Law, 2005) 15. 
42
  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (done 16 
September 1988, entered into force 1 January 1992) Official Journal L319/9 (hereafter ‘1988 Lugano 
Convention’). Accession to the Lugano Convention was a possibility for some States; however, accession 
was only possible on invitation and with the consent of all Contracting States. Unlike the Brussels 
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negotiating and becoming party to a new convention on jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.
44
 The third option included the following possibilities: a Lugano 
type convention, based on direct grounds of jurisdiction;
45
 a 1971 Hague Convention type, 
based on indirect grounds of jurisdiction,
46
 or, as suggested in the USA proposal, an 
                                                                                                                                                        
Regulation (Convention), which is open only to EU members, the Lugano Convention is open to accession, 
but only on the invitation of a Contracting State and with the consent of all Contracting EC and EFTA States 
and, even then, any Contracting state can refuse to apply the Convention in the relations to the acceding 
State (Lugano Convention Article 62, par 1(b) and 4). Moreover, the Lugano Convention’s solutions may 
pose problems to some States. For example, the fact that the requested court would not be able to review the 
jurisdictional grounds assumed by the rendering court may not be acceptable to some States; the system may 
be too rigid for some States; and there may be States which find some of the jurisdictional bases either 
overly broad or overly restrictive: Hague Conference (note 38) 234. 
43
  Becoming a party to the 1971 Hague Convention and its Protocol, and concluding the Supplementary 
Agreements was posed as a second option, ‘which should perhaps not be too readily excluded’, as the 
Convention and its Protocol are in force as international instruments and no major objections have been 
raised against it, except for its complicated form: Hague Conference (note 38) 234. 
44
  The original idea for a Judgments Convention came from a letter to the Hague Conference from the Legal 
Adviser at the US Department of State in May 1992, at which point the idea of a mixed convention was first 
introduced: Beaumont P ‘Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, 
Analysis and Current Status’ 2009 Journal of Private International Law 128. They proposed the following:  
 ‘While taking account of the 1971 Hague Convention, we would propose that the Hague Conference 
build on the Brussels and Lugano Conventions in seeking to achieve a convention that is capable of 
meeting the needs of and being broadly accepted by the larger community represented by the Member 
States of the Hague Conference. For example, it appears that it might be possible to accept certain of the 
bases for recognition and enforcement of judgments set out in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and 
thereby makes provision for a generally accepted system for use in Europe and beyond. However, other 
aspects of these Conventions may not be so broadly acceptable and would need change to accommodate 
the needs and preferences of countries from other regions of the world than Western Europe. It seems to 
us that we are need not necessarily choose between a traité simple dealing essentially only with those 
judgments that are entitled to recognition and enforcement in party States, and a traité double also 
dealing with permissible bases of jurisdiction for litigation involving persons or entities habitually 
resident in party States. We believe that there should be consideration of the possibility for party States 
to utilise jurisdictional bases for litigation that are not designated as permissible or exorbitant by the 
convention.’ 
 Letter from United States Department of State to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law dated 5 May 1992, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65973.pdf 
(accessed 14 February 2013).    
45
  Direct jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of a court adjudicating the merits of a case, as opposed to 
‘indirect jurisdiction’, which is used only where a requested court has to ascertain whether the rendering 
court had jurisdiction: see Chapter 3 para 1. Section 2 of the Lugano Convention provides detailed rules as to 
where a person domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in another Contracting State under the 
Convention, as well as which courts have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: Lugano Convention 
(note 42) arts 5, 16. 
46
  Article 10 of the 1971 Hague Convention lists the circumstances when the court of the State of origin will be 
considered to have jurisdiction for the purposes of recognition and enforcement: see Chapter 3 para 2.3.  
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intermediate (mixed) type convention,
47
 allowing states to assume jurisdiction on grounds 
that are not designated as either permissible or prohibited (exorbitant)
48
 by the convention.
49
 
 
Against this background, the Hague Conference determined that it would be advantageous to 
draft a broad instrument establishing jurisdiction in almost all fields of civil and commercial 
law and guaranteeing the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.
50
 From 1996 
to 2001, the Hague Conference conducted negotiations on a Convention that would deal with 
both the assumption of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, leaning towards existing double conventions
51
 such as the 1968 
European Brussels Convention
52
 and the Lugano Convention.
53
 These efforts resulted in a 
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters,
54
 and an Interim Text.
55
 
 
                                                 
47
  Similar to a double convention, a ‘mixed convention’ contains a list specifying approved grounds of 
jurisdiction. Judgments rendered in a contracting state and resting on an approved jurisdictional basis are 
entitled to recognition and enforcement under the convention. However, unlike a true double convention, the 
a mixed convention allows contracting states to assume jurisdiction on other jurisdictional bases not listed in 
the convention and a state may, unless the convention expressly provides otherwise, grant recognition and 
enforcement under its general law: see Von Mehren (note 29) 283. 
48
 Jurisdiction may be regarded as exorbitant when the court seized does not possess a sufficient connection 
with the parties to the case, the circumstances of the case, the cause or subject of the action, of fails to take 
into account of the principle of the proper administration of justice. An exorbitant form of jurisdiction is one 
which is solely intended to promote political interests, without taking into consideration the interests of the 
parties to the dispute: Hague Conference ‘International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ Preliminary Document No 7 of April 1997 (1997) 8, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3490&dtid=35 (accessed 14 February 
2013) (hereinafter ‘Kessedjian Report’). 
49
  Hague Conference (note 38) 234. See Chapter 3 para 1 for an overview of multilateral recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgment convention types.  
50
  For a summary of the history of this project, see Hague Conference ‘Continuation of Judgments Project’ 
Preliminary Document No 14 of February 2010 (2010) 3-5, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd14e.pdf (accessed 14 February 2013). 
51
  A double convention in the context of recognition and enforcement contains rules on both direct jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and can be distinguished from single conventions 
which only contains rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This is discussed in 
Chapter 3 para 1. 
52
  The Brussels Convention has been replaced by the Brussels I Regulation: see para 3.1.1 below for a 
discussion of the Brussels Convention/Regulation and Chapter 4 para 2 for an overview of multilateral 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment convention types. 
53
  See para 3.1.2 below for a discussion of the Lugano Convention. 
54
  This was completed by a Preliminary Document drawn up by Nygh and Pocar: see Nygh P & Pocar F 
‘Report on the preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
matters’ Preliminary Document No 11 of August 2000 available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3497&dtid=35 (accessed 14 Feb 2013) 
(hereafter ‘Nygh & Pocar Report’). 
55
  This text excluded matters of family law, insolvency, social security, arbitration and maritime matters. 
Hague Conference ‘Interim Text – Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First 
Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001’ available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf (accessed 14 February 2013).  
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Following further work the Hague Conference decided in 2003 that the negotiations should 
be limited to issues of jurisdiction relating to choice of court agreements and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments rendered by the agreed court. The negotiations resulted into 
the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
56
 adopted in June 2005, which was a much 
narrower product than originally envisaged.
57
 
 
In April 2010, while discussing future work in the area of international litigation to 
supplement the on-going efforts to ensure wide ratification of the Choice of Court 
Convention, the Hague Conference recalled ‘the valuable work which has been done in the 
course of the Judgments Project and noted this could possibly provide a basis for further 
work’.58 Three options for future work were presented for consideration: continuing with a 
convention dealing with both primary grounds of jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments; continuing with a convention on recognition and enforcement of 
judgments (i.e. without direct grounds of jurisdiction); and continuing with a model 
agreement.
59
 The Permanent Bureau (the Secretariat of the Hague Conference) proposed as a 
first step convening a group of experts to advise on the areas where it might be feasible to 
resume work on judgments, and where consensus might be possible.
60
 The expert group’s 
2012 meeting recommended that work be undertaken towards a future binding instrument 
making provision for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, including jurisdictional 
filters.
61
 In addition, a further meeting of the expert group would be convened to consider 
matters of direct jurisdiction.
62
 
 
                                                 
56
  Hague Conference on Private International Law Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, 
44 I.L.M. 1294. 
57
  Hague Conference (note 50) 5; Schulze (note 37) 40. 
58
  Hague Conference ‘On-going work on international litigation and possible continuation of the judgments 
project’ Preliminary Document 5 of March 2012 (2012) 4. 
59
  In 2002 the Hague Conference, being faced with the practical impossibility for lack of time of exploring in 
more detail the possibility of adding grounds of jurisdiction to choice of court agreements, suggested that 
these other grounds of jurisdiction might be dealt with in a non-binding model agreement. This possibility 
was not further explored by the Conference, but the idea was not new. It had also been considered in the 
1971 Convention, but was then rejected because it was considered more complicated and less likely to lead 
to a homogeneous network of treaties than the (bilateralised) uniform Convention system. The Conference 
concluded that a model agreement is an option to be considered only if it is not possible to proceed along the 
lines of a binding instrument: Hague Conference (note 50) 7. 
60
 Hague Conference (note 50) 7. 
61
  The term ‘jurisdictional filters’ refers to jurisdictional criteria for recognition and enforcement of judgments; 
also sometimes referred to as ‘indirect grounds of jurisdiction’: see Chapter 3, para 1. 
62
 Hague Conference ‘Conclusions and recommendations of the Expert Group on possible future work on 
Cross-border litigation in civil and commercial matters’ Working Document No 2 of April 2012 (2012). 
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The Hague Judgments Project ultimately failed in its aim of concluding a global convention 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, to replace the, also unsuccessful, 
1971 Hague Convention.
63
 The outcome of the Judgments Project was a very narrow 
Convention,
64
 which was also not successful in terms of ratification, although as this is still a 
relatively new Convention, it may still receive wider ratification.
65
 Despite these failures, the 
negotiations may nevertheless prove valuable and form the basis of negotiations for future 
attempts at a global recognition and enforcement convention.
66
 Should the Hague Conference 
ultimately succeed in concluding a widely accepted recognition and enforcement of 
judgments convention this would significantly improve the current situation and create an 
enforcement regime similar to the New York Convention achieved more than 50 years ago.  
 
The Hague Conference is the primary global organisation focusing on the harmonisation of 
private international law, but the harmonisation of private international law may also be 
influenced by the work of other intergovernmental organisations, which is now discussed.  
 
2.2 Some Other Intergovernmental and Private Organisations 
International organisation that may play a role in the harmonisation or unification of private 
international law, include the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and the International Organisation for Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT).  
 
2.2.1 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNCITRAL plays an important role the development of an improved legal framework for the 
facilitation of international trade and investment.
67
 Its mandate is to further the progressive 
harmonisation and modernisation of the law of international trade by preparing and 
promoting the use and adoption of legislative and non-legislative instruments in certain 
                                                 
63
  See note 34. 
64
  See note 56; Schulze (note 37) 40. 
65
  See Chapter 3, para 3 below for a discussion of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention. See, for 
example, the La Paz Convention (Chapter 3, para 5 below) as an indication of the long time period certain 
judgments conventions may take to receive the required ratifications.  
66
  Hague Conference (note 58) 4. 
67
 UNCITRAL was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. 
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fields
68
 of commercial law.
69
 UNCITRAL fulfils its mandate by promoting wider 
participation and acceptance of existing international conventions,
70
 model and uniform 
laws,
71
 as well as preparing and promoting the adoption of new ones; promoting the 
codification and wider acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs and 
practices; and promoting the means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and application of 
international trade conventions and uniform laws.
72 
 
An important instrument that falls within the ambit of recognition and enforcement is the 
1958 UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(known as the ‘New York Convention’).73 The Convention is the most successful multilateral 
instrument in the field of international trade law.
74
 It provides for the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of another Contracting State.
75
 
Contracting States have a general obligation to recognise such awards as binding and to 
enforce them in accordance with their rules of procedure.
76
 A party seeking enforcement of a 
foreign award needs to supply the court with the arbitral award and the arbitration 
agreement.
77
 The party against whom enforcement is sought can object to the enforcement by 
                                                 
68
 Such as dispute resolution, international contract practices, transport, insolvency, electronic commerce, 
international payments, secured transactions, procurement and sale of goods.   
69
 UNCITRAL ‘Basic facts about the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ (2010) 2 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/06-50941_Ebook.pdf (accessed 17 February 
2013). 
70
 UNCITRAL has prepared a number of important conventions, including on Carriage of Goods by Sea 
(1978); Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980); International Bills of Exchange and 
International Promissory Notes (1988); Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit (1995); and 
the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (2005): UNCITRAL 
(note 69) 11. 
71
 Various model laws with guide to enactments have also been drafted, including on the subjects of 
international commercial arbitration, international credit transfers (1992); procurement of goods, 
construction and services (1994); electronic commerce (1996); cross-border insolvency (1997); electronic 
signatures (2001); and international commercial conciliation (2002) UNCITRAL (note 69) 39. 
72
 UNCITRAL General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI), sect. II, para 8. UNCITRAL’s work is organised and 
conducted at three levels: the first level is UNCITRAL itself, often referred to as the Commission, which 
works through and annual plenary session. The second level is the intergovernmental working groups, which 
to a large extent undertake the development of the topics on UNCITRAL’s work programme, while the third 
is the secretariat, which assists the Commission and its working groups in the preparation and conduct of 
their work: UNCITRAL (note 69) 5,6. 
73
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (‘New York Convention’). 
74
 International Council for Commercial Arbitration ‘ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York 
Convention: A guide for judges' (2011) iv available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/13365477041670/judges_guide_english_composite_final_revised_may_2012.pdf (accessed 
22 July 2012) (herein after ‘ICCA’).  
75
 New York Convention (note 73) art I. 
76
 New York Convention (note 73) art III. 
77
 New York Convention (note 73) art IV. 
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submitting proof of one of the listed grounds for refusal.
78
 The court may of its own motion 
refuse enforcement for reasons of public policy.
79
 In addition to recognition of enforcement, 
one of the actions the Convention contemplates is that a court should refer a matter to 
arbitration if there is an agreement to that effect. When court of a Contracting State is seized 
of a matter in respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement the court must 
refer them to arbitration at the request of one of the parties.
80
 This will not be required if the 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
81
 The 
arbitration agreement must, however, satisfy the requirements laid down in the Convention, 
which include in particular that the agreement be in writing.
82
 
 
The success of modern international commercial arbitration has been built on the twin pillars 
of the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1985 (amended 2006).
83
 The latter forms the basis for States without an 
                                                 
78
 Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if it is proved that -   
a) The parties to the agreement were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made;  
b) The party against who the award is invoked was not given proper notice;  
c) The award deals with a difference not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;  
d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or in the absence of an agreement, not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place; or 
e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent 
authority in which, or under whose law, that award was made.  
Recognition and enforcement may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that - 
a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country; or 
b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country: New 
York Convention (note 73) art V(2). 
79
 New York Convention (note 73) art V(2). 
80
 New York Convention (note 73) art II(3). 
81
  New York Convention (note 73) art II(2). 
82
 ‘Each Contracting State shall recognise an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit 
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration’: New York Convention (note 73) art II(1),(2).  
83
  UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration on 21 June 1985. The General 
Assembly, in its resolution 40/72 of 11 December 1985 recommended that ‘all States give due consideration 
to the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in view of the desirability of the law of arbitral 
procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice’. The Model Law was 
amended by UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006. The Model Law constitutes a basis for the harmonisation and 
improvement of national laws. It covers all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitral agreement, the 
composition and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and the extent of court intervention through to the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. Since its adoption by UNCITRAL, the Model Law has 
come to represent the accepted international legislative standard for a modern arbitration law and a 
significant number of jurisdictions have enacted arbitration legislation based on the model law: UNCITRAL 
‘Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial 
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arbitration law to adopt a ready-made law or to substitute it for a law that is out of date. Some 
jurisdictions which have not enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law have enacted new 
legislation, which, although not exactly the Model Law, is based essentially upon it. All this 
have contributed greatly to achieving the harmonisation of international arbitration law, 
which in turn, assists in achieving predictability and certainty – qualities much desired by the 
international business community.
84
 
 
2.2.2 International Organisation for Unification of Private Law 
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is an independent 
intergovernmental organisation operating worldwide. It has since 1926 been preparing 
international instruments
85
 in the fields of international trade law and uniform private law in 
general.
86
 UNIDROIT is based in Rome and operates on the basis of a mandate from its 
Member States
87
 and collaborates with non-Member States, intergovernmental, regional and 
international organisations, and national institutions, in particular universities and 
professional associations. UNIDROIT studies needs and methods for modernising, 
harmonising and co-ordinating private and, in particular, commercial laws between States 
and groups of States. UNIDROIT prepares uniform rules for the unification 
                                                                                                                                                        
Arbitration as amended in 2006’ available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-
86998_Ebook.pdf  (accessed 15 February 2013). 
84
 ICCA (note 74) xi; see also Mistelis (note 24) 1057. 
85
  This includes conventions, uniform laws and principles. UNIDROIT previously directed its activities 
exclusively towards international conventions, but several conventions were never signed or ratified by the 
required number of states. As a result, the project which originally started out as the ‘Progressive 
Codification of International Commercial Law’ was later categorised as a legal guide to show its flexibility 
for adaptation and termed the ‘Principles for International Commercial Contracts’. The Principles are 
accompanied by comments, which include illustrations of their content and scope and references to other 
pertinent international instruments of unified law.  The Principles may serve as model law that could inspire 
legislators who strive for law reform and may serve to enlighten parties negotiating a contract in order to 
identify the problems to be resolved in their contracts. Parties to an international contract could also choose 
the Principles as the law applicable to their contract: Yuejiao Z ‘Harmonization of contract law and its 
impact on China‘s contract law’ Modern Law for Global Commerce Congress to celebrate the fortieth 
annual session of UNCITRAL Vienna, 9-12 July 2007 2. 
86
 UNIDROIT (‘Institut International pour l’Unification du Droit’) was founded in 1926 under the auspices of 
the League of Nations, but is now an independent international organisation. 
87
  UNIDROIT has 63 member States from the five continents at different levels of economic development and 
representing the different legal traditions: see UNIDROIT ‘Membership’ available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/members/main.htm (accessed 8 August 2012). 
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of substantive law and only includes uniform conflict of law rules incidentally.
88
 UNIDROIT 
has also adopted a number of Conventions and Protocols.
89
 
 
An example of the importance of the work of UNIDROIT is the fact that it assisted the 
Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA)
90
 in drafting a 
Uniform Act on Contract Law for its sixteen Member States.
91
 OHADA has now completed 
eight Uniform Acts
92
 and further Acts are being prepared. Following its meeting in Bangui in 
March 2001 it decided to include contract law in the harmonisation programme. At its 
meeting in Brazzaville in February 2002 the OHADA Council of Ministers instructed the 
Permanent Secretariat to approach UNIDROIT for assistance. They specified that the text to 
be drafted by UNIDROIT should take account of recent international trends in contract law 
and reconcile the concerns of the romano-germanic and common law legal systems.
93
 
 
                                                 
88
 UNIDROIT ‘UNIDROIT: An overview’ available at http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 
(accessed 8 August 2012). 
89
 These include the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (The Hague, 
1964) (ULIS) and Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (The Hague, 1964) (ULIF). These two instruments were rendered largely redundant since the 
adoption of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Other Conventions include the 
Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods (Geneva, 1983); Convention on International 
Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 1988); Convention on International Factoring (Ottawa, 1988); Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 2001); Protocol to the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town, 2001). UNIDROIT 
‘Conventions’ available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm (accessed 10 August 
2012). 
90
  OHADA was created by the Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa signed on 17 October 
1993 at Port-Louis (Mauritius). It is open to any State in the African continent. The Organisation aims at 
establishing a unified, secure and up-to-date legal environment with a view to boosting economic activity 
and investment in its member States. The constitutive treaty states as its objective the harmonisation of 
business law in the States Party by means of the elaboration and adoption of simple, modern rules geared to 
the state of their economies, by implementing appropriate judicial procedures, and by promoting recourse to 
arbitration for the settlement of disputes arising out of contracts: Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business 
Law In Africa (JO OHADA N° 4), 1 November 1997 available at 
http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/HTML/legal_review/Annexes/Annexes%20III/Annex%20III-
06.pdf  accessed on 17 April 2013 [‘OHADA Treaty’].  
91
  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. The accession of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is underway. 
92
  On general commercial law (1997); on commercial companies and economic interest groups (1997); on 
organising securities (1997); on simplified recovery procedures and measures of execution (1998); on 
organizing collective proceedings for wiping off debts (1998); arbitration law within the framework of the 
OHADA Treaty (2000); on organizing and harmonizing company accounting systems (2000); on contracts 
for the carriage of goods by road (2003). 
93
  UNIDROIT ‘Preparation by UNIDROIT of a draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law’ available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/legalcooperation/ohada.htm (accessed 10 March 2013). 
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Against this background, UNIDROIT acceded to the request of the OHADA Council of 
Ministers by providing the necessary expertise for the preparation of a draft Uniform Act.
94
 
The objectives and drafting methods were decided jointly by the OHADA and UNIDROIT 
Secretariats. Following preparatory work and broad consultations with African experts and 
specialists, UNIDROIT completed a preliminary draft Uniform Act on Contract Law, 
accompanied by an Explanatory Note. These texts were transmitted for consideration by the 
UNIDROIT Secretariat to the OHADA Permanent Secretariat in February 2005. Once this 
round of consultations is complete, the preliminary draft will be finalised at a meeting of the 
national commissions to be convened by the Permanent Secretariat of OHADA with a view 
to its adoption by the Council of Ministers of OHADA as soon as the Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration of OHADA has issued a favourable opinion on the text.
95
 
 
The cooperation of UNCITRAL with OHADA, a regional economic community of which the 
Members come from different legal traditions,
96
 illustrates the importance and relevance of 
UNIDROIT. UNIDROIT may, therefore, also offer valuable assistance to the SACU should 
Member States in future decide to attempt a similar effort to OHADA, and negotiate uniform 
laws on specific matters falling within the mandate of UNCITRAL. 
 
2.3 Evaluation of international harmonisation efforts 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, despite its failure to conclude a 
successful recognition and enforcement convention, nevertheless contributes significantly 
towards the harmonisation of private international law in the fields of international legal 
cooperation and litigation and international finance law, as can be seen by the work that it 
produces, including 39 Conventions.
97
 
 
The work of the UNCITRAL is mostly focused on international trade law and, therefore, only 
impacts on private international law incidentally. It has, however, made a significant 
                                                 
94
  The expertise was provided in the person of Professor Marcel Fontaine (Emeritus Professor, former Director 
of the Centre de droit des obligations, Faculty of Law, Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, 
and member of the UNIDROIT Working Group for the preparation of the UNIDROIT Principles), with the 
financial support of the Swiss Government, Development and Cooperation Office: See UNIDROIT (note 
93). 
95
  Draft text and explanatory note available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/legalcooperation/ohada.htm 
(accessed 10 March 2013). 
96
  See note 91. 
97
  Hague Conference ‘Conventions’ available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.listing 
(accessed 10 March 2012). 
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contribution to the harmonisation of private international law in the field of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards through the New York Convention.
98
  
 
Despite the above successes, however, the present situation remains unsatisfactory due to the 
lack of an international convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
comparable to that of the New York Convention.
99
 
 
These global harmonisation and unification efforts, have to some degree been accompanied 
by the harmonisation of various laws, and especially the rules on the recognition and 
enforcements have also taken place on a regional level, generally within the context of a 
regional economic community, such as the European Union (EU) or the Australia New 
Zealand Closer Economics Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), or grouping of 
geographically linked states, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS);
100
 as well 
as within a federation such as the USA. These regional efforts at harmonising or unifying the 
laws of their Member States on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are 
now discussed.  
 
                                                 
98
  See para 2.2.1 above. 
99
  See Chapter 1, para 3.1 above. 
100
  The Organisation of American States (OAS) is a regional international organisation that was founded on 30 
April 1948. Its Members are the 35 independent States of the Americas. The goal of the member nations in 
creating the OAS was ‘to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen 
their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence’ (art 1). 
The objectives of the OAS is to strengthen the peace and security of the continent [North and South 
America]; to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-
intervention; to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that 
may arise among the member states; to provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of 
aggression;  to seek the solution of political, judicial, and economic problems that may arise among them; to 
promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development; to eradicate extreme 
poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the peoples of the continent; to 
achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest 
amount of resources to the economic and social development of the member states (art 2): Charter of the 
Organization of American States, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force December 13, 1951. 
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3 HARMONISATION OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
3.1 European Community Brussels/Lugano Regime 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in European States has a long and 
complex history,
101
 with treaty law playing a prominent role.
102
  
 
The movement for legal unification and harmonisation gained momentum in Western Europe 
with the internationalisation of trade, investment and financing, assisted by the dynamics of 
economic integration.
103
 The European Community was established in 1957 with the entry 
into force of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (‘Treaty of Rome’)104 between 
Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Part one of the Treaty 
sets out the principles of the Community.
105
 In terms of article 2, the objective of the 
Community is to,   
‘by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of 
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging 
to it’.106 
 
Part two sets out the foundations and is divided into four titles, namely free movement of 
goods,
107
 agriculture,
108
 persons,
109
 services and capital, and transport.
110
 Part three contains 
                                                 
101
  The starting point for the history of the EU is usually stated to be at the end of World War II, although 
integration initiatives and ideologies existed long before then. After the war, European countries decided to 
take the first significant steps towards European integration. The Marshall Plan (American economic aid to 
Europe, as announced by the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, in June 1947) was of fundamental 
importance to European Integration, as it provided that recipient states must co-ordinate their activities and 
planning in order to obtain the maximum benefit from the European Recovery Plan. In 1948 the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) came into being, with the main purposes of 
meeting the requirements set up by the European Recovery Program. A political body to support European 
integration, the Council of Europe (CoE), was created in 1949. Its Statute was initially signed by Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden. The CoE was 
not given proper supranational powers, as its decisions required the unanimous votes of government 
representatives. Its creation is nevertheless seen as a decisive step towards a United Europe: Fazio S The 
Harmonisation Of International Commercial Law (2007) 49-51. 
102
 Nadelmann (note 3) 995. 
103
 Garro AM ‘Unification and harmonisation of private law in Latin America’ (1992) 40(3) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 587. 
104
  The Treaty Establishing the European Community signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 (1957) 298 UNTS 11 
(hereafter ‘Treaty of Rome’). 
105
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) arts 1-8.  
106
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) art 2. 
107
 Title I (free movement of goods) consists of Chapter 1: Customs Union (arts 18-29); and Chapter 2: 
Elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member states (arts 30-37): see Treaty of Rome (note 104). 
108
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) arts 38-47. 
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the policy of the Community;
111
 Part four deals with ‘Association of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories;
112
 Part five with the institutions of the Community
113
 and Part six deals with 
the general and final provisions.
114
 
 
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome required the then Member States
115
 to engage in further 
negotiations ‘with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the simplification of 
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments’.116 This 
stipulation was intended to encourage the free movement of judgments within the European 
Community, in the same manner that there was to be free movement of labour, services, 
goods and capital. It was, therefore, acknowledged that Europe could not effectively operate 
as a single market, or a single economic unit, until the laws, court decisions, and the official 
documents of its Member States were automatically recognised and respected throughout all 
parts of the region.
117
 
                                                                                                                                                        
109
  Title III consists of Chapter 1: Workers (arts 48-51); Chapter 2: Right of establishment (arts 52- 58); Chapter 
3: Services (arts 59-66); and Chapter 4: Capital (arts 67-73): see Treaty of Rome (note 104). 
110
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) arts 74-84.  
111
  Articles 85-130 consist of Title I: Common Rules; Title II: Economic Policy; Title III: Social Policy; and 
Title IV: The European Investment Bank: see Treaty of Rome (note 104).  
112
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) arts 131-136. 
113
  These include the Assembly (European Parliament) (arts 137-144); the Council (arts 145-154); the 
Commission (arts 155-163); the Court of Justice (arts 164-188); the Economic and Social Committee (arts 
193-198). 
114
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) arts 210-248. 
115
  The first enlargement occurred in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom formally joined the 
EEC, followed by Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986: European Union ‘The history of the 
European Union’ available at http://europa.eu/abc/history/1980-1989/index_en.htm (accessed 10 March 
2013). The Treaty on the European Union, which was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into 
force on 1 November 1993. The Maastricht Treaty introduced new forms of cooperation between the 
Member States’ governments and in the area of justice and home affairs. By adding this inter-governmental 
cooperation to the existing Community system, the Maastricht Treaty created a new structure with ‘three 
pillars’ which formed the European Union: European Union Treaties and law’ available at 
http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (accessed 10 March 2013).  A further enlargement took place in 
1995 with the new membership of Finland, Austria and Sweden: European Union ‘The history of the 
European Union: 1990-1999 A Europe without frontiers’ available at http://europa.eu/abc/history/1990-
1999/index_en.htm (accessed 10 March 2013). In 2004, a mainly Eastern enlargement took place when the 
EU was joined by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007, bringing the total membership to 
27 countries: European Union ‘2000 – Today: a further enlargement’ available at 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/2000_today/index_en.htm (accessed 10 March 2013). 
116
  Treaty of Rome (note 104) art 220. 
117
 Russel KA ‘Exorbitant jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments: the Brussels system as an impetus for the 
United States action’ (1993) 19 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 57. See also letter 
dated 22 October 1959  from the European Commission to Member States, in which it was recognised that 
‘legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the common market are essentially dependent on the adoption 
by the Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement of 
judgments’: Jenard P ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)’ (1979)  Official Journal of the European 
Communities No. C 59/1 (5 March 1979) (‘Jenard Report’) 3.  
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At the time of adoption of the Treaty of Rome domestic recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments rules among European States were restrictive and varied considerably.
118
 
States adopted bilateral treaties to solve difficulties relating to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, but there were striking differences between the various 
treaties.
119
 The treaties generally allowed the enforcing court to investigate the assertion of 
jurisdiction by the rendering court according to the enforcing court’s own jurisdiction rules, 
and addressed other questions such as whether the judgment was obtained by fraud, whether 
there was fair trial, and whether the defendant received due notice of the proceedings.
120
 
 
Although, theoretically, additional bilateral treaties could have been concluded so that the 
grid of treaties encompassed the entire community, unless all the treaties were re-negotiated, 
the problems of conflicting treaties and discrimination would have remained.
121
 As a result of 
the problems inherent to the negotiating of bilateral treaties, and the differences between the 
provisions of existing ones, Member States concluded that only a multilateral Convention 
would foster the desired free movement of judgments, and would not lead to unequal 
treatment of the various nationals of the Member States.
122
 
 
                                                 
118
 For example, the Netherlands would deny recognition and enforcement in the absence of a recognition and 
enforcement treaty; both France and Luxembourg permitted revision au fond in some circumstances (French 
courts abandoned révision au fond after 1964); Germany required reciprocity as a condition for recognition 
and enforcement; Belgium courts were allowed to re-examine foreign judgments. Italy denied judgments by 
default: Huang J Interregional Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: Lessons 
for China from US and EU Laws (unpublished SJD Thesis, Duke University School of Law, 2010) 21-2; 
Jenard Report (note 117) 6. 
119
 For example some, like those between France and Belgium, and between Belgium and the Netherlands, and 
the Benelux Treaty, were based on ‘direct’ jurisdiction, but all the others were based on ‘indirect’ 
jurisdiction; some conventions covered judgments given in civil matters by criminal courts, whilst others 
were silent on this point or expressly exclude such judgments from their scope, such as the Conventions 
between Italy and the Netherlands, and between Germany and Italy: Jenard Report (note 117) 7. 
120
 Oestreicher (note 16) 128. 
121
 Bartlett LS ‘Full faith and credit comes to the Common Market: An analysis of the provisions of the 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1975) 24 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45. Member States felt that the differences between the 
existing bilateral conventions would hinder the 'free movement' of judgments and lead to unequal treatment 
of the various nationals of the Member States, such inequality being contrary to the fundamental EEC 
principle of non-discrimination, set out, in particular, in art 7 of the Treaty of Rome: Jenard Report (note 
117) 7. Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome provides that ‘Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and 
without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be prohibited’. 
122
 Bartlett (note 121) 45. 
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The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters in 1968,
123
 was subsequently adopted by Member States, ‘desiring to 
implement the provisions of Article 220 of [the Treaty of Rome]’,124 and ‘considering that it 
is necessary … to determine the international jurisdiction of their courts, to facilitate 
recognition and to introduce an expeditious procedure for securing the enforcement of 
judgments’.125 The Convention contains detailed provisions on the assumption of jurisdiction 
by national courts of Member States in matters falling under the Convention,
126
 and provides 
for procedures for the recognition
127
 and enforcement
128
 of ensuing judgments.  
 
The Brussels Convention has been described as ‘the single most important private 
international law treaty in history’.129 The Convention has managed to bridge the gulf 
between common law and civil law jurisdictions and works well, despite national 
idiosyncrasies and linguistic difficulties.
130
 The Convention has also been called Europe’s 
‘full faith and credit clause’,131 comparing it to the constitutional requirement of USA States 
to afford full faith and credit to judgments from sister States.
132
 Hay
133
 suggests that this is an 
understatement and that the European recognition command is in fact stronger than required 
                                                 
123
 See Chapter 3 para 4 for a discussion of the provisions of the Brussels Convention. 
124
  By virtue of which they undertook to secure the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal 
enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals. 
125
  Brussels Convention (note 13) Preamble. 
126
 The Convention applies in civil and commercial matters, except to the extent that they are excluded by art 1 
of the Convention: Brussels Convention (note 13) art 1. The material scope of the Convention is discussed in 
Chapter 3, para 3.1 below. The Convention includes provisions on special jurisdiction, jurisdiction in matters 
relating to insurance, jurisdiction over consumer contracts, exclusive jurisdiction, prorogation of jurisdiction, 
examination as to jurisdiction and admissibility, lis pendens-related actions, and provisional, including 
protective, measures: Brussels Convention (note13) arts 2-25. The general rule established by the 
Convention is that persons domiciled in a Contracting State, whatever their nationality, must be sued in the 
courts of that State, and that persons domiciled in a Contracting State may only be sued in the courts of 
another Contracting State by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2-6 of the Convention: Brussels 
Convention (note 13) arts 2-3.  
127
 See Brussels Convention (note 13) Title III arts 25, 26-30. A judgment given in a Contracting State will 
generally be recognised in the other Contracting States without any special procedure being required, unless 
it falls under one of the instances listed in art 27 when a judgment will not be recognised, which is discussed 
in Chapter 3, para 4.3 below.  
128
  Title III Section 2 arts 31-45. The Convention generally provides that a judgment given in a Contracting 
State and enforceable there will be enforced in another Contracting State, of the order for its enforcement has 
been issued there, after an application to this effect has been made by any interested party, except in the 
United Kingdom, where a judgment will be enforced if it has been registered for enforcement: Brussels 
Convention (note 13) art 31. See Chapter 3, para 4.3 below for a discussion of these provisions. 
129
 Juenger FK ‘Some Comments on European Procedural Harmonization’ (1997) 45 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 933. 
130
 Juenger (note 129) 933. 
131
 Bartlett (note 121) 44. 
132
 This is discussed at paragraph 3.2 below. 
133
 Hay P ‘The development of the public policy barrier to judgment recognition within the European 
Community’ (2007) 6 The European Legal Forum 290. 
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by the US full faith and credit clause, because it is combined with jurisdictional bases that 
must be observed by rendering courts with respect to EU defendants. Review of jurisdiction 
is excluded, even for default judgments, except within a limited category of cases.
134
 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam
135
 changed the sphere of harmonising of private international law 
rules in the EU,
136
 by transferring the area private law within the bounds of judicial 
cooperation from the Third Pillar
137
 (intergovernmental cooperation in the field of Justice and 
Home Affairs) to the First Pillar (Community Law).
138
 This had the effect that the 
                                                 
134
 For example with respect to consumer transactions (arts 15-17); insurance (arts 3-14); and exclusive 
jurisdiction (arts 32 and 35(1)). 
135
 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Related Acts Official Journal C340, 10 November 1997.   
136
 Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland, however, enjoy a special regime as regards to Title IV of the EC 
Treaty, which constitute the legal basis for judicial cooperation in civil matters. Legal instruments adopted 
under Title IV of the EC Treaty are not binding or applicable in Denmark, while Ireland and the United 
Kingdom are bound by them if they notify the Council to that effect European Union ‘Judicial Cooperation 
in Civil Matters’ available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l16
016_en.htm (accessed 22 October 2012). 
137
 The ‘three pillars structure’ functioned on the basis of different decision-making procedures: the Community 
procedure for the first pillar, and the intergovernmental procedure for the other two. In the case of the first 
pillar, only the Commission could submit proposals to the Council and Parliament, and a qualified majority 
was sufficient for a Council act to be adopted. In the case of the second and third pillars, this right of 
initiative was shared between the Commission and the Member States, and unanimity in the Council was 
generally necessary. The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred some of the fields covered by the third pillar to 
the first pillar (free movement of persons): ‘Pillars of the European Union’ available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm (accessed 22 October 2012). The Pillar 
Structure has since been abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 
Official Journal C 306 of 17 December 2007).  
 The Treaty of Lisbon divides Union competences into three separate groups: exclusive competence, shared 
competence and supporting competence. When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a 
specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts; Member States will only be 
allowed to do so themselves if empowered by the Union, or for the implementation of Union Acts 
(Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 30 March 2010, C83/47 [‘TFEU’] art 2(1)). 
The areas in which the Union has exclusive competence include the customs union, the establishing of the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market and a common commercial policy. The 
Union also has exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement of which the 
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, or which is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence: art 3. When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the 
Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts in that area. The Member States may exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not 
exercised its competence, or to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence: art 
2(2). Principle areas in which the Union and the Member States share competence include the internal 
market, economic, social and territorial cohesion, consumer protection and transport (art 5). When the 
Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and 
the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States may 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence, or to the extent that 
the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence (art 2(2)). Principle areas in which the Union and 
the Member States share competence include the internal market, economic, social and territorial cohesion, 
consumer protection and transport (art 5). 
138
 Treaty of Amsterdam (note 135) art 2(15).  
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competence for coordination of internal rules on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments 
fell with the Community Institutions,
139
 and legislation on matters of private international law 
no longer had to be in the form of intergovernmental Conventions that had to be ratified and 
implemented by States, but could become directly applicable through community law.
140
 
Regulations have, since 1999, been accepted as the most important means for harmonising 
private international law rules in the EU.
141
  
 
The pre-1999 approach posed a number of challenges. The ratification procedures were 
generally slow, and each time a new Member joined the group, an accession treaty to each 
convention had to be negotiated and ratified. In addition, the European Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction to ensure the uniform interpretation of the conventions was limited.
142
 The 
adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam removed the risk that Members would fail to meet their 
obligations and that measures would not come into force, as was the case with, for example, 
the Insolvency Convention.
143
  
 
On 22 December 2000, the Council of the EU adopted the Brussels I Regulation.
144
 The basic 
framework of the Regulation remains similar to that of the Brussels Convention, although 
there are numerous changes on points of detail and some on matters of substance.
145
 The 
                                                 
139
 Woestehoff (note 41) 9.  
140
 TFEU (note 137) art 288 provides that to exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions shall adopt 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. A regulation has general application and is 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. A directive is binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods. A decision is binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom 
it is addressed is binding only on them. Recommendations and opinions have no binding force: see TFEU 
(note 137) art 288.  
141
 Regulations are the most direct from of EU law and as soon as they are passed, they have binding legal force 
throughout every Member State, on a par with national laws. National governments do not have to take 
action themselves to implement EU regulations: Boele-Woelki K ‘Unification and Harmonization of Private 
International Law in Europe’ in Basedow J, Meier I, Girsberger D, Einhorn T & Schnyder AK (eds) Private 
Law in the International Arena - From National Conflict Rules Towards Harmonization and Unification: 
Liber amicorum Kurt Siehr (2000) 62. 
142
 Bayraktaroğlu G ‘Harmonisation of private international law at different levels: Communitarization v. 
international harmonisation’ (2003) European Journal of Law Reform 134. 
143
  The Insolvency Convention failed to receive the required number of ratifications, and therefore never came 
into effect. However as a result of the changes brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was possible 
for the instrument came into immediate effect immediately as a Regulation: Basedow J ‘The 
communitarization of the conflict of laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 688. 
144
 Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters [2001] Official Journal L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’). 
145
 Although much of the Regulation is the same as the Convention, the similarities are partly obscured by 
structural changes. Renumbering was inevitable in the light of some of the changes made: the matters 
regulated in the Protocol to the Convention have been brought into the main text of the Regulation at various 
points. Other changes have been made with a view to simplifying the structure of the instrument (eg, the 
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Brussels Convention continues to apply with respect to those territories of EU countries that 
fall within its territorial scope and that are excluded from the regulation pursuant to art 299 of 
the Treaty of Rome.
146
 The Regulation is the fruit of renegotiations that began in 1997, where 
the original plan was to amend the Brussels and Lugano Conventions
147
 while retaining the 
parallelism between the two.
148
 The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam brought with 
it the expectation that the new instrument regulating jurisdiction and enforcement would be a 
Regulation and would pass through the Community law legislative provisions.
149
 Regulations 
contain unconditional mandatory provisions that are directly and uniformly applicable, and 
by their very nature, require no action by the Member States to transpose them into national 
law.
150
 
 
Chapter 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’)151 provides for 
the adoption of measures which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. Article 81 of the TFEU provides for the development of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters having cross-border implications - this is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases, which may include the 
                                                                                                                                                        
procedure for appeals). The list of exorbitant heads of jurisdiction (art 3), competent authorities to which an 
application can be made (arts 43 and 44) are contained in Annexes to the Convention; and the various Titles 
of the Convention are found as Chapters in the Regulation: See Brussels Convention (note 13); Brussels I 
Regulation (note 144). See also Kennet W (ed) ‘Current Developments, Private International law: The 
Brussels I Regulation’ (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 725-737 for a detailed 
comparison of the provisions of the Brussels Convention and Brussels Regulation. 
146
 European Union ‘Judicial cooperation in civil matters’ available at 
‘http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l33
054_en.htm (accessed 6 September 2012). 
147
 In 1997 the Council of the EU initiated a simultaneous revision of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, 
with the aim of fully harmonising the two Conventions and incorporating changes to resolve certain 
problems that had emerged in the course of the interpretation of the Conventions by the ECJ. It was felt that 
the two Conventions ought to be revised together in order, among other things, to keep them abreast of 
developments in international life and technology, in particular with regard to electronic commerce; to 
expedite the enforcement of judgments, a need later underlined by art 65 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
was not yet in force when the work began; to simplify aspects of jurisdiction and coordination between 
jurisdictions; to clarify points which were imprecise or which had been found problematic on application; 
and, finally, to adapt certain of the Convention’s provisions  to case law of the ECJ: see Pocar F ‘Convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed in 
Lugano on 30 October 2007 Explanatory Report’ Official Journal of the European Union 2009/C 319/01 
(hereafter ‘Pocar Report’) 1-2. 
148
  Kennet (note 145) 725. 
149
 Kennet (note 145) 725. The entering into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999 gave the 
European Community new powers with regard to judicial cooperation in civil matters, and prevented the 
draft proposal from becoming a new version of the Brussels Convention and, in parallel, of a new Lugano 
Convention. The draft was ‘frozen’ by the Council on 12 May 1999, pending presentation by the 
Commission, of a draft Community act which would replace the Brussels Convention in the community 
framework. On 14 July 1999, the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for a Community 
regulation, which was approved on 22 December 2000: see Pocar Report (note 147) 2.  
150
 Bayraktaroğlu (note 142) 145. 
151
 See note 137. 
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adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States.
152
 
 
The Brussels Regime is complemented by the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
153
 between non-EU European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) Member States and is analogous to the Brussels Regulation.
154
 The 
aim of the Convention is to strengthen in the territories the legal protection of persons 
established therein, and for this purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of the 
courts, to facilitate the recognition of judgments, and to introduce an expeditious procedure 
for securing their enforcement.
155
 The Convention sets out to extend to the Contracting 
Parties the principles of the Brussels I Regulation, and substantially reproduces its 
provisions.
156
 The parallelism with the Brussels I Regulation is referred to once again in the 
introduction to Protocol 2 to the Convention,
157
 which stresses the substantial link that exists 
between the two acts despite the fact that they remain distinct from one another.
158
 The 
structure of the Convention is consequently based on the principles of the Regulation.
159
  
                                                 
152
 In order to achieve such cooperation, the EU Parliament and Council must adopt measures, particularly 
when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, aimed at ensuring: (a) the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions in extrajudicial cases; (b) the cross-border service 
of judicial and extrajudicial documents; (c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member State 
concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; (d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; (e) effective access 
to justice; (f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by 
promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States; (g) the 
development of alternative methods of dispute settlement; and (h) support for the training of the judiciary 
and judicial staff: see TFEU (note 137) art 81. 
153
  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (done at 
Lugano on 30 October 2007) Official Journal L339/3 (‘2007 Lugano Convention). 
154
  The 2007 Lugano Convention replaced the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 16 September 1988, which was concluded between the 
Member States of the EC and certain Members of the EFTA. This was a ‘parallel convention’ to the Brussels 
Convention in 1968, which was concluded between the six original Members of the EC, and was amended 
several times thereafter to extend its application to new States that has acceded to the Community. After 
1988, several States that were parties to the Lugano Convention acceded to the European Community, and 
became parties to the Brussels Convention, which has since been replaced by the Brussels I Regulation: 
Pocar Report (note 147) 1.  
155
  Lugano Convention (note 153) Preamble.  
156
  Pocar Report (note 147) 4. 
157
  Protocol 2 on the uniform interpretation of the Convention and on the Standing Committee 21 December 
2007 Official Journal of the European Union L 339/27. 
158
 ‘Considering the substantial link between [the] Convention, the 1988 Lugano Convention, and … Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, as well as any amendments thereof, of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at Brussels on 27 September 1968, and of the Protocol 
on interpretation of that Convention by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, signed at 
Luxembourg on 3 June 1971, as amended by the Conventions of Accession to the said Convention and the 
said Protocol by the States acceding to the European Communities, as well as of the Agreement between the 
European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
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The Convention is a double convention governing, within its field of application,
160
 direct 
jurisdiction of the courts in the States that are bound by the Convention,
161
 coordination 
between courts in the event of competing jurisdiction, conditions for the recognition of 
judgment,
162
 and a simplified procedure for their enforcement.
163
 On each of these points the 
text of the new Convention diverges from that of the 1988 Convention, either because it has 
been aligned on the Brussels I Regulation, or because specific provision has been made to 
take account of subsequent developments in the case-law of the ECJ or to regulate the 
relationship between the Convention and the Regulation.
164
 
 
The next regional approach that is discussed is that of the USA.  
 
3.2 United States full faith and credit approach 
Recognition of sister-state judgments in the USA federal system
165
 is governed by the full 
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
166
 The need for internal regulation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Brussels on 19 October 2005’: see Protocol 2 (note 
157) Preamble. 
159
  Pocar Report (note 147) 4. 
160
  The material scope of the 2007 Convention has not been changed in any way with respect to the Lugano 
Convention of 1988, and the new wording is identical to that of the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I 
Regulation: see Pocar Report (note 147) 4. 
161
  Lugano Convention (note 153) arts 2-22. 
162
  Lugano Convention (note 153) arts 33-37. 
163
 A judgment given in a Contracting State and enforceable there will be enforced in other Contracting States, 
when it has been declared enforceable there, except in the United Kingdom, where it will be enforceable 
once it has been registered. Annex II lists the courts or competent authorities to whom the applications for 
enforcement must be submitt3ed, and the procedure for making the application is governed by the law of the 
State in which enforcement is sought: Lugano Convention (note 153) arts 38-40. 
164
  Pocar Report (note 147) 4. 
165
  In the United States there are complete systems of both federal and state courts whose work and 
responsibilities overlap and interrelate in various and complex ways. Thus state courts can apply federal law 
and federal courts, state law. Each state has, subject to any applicable treaty provisions and to certain 
controls based on provisions of the Constitution of the United States (in particular, the full faith and credit 
clause) its own system of procedure, of substantive law and of private international law. Consequently, a 
judgment rendered in one state of the United States is a product of a legal system that may differ in 
important respects both substantially and, though the various are portably less great, procedurally from the 
legal system of the sister state asked to enforce the judgment: see Von Mehren AT ‘Recognition and 
Enforcement in Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European 
Economic Community and the United States’(1981) 81 Columbia Law Review  1045. 
166
  Yntema HE ‘The enforcement of foreign judgments in Anglo-American law’ (1935) 33(8) Michigan Law 
Review 1148; Fitzpatrick J ‘The Lugano Convention and Western European integration: A comparative 
analysis of jurisdiction and judgments in Europe and the United States’ (1992-1993) 8 Connecticut Journal 
of International Law 718; Von Mehren (note 165) 1044; Silberman LJ ‘The impact of jurisdictional rules 
and recognition practice on international business transactions: the US Regime’ (2003-2004) Houston 
Journal of International Law 352; Homburger A ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: A 
New Yorker reflects on Uniform Acts’ (1970) 18 The American Journal of Comparative Law 367; Von 
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recognition of judgments was recognised at an early stage in the USA.
167
 Before the 
American Revolution a requested colony usually imposed very stringent requirements for 
verifying judgments from a sister colony. This resulted in enforcement proceedings which 
were tedious, expensive, time-consuming, and ‘at times impossible’, with sister States 
considering each other as foreign countries.
168
 The full faith and credit clause was aimed at 
establishing an inexpensive and simplified method of proving sister-State judgments, and also 
reflected the aspiration of uniting independent and sovereign American colonies into a 
political union.
169
 The framers of the Constitution realised that to achieve this, each state 
needed to forego some degree of its sovereignty for the benefit of establishing a unified 
country.
170
 They recognised that an essential feature of their federal system would be the 
requirement that the courts of the several States give ‘full faith and credit’ to the judgments of 
the courts of other States.
171
 
 
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of 1777 provided that ‘full 
faith and credit shall be given in each of the States to the … judicial proceedings of the courts 
and magistrates of every other State’.172 A full faith and credit clause of almost identical 
language was included in the USA Constitution, and requires that ‘full faith and credit shall 
be given in each State to the … judicial proceedings of every other State’.173 The purpose of 
this clause was to establish throughout the federal system the principle that litigation once 
pursued to judgment will be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in 
that where the judgment was rendered’.174 The full faith and credit clause contained explicit 
authorisation for legislative implementation
175
 by providing that Congress may ‘prescribe the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mehren AT & Trautman DT ‘Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach’ 
(1968) 81 Harvard Law Review 1601. 
167
  Nadelmann (note 3) 995. 
168
  Huang (note 118) 15. 
169
  Huang (note 118) 17. 
170
  Sumner JD ‘The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause – Its History and Purpose’ (1954-1955) 34 Oregon Law 
Review 241. 
171
  Walker ‘The utility of the ALI/UNIDROIT Project on principles and rules of transnational civil procedure’ 
(2001) 6(4) Uniform Law Review 807. 
172
 The Articles of Confederation was an agreement among the 13 founding states that established the United 
States of America as a confederation of sovereign states and served as its first constitution.  
173
 United States Constitution, Article IV Section 1.  
174
 Magnolia Petroleum Co v Hunt 320 US 430, 439 (1943) (indicating that the ‘clear purpose’ of the full faith 
and credit clause is to "establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that 
a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as 
in that where the judgment was rendered"); Huang (note 118) 15. 
175
 Reese WLM & Johnson VA ‘The Scope of the Full Faith and Credit to Judgments (1949) 49 Columbia Law 
Review 154. 
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manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof’.176 
In 1790 Congress enacted that ‘records and judicial proceedings, … shall have such faith and 
credit given to them in every Court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in 
the Courts of the state from whence they are taken or shall be taken’.177 
 
The Supreme Court held that a judgment was without force in sister states until reduced to a 
new judgment there,
178
 and that the jurisdiction of the rendering court remained subject to re-
examination in the second suit.
179
 The Court has enlarged the scope of the clause by limiting 
the defences which may be made in actions judgments: for example, a judgment must be 
enforced by the second State despite the fact that the underlying cause of action arose within 
the latter jurisdiction and is contrary to its public policy;
180
 and a state cannot escape its 
‘constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts 
otherwise competent’.181   
 
A basic feature of the USA interstate recognition and enforcement system is, therefore, that 
States need to give effect to the full faith and credit requirement for interstate recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.
182
 The US Code provides that-    
‘the records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State…  shall be proved or 
admitted in other courts within the United States …  by the attestation of the clerk and seal of 
the court annexed … , together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said 
attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so 
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States 
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State … 
from which they are taken’.183 
 
The full faith and credit clause create an effective and efficient recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments system among USA sister States.
184
 In general, a sister-state judgment 
                                                 
176
 See note 173.  
177
  Act of May 26, 1970.  
178
  M’Elmoyle v Cohen 13 pet. 312, 324-25 (US 1839) 
179
  D’Arcy v Kletchum 11 How. 165 (US 1839). 
180
  Fauntleroy v Lum 210 US 230 (1908). 
181
  Milwaukee County v ME White Co 296 US 268 (1935). 
182
 Interstate recognition and enforcement refers to the recognition and enforcement in one State of the USA in 
a sister-State. In the international sphere, although the US is not a party to any of the conventions on 
recognition and enforcement, the Supreme Court in Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 (1895) decided that 
judgments form foreign countries that are considered to have a reliable legal system should be enforceable 
both in federal and in state courts under the common law: see Woestehoff (note 41) 20; Murphy (note 35) 
419. 
183
 United States Code Title 28 Part V Chapter 115 Section 1738. 
184
  The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, originally promulgated in 1948 and revised in 1964, is 
by its terms specifically not applicable to foreign country judgments. Rather, it applies only to sister state 
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will be recognised in the forum state to the same degree as it would be in the state of 
origin.
185
 Sister-state judgments may only be attacked under the full-faith and credit clause if 
the defendant did not participate in the original proceedings.
186
 However, review of sister-
state judgments is precluded on other issues such as review on the merits, a choice of law 
requirement or a public policy test.
187
  
 
The Trans-Tasman judicial area between Australia and New Zealand is discussed next.  
 
3.3 The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area 
Australia and New Zealand
188
 entered into the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA),
189
 principally with the aim of establishing a free 
trade area.
190
 The ANZCERTA has been the platform for the rapid integration of New 
Zealand and Australia’s economies, and has brought ‘unparalleled economic, social and legal 
integration to the two countries’.191 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and federal judgments that are entitled to full faith and credit under Art IV s 1 of the United States 
Constitution or the applicable federal statute: see Brand RA Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Federal Judicial Centre Litigation Guide (2012) 38. 
185
  Fitzpatrick (note 166) 719. 
186
  For example, default judgments can be questioned where the state of origin lacked adjudicatory jurisdiction.  
Griffen v Griffen 327 US 220 (1946), the Court held that ‘[a] judgment obtained in violation of procedural 
due process is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon in another jurisdiction’. Rather, the Court 
explained, ‘due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a 
judgment elsewhere acquired without due process” and it “forbids any exercise of judicial power which, but 
for the constitutional infirmity, would substantially affect a defendant’s rights’: Griffen v Griffen at 224-25. 
187
  Fitzpatrick (note 166) 719. 
188
 Australia and New Zealand have a shared history stemming from the European settlement of the countries as 
British colonies through the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. This shared history saw occasional co-operation 
between them, and efforts at improving the enforcement across the Tasman Sea: see Mortensen R ‘The 
Hague and the Ditch: The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area and the Choice of Court Convention’ (2009) 5(2) 
Journal of Private International Law 216. 
189
 Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (‘ANZERTA’), and Exchange of 
Letters (Canberra, 28 March 1983). 
190
 Farrar JH ‘Harmonisation of business law between Australia and New Zealand’ (1989) 19 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 436. The objectives of the Agreement are:  
a) to strengthen the broader relationship between Australia and New Zealand; 
b) to develop closer economic relations between the Member States through a mutually beneficial expansion 
of free trade between New Zealand and Australia;  
c) to eliminate barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand in a gradual and progressive manner 
under an agreed timetable and with a minimum of disruption; and 
d) to develop trade between New Zealand under conditions of fair competition: ANZCERTA (note 189) art 
1. 
191
 Mortensen R ‘Judgment Extension under CER’ 1999 New Zealand Law Review 237; Mortensen (note 188) 
216. 
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The rationale for the Agreement was that in an environment of flow of people, goods, 
services and investments, there is a greater possibility of cross-border disputes and that close 
integration of both countries’ civil justice systems could help resolve these.192 Each country 
has a significant interest in promoting the effectiveness of existing regulatory regimes to 
ensure that limits to the reach of each country’s regulatory system are not exploited and that 
consumers have effective redress.
193
 
 
In the Memorandum of Understanding on Harmonisation of Business Laws,
194
 the national 
governments of Australia and New Zealand recognised that it was desirable to remove legal 
impediments to trade that may arise out of differences between the business laws and 
regulatory practices of the two countries, and to establish a program for examining 
harmonising business laws and regulatory practices, including the removal of any 
impediments that are identified.
195
 Among the areas to examine was further recognition and 
reciprocal enforcement of court decisions in each country.
196
 
 
The early 1990s saw some reforms to the two civil justice systems under the CER umbrella, 
including the recognition and enforcement of each other’s tax judgments, and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments from each other’s lower courts. Apart from this, Australia and 
New Zealand handled cross-border civil disputes involving the other country in the same way 
as for any other foreign country.
197
 This did not reflect the special relationship between the 
two countries, which have a shared common law heritage; or their similar justice systems and 
the confidence they have in each other’s judicial and regulatory institutions.198 The shared 
history and special relationship between the countries made many of the safeguards needed 
                                                 
192
 Trans-Tasman Working Group ‘Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A public 
discussion Paper by the Trans-Tasman Working Group’ Attorney-General’s Department (Australia) and 
Ministry of Justice (New Zealand) August 2005 (2005) 1 (referred to as the Trans-Tasman Working Group 
discussion paper). 
193
 Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 1. 
194
 Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and New Zealand on Harmonisation of Business Laws 
Signed at Darwin on 1 July 1988, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/anzcerta/memorandum_of_understanding_business_law.html (accessed 3 April 
2013). In 1988 negotiations were held between the two governments in Christchurch and agreement was 
reached to move towards the creation of a single Trans-Tasman market from 1 July 1990 which will covered 
both goods and services. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Harmonisation of Business Law was 
one of a number of instruments signed to record the consensus reached in the meetings: Mortensen (note 
191) 442. 
195
 Memorandum of Understanding (note 194) art 5. 
196
 Memorandum of Understanding (note 194) art 5(h). 
197
 Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 1. See Chapter 1, para 2.4 for a discussion of 
these problems.  
198
 Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 1. 
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with more distant, dissimilar countries unnecessary. It was acknowledged that further reform 
to create a more coherent legal framework for resolving civil disputes with a trans-Tasman 
element would have many benefits, including reduced costs, increased efficiency and reduced 
forum shopping and would build on the success of existing measures and support other 
current initiatives.
199
 
 
A Trans-Tasman Working Group was accordingly set up
200
 to examine the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of current arrangements that relate to civil proceedings, civil penalty 
proceedings and criminal proceedings, including recognition and enforcement of court orders 
and judgments.
201
 The Working Group recommended that a treaty on jurisdiction and 
judgments should extend the present Australian federal model to New Zealand.
202
 Support for 
a free market was one of the motivations for the recommendations made by the Trans-
Tasman Working Group.
203
 
 
The proposed regime is modelled on the Australian inter-state scheme, the Service and 
Execution of Process Act 172 of 1992 (‘SEPA’). In short, the Australian model provides for 
the absolute free circulation of any judgment made in any federal, State or territory court, or 
tribunal anywhere in the Australian federation. Key elements of the SEPA include that a 
                                                 
199
 Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 1. 
200
 In 2003 the Australian and New Zealand governments agreed to review existing trans-Tasman co-operation 
in court proceedings and regulatory enforcement. They also agreed to investigate the possibility of 
streamlining and improving existing mechanisms, especially in areas such as service of process, taking of 
evidence, recognition of judgments in civil and regulatory matters and regulatory enforcement. A working 
group was set up to undertake this review. The Terms of Reference agreed between Australia and New 
Zealand require the Working Group to ‘examine the effectiveness and appropriateness of current 
arrangements that relate to civil (including family) proceedings, civil penalty proceedings and criminal 
proceedings (where those proceedings relate to regulatory matters). Those arrangements include: 
investigatory and regulatory powers; service of initiating and other process; taking of evidence; and 
recognition and enforcement of court orders and judgments (including civil penalties and criminal fines). 
The Working Group was required to identify any problems that exist with the current arrangements; consider 
a more general scheme for trans-Tasman service of process, taking of evidence and recognition and 
enforcement of court orders and judgments; consider a more general scheme for trans-Tasman co-operation 
between regulators; undertake appropriate domestic consultation; and propose options that may be pursued: 
see Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 2-3. 
201
 Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 2. 
202
 Australia (Attorney-General’s Department) and New Zealand (Ministry of Justice) Trans-Tasman Court 
Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement – A Report by the Trans-Tasman Working Group Common 
Wealth of Australia, Canberra 2006 (referred to as ‘Trans –Tasman Working Group Report’) 17-24. 
However, the Trans-Tasman Treaty does not provide for a regime that replicates the existing Australian 
model in precisely all details. The regime therefore loses some of the efficiency of the Australian model, and 
also replicates a weakness of the Australian model, namely that it is silent on the treatment of incompatible 
judgments: see Mortensen (note 188) 223. 
203
 Pham K ‘Enforcement of Non-Monetary Foreign Judgments in Australia’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 
671. 
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judgment from one state can be registered in the other and will be of the same force and 
effect, and can be enforced, as a judgment of the court where it is registered.
204
 A judgment 
can only be varied, set aside or appealed in the court of origin and the court of registration 
would be able to stay enforcement to allow this to happen. A judgment debtor would be 
notified if a judgment was registered in the other State.
205
 A judgment can only be refused 
enforcement in the other country on public policy grounds. Grounds such as breach of natural 
justice would have to be raised with the original court.
206
 There is no restriction on the kind 
of judgment that can be enforced: the Australian model allows enforcement of money-
judgments and non-monetary judgments of any kind.
207
 It also denies any place to traditional 
common law defences to the enforcement of foreign judgments when securing interstate 
registration and enforcement of foreign judgments.
208
 The Act will ease enforcement further 
by allowing registration to take place by faxing a copy of the judgment to the appropriate 
court registry where enforcement is sought.
209
 This scheme effectively gives all State and 
territory courts an inexpensive, efficient and unchallengeable ability to ensure the 
enforcement of their judgments anywhere in the federation.
210
 
 
The SEPA abandoned the rule-based jurisdictions within Australia: a writ from any state or 
territory court can be served anywhere in the federation, and establishes the court’s 
jurisdiction.
211
 That court is, however, only to exercise the jurisdiction if it is the forum 
conveniens (most appropriate forum to hear the case).
212
 If it concludes that it is not the 
forum conveniens, it has discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Australian court 
that is the forum conveniens.
213
 
 
                                                 
204
 A registered judgment has the same force and effect; and, may give rise to the same proceedings by way of 
enforcement; as if the judgment had been given, entered or made by the court in which it is registered. A 
judgment is capable of being enforced only if the judgment is capable of being enforced by the rendering 
court or a court in the rendering state: Service and Execution of Process Act 172 of 1992 (‘SEPA’) s 105. 
205
 SEPA (note 204) s 106. 
206
 Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 5. 
207
 SEPA (note 204) s 3; Mortensen (note 188) 218. 
208
 Section 109 provides that: ‘If a judgment is registered in a court of a State ..., the courts of the State must 
not, merely because of the operation of a rule of private international law, refuse to permit proceedings by 
way of enforcement of the judgment to be taken or continued.’ 
209
 SEPA (note 204) s 105. 
210
 Mortensen (note 188) 218. 
211
 SEPA (note 204) ss 12, 15; Mortensen (note 188) 219. 
212
  Mortensen (note 188) 219. 
213
  Mortensen (note 188) 219. 
 
 
 
 
 77 
As part of the economic and legal integration, Australia and New Zealand in 2008 entered 
into a bilateral treaty on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement.
214
  
 
Australia enacted the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act
215
 in 2010 to, among other things, 
implement the Trans-Tasman Treaty into law;
216
 and streamline the process in resolving civil 
proceedings with a Trans-Tasman element, and to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
217
 
Virtually all the provisions of the Act (sections 3 to 110) have not yet commenced operation, 
and will commence on a single day to be fixed by proclamation.
218
 A judgment has to be 
registered
219
 in an Australian court to be enforceable and to be registered, the judgment must 
be a registrable New Zealand judgment and an application for its registration must be 
made.
220
 Once registered in an Australian court, the judgment has the same force, and may be 
enforced in the Australian court, as if the judgment had been given by the Australian court.
221
 
An equivalent Act with the same title has been assented to in New Zealand.
222
 Virtually all 
                                                 
214
 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Trans-Tasman 
Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement (done at Christchurch, 24 July 2008) (‘Trans-Tasman 
Treaty’).  
215
 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Australia) No 35 of 2010. The Act received Royal Assent on 13 April 2010. 
216
 The Agreement is unable to enter into force for Australia until it is fully implemented domestically (see 
Article 16 of the Agreement), that is, Australia is fully capable of carrying out its obligations under the 
Agreement.  Currently, a number of State and Territory courts are working on adopting relevant rules to give 
effect to the Agreement. Once all these rules are in place, Australia will be in a position to notify New 
Zealand that its domestic implementation is complete: see Australian Government Report on Unproclaimed 
Legislation (August 2012) available at 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/parliamentary/docs/unproclaimed_legislation.pdf (accessed 4 September 2012). 
217
 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Australia) s 3. 
218
 A proclamation must not specify a day that occurs before the day the Trans-Tasman Agreement enters into 
force for Australia. However, if the provision(s) do not commence within the period of six months beginning 
on the day the Agreement enters into force for Australia, they commence on the day after the end of that 
period: Australian Government (note 216). 
219
 An entitled person may apply to register a New Zealand judgment in a superior Australian court, or an 
inferior court that has power to give the relief that is in the judgment (s 67). A judgment may be set aside if 
enforcement would be contrary to public policy; it was registered in contravention of the Act; and if the 
judgment was immovable property that was at the time of the proceeding in the original court, not situated in 
New Zealand (s72(1)). The latter includes the only jurisdictional provision in terms of which a registered 
judgment may be set aside. The court may not otherwise set the registration aside (s 72(3)).   
220
 Requirements include that the judgment must be final and conclusive. A judgment will not be registrable if, 
amongst others, it relates to an excluded matter; is a non-money judgment; is an order under proceeds of 
crime legislation; is an order relating to the administration of the estate of a deceased person, the 
guardianship or care of a person who is incapable of managing his or her personal affairs; is an order relating 
to the management of the property of a person who is incapable of managing that property or the care, 
control, or welfare of a child: Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Australia) s 66.  
221
 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Australia) s 65. There are some exceptions to this, for example the 
judgment cannot be enforced during a particular period if notice of the registration has not been given (s 
74(2)); or if the judgment could not be enforced in New Zealand (s 75).  
222
 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act No 108 of 2010 (New Zealand). 
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provisions will come into force on a date appointed by the Governor-General of New Zealand 
by Order in Council.
223
 
 
The approach in Latin American States is discussed next. 
 
3.4 Latin American States 
There has for a long time been a series of movements among Latin-American countries
224
 to 
codify their international law rules, both public
225
 and private.
226
 The most comprehensive 
effort, by far, to codify principles of private international law, namely choice of law, 
jurisdiction and judgment recognition on a regional basis was the 1928 Pan American Code 
on Private International Law
227
 (‘Bustamante Code’).228 
 
The Bustamante Code
229
 was approved in 1928 at the Sixth International Conference of 
American States held in Havana, Cuba. Of then then existing twenty-one Latin American 
States, fifteen have ratified the Convention,
230
 six with reservations.
231
 A ‘general’ 
                                                 
223
 Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (New Zealand) s 2. 
224
  There is a close affinity among Latin American legal systems to the extent that they share a similar 
socioeconomic structure, political culture and a common civil-law legal heritage: see Garro (note 103) 587. 
225
  The Latin American experience in the unification of private substantive law has not been very significant, 
but has instead focused on the unification of private international law: See Garro (note 103) 587. 
226
 A motion was proposed as early as 1826 at the Congress of Panama for the preparation of a draft code of 
international law: see Lorenzen (note 1) 499. 
227
 Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code), promulgated as the Final Act of the Sixth 
International Conference of American States, Feb. 20, 1928, in Havana, Cuba, reprinted in Treaties and 
Conventions Signed at the Sixth International Conference of American States (Pan American Union 1950). 
228
 Garro (note 103) 591. 
229
 By an international agreement of 23 August 1906 at the Second Pan-American Conference, a commission of 
jurists was appointed for the elaboration of codes on public and private international law, which began its 
work in Rio de Janeiro in 1912. The World War interrupted the work of codification, but it was resumed in 
1924 when the American Institute of International Law at an extraordinary meeting held at Lima, appointed 
a commission composed of four of its members, including Dr. Antonio S. de Bustamante of Cuba, to draw 
up a code of private international law. In 1925 the Pan-American Union associated itself with this work of 
codification, and on 2 March 1925 its Board of directors requested the American Institute of International 
Law to prepare a series of drafts on private international law, with a view of their submission to the 
commission of jurists of Rio de Janeiro. The draft code of private international law, prepared by Dr. 
Bustamante, was examined by a commission appointed by the American Law Institute, at a meeting of the 
Institute held in Havana in December, 1925. The draft was approved by the Institute and was thereupon 
transmitted to the President of the Board of Directors of the Pan-American Union, and through the latter to 
the governments represented in the Union. The draft was discussed at Rio de Janeiro in 1927 by the 
Commission of Jurists which had been convoked by the Government of Brazil in agreement with the Pan-
American Union, and recommended for adoption. It was finally approved by the Sixth Pan-American 
Conference held in Havana in 1928: see Lorenzen (note 1) 501. 
230
 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The countries which did not ratify the Convention, in 
addition to the United States, are Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Colombia: see Nadelmann 
(note 3) 782-3.  
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reservation was used by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, and El Salvador, providing in 
substance that the Code rules will apply only if they are not contrary to domestic law.
232
 The 
Code includes provisions on International Civil Law,
233
 International Commercial Law,
234
 
International Criminal Law
235
 and International Law of Procedure.236 The rules of the conflict 
of laws in the various Latin-American countries although more or less based upon continental 
models differed considerably and also differed widely from the Anglo-American conception 
of private international law.
237
 The task of drawing up a code which could meet with the 
approval of Latin-American countries was therefore a task of the greatest delicacy; and the 
unwillingness of either Brazil or Argentina to yield made it impossible to frame a code of 
private international law which would operate uniformly in Latin-America. Bustamante was 
forced, therefore, to allow each state to apply as personal law, either that of the domicile, or 
that of nationality.
238
  
 
Some of the major weakness of the Bustamante Code was that it deferred excessively to the 
local interests of the State addressed, providing its courts substantial opportunity to refuse to 
enforce or recognise the judgments of another State.
239
 For example, in matters of 
enforcement of foreign judgments,
240
 the Bustamante Code did not create uniform 
enforcement procedures, relying instead on the local law of the State where the enforcement 
was sought.
241
 A principal complaint about the Code has been its failure to choose between 
the national law and the law of the domicile by leaving the decision to the local law:
 242
 each 
contracting States is free to apply as ‘personal law’243 either that of the domicile or that of 
                                                                                                                                                        
231
 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela: Casad RC ‘Civil Judgment Recognition 
and the Integration of Multi-state Associations: A Comparative Study’ (1980-1981) 4 Hasting International 
& Comparative Law Review 5. 
232
 Nadelmann (note 3) 783. 
233
 Bustamante Code (note 227) arts 9-231. 
234
  Bustamante Code (note 227) arts 232-295. 
235
  Bustamante Code (note 227) arts 296-313. 
236
  Bustamante Code (note 227) arts 314-437. 
237
  Lorenzen (note 1) 522. 
238
  Lorenzen (note 1) 522-3; Bustamante Code (note 227) art 7. 
239
 Nadelmann K ‘Notes and Comments: The need for revision of the Bustamante Code on Private International 
Law’ (1971) 65 American Journal of International Law 782; Amado JD ‘Recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Latin America: An overview and update’ (1990) 31 Virginia Journal of International 
Law) 105.  
240
 Bustamante Code (note 227) arts 423-437. 
241
 Bustamante Code (note 227) art 424; Garro (note 81) 591. 
242
 Nadelmann (note 239) 784. 
243
 The status and capacity of persons are governed in general in the Convention by ‘personal law’ (art 27), 
which also applies to the determination of majority (art 101): Amado (note 239) 501-2. According to the 
Code, ‘capacity’ to do juristic acts is governed by the personal law, without regard to the connection in 
which the question may arise. It includes not only all cases of capacity in the field of domestic relations, but 
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nationality.
244
 In spite of its inadequacies as a vehicle for hemispheric unification of private 
international law, the Bustamante Code provided the framework for a general plan of 
judgment recognition within Central America.
245
  
 
Nations were free to adopt the Code with reservations.
246
 Uniformity could thus not be 
achieved under the Code unless all nations voluntarily chose either domicile or nationality as 
the basis for ‘personal’ law and accepted the Code without reservations. This did not occur, 
and even with these concessions to local concerns, not all nations were willing to sign.
247
 
 
The Bustamante Code was followed by the 1979 Montevideo Convention.
248
 The Convention 
provides that a foreign judgment will have extraterritorial validity in the States party to the 
Convention, provided that the requirements listed in art 2 of the Convention are met.
249
 The 
Convention is supplemented by the 1984 La Paz Convention.
250
 The Montevideo and La Paz 
Conventions, considered together, represent a significant improvement toward greater ease of 
foreign judgment recognition in Latin America,
251
 as it addresses some of the weaknesses of 
the Bustamante Code, discussed above.
252
 The Conventions collectively promotes legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
also those relating to contracts, to conveyances of land, or to the execution of wills disposing of real 
property: Lorenzen (note 1) 520. 
244
 Bustamante Code (note 227) art 7. 
245
 Casad (note 216) 5. 
246
 Bustamante Code (note 227) art 3; Casad (note 216) 5. 
247
 Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and the United States did not sign the Convention: see 
Lorenzen (note 1) 501. The Delegation of the United States of America abstained from voting, but made the 
following declaration: ‘The Delegation of the United States of America regrets very much that it is unable at 
present time to approve the Code of Dr. Bustamante, as in view of the Constitution of the United States of 
America, the relations among the States, members of the Union, and the powers and function of the Federal 
Government, it finds it very difficult to do so. The Government of the United States of America firmly 
maintains its intention not to disassociate itself from Latin-America, and therefore, in accordance with 
Article 6 of the Convention, which permits any Government to adhere later thereto, it will make use of the 
privilege extended by this Article in order that, after carefully studying the Code in all its provisions, it may 
be enabled to adhere to at least a large portion thereof’: see Amado (note 239) 520. The explanation given 
for the unlikelihood of the US to adopt the Code was constitutional restrictions: matters of procedure were 
largely left to the States, and the Federal Government could not dictate to the States the manner in which 
they should regulate procedural matters, including international judicial assistance: see Ristau BA ‘Overview 
of International Judicial Assistance’ (1984) 18 International Lawyer 529. 
248
 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 
1979, OEA/Ser.A/2818 ILM 1224 (1979). The contents of the Montevideo Convention is discussed in 
Chapter 3, para 3 below. 
249
 See Chapter 3, para 3 below. 
250
 Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of 
Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, OEA/Ser.A/39 (SEPF), 24 ILM. 468 (1985). According to art 13, the 
convention enters into force only after the second instrument of ratification has been deposited.  
251
 Amado (note 239) 105. 
252
 These include the ample opportunities for a state to refuse recognition of enforcement of judgments; the lack 
of a uniform procedure on recognition and enforcement; and leaving the option of whether to use nationality 
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certainty by providing clear rules on when foreign judgments will be entitled to recognition 
and enforcement, and what the grounds are on which a court would be deemed to have had 
jurisdiction or purposes of jurisdiction.
253
 
 
Although the inter-American conventions do not institute a near-automatic system, such as 
that of the EU, as evident from the requirements for recognition and enforcement, they 
considerably ease the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by establishing 
uniform requirements for judgments originating in other Latin American States party to the 
Convention.
254
 
 
4 FEASIBILITY OF THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR THE SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION 
 
4.1 Brussels/Lugano Regime 
The EU States did not sign the Treaty of Rome simply to create mutual obligations governed 
by the law of nations. They in fact transferred some of their sovereign rights to Community 
institutions over which none of them has direct control. Furthermore, it was not only Member 
States which were bound by the new rights and obligations, but also their citizens who 
became subjects of the Community.
255
 
 
They thus created a ‘supranational’ body as opposed to an international body of law and 
institutions which stood above individual member states. International organisations operate 
on either an intergovernmental or supranational basis, with it being possible for the 
intergovernmental organisations to evolve into supranational organisations.
256
 The term 
‘supranationalism’ has been defined as ‘the development of authoritative institutions of 
governance and a network of policy-making activity above the nation state’.257 A 
supranational organisation is a sui generis international organisation which acts 
independently of its member states. It takes binding decisions and is responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
or domicile to determine personal law to the requested court, as well as the wide range of areas in which 
States could make reservations.  
253
  See Chapter 3, para 5 for an overview of the Conventions.  
254
 Amado (note 239) 123. 
255
 Fagbayibo B ‘A supranational African Union? Gazing into the crystal ball’ 2008 De Jure 494. 
256
 Fagbayibo (note 255) 494. 
257
 Rosamond B Theories of European Integration (2000) 204. 
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supervision and implementation of these decisions. The EU is an autonomous legal order, 
which has been established by the ECJ.
258
 Generally speaking, nation-states in a 
supranational system not only share an overarching constitutional framework, but also enjoy 
a higher degree of economic, geographical, cultural and historical proximity with one another 
than with outsiders.
259
 Therefore, a State is usually more willing to recognise and enforce a 
judgment issued by a court in a sister State within a supranational system than a court in a 
State outside the constitutional framework.
260
 
 
The EU has overcome the problem of implementing international law at a national level by 
providing for the principle of direct applicability,
261
 which allows for the integration of 
community law into Member States' legal systems without requiring any intervening national 
implementation procedures or measures.
262
 Article 288 TFEU provides that ‘a Regulation 
shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States’.263 
 
                                                 
258
 Czuczai J ‘The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organisations: 
Some examples regarding the Council’s most recent practice’ Research Papers in Law 3/2012 (2012) 
European Legal Studies 2 available at http://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-
paper/researchpaper_3_2012_czuczai_final.pdf (accessed 16 February 2013). In Flaminio Costa v ENEL 
[1964] ECR 585 (6/64) the court held that ‘By ‘By contrast with ordinary international treaties , the EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system, which , on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part 
of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a 
Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own legal capacity and capacity of 
representation on the international plan, and more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of 
sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the Community, the Member States have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have created a body of law which binds both their nationals 
and themselves. ….the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of 
its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called 
into question’ (at 593). 
259
 Von Mehren (note 21) 194. 
260
 Von Mehren  (note 21) 194. 
261
  This is significant for the following reasons: once harmonisation instruments are drafted a principal problem 
may be experienced in the implementation at the national level. In dualist countries (as opposed to monist 
countries) international law must be implemented nationally using national constitutional procedures or 
measures. This opens the way to a number of difficulties: states may delay the implementation; they may 
implement it incompletely or partially; or may not implement international law at all. The principle of direct 
applicability addresses this problem and allows for the integration of community law into member states' 
legal systems without requiring any intervening national implementation procedures or measures: Oppong 
RF  Relational issues of law and economic integration in Africa: perspectives from constitutional, public 
and private international law (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 
2009) 43. 
262
 Oppong (note 263) 43. 
263
 TFEU (note 137) art 288. 
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The authorisation of the ECJ to interpret the Brussels Convention and the Regulation is 
another significant feature of the EU Regime.
264
 The ECJ has been deemed essential for the 
successful operation of the Brussels Convention and the Regulation.
265
 In many cases, the 
ECJ interpreted the terms and phrases in the Convention and Regulation by adopting an 
autonomous Community definition instead of one favoured by a particular Member State.
266
 
 
The Brussels model which has operated successfully in Europe was originally designed at a 
time when all Member States belonged to the civil law legal tradition. Its civil law origins 
mean that it may not be considered the best model for countries with a shared common-law 
heritage.
267
 
 
The analysis presented, including the absence of a supranationalism and its elements in the 
region to replicate the Brussels Regime; the lack of direct applicability of laws within the 
SACU Member States;
268
 the absence of a supranational court
269
 to ensure uniform 
                                                 
264
 Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Brussels Convention, done Jun 3, 1971, 1975 
Official Journal  l204 28.  
265
 Von Mehren AT ‘Jurisdictional Requirements: To What Extent Should the State of Origin's Interpretation of 
Convention Rules Control for Recognition and Enforcement Purposes?’ in Lowenfeld AF & Silberman LJ 
(eds) The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments (2001) 34. 
266
 Reuland RC ‘The Recognition of Judgments in the European Community: the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of 
the Brussels Convention’ (1993) 14 Michigan Journal of International Law 566. 
267
 For example domicile is not used in the same sense as at common law. Under this model a person (especially 
a company) could potentially have more than one ‘domicile’. A further example is the doctrine of lis 
pendens included in art 27 of the Brussels Convention which is applied mainly by civil law countries: Hague 
Conference ‘Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements: Explanatory Report by Trevor 
Hartley & Masato Dogauchi’ 2005 (‘Hartley Dogauchi Report’) 16. The ‘first to file’ rule, which applies 
when more than one court has jurisdiction, may be considered undesirable for states from a common law 
legal tradition; and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which is mainly applied by common law countries 
is also absent in the Brussels I Regulation: Trans-Tasman Working Group discussion paper (note 192) 12. 
The Working Group considered a scheme based on the Brussels Model, but did not recommend it for use 
between Australia and New Zealand, as it was thought unsuitable for two States with common law legal 
traditions. 
268
  Although the objectives of the SACU Agreement includes the facilitation of the cross-border movement of 
goods between the territories of the Member States; promoting the integration of Member States into the 
global economy through enhanced trade and investment; and facilitating the development of common 
policies and strategies (2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement between the 
Governments of the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic 
of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland signed on 21 October 2002 in Gaborone, Botswana Article 
3), it does not include the harmonisation of the laws of Member States. 
269
  The SACU Agreement provides for an ad hoc SACU Tribunal which is responsible for settling any dispute 
regarding the interpretation or application of the SACU Agreement, or any dispute arising thereunder at the 
request of the Council (art 13(1)), whose mandate may possibly be expanded to incorporate this function: see 
Chapter 4 para 4.6.1.  
 An alternative long term option is the still to be established African Court of African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, although this would require an amendment and extension of its mandate: On 1 July 2008, at 
the AU Summit in Egypt, Heads of State and Government signed a protocol [Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 July 2008, reproduced in (2009) 17 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law] on the merger of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights with 
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interpretation and application; and the fact that it was originally designed for Member States 
when all were civil law countries, suggests that the Brussels Model is not the most suitable 
model on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments to adopt for the SACU region. 
 
4.2 United States of America full faith and credit Approach 
The full faith and credit approach in the USA was feasible because as a constitutional 
requirement it created an overarching recognition and enforcement scheme binding for every 
American state.
270
 Each of the States is part of the USA and by virtue in its membership of 
the federation is obliged to give effect to the clause.
271
 This approach, therefore, presupposes 
the existence of a politico-legal community for purposes of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments; and therefore suppresses the differences among the political sub-
communities whose interests are embedded in the policies on which those judgments are 
based.
272
 A treaty would need to be self-executing,
273
 or to achieve a similar effect, enabling 
all interested individuals to invoke treaty rights to protect their substantive interests in the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
274
 
 
 The full faith and credit approach is likely to succeed only in Federations; therefore, it may 
not be a suitable approach for SACU Member States at present, as they are a group of 
                                                                                                                                                        
the African Court of Justice, which is still to be created, to form an African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights. Upon negotiating a recognition and enforcement instrument for the region, consideration could 
therefore be given to the newly established court to perform functions akin to the European Court of Justice 
in respect of recognition and enforcement, namely interpretation and dispute resolution..Alternatively, 
consideration could be given to substantively broaden the mandate of the current African Court on Human 
and People’s Rights. This would require substantive changes to the mandate of the court and rules on access 
to the Court as, according to the Protocol (art 5) and the Rules of the Court (Rule 33), the Court may only 
receive complaints and/or applications submitted to it either by the African Commission of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights or State parties to the Protocol or African Intergovernmental Organizations. Non-
Governmental Organizations with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and individuals from States which have made a Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court 
can also institute cases directly before the Court. Only five countries had made such a Declaration as at 
October 2012: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania: African Union ‘The African Court on 
Human and People’s Rights’ available at http://www.au.int/en/organs/cj (accessed 15 February 2013). 
270
 Huang (note 118) 15. 
271
 Sumner (note 170) 245. 
272
 Perez AF ‘The international recognition of judgments: The debate between private and public law solutions’ 
(2001) 19 Berkeley Journal of International Law  49. 
273
 A self-executing treaty is a treaty that becomes judicially enforceable upon ratification. As opposed to a non-
self-executing treaty, which becomes judicially enforceable through the implementation of legislation.  A 
treaty could be identified as either self-executing or non-self-executing by looking to various indicators, 
including indeterminate language of the treaty, or if the treaty deals with a matter within the exclusive law-
making power of Congress, indicating that Congress must create implementing legislation: Cornell 
University School of Law Legal Information Institute available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_executing_treaty (accessed 7 March 2013). 
274
 Perez (note 272) 50. 
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sovereign States and not a single politico-legal community, which is a prerequisite for the use 
of a full faith and credit clause. This approach would, therefore, not likely be the best suited 
at the current stage of integration, but may become more appropriate as political integration 
in Africa progresses, perhaps towards a ‘United States of Africa’.275 
 
4.3 Trans-Tasman Judicial System 
The approach of Australia and New Zealand to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments between the two states entailed extending the application of one federal state 
(Australia)’s recognition and enforcement regime for inter-state judgments to a foreign State 
(New Zealand).
276
 This system therefore goes further than the USA model
277
 by treating a 
foreign judgment of the State party to the agreement as a sister-State judgment, while 
continuing to treat other States not party to the agreement in a different manner. This scheme 
effectively extends the inexpensive, efficient and unchallengeable ability to enforce their 
judgments anywhere in the federation which it gives to states within the federation, to a 
foreign State with which it shares a close relationship.
278
 
 
The Australian-New Zealand model may be the most suitable for countries which share a 
common law heritage and very similar justice system.
279
 This model requires confidence by 
the countries in each other’s judicial and regulatory institutions,280 as it does away with many 
of the safeguards required for interaction with more distant, dissimilar countries.
281
 
 
                                                 
275
  The United States of Africa is a proposed concept for a federation of some or all of the 55 sovereign states of 
Africa. Nyere suggested that ‘For the sake of all African states, large or small, African unity must come and 
it must be real unity. Our goal must be a United States of Africa. Only this can really give Africa the future 
her people deserve after centuries of economic uncertainty and social oppression. This goal must be 
achieved, and it does not matter whether this is done by … economic, political or social development’: See 
Nyere JK ‘A United States of Africa’ 1963 1(1) Journal of Modern African Studies 1.  
276
  See para 3.3 above. 
277
  See para 3.2 above. 
278
  See para 3.3 above. 
279
 Australia and New Zealand have a shared history stemming from the European settlements of the countries 
as British colonies through the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. This shared history saw occasional cooperation 
between them, and efforts at improving the enforcement of judgments. From the mid-1930’s, the Australian 
states and New Zealand adopted legislation based on the UK’s Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act However, the present arrangements between Australia and New Zealand is within the trading 
cooperative of the ANZCERTA (done at Canberra, 1 January 1983). In 1988 a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Governments of Australia and New Zealand (signed at Darwin, 1 July 1988), 
promising the ‘further recognition and reciprocal enforcement of court decisions in each country’ (art 5(h)): 
see Mortensen (note 188) 216. 
280
 Trans-Tasman Working Group Report (note 202) 6. 
281
 Trans-Tasman Working Group Report (note 202) 6. 
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While this approach may be specifically successful amongst states which share a common 
legal heritage, it in essence entails extending the recognition and enforcement regime of sister 
States in a federation, to a foreign State. None of the SACU Member States is a federation; 
therefore, none of them have a similar recognition and enforcement regime that would be 
capable of being extended to neighbouring States.
282
 
 
Mortensen
283
 suggests that the Australian federal scheme ‘probably represents the purest 
presentation of a common law model for a double convention that is presently available’,284 it 
may offer some lessons to the SACU if a multilateral treaty in the form of a double 
convention is adopted as the best approach for the Southern African region,
285
 amongst others 
because it is between two States who share a common law heritage, whereas the Brussels I 
Regulation and Montevideo Convention were negotiated between predominantly civil law 
States.
286
 
 
4.4 Latin America 
A common legal heritage that traces back almost five centuries, that is perpetuated by the 
reception of the European codification and its scholarly doctrine and strengthened by socio-
economic and political structures, has not eliminated the diversity of substantive private law 
in Latin America and uniformity and harmonisation is still the exception.
287
 
 
The States of Latin America are far less integrated than either a federal system, such as the 
USA, or a supranational arrangement, like the EC.
288
 The treaty law on enforcing and 
recognising judgments is however well developed. Unlike the EU Brussels Regime,
289
 or the 
full faith and credit clause of the USA Constitution,
290
 the Latin American conventions are 
not specifically concerned with the overall harmonisation of judicial procedures, including 
                                                 
282
 See Chapter 4, para 3 below.  
283
 Mortensen (note 188) 217. 
284
 It is a ‘double convention’ because there are common principles of jurisdiction that help to address litigation 
between courts across the federation.  
285
 For example the requirements that a judgment have to meet to be registerable under the judicial system (s 66 
of the Australia Trans-Tasman Act 35 of 2010), and when a judgment would not be registerable under the 
Act (s 66(2)); application requirements (s 66(5); setting aside registration (s 72); effect of registration and 
notice of registration (s73 and s74). 
286
  See para 3.1 and 3.4 above. 
287
 Garro (note 103) 610. 
288
 Garro (note 103) 610. 
289
  See para 3.1.1 above.  
290
  See para 3.2 above. 
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jurisdiction in international cases, among the Member States. As a result, the judgment 
Conventions are all ‘single conventions’, which only address recognition and enforcement 
and are silent on the issue of when courts may assert jurisdiction (direct jurisdiction), but 
specify jurisdictional conditions that must be satisfied before one State recognises or enforces 
the judgments of others (indirect jurisdiction).
291
 
 
A number of reasons may be suggested why the countries of Latin America adopted a 
regionalist approach to establishing uniform laws rather than joining those undertaken by the 
European Community under the Lugano Convention or under the Hague Conference. First, 
only a handful of Latin American countries are members of the Hague Conference.
292
 More 
importantly, the prevailing sentiment among Latin American countries has been that Latin 
America’s political, social, and economic background is sufficiently different from that of 
Western Europe to justify a distinctive legal approach towards unification of private law.
293
 It 
is not clear that those differences genuinely prevent or inhibit Latin America from joining 
global unification efforts in the area of private international law.
294
  It has also been suggested 
that the adoption of international instruments may be may be hindered in developing 
countries because their legislatures may have more urgent problems
295
 to cope with than the 
ratification of the various uniform laws at the international level.
296
 
 
Ristau is of the view that there appears to be considerable reluctance on the part of Latin 
America to join any treaty regime developed in Europe, or developed between the USA and 
other non-Latin American States.
297
 Bonnell suggests that the traditional reluctance on the 
part of developing countries to join international conventions has been due largely to their 
                                                 
291
 Amado (note 239) 102. See Chapter 3 para 1 for a discussion between single and double conventions and 
direct and indirect jurisdiction.  
292
 Of the 35 Member States of the Organisation of American States, 14 States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,  Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Suriname 
and Canada) are Member States of the Hague Conference on Private International Law: Hague Conference 
‘Members’ available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing (accessed 7 March 2013). 
293
 Garro (note 103) 597.   
294
 It is also not clear which areas would prevent Latin American countries, if given the opportunity to 
participate in treaty negotiations from reaching workable compromises with the EC and the US: see Garro 
(note 103) 597. 
295
 Such as civil wars, famine, AIDS and excruciating poverty: see Oppong RF ‘The Hague Conference and the 
development of private international law in Africa: A plea for greater cooperation’ (2006) 8 Yearbook of 
Private International Law 189. 
296
 Bonell MJ ‘International uniform law in practice – Or where the real trouble begins’ (1990) 38 American 
Journal of Comparative Law  870. 
297
 Ristau (note 247) 525. 
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inadequate participation in the preparation of those instruments.
298
 Garro suggests that the 
traditional reluctance, or even hostility, towards the adoption of international conventions has 
been largely based on the belief that those international instruments favoured the interests of 
industrialised countries at the expense of developing countries.
299
 The more or less 
favourable impact of any uniform law in a given jurisdiction depends, up to a certain point at 
least, on the active participation of that country in the preparation of a particular instrument. 
It is therefore plausible to think that increasing Latin American participation in global 
unification efforts may result in greater acceptability of uniform and model laws.
300
 
 
Garro
301
 has identified a number of factors as impeding legal harmonisation in Latin 
America, including: 
i. The difficulties encountered by business people and lawyers from developing countries 
in interpreting and applying legal texts drafted in a style and using terminology with 
which they are not familiar.
302
 
ii. Inadequate systems of reporting court decisions. Foreign court decisions are not 
binding and the paramount concern of most courts will be reaching a ‘fair’ decision, 
even though not in harmony with decisions in similar cases reached by foreign courts. 
iii. Judicial decisions are not likely to prove an efficient means of Latin American legal 
unification.
303
 
iv. The efforts to reach harmonisation and unification through the process of law reform.304 
 
The fact that law reformers are not likely to compromise what they believe to be a good rule 
for the cause of unification brings out clearly that the challenges faced by those involved in 
                                                 
298
 Bonnell (note 296) 878. 
299
 He however suggests that this attitude seems to be changing, as reflected in the free trade agreements 
pursued by most Latin American countries and the willingness of governments to insert themselves into a 
market oriented internal economy: see Garro (note 103) 614. 
300
 Garro (note 103) 614. 
301
 Garro (note 103) 614. 
302
 See also Farnsworth  EA ‘Uniform law and its impact on business circles’ (1987) Acts and Proceedings of 
the 3
rd
 Congress on Private Law held by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT), Rome, 7-10 September 1987 547, who states that business circles are impacted by uniform 
law; Bonnel (note 296) 871. 
303
  The appellate jurisdiction of most Latin American supreme courts is meant to unify the interpretation of law 
within the country; and despite the compromises in practice and in some instances in theory made to the 
traditional non-recognition of the binding force of precedents, the lack of easy access to published precedent 
severely conspires against the use of judicial decisions as a vehicle of unification of law in the same 
jurisdiction. 
304
 A review of the travaux préparatoires of recent codes adopted in Latin America indicates that the emphasis 
has been on improvement of the law, generally, by adopting a provision of ‘modern’ European codes, rather 
than bringing the law in harmony with those other Latin American countries: See Garro (note 103) 613. 
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the unification of law are not merely to harmonise and restate, but also to choose the best 
approach among various alternatives.
305
 It also indicates that the cause of unification may be 
promoted not necessarily out of a desire to pursue unification, but rather as a vehicle of sound 
law reform.
306
 
 
Regional groupings such as the EU have devoted considerable effort to finding solutions to 
the problems arising out of domestic legal differences. Harmonisation in such groupings 
creates a multi-layered legal system: at the lowest level are the still diverse municipal 
systems; on the second level are the harmonised legal norms, and on the third level, 
international unified rules play an important role.
307
 Regional groupings, however, aim 
primarily for intra-harmonisation, that is harmonisation within the grouping, rather than for 
inter-group harmonisation as such, and differences will accordingly persist. 
 
In comparison with the approaches followed in other regions to harmonise the rules on 
recognition and enforcement, Latin American states presently show the most similarities with 
those of SACU Member States. SACU Member States are far less integrated than either a 
federal system such as the USA, or to some extent under the Trans-Tasman Judicial Systems 
of Australia and New Zealand, as well as the supranational arrangement like the EC. The 
approach followed by the Latin American States will therefore influence the proposals made 
for the approach to be followed in the SACU, which is now discussed.  
 
5 PROPOSED APPROACH FOR THE SACU 
 
As indicated above
308
 two possible approaches for the SACU is to adopt either a set of 
bilateral treaties, or a single multilateral treaty ratified by all Member States.  
 
A range of bilateral treaties will not necessarily improve the current position in Southern 
Africa, because as will be indicated below,
309
 most States already have similar statutes in 
place, but these extend to only a limited number of designated States, and rely heavily on 
reciprocity. The similarity between the Southern African statutes suggest a similar outcome 
                                                 
305
 Garro (note 103) 613. 
306
 Garro (note 103) 613. 
307
 Zeller (note 2) 476. 
308
  See para 1. 
309
  See Chapter 4, para 4.1 below. 
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to negotiating bilateral treaties could possibly be achieved by States simply designating more 
States under their statutory regimes.
310
 Oppong
311
 in fact suggests that, in the context of 
continental harmonisation, the statutory designation of more African States may be the only 
feasible option towards harmonisation,
312
 at least for the immediate future, given the scarcity 
of inter-African judgment enforcement cases, the similarities in the provisions of existing 
national statutes on foreign judgment enforcement, the challenges of negotiating an 
international convention and the general ambivalence towards private international law 
issues.
313
 Statutory designation may be an easier course to take and can be done immediately. 
The Executive must designate the foreign territory and only then can a court grant effect to 
the judgments delivered in that territory.
314
 
 
It is, however, important to note that in the absence of any treaty provisions, States will have 
no legal obligation to designate any specific States under their statutory enforcement 
regimes
315
 or a time-frame to do it in, which mean even if they do undertake to designate 
SACU Member States under their respective regimes, it may take number of years for them 
to actually do so. Designation will also not provide traders with the same degree of legal 
certainty that a multilateral convention would do.
316
 Further, based on the facts that SACU 
Member States share a common legal tradition; there are only five Member States, in 
comparison with, for example, the 27 Member States of the EU
317
 whose interests and 
considerations will have to be taken into account; the similarities between their current 
statutory provisions, which suggest that may not need to be compromises on all issues; as 
well as the benefits associated with multilateral conventions
318
 it is recommended that a 
multilateral, rather than a series of bilateral conventions on recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments be negotiated amongst SACU Member States.  
 
                                                 
310
  See Chapter 4, para 4.1 below. 
311
 Oppong (note 261) 279. 
312
  This would not attempt to replicate the Trans-Tasman Judicial System as it will not have one system 
whereby foreign judgments are treated similar as judgments from sister-states in a federal system, but a 
number of different national laws; it would also not be a ‘closed’ system applicable only to the SACU – 
states would also be able to extend (and in fact many of them already have) the application of their 
respective Statutes to other non-SACU Member States. 
313
 Oppong (note 261) 279. 
314
 Oppong RF ‘Private international law in Africa: Past, present & future’ (2007) 55 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 704. 
315
  See Chapter 1, para 5.1 above. 
316
  See Chapter 3 for a comparison of approaches in this regard. 
317
  See para 3.1 above. 
318
  See para 5.2 below. 
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The EU similarly concluded that only a multilateral Convention, rather than a series of 
additional treaties, would foster the free movement of judgments, and would not lead to 
unequal treatment of the various nationals
319
 of the Member States.
320
 
 
Alternatively, the approach of a multilateral convention has been particularly successful 
within a Common Market, as the Brussels Regime demonstrates,
321
 but has also been 
successful in the context of lesser integrated communities such as the EFTA
322
 and OAS.
323
 
The EC decided in favour of the multilateral convention, as they felt that the differences 
between the bilateral conventions would hinder the free movement of judgments and lead to 
unequal treatment of the nationals of various Member States.
324
 
 
Although it may have some disadvantages,
325
 a multilateral instrument on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments would have three advantages for all parties concerned.
326
 
First, a convention would roughly ensure equality between the practices of the contracting 
States. Secondly, a recognition and enforcement convention could deal with the practice of 
permitting the use of unreasonable or exorbitant jurisdictional bases against persons not 
domiciled in a contracting State, and requiring that other contracting States recognise and 
enforce any resulting judgment. Thirdly, treaty regulation would clarify and simplify 
recognition and enforcement procedures, and as a result a party holding a judgment rendered 
in, or contemplating initiating litigation in, a contracting State could ascertain relatively 
quickly and easily the effects that a judgment would have in another contracting State if 
recognition or enforcement were sought in its courts.
327
 
 
                                                 
319
 This would be contrary to the fundamental EEC principle of non-discrimination: see note 121 above. 
320
  See para 3.1 above. Even though the SACU is not a common market like the EU, the differences between the 
rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may nevertheless impede international trade, and 
therefore, it is argued that the harmonisation of the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments will remove a non-tariff barrier to trade and facilitate international trade by promoting legal 
certainty and reducing transaction costs: see Chapter 1, para 4.1. 
321
 Juenger however cautions that such regional schemes can be faulted for discriminating against outsiders: See 
Juenger (note 13) 9. 
322
  See Lugano Convention, discussed in para 3.1 above. 
323
  See Montevideo and La Paz Conventions, discussed in para 3.4 above. 
324
 Russel (note 117) 64; see para 3.1 above. 
325
  Like any instrument of international law-making process, multilateral treaties has to be negotiated, signed 
and ratified by the participating States. Reservations and denunciation, to which it may be subject, may make 
it less attractive as a vehicle of legal integration, and there is also run the risk of it being compromised in the 
course of its transformation into national law: Lasok & Stone (note 28) 85. 
326
 Von Mehren (note 29) 278. 
327
 Von Mehren (note 29) 279. 
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It is, therefore, suggested that the most appropriate instrument to harmonise the rules on 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the SACU is a multilateral convention 
negotiated and concluded amongst all five Member States.
328
 
 
6 SOME FACTORS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE HARMONISATION IN SACU 
 
The actual behaviour of the national courts will be decisive in furthering harmonisation after 
harmonised laws have been adopted.  
 
There is some use of comparative law and a degree of reliance by courts on the private 
international laws between countries with a Roman-Dutch tradition.
329
 Judgments of 
Southern African courts, mainly those of South Africa, have been relied on frequently in 
other Southern African countries. In Silverston Ltd v Lobatse Clay Works
330
 it was held that 
the courts of Botswana have never been reluctant, in their own adaptation of the common law 
to the requirements of modern times, to have regard to the approach of the South African 
courts and to the writings of authoritative South African academics.
331
 
 
The implementation of harmonised laws will require high-level expertise in every field 
concerned. The availability of trained personnel and resources is of the utmost importance as 
this will require expenditure, research, implementation and high-quality elaboration of 
instruments to bring about the desired results.
332
 A possible model for training in community 
instruments is OHADA’s Regional Training School for Legal Officers (L’ERUSMA), whose 
main role is to improve the legal environment in the Member States, in particular by training 
judges and other legal officers in community (OHADA) law.
333
 
 
                                                 
328
  See specific proposals and a proposed draft text in this regard in Chapter 4, para 6 below. 
329
  Oppong (note 261) 282. See Silverston Ltd v Lobatse Clay Works 1996 Butterworth’s Law Reports 190 195; 
See also Mutamo v News Company(Botswana) t/a The Gazette 1997 Butterworth’s Law Reports 43 (IC) 
where the Judge explained why he had used South African case law as authority: ‘The reason why the court 
referred to the aforesaid cases is because they are based on the South African common law which is Roman-
Dutch law, which is also the Botswana common law’. 
330
 Silverston v Lobatse Clay Works (note 329) 195. 
331
 Silverston v Lobatse Clay Works (note 329) 195. 
332 Bamodu G ‘Transnational law, unification and harmonisation of international commercial law in Africa’ 
(1994) 38 Journal of African Law 137. 
333
 Martor B Business law in Africa OHADA and the harmonisation process (2002) 17. The majority of the 
OHADA Member States are francophone countries, with the result that OHADA’s official language is 
French. Further information on L’ERUSMA was available in French, and, therefore, not accessible.  
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A further factor which may influence harmonisation is the availability of legal literature 
indigenous to the region.
334
 In Southern Africa, law reporting and access to legal materials is 
fairly up to date in the major states of the region, especially South Africa, Namibia and 
Botswana, which may support harmonisation.
335
 Judicial decisions and recent proposed law 
reforms, in South Africa, at least,
336
 is bringing about a convergence between the Roman-
Dutch law and common law jurisprudence.
337
 Two recent judgments from South Africa’s 
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the possibility of closer convergence between Roman-
Dutch law and common law. In Richman v Ben-Tovim
338
 mere presence was accepted as a 
basis of international competence,
339
 a position which is well entrenched in the common law 
tradition.
340
 In Bid Industrial Holdings v Strang
341
 the arrest of foreign defendants
342
 as a 
                                                 
334
 The borrowing of legal literature in Latin America, for example, has favoured harmonisation: see
: 
Garro 
(note 103) 612. 
335
 Oppong (note 261) 282. 
336
 South African Law Reform Commission Project 21 - Report on Consolidated Legislation pertaining to 
international judicial cooperation Report (2006) (hereafter ‘SALRC Report’). 
337
 Oppong (note 261) 283. 
338
 Richman v Ben-Tovim 2007 (2) SA 283. The plaintiff’s case was predicated on the proposition that there is 
international competence in South African law if a defendant is merely physically present in the jurisdiction 
of the foreign court at the time the action is instituted (at 3). 
339
 The South African courts has accepted, for purposes of reciprocal enforcement of a foreign judgment, that 
the defendant’s mere physical presence within the foreign jurisdiction when the action was instituted is 
sufficient, according to South African conflict of law rules, for finding that the foreign court had jurisdiction: 
Richman v Ben-Tovim (note 338) paras 7-9. This decision has however attracted criticism: Schulze argues 
that there are no reasons why traditional grounds of international competence should be extended to an 
extent that they produce an artificial and intolerable result. In this case, the English court did not have 
international jurisdiction under the principles recognised by South African law. Schulze whether the result 
according to which a judgment that is ineffective and unenforceable within the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court that granted it, is fully recognised and made enforceable in South Africa law can be justified by the 
quest for ‘catering for itinerant international businessmen’: see Schulze C ‘International jurisdiction in 
claims sounding in money: Is Richman v Ben-Tovim the last word?’ (2008) 20 South African Mercantile Law 
Journal 73. Oppong is also highly critical of this decision and suggest that it is difficult to reconcile mere 
presence as a basis of international competence with the theory of obligations that is sometimes seen as the 
foundation of the common law regime for the enforcement of judgments and further that the doctrine of 
effectiveness prevents the South African courts from assuming jurisdiction merely on the basis of the foreign 
defendant’s presence within the jurisdiction: see Oppong ‘Mere presence and international competence in 
private international law’ (2007) 3(2) Journal of Private International Law 326, 328. Oppong further 
cautions that a court should not fall prey to the illusion of sitting as an ‘international judicial tribunal’ open 
to the beck and call of litigants who are exempt from the need to establish a proper nexus between the 
litigants, the cause of action and the state: see Oppong (note 239) 236. 
340
  Bid Industrial Holdings v Strang 2008 (3) SA 355 at 49. 
341
 See note 340. 
342
 In South African domestic law, the procedure of arrest to found jurisdiction may be resorted to where a 
peregrine is temporarily within the jurisdiction of the court: Richman v Ben-Tovim (note 338) para 10. 
Section 19(1) of the South African Supreme Court Act provides that: 
‘(a) A [High Court] shall have jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in and in relation to all causes 
arising … within its area of jurisdiction and all other matters of which it may according to law take 
cognisance ... 
(b) … 
(c) Subject to the provisions of section 28 … any High Court may – 
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basis for jurisdiction was abolished and the court accepted mere presence as a basis for 
jurisdiction
343
 and raised the prospect of applying the principles of forum non conveniens in 
such cases.
344
 
 
Further factors influencing harmonisation may be the training of lawyers by law schools, and 
access to research tools.
345
 In Southern Africa, the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, 
recently established an Institute for Private International Law in Africa, and its objectives are 
to undertake and publish research in the field of private international law, particularly in an 
African context.
346
 The work of this Institute should be encouraged, and possibly made a 
regional initiative.
347
 The Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, Mozambique in 2008 
organised the First International Conference on Regional Integration Issues and SADC 
Law.
348
 Other academic institutions in Southern Africa which are encouraging research in 
                                                                                                                                                        
(i)  issue an order for attachment of property or arrest of a person to confirm jurisdiction … also where 
the property or person concerned is outside its area of jurisdiction but within the Republic: Provided 
that the cause of action arose within its area of jurisdiction; and 
(ii) where the plaintiff is resident or domiciled within its area of jurisdiction, but the cause of action arose 
outside its area of jurisdiction and the property or person concerned is outside its area of jurisdiction, 
issue an order for attachment of property or arrest of a person to found jurisdiction regardless of 
where in the Republic the property or person is situated’ (s 19(1)).   
 The court in Bidvest Industrial Holdings referred to the practice in Holland, which allowed resident plaintiffs 
to arrest foreign nationals and to bring them before a local court in order to compel them to give security or 
their appearance in court or to bay whatever the judgment might be. This saved the plaintiffs the expense of 
proceeding in a foreign country; they could obtain judgment and levy execution in their own domicile (at 13-
14). The court also referred to Thermo Radiant Oven Sales Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries 1969 (2) SA (A) 295 at 
305C-D where it was held that ‘the attachment … served to found jurisdiction and thereby enabled the Court 
to pronounce a not altogether ineffective judgment’. 
343
  It was held that ‘it would suffice to empower the court to take cognisance of the suit if the defendant were 
served with the summons while in South Africa and, in addition, there were adequate connection between 
the suit and the area of jurisdiction of the South African court concerned from the point of view of the 
appropriateness and convenience of its being decided by that court. … Obviously the strongest connection 
would be provided by the cause of action arising within that jurisdiction: Bid Industrial Holdings (note 340) 
para 56. 
344
 Oppong (note 261) 283. 
345
 Garro (note 103) 611.  
346
 University of Johannesburg ‘The Institute for Private International Law in Africa’ available at 
http://www.uj.ac.za/EN/Research/NewsAnnouncements/ResearchHighlights/2008ResearchHighlights/Pages/
TheInstituteforPrivateInternationalLawinAfrica.aspx (accessed 08 October 2012). Its work will include the 
drafting of regulations conventions, model laws and other legislative instruments in the field of private 
international law for use by the various organs and Member States of the AU. It also acts as an information 
centre for The Hague Conference, providing training and arranging conferences, seminars and workshops. 
The statutes of the institutes were drafted in collaboration with the legal division of the AU. Research is 
conducted on an on-going basis in order to draft an African Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations for future use by the AU. 
347
 Oppong (note 261) 304. 
348
 The conference recommendations are grouped in three main areas: harmonisation and unification of national 
legal systems; implementation of the regional agenda; and institutional architecture. In order to achieve 
effective harmonisation and unification of national legal systems, the following activities were 
recommended: a) to set up a Regional Academic Partnership Network in SADC countries, with the main 
purpose of boosting research on regional integration and run regional capacity programmes. It was 
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private international law include the Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law
349
 at the 
University of South Africa
350
 and the Institute of International and Comparative Law in 
Africa
351
 at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. 
 
The above discussion suggests that there are a number of factors present in the Southern 
Africa which may render the proposed harmonisation efforts feasible.   
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This Chapter firstly considered the current international harmonisation efforts, specifically 
those of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
352
 Despite the on-going efforts 
since 1992 to conclude a global recognition and enforcement convention, the Hague 
Conference has not succeeded in this regard, but rather produced a much narrower than 
originally envisaged Choice of Court Convention.
353
 
 
While other international organisations such as UNCITRAL have contributed to the 
harmonisation of especially trade laws, including the successful New York Convention,
354
 the 
                                                                                                                                                        
recommended that the Faculties of Law of each country should be the driving force of the process and 
should take on board all the relevant players and stakeholders including civil society; b) establish a Regional 
Centre of Studies on Integration and SADC Law: Universidade Uduardo Mondlande Faculty of Law ‘First 
International Conference on “Regional Integration Issues and SADC Law”: Conclusions and 
Recommendations’ 23-25 April 2008, available at http://vi.unctad.org/files/mozambique/uemsadcreppt.doc 
(accessed 17 February 2013).   
349
 The Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law aims to maintain and develop their database of private 
international law rules; track the development of regional law, particularly within SADC; monitor Africa's 
participation in the development of public international law; and undertake comparative law studies on 
various aspects of private, commercial and public law in African states. 
350
 UNISA ‘Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law’ available at  
http://www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=13490 (accessed 17 April 2011).  
351
  The objective of the ICLA is to become a first port of call for those who wish to engage in legal research and 
legal reform in Africa involving comparative or international law at the advanced level. A central feature of 
the Institute is the Law of Africa Collection, the most comprehensive and up-to-date collection of primary 
legal materials of African countries in the world today, which is located in the Oliver R Tambo Law Library 
of the Faculty of Law. ICLA will be involved in providing technical assistance to African governments and 
international organisations engaged in legal reform on the continent. It also engages in collaborative projects 
with researchers on the continent and abroad. The ICLA houses doctoral students and visiting scholars and 
arrange seminar opportunities for government officials, judges, international civil servants and civil society: 
University of Pretoria ‘Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa’ available at 
http://web.up.ac.za/default.asp?ipkCategoryID=15428&subid=15428&ipklookid=10 (accessed 17 February 
2013).   
352
  See para 2.1 above. 
353
  See para 2.1 above. 
354
  See para 2.2.1 above. 
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current position is still that there is no international convention for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.
355
 
 
The Chapter further considered the approaches followed by the EU to harmonise its 
recognition and enforcement regime under the Brussels I Regulation/Brussels Convention,
356
 
and concludes that due to the absence of a number of factors which contributed to the success 
of the Brussels Regime in Europe, including the supranational elements of the EU law, the 
direct applicability of EU laws in EU Member States and the absence of a supranational court 
akin to the ECJ to ensure uniform interpretation of the instrument in the SACU, suggest that 
this may not be the most suitable approach to follow to harmonise the laws on recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the SACU.
357
 
 
Secondly, a discussion of the full faith and credit clause requirement in the Constitution of 
the USA
358
 suggest that this approach is likely only to succeed in politico-legal federation, 
where there is a Constitution which can impose legal obligations on its Member States, and 
not in the SACU which is a grouping of five independent States who have entered into a 
Customs Union Agreement with each other.
359
 
 
Thirdly, the approach in Australia-New Zealand entails extending the application of one 
federal state’s recognition and enforcement regime for inter-state judgments to a foreign 
State.
360
 This system therefore goes further than the United States model by treating a foreign 
judgment of the State party to the agreement as a sister-state judgment, while continuing to 
treat other States not party to the agreement in a different manner. Although SACU Member 
States share a common legal heritage, which is required by this approach, none of the SACU 
Member States are a federation whose federal rules on recognition and enforcement can be 
extended to other SACU Member States.
361
 
 
The final regional approach considered is that of the Latin American States, which are far less 
integrated than the USA or the EU, but nevertheless have a well-developed regime for the 
                                                 
355
  See Chapter 1, para 3.1 above. 
356
  See para 3.1 above. 
357
  See para 4.1 above. 
358
  See para 3.2 above. 
359
  See par 4.2 above. 
360
  See para 3.3 above. 
361
  See para 4.3 above. 
 
 
 
 
 97 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments amongst Member States based on treaty 
law, which facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments amongst them.
362
 
 
After a comparison of bilateral and multilateral recognition and enforcement conventions,
363
 
this Chapter concludes that a multilateral recognition and enforcement agreement is the most 
suitable method to harmonise or unify the rules of SACU Member States; and finally that the 
presence of a number of factors on the region points toward the feasibility of the proposed 
harmonisation efforts.
364
 
 
The following Chapter compares a number of multilateral recognition and enforcement 
agreements that are currently in force, to determine what lessons can be learned from their 
examples and what the form and content of a proposed recognition and enforcement 
convention for the SACU should be. 
 
                                                 
362
  See para 43.4 above. 
363
  See para 5.1 and 5.2. 
364
  Such as the use of comparative law and reliance by courts on courts of other Member states; the availability 
of legal literature indigenous to the region; the fact that law reporting and access to legal materials is fairly 
up to date in the major states of the region; a number of tertiary initiatives towards the study and 
harmonisation and laws of the region, and finally the availability of research tools in the region: see para 5.3 
above.  
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF TYPES OF MULTILATERAL 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT CONVENTIONS 
 
It was suggested in the previous Chapter
1
 that the harmonisation or unification of the rules on 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may best be achieved by the negotiation 
and conclusion of a multilateral convention on recognition and enforcement.  
 
This chapter firstly provides an overview of the types of multilateral convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
2
 It then focuses on the various aspects that 
an instrument to regulate the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for the region 
would possibly cover, including the scope and exclusions from scope of such an instrument 
and exceptions to the general enforcement rule.
3
 It compares a number of multilateral 
conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: the 1971 Hague 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments;
4
 the 2005 Hague 
Choice of Court Convention;
5
 the EU Brussels Convention/Brussels I, along with the Lugano 
Convention;
6
 and the Montevideo Convention.
7
 The purpose of this comparison is to 
ascertain whether the various instruments examined evidence any prevailing legal positions; 
as well as to identify the commonalities and differences between the current international and 
regional instruments.
8
 This will form the background against which proposals for a 
multilateral convention for the SACU will be made, based on the existing domestic laws in 
SACU Member States.
9
 
 
                                                 
1
  See Chapter 2 para 6 above.  
2
  See para 1.1 and 1.2 below.  
3
  This coincides with the different aspects that will be compared in the respective statutes of the SACU 
Member States: See Chapter 4 below.  
4
  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Feb. 1, 1971, (1971) 1144 U.N.T.S.249 (‘1971 Hague Convention’): see para 2 below. 
5
  Hague Conference on Private International Law Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 
44 I.L.M. 1294: see para 3 below. 
6
  EU Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters [2001] Official Journal L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’); Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 Official Journal L229 
(‘Brussels Convention’); Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (done 30 October 2007) Official Journal L339/3 (‘Lugano Convention’): see para 4 
below. 
7
  Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 
1979, OEA/Ser.A/2818 ILM 1224 (1979) (‘Montevideo Convention’): see para 5 below. 
8
  See para 6 below. 
9
  As discussed in Chapter 2. See Chapter 4, para 5 for proposed recognition and enforcement instrument for 
the SACU. 
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Traditionally, each convention dealing with an aspect of private international law have 
addressed only one subject matter, such as choice of law, jurisdiction or recognition and 
enforcement, but conventions can also be multi-dimensional in character and address a 
combination of these subjects or matters in the same instrument.
10
 Recognition and 
enforcement, and jurisdiction are often combined in a single instrument,
11
 and choice of law 
rules in a different instrument.
12
  The latter approach for dealing with choice of law rules in a 
separate instrument is generally accepted as preferable for both theoretical and practical 
reasons.
13
 
 
There are, however, different opinions on which approach should be adopted for a convention 
dealing with recognition and enforcement, namely whether it should be combined with rules 
on jurisdiction, or whether or not jurisdiction should be addressed in a separate instrument.
14
 
The question whether recognition and enforcement will be addressed in a single instrument, 
or combined with (direct) jurisdiction will often profoundly affect the drafting of the 
proposed instrument.
15
 A comparison between the relative successes of regional instruments 
regulating recognition and enforcement and the failure to create an international convention, 
                                                 
10
 Von Mehren AT ‘Enforcing judgments abroad: Reflections on the design of recognition conventions’ (1998-
1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 17. 
11
  The Brussels I Regulation (note 6) for example combines rules of direct jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in a single instrument. 
12
  See, for example Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I Regulation) which addresses choice of law 
in single instrument. 
13
 A forum’s choice of law rules and principles generally do not depend either on the basis on which 
adjudicatory authority is claimed, or on the prospects for the resulting judgment’s recognition and 
enforcement abroad. In addition, since enforcement may be appropriate in several states, each of which holds 
different views respecting choice-of-law methodologies and solutions, great difficulties would be 
encountered, at least in multilateral conventions, if choice of law was linked closely with either jurisdiction 
or recognition and enforcement. To the extent that a legal order takes specific choice-of-law rules into 
account in deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment, an indirect control by imposing a choice-of-law 
test for recognition suffices. Little would be gained by regulating directly the State of origin’s choice-of-law 
rule or methodology so far as these are employed for that State’s own purposes or affect possible 
enforcement in third states. Accordingly, neither a three-dimensional convention nor a two-dimensional one 
dealing directly with choice of law and either jurisdiction to adjudicate or recognition and enforcement are 
practical: see Von Mehren (note 10) 17-18.  
14
 See for example Oestreicher Y ‘”We're on a Road to Nowhere" – Reasons for the Continuing Failure to 
Regulate Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2008) 42 The International Lawyer 61; and 
Brand RA ‘Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law: A View from the United States’ (2001-2002) 21 Journal of Law and Commerce 191 who 
supports the idea of a single convention for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and Von 
Mehren (note 10) who proposes double conventions, or a variant, the mixed convention.  
15
 Von Mehren AT ‘Leonard J. Theberge Award for Private International Law: Arthur Taylor von Mehren’ 
(1997) 31(3) International Business Lawyer 724. 
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has led to the suggestion that choosing the wrong model is the main reason that the 
conventions failed.
16
 
 
The traditional distinction, before the introduction of the concept of a mixed convention, for 
conventions dealing with recognition and enforcement was between single and double 
conventions, but there are different understandings of these terms. 
 
The first understanding is that a single convention focuses solely on recognition and 
enforcement, listing the bases for jurisdiction that will entitle a judgment to recognition, but 
permitting judgments on other bases that a contracting State may, in its discretion enforce.
17
 
Single conventions regulate recognition and enforcement directly and indirect jurisdiction 
incidentally.
18
 A double convention deals with both the question of direct jurisdiction 
(international competence) and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and 
indirect jurisdiction.
19
 
 
Direct jurisdiction (international competence), as distinct from internal or domestic 
jurisdiction, has been described as ‘a term of art unique to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, [which] meaning cannot be ascertained by reference to the rules of other 
                                                 
16
 Oestreicher suggests that the failure of previous attempts such as the 1971 Hague Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (see para 2 below) 
was their attempt to base a recognition and enforcement convention on a mixed or double convention model, 
thus combining the question of recognition and enforcement with the substantially complicated issue of 
jurisdiction. He argues that the inability to agree on the jurisdiction question resulted in the inability to 
regulate the recognition and enforcement issue, as the two were needlessly intertwined: see Oestreicher Y 
‘The Rise and Fall of the “Mixed” and “Double” Convention Models Regarding Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 341; 
Oestreicher (note 14) 61.  
17
 Weintraub RJ ‘How substantial is our need for a judgments recognition convention and what should we 
bargain away to get it?’ (1998-1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 185. 
18
 In other words, it does not respond to the question as to when courts have jurisdiction in proceedings 
instituted for the first time. If a simple convention contains rules on jurisdiction, they are only rules on 
indirect jurisdiction. These are rules which, only a posteriori, at the stage of the recognition and enforcement 
of the judgment, serve to verify the jurisdiction of the court of origin in order to ascertain whether its 
decision may or may not be recognised or enforced in the State addressed: Hague Conference ‘International 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ Preliminary Document No 7 of April 
1997 (1997) 8, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3490&dtid=35 
(accessed 14 February 2013) (hereinafter ‘Kessedjian Report’) 1. The majority of recognition and 
enforcement conventions have traditionally been simple conventions, directly addressing only recognition 
and enforcement. They have an indirect and limited effect on the assumption of jurisdiction: Von Mehren 
AT ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?’ 
(1994) 57(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 282. 
19
 Kessedjian Report (note 18) 1. 
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branches of the law’.20 This concept has been explained as follows in the South African case 
of Reiss Engineering:
21 
‘The fact that the [foreign]... court may have had jurisdiction in terms of its own law does not 
entitle its judgment to be recognised and enforced [in the requested state]. It must have had 
jurisdiction according to the principles recognised by [the law of the requested] with reference 
to the jurisdiction of foreign courts.’22 
 
The issue whether a court has adjudicatory jurisdiction can become relevant at two different 
stages: the first stage concerns the proceedings before the court that renders the original 
decision, the ‘rendering court’. The rendering court will not hear a case, unless it determines 
that it has jurisdiction to do so.
23
 The second stage concerns the proceedings before the court 
requested to recognise and/or enforce the judgment, the ‘requested court’. The requested 
court will not recognise or enforce the decision of the rendering court unless it determines 
that the rendering court had jurisdiction to decide the case. The use of the same term, 
‘jurisdiction’, at both stages suggests uniformity of concepts, but this suggestion is 
misleading. French law resolved this concern by distinguishing between two concepts: direct 
jurisdiction (‘compétence directe’) and indirect jurisdiction (‘compétence indirecte’).24 
 
Rules on direct jurisdiction are determined by the laws of the State in which the judgment-
rendering court is located, and indirect jurisdiction is decided according to the law where the 
judgment is sought to be recognised or enforced.
25
 ‘Direct jurisdiction’ therefore refers to the 
jurisdiction of a court adjudicating the merits of a case, as opposed to ‘indirect jurisdiction’, 
which is used only where a requested court has to ascertain whether the rendering court had 
jurisdiction.
26
 
 
There is, however, a second understanding of single and double conventions which refers to 
the issue whether a convention only requires certain bases of jurisdiction (in which case it 
                                                 
20
 Forsyth CF Private International Law: The modern Roman-Dutch law including the jurisdiction of the High 
Courts 5ed (2012) 420; Nussbaum A ‘Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments’ (1941) 41(2) Columbia Law 
Review 223. 
21
 Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Isamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA. 
22
 Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Isamcor (note 21) 1037H. This was approved in Purser v Sales 2001 (3) SA 445 
(A) 450C: see Forsyth (note 20) 420. 
23
 Michaels R ‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions Conflict of 
Laws in a Globalizing World: A Tribute to Arthur von Mehren’ (2006) available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/15748 (accessed 28 April 2013). 
24
 Michaels (note 23) 8. 
25
 Michaels R ‘Two paradigms of Jurisdiction’ (2007) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 35-6.  
26
 Kessedjian Report (note 18) 8. 
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will be regarded as a single convention), or whether it also excludes certain bases of 
jurisdiction (in which case it will be a double convention).
27
 Double conventions regulate 
both the assumption of (direct) jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of the 
resulting judgment. Such conventions set out a list detailing all the bases on which 
jurisdiction may be predicated, and all judgments resulting from one of these listed bases 
automatically satisfy the convention’s jurisdictional requirement for recognition and 
enforcement. In its pure or complete form, the bases for the assumption in a double 
convention are exclusive; the courts of contracting states can exercise jurisdiction in matters 
within the convention only if a listed basis is present. The distinguishing characteristic of a 
full-fledged double convention is that each Contracting State must exercise adjudicatory 
authority when a convention basis is present but otherwise must refrain from adjudicating on 
the merits. In litigation within a double convention’s scope, either the litigation proceeds on a 
convention basis and a judgment entitled to recognition and enforcement results, or litigation 
is stopped for lack of adjudicatory authority and a judgment on the merits cannot be given. A 
double convention, combining jurisdiction and recognition, therefore operates in ‘either-or’ 
terms. Only the jurisdictional bases required by the convention can be invoked – permitted 
bases that are not required have no place - and all resulting judgments are, subject to rare 
exceptions, enforceable in the other Contracting States.
28
  
 
It is in within the context of this understanding that the concept of ‘mixed convention’ has 
been introduced. Similar to a double convention, a ‘mixed convention’ contains a list 
specifying approved grounds of jurisdiction. Judgments rendered in a contracting state and 
resting on an approved jurisdictional basis are entitled to recognition and enforcement under 
the convention. However, unlike a true double convention, a mixed convention allows 
contracting States to assume jurisdiction on other jurisdictional bases not listed in the 
convention and a State may, unless the convention expressly provides otherwise, grant 
recognition and enforcement under its general law.
29
 
 
A mixed convention differs from a double convention in that it divides bases of adjudicatory 
authority into three, rather than two, groups:
30
 
                                                 
27
 Michaels (note 23) 11-12.  
28
  Von Mehren (note 18) 293; Von Mehren (note 15) 723). 
29
 Von Mehren (note 18) 283. 
30
 Weintraub (note 17) 185. 
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i. Required bases that each Contracting State must make available if the litigation falls 
within the scope of the Convention, the use of which results in judgments that are, in 
principle, entitled to recognition and enforcement under the convention;   
ii. Prohibited bases that a Contracting State is not entitled to invoke in litigation that is 
within the scope of the Convention; and 
iii. Permitted bases that a Contracting State is not forbidden to use, but the use of which 
results in judgments that are not entitled to recognition and enforcement under the 
Convention – instead, the enforceability of such judgments is determined under the 
domestic law of recognition and enforcement of the State addressed.
31
 
 
The idea is that where the court has jurisdiction on an approved ground, and the resulting 
judgment will be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States under the Convention, 
provided that certain other requirements are met. A court of a Contracting State is not 
permitted to take jurisdiction on prohibited grounds. Courts are permitted to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ‘grey area’ grounds, but the provisions of the Convention relating to 
recognition and enforcement will not apply to the resulting judgment.
32
 
 
Therefore, in the first understanding, a single convention refers to a convention dealing only 
with recognition and enforcement, and a double convention refers to a convention dealing 
with both recognition and enforcement and jurisdiction. On this understanding, a ‘mixed 
convention’ is a sub-category of a double convention. In the second understanding, a single 
convention contains a white list (required grounds), a double convention white and black lists 
                                                 
31
 The US Department of State who originally suggested the idea of a global recognition and enforcement 
convention proposed that the Hague seeks to achieve a convention that is capable of meeting the needs of 
and being broadly accepted by the larger community represented by the Member States of the Hague 
Conference. They were of the opinion that the only options need not necessarily be between a simple or 
double convention, but believed that there should be consideration of the possibility for party States to utilise 
jurisdictional bases for litigation that are not designated as permissible or exorbitant by the convention: see 
Von Mehren (note 15) 724. 
32
 The European instruments in this area (the Brussels Regulation, the Brussels Convention and the Lugano 
Convention) are based on a slightly different idea. The Convention contains black and white list that are 
mandatory if defendant is domiciled in a signatory State, but not if defendant is a non-domiciliary - where 
the defendant is domiciled in another Member State, there is no grey area: jurisdiction may be exercised only 
on the required bases. Where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, jurisdiction may, subject to 
certain exceptions, be exercised on any ground permitted by national law (permitted bases), but the resulting 
judgment must nevertheless be recognised and enforced in the other States: see Hague Conference 
‘Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements: Explanatory Report by Trevor Hartley & 
Masato Dogauchi’ 2005 (hereafter ‘Hartley Dogauchi Report’) 16; Weintraub (note 17)185. 
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(excluded grounds), and a mixed convention white, black and grey (permitted grounds) 
lists.
33
 
 
Consequently, in terms of the different understandings of single and double conventions, 
negotiating parties will have to exercise two choices. This first will be between whether to 
address recognition and enforcement separately (single convention) or whether to combine it 
with rules on direct jurisdiction (double convention). If the latter approach is adopted, a 
decision will once again have to be made on whether the instrument would only require 
certain grounds of jurisdiction, whether it would require some and exclude others or whether 
it would also include a third category of permitted bases. This is illustrated by the following 
diagram:
34
 
 
                                                 
33
 Michaels (note 23) 13-14. 
34
 Prepared by Trooboff PD repeated in Von Mehren (note 10) 29; Von Mehren (note 18) (Original not 
available). 
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Figure 1: Types of Conventions addressing both Jurisdiction and Recognition and 
Enforcement 
 
State of Origin (Rendering Court)  
(SO) 
 
 
State of Recognition  
(Requested Court) (SR) 
No Convention 
SO may assume jurisdiction on 
these bases 
 Uncertain 
Area 
 
SR may enforce judgments when 
jurisdiction on these bases 
SO law determines   SR law determines 
 
Single Convention 
SO may assume jurisdiction on 
these bases 
 
List of 
permitted 
bases 
 
SR required to enforce judgments 
when on these bases 
SO may assume jurisdiction on 
other bases determined by its law 
 
Uncertain 
Area 
 
SR may enforce judgment when 
jurisdiction on these bases: SR law 
determines 
 
Double Convention 
SO required to assume jurisdiction 
only on these bases and no others 
 
List of 
required 
bases
35
 
 
SR required to enforce judgments 
when jurisdiction assumed on these 
bases 
SO required not to assume 
jurisdiction on other bases 
 
 
Prohibited 
bases 
 
SR not required to enforce 
judgments when F-1 proceeds to 
judgment on a prohibited basis 
 
 
Mixed Convention 
SO required to assume jurisdiction 
on these bases  
 
List of 
Required 
Bases 
 
SR required to enforce judgments 
when jurisdiction is determined to 
have rested on a required basis 
SO may assume jurisdiction on 
other bases: SO law determines 
 
Permitted 
bases
36
 
 
SR may, but is not required, to 
enforce judgments where 
jurisdiction rested on a permitted 
base: SR law determines 
SO required not  to assume 
jurisdiction on these bases 
 
Prohibited 
bases 
 
SR determines whether the 
judgment rests on a prohibited 
basis, and if so, is required not to 
enforce 
     
 
The above diagram provides an overview of the simple, double and mixed convention types. 
Two traditional types of conventions dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, namely single convention and double convention, with mixed conventions a sub-
                                                 
35
  All bases not listed as required are prohibited. 
36
 All bases not listed as required or prohibited are permitted. 
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type of double conventions are now discussed, followed by a discussion of possible variations 
on the traditional convention types. 
 
1.1 Single Convention 
Double conventions received considerable attention in the recent past, more recently some 
scholars have suggested moving back to a single convention, regulating only the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments, and leaving the rules of jurisdiction to national laws.
37
 The 
reason for this is that it is easier to agree on issues relating to the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments than it is to agree on jurisdiction issues and addressing recognition and 
enforcement in an instrument separate from potentially complex jurisdiction issues may 
significantly increase the likelihood of success of a prospective future instrument.
38
 
 
The Hague Conference has suggested a ‘reinforced simple instrument’,39 which would 
include the main characteristics of the single convention. The suggested instrument would 
deal only with the recognition and enforcement of judgments and not directly regulate 
jurisdiction; but this could be complemented by additional provisions that regulate the 
circulation of judgments either at the jurisdiction stage or at the recognition and enforcement 
stage.
40
 For example, the Interim Text of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements contained a rule allowing the court to suspend enforcement proceedings where it 
is clearly inappropriate for it to exercise jurisdiction, and another court is clearly the more 
appropriate forum.
41
 This bears resemblance to the common law rule of forum non 
conveniens.
42
 
 
Another consideration is whether it might be useful to include a provision which places the 
onus on the court of origin to consider whether a judgment is likely to require enforcement 
abroad, and if so, only accept jurisdiction if it is expected that the judgment will be capable of 
being recognised and enforced under the terms of the instrument. Such a provision may assist 
in promoting awareness of the potential hurdles in enforcing judgments abroad and motivate 
                                                 
37
 Oestreicher (note 16) 349. 
38
 Oestreicher (note 14) 61. 
39
  Hague Conference ‘Ongoing work on international litigation and possible continuation of the Judgments 
Project’ Preliminary Document No 5 of March 2012 (2012) 12, 15-16. 
40
 Hague Conference (note 39) 15.  
41
 Hague Conference Interim Text – Summary of the outcome of the discussion in Commission II of the first 
part of the Diplomatic Conference 20 June 2001 (2001) Article 22. 
42
  See Chapter 2 note 267 above.  
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originating courts to provide a more comprehensive summary of the reasons for the decision 
to exercise jurisdiction.
43
 
 
A further possibility to enforce the simple convention would be to include provisions which 
facilitate judicial communication between courts, both at the jurisdiction stage (e.g. to 
support the court of origin in deciding to suspend proceedings on grounds of lis pendens or 
clearly inappropriate forum) and the enforcement stage (e.g. to support the court addressed in 
verifying the jurisdiction of the court of origin).
44
 This would support the orderly rendition 
and recognition of judgments. 
 
Oestreicher suggests that under a simple convention, every foreign judgment should be 
entitled to recognition and enforcement, unless there is a good reason not to do so – therefore 
creating a ‘presumption of enforceability’.45 The party against whom the judgment is to be 
enforced will have to prove that there is a legitimate reason to refrain from doing so. 
Legitimate reasons would probably include lack of jurisdiction, fraud and public policy. 
Consequently, the party objecting to the recognition has to overcome this presumption. The 
presumption arises as soon as the party seeking recognition or enforcement of the foreign 
judgment proves that the judgment is genuine, and he or she bears the burden of proof in this 
regard.
46
 
 
1.1.1 Advantages of a single convention 
A single convention on recognition and enforcement, while still being a challenge, would 
unquestionably be easier and less complicated to negotiate than a double convention.
47
 This 
would be more feasible than reaching consensus on direct grounds of jurisdiction,
48
 as it 
would eliminate the need to agree in advance on the bases for the assertion of jurisdiction.
49
 
The asymmetric design of direct and indirect jurisdiction leaves States’ direct jurisdiction 
laws untouched so each State still maintains its freedom in rendering judgments, therefore, 
                                                 
43
 Hague Conference (note 39) 15.  
44
  Hague Conference (note 39) 15.  
45
  Oestreicher (note 16) 356. 
46
  Oestreicher (note 16) 356. 
47
  Huang J Interregional Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: Lessons for China 
from US and EU Laws (unpublished SJD Thesis, Duke University School of Law, 2010) 288.  
48
  Hague Conference ‘Continuation of Judgments Project’ Preliminary Document No 14 of February 2010 
(2010) 3-5, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd14e.pdf (accessed 14 February 2013) 
para 12.  
49
  Oestreicher (note 16) 350-54. 
 
 
 
 
 109 
the convention will probably meet less resistance.
50
 In a double convention both the 
jurisdiction which the courts of the Contracting States are permitted to exercise as well as the 
conditions upon which such judgments are to be recognised are regulated. Such a Convention 
requires a high degree of consensus on what the required grounds of jurisdiction ought to be. 
It also requires Contracting States to change their national laws relating to international 
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The obligations facing 
Contracting States can therefore be substantial. In a single Convention, where jurisdiction is 
only dealt with as a condition for the recognition of judgments, Contracting States remain 
free to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with their national laws, which do not require any 
change.
51
 Previous discussions by the Hague Conference have revealed a broad consensus 
with regards to recognition and enforcement, while consensus relating to the grounds of 
jurisdiction proved more difficult to achieve.
52
 
 
A single convention may be easier to negotiate than a double convention in a region, or 
regional economic community where the laws of the States within the region are divergent,
53
 
and they have not yet established strong mutual trust of each other’s judicial institutions 
amongst themselves. The underlying assumption behind the proposal for a single convention 
is that a mixed or double convention will not succeed unless there is a very high level of 
confidence between negotiating parties on the issues of jurisdiction.
54
 History has proven that 
the double convention is likely to succeed only in situations where the participating countries 
share the same view as well as the same political, social, cultural and economic interests.
55
 
 
For example, the purpose of art 220 of the Treaty of Rome
56
 requiring EC Member States to 
engage in negotiations to simplify formalities governing recognition and enforcement,
57
 was 
to provide the players in the EC with legal protection upon which they can rely should they 
                                                 
50
  Michaels (note 25) 38-9.  
51
  Hague Conference on Private International Law ‘Preliminary Draft Convention on jurisdiction and foreign 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, adopted by the Special Commission and Report by P. Nygh & F. 
Pocar’ Preliminary Document No 11 of August 2000 (2000) 27 (hereafter ‘Nygh & Pocar Report’). 
52
  Hague Conference (note 39) 13. 
53
  This would be the case where the Member States within a regional economic community belong to different 
legal traditions. This would not be the case in the SACU however, as the laws within the region shows great 
similarities between the respective statutes dealing with recognition and enforcement: see Chapter 2, para 4. 
54
  Oestreicher (note 16) 349. 
55
 Oestreicher (note 16) 350.  
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decide to engage in economic activities. At the time when the EC Member States negotiated 
the Brussels Convention, they shared a view of a united Europe and their political, social and 
economic interests were relatively close to each other. There was, therefore, a real incentive 
for, and interest in, the successful implementation of the Brussels, and related new 
conventions. The negotiating States did not necessarily agree on all issues, and they 
sometimes agreed to ‘swallow the bitter pill’ for the sake of ultimately enjoying the benefits 
of belonging to this union of countries. The gain they expected from joining the EC 
compensated them from the concessions they had to make and for the fear and risks 
involved.
58
 
 
The success the Brussels Convention/Regulation achieved may, to some extent, be compared 
to the relative success of the ‘sister states’ recognition and enforcement system in the USA, 
which is based on the full faith and credit clause.
59
 Both the Brussels Convention and the 
USA Constitution are based on the broader commitment that the participating members have 
towards one another.
60
 
 
A single convention implies a weak sense of interdependence because it only regulates 
indirect jurisdiction,
61
 therefore, it is best applicable in settings in which there is a lack of 
strong political and economic commitments.
62
 The lack of trust that exists between various 
countries and legal systems has been offered as one of the explanations for the continuing 
failure to achieve the goal of creating an international convention for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.
63
 
 
The single convention format may also be more appropriate in the absence of an overarching 
court of final review, such as the ECJ, and when there are no neutral institutions that can 
control the interpretation and application of each state's international obligations.
64
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A single enforcement arrangement also has the benefit of its ability to adapt to the changing 
economic, legal and political situations within regions. If regions become more and more 
economically interrelated, legally converged, and politically allied in the future, the single 
enforcement arrangement has the potential to develop into a mixed or double arrangement, 
and ultimately harmonise regional direct and indirect jurisdiction laws.
65
 And while this 
design unifies regional indirect jurisdiction law, the certainty of the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments will also increase significantly.
66
 
 
1.1.2 Disadvantages of the single convention 
The jurisdiction of Member States is only dealt with indirectly in a single convention, and 
Member States remain free to exercise jurisdiction on other grounds in accordance with their 
national laws, as the convention does not require any change. A single convention is, 
therefore, described as imperfect, because it does not prevent the exercise of exorbitant 
grounds of jurisdiction ‘which are as much a hindrance to international commerce as the 
uncertainty about recognition and enforcement of judgments’.67 Exorbitant jurisdiction is 
described as ‘jurisdiction validly exercised under the jurisdictional rules of a State that 
nevertheless appears unreasonable to non-nationals because of the grounds used to justify 
jurisdiction’.68 In other words, jurisdiction is exorbitant when the court seized does not 
possess a sufficient connection with the parties to the case, the circumstances of the case, the 
cause or subject of the action, or fails to take account of the principle of the proper 
administration of justice. An exorbitant form of jurisdiction is one which is solely intended to 
promote political interests, without taking into consideration of the interests of the parties to 
the dispute.
69
 Indirect jurisdictional rules do not limit the diverse jurisdictional bases of the 
various rendering courts and a single Convention based on indirect rules preserves the 
diversity, and assures recognition only for the limited group of cases in which there is 
substantial consensus in national law.
70
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One of the main arguments against the single convention idea is that it does not really solve 
anything, because the jurisdiction problem does not go away, and much uncertainty remains:  
leaving the matter of when a rendering court will be deemed to have jurisdiction for the 
national laws of the requested State to determine, creates uncertainty for prospective 
traders,
71
 and may also promote forum shopping.
72
 Refraining from including agreed upon 
bases of jurisdiction in the convention does not mean that the enforcing court can avoid 
looking into whether the rendering court was entitled to render the judgment. The court will 
still need to address this issue before recognising or enforcing the foreign judgment, but it 
will not have a convention to guide it.73  
 
Oestreicher is of the view that the argument that a single convention leaves jurisdiction to 
uncertainty, and therefore does not improve the situation in which each country recognises 
and enforces judgments according to its own laws, ‘unconvincing’.74 He argues that a single 
recognition and enforcement instrument will change and dramatically improve a situation in 
which there is no such convention as it will add a major international obligation and a moral 
commitment on the part of all of the participating countries to recognise and enforce foreign 
judgments, and that that should not be underestimated.
75
 
 
1.2 Double Conventions 
A court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter and the recognition of the ensuing judgments 
are both addressed in a double convention. The reason for this approach is the relationship 
between adjudicatory authority and enforcement of foreign judgments, as recognition 
conventions almost invariably impose a jurisdictional test.
76
 A universal requirement for 
enforcement of a judgment is that the rendering court must have had adjudicatory 
jurisdiction. Von Mehren & Trautman
77
 suggest that such a test seem natural since a basic 
function of jurisdictional standards is to assure that it is fair to require parties to litigate a 
controversy in the courts of a given community. If the rendering court was a clearly 
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inappropriate forum in the view of the requested court, policies against duplication of effort 
and harassment of the parties, as well as considerations of international order, would no 
longer decisively support recognition. On the other hand, the use of fair standards of 
adjudicatory jurisdiction may be seen as some indication that the rendering court also dealt 
fairly with the underlying situation.
78
  
 
The question on whether the rendering court has the right to assert jurisdiction in a specific 
case is a fundamental factor in determining whether to recognise or enforce a foreign 
judgment, or refrain from doing so.
79
 The Brussels Regime, and its sister instrument, the 
Lugano Convention, are suggested to have enjoyed the success they have, in comparison with 
the Hague endeavours, because they have one common characteristic: they are double 
conventions, in the sense that they primarily regulate the direct jurisdiction of courts, treating 
this as an important prerequisite to the effects which arise from the resulting judgments.
80
 
Double conventions provide direct jurisdiction rules applicable in the court in which the case 
is first brought. It, therefore, addresses the matter from the outset, and pre-empts the need for 
indirect consideration of the rendering court’s jurisdiction (indirect jurisdiction) by the 
requested court.
81
 
 
The mixed convention is a variation on the double convention, providing rules for both 
jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments, but also leaves some bases of jurisdiction 
available under national law.
82
 A mixed convention does not entirely pre-empt the Member 
States’ jurisdictional rules, but rather outlaws specified exorbitant jurisdictional bases and, in 
addition, lays down a set of jurisdictional provisions that, if complied with, would assure the 
resulting judgments recognition in all member states.
83
 Mixed conventions, at the same time, 
allow Member States to use jurisdictional bases that are neither outlawed, as exorbitant, nor 
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listed among those that predestine judgments to recognition.
84
 There is consequently a ‘grey 
zone’ of jurisdictional bases between the recognised and the impermissible heads of 
jurisdiction.
85
 
 
1.2.1 Advantages of a double convention 
A double convention has certain advantages when compared to a single instrument:  
i. It provides more information and predictability by setting out the acceptable and 
unacceptable grounds of jurisdiction that would be applicable in each State Party.
86
 
ii. It facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgments, saving both in time and 
expense because it relies to a greater extent than a single convention on the findings 
made by the original court.
87
 
iii. It offers a regime more evenly balanced between plaintiffs and defendants. Single 
conventions afford defendants no protection where a judgment can be enforced in the 
State of origin or in another State under the latter’s general law of recognition and 
enforcement. Double conventions, at the minimum, abort actions based on exorbitant 
bases of jurisdiction.
88
 
iv. A double convention establishes uniform rules of jurisdiction for all rendering courts 
and facilitates increased harmonisation of laws,
89
 provides greater legal certainty,
90
 
avoid discrimination and facilitate the free movement of judgments.
91
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v. Forum shopping is significantly restricted under a double convention as jurisdiction 
can only be exercised on bases set out in the convention.
92
 
vi. A double convention would by itself in due course provide an important incentive to 
litigate in courts whose judgments would, under the convention qualify for 
recognition and enforcement. Consequently, a negative list, which obliges Contracting 
States to refuse the recognition and enforcement of judgments based on certain 
grounds of jurisdiction considered to be ‘exorbitant’, would be less necessary.93 
 
The mixed model also offers distinct advantages over the single convention model: it offers 
both parties significant informational advantage: a plaintiff need only consult the ‘white list’ 
to know where he can sue and where the resulting judgment will be recognised and 
enforced.
94
 Likewise, a defendant can easily ascertain that certain exorbitant jurisdictional 
bases are not available to the plaintiff. Additionally, a mixed convention provides both 
plaintiffs and defendants with substantive guarantees with respect to the exercise of 
jurisdiction; a plaintiff can count on the availability of certain jurisdictional bases; and a 
defendant is protected against ‘exorbitant’ jurisdictional claims.95 
 
A mixed convention best suits participating states within a region that ‘have become to a 
significant extent economically inter-dependent but do not aspire to political or economic 
union’.96 Parties, who initially conclude a single enforcement convention, may, when the 
States within a region become more integrated with each other, consider developing the 
convention into a mixed convention.
97
 As a further step, regions may consider reducing the 
permitted jurisdiction grounds in the mixed convention, and change it into a double 
convention.
98
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1.2.2 Pure and mixed double conventions: comparative advantages 
Pure double conventions provide clear, easily accessible information as to where an action 
can be brought and where it cannot be brought, and enjoy an informational advantage over 
mixed conventions as under a mixed convention’s permitted jurisdictional areas, uncertainty 
will remain as to whether a judgment will be entitled to recognition and enforcement in a 
particular State.
99
 By reading a pure double convention’s text potential litigants can 
determine immediately where they can sue or be sued, subject only to possible questions of 
interpretation, and the availability of recognition and enforcement of any resulting 
judgment.
100
 
 
Similar to a double convention, a mixed convention also improves clarity, predictability and 
simplicity, in two basic situations: (i) where jurisdiction could be assumed on a basis 
contained in the ‘white list’; and (ii) where the only jurisdictional basis available is a ‘black-
listed’ basis. In other situations, study of each potential forum’s general law will be necessary 
to determine where a suit can be brought and whether recognition and enforcement is 
available under the general law of the jurisdiction where it may be sought. As for the first two 
grounds, a mixed convention has the same potential for clarity, predictability and simplicity 
as a double convention. The situation within the ‘grey zone’ is, however, as muddled as that 
which exits in the absence of treaty regulation.
101
 
 
Adoption of a mixed convention would leave many difficult issues unresolved; however, 
these issues arise for pure double-conventions as well. For example, to what extent, if at all, 
will forum non conveniens stays or dismissals of proceedings be allowed when a required 
jurisdictional basis is in question? Will the convention accept the lis pendens
102
 principle and, 
if so, how will it apply to proceedings in which a party is seeking a declaratory judgment?
103 
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A double convention, in contrast to a single convention, is appropriate where the countries 
involved have relatively common legal traditions and cultures, and where a neutral institution 
can control the interpretation of the Convention and ensure that all Member States act 
according to their obligations.
104
 This type of arrangement generally requires that member 
states share strong political alliances and an overarching court that can control the 
interpretation and application of the convention.
105
 A mixed convention, on the other hand, 
better suits situations where these conditions are lacking. A mixed convention comes into 
consideration where there is neither a sufficiently compelling sense of interdependence nor a 
supranational institution that serves as legal guard.
106
 
 
1.2.3 Comparative disadvantages of pure and mixed double conventions 
In a perfect world, where everyone shares the same interests and follows the same agenda, 
the double convention model would have been the ultimate solution, because it provides 
certainty and an element of predictability that is so important in the business world.
107
 We do 
not live in a perfect world and consequently there are many conflicting interests, economic, 
cultural and political, that make it difficult for countries to reach mutual understanding on the 
international recognition and enforcement of judgments.
108
 
 
Agreement on the particularised and exclusive list of jurisdictional bases that a true double 
convention requires may be very difficult to obtain: it requires a high degree of consensus on 
what the required grounds of jurisdiction ought to be and it also requires Contracting States to 
alter their national laws relating to international jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions 
of the Convention. The obligations facing Contracting States can, therefore, be substantial.
109
 
The issue of international competence is one of the major practical stumbling blocks 
preventing the creation of a successful international recognition and enforcement convention. 
The lack of agreement on the issue has been ascribed as the most significant reason for why 
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we currently do not have an international instrument regulating the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.
110
 There are some circumstances where one legal order 
has strong reasons for claiming adjudicatory authority while another has, from its perspective, 
strong reasons for refusing recognition of the resulting judgment. These tensions may, in 
many cases, be too deeply rooted to be resolved in the ‘either-or’ fashion of a true double 
convention.
111
 
 
One of the problems which the Hague Conference foresaw with a double convention when 
negotiations for a new convention began, is that unless the new grounds of jurisdictions were 
framed very close to those of the Lugano Convention, some reluctance on the part of some of 
the Lugano countries could be expected.
112
 
 
Many critics of the double conventions, despite its successes, on a regional level believe that 
efforts to conclude a convention using the two-dimensional approach is the fundamental 
mistake leading to the failure of previous efforts at global regulation of recognition and 
enforcement.
113
 The failed proposals all required the potential members to agree on bases for 
the assertion of jurisdiction, something the potential signatories and participants were not in a 
position to do.
114
 
 
1.3 Analysis 
It can be concluded from the discussions above that bilateral arrangements may be the first 
steps beyond unsatisfactory pure domestic laws on recognition and enforcement. The next 
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stage might be the establishment of a multilateral convention on recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments.
115
  
 
A judgment agreement providing for regularity, and thus ease of enforcement, will transcend 
different legal systems and national cultures. Signatory countries may have to sacrifice laws 
or parts of their systems in order to reach an agreement. Such an agreement will represent the 
common ground of signatory States’ legal systems.116 Negotiating States will be faced with 
complex challenges on how to resolve the major challenges confronting interregional rules on 
recognition and enforcement, including conflicts between civil law and common law; and 
low levels of trust.
117
 
 
What will be of critical importance for the negotiators of a possible recognition and 
enforcement convention is choosing the most suitable form of the instrument for the Member 
States of the SACU, taking into account the specific historical, political, cultural and socio-
economic differences between the States. The critical importance of these factors can be 
illustrated by the Brussels I Regulation: while it has achieved tremendous success in the EU, 
some authors
118
 attribute the failure of the 2004 attempt by the Hague Conference to create a 
mixed convention to the fact that it used the Brussels double convention as model and 
ignored the economic, political, cultural and social background differences among the 
negotiating parties.
119
 Shared interests may, to a certain extent, also be the very reason for, 
and explanation of, the success of the Brussels Convention/Regulation and Lugano 
Convention, of which the participants, at least in recent years, pursued a similar agenda, of 
social, political, cultural and economic interests.
120
 These instruments were fairly successful 
despite the fact that they were drafted as double conventions, addressing the complex issue of 
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direct jurisdiction, since the signatories shared substantially similar interests and were thus 
motivated to participate.
121
 
 
Although a simple convention would be the easiest conclude, and, therefore, the most likely 
option to succeed, it will not circumvent the issue of jurisdiction in its entirety. Where a 
double convention can be agreed to between States, it is suggested that this should be the 
preferred solution, as it will offer litigants and traders a great degree of legal certainty. The 
likelihood and intensity of tensions in reaching agreement upon the exclusive list of 
jurisdictional bases that a true double convention requires, increases as a function of the 
differences between the social, sociological, political, and economic cultures of the legal 
orders in question. Grouping of States that have relatively common backgrounds and cultures 
can often resolve these conflicts in favour of unqualified acceptance or unqualified rejection 
of the basis in question; this may be especially so where the States aspire to a more closely 
knit legal, economic, and political order.
122
 
 
Should agreement not be reached on bases of jurisdiction, a single convention may under the 
circumstances be a feasible route. Comparatively speaking, a single convention with indirect 
jurisdiction grounds may be easier for States to agree upon than concluding an arrangement 
on direct jurisdiction. This is because it leaves direct jurisdiction to national laws, and it can 
use denying recognition and enforcement to discourage parties from litigating on exorbitant 
direct jurisdiction grounds.
123
 A single convention with indirect jurisdictional bases may pave 
the way for the regions to develop a mixed or double convention regulating both direct and 
indirect jurisdiction in the long run.
124
 It is, therefore, submitted that this should be the 
approach followed by the SACU. 
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In negotiating a new instrument on recognition and enforcement for the SACU
125
 negotiating 
parties may want to consider whether there is anything to be learnt from other regional or 
international efforts insofar as recognition and enforcement are concerned.
126
 Two 
international conventions, namely the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention,
127
 and the 2005 
Hague Choice of Court Conventions,
128
 as well as two regional examples, namely the EU 
Brussels I Regulation/Convention
129
 and the 1979 OAS Montevideo Convention
130
 are 
considered.  
 
1.4 Variations on traditional convention types 
The above discussion shows that there are three basic forms that a judgments-recognition 
convention may take: single, double and mixed. A single convention focuses solely on 
recognition and enforcement, listing the bases for jurisdiction that will entitle a judgment to 
recognition, but permitting judgments on other bases that a contracting state may, in its 
discretion, enforce.
131
 A double convention lists the exclusive bases for jurisdiction, a ‘white 
list’, and may also contain a list of prohibited bases for jurisdiction, a ‘black list’.132 A mixed 
convention contains a white list, perhaps a black list and also provides that a signatory may, 
but need not, recognise judgments on bases not on either the white or black lists, the ‘grey’ 
list.
133
 
 
Variations on these forms combining both the first and second understanding of the concepts 
of single and double conventions
134
 suggest that there are at least seven major possibilities for 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment conventions, and not only the traditional 
three convention types:
135
 
i. The issue of jurisdiction is not dealt with and Contracting States agree to recognise 
any judgment that is valid under the standards of the rendering State, i.e. States agree 
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to recognises and enforce judgments provided the rendering court had jurisdiction in 
terms of the domestic laws of the rendering State;
136
 
ii. The issue of jurisdiction is not dealt with and a signatory State must recognise a 
foreign judgment that meets the requested State’s domestic jurisdictional standards, 
i.e. States agree to recognise and enforce judgments provided the rendering court had 
jurisdiction in terms of the domestic laws of the requested State;  
iii. The Convention contains no black list, but an exclusive white list, and judgments on 
other bases may not be recognised. This is the traditional pure double convention 
form, but negotiating parties would not necessarily be required to agree on specific 
jurisdictional grounds to be on the black list – everything not on the white list is on an 
‘implied’ black list;  
iv. The Convention contains no black list and permits recognition of judgments that are 
not on its white list (therefore, containing only a ‘white’ and an implied ‘grey’ list);  
v. The Convention contains a black list and a white list and these lists apply exclusively 
to judgments entitled to recognition, but for domestic purposes, signatories are free to 
exercise jurisdiction even on black lists basis;  
vi. The Convention contains black and white lists that are mandatory if the defendant is 
domiciled in a signatory State, but not if the defendant is a non-domiciliary (the 
Brussels Convention is in this form);
137
 
vii. The Convention contains a black list and a white list, but signatories free to adjudicate 
on other bases not on the black list and other signatories may, but need not, enforce 
such judgments (‘grey’ jurisdiction) – this is the traditional ‘mixed convention’ form. 
 
The larger number of types available for recognition and enforcement conventions may 
increase the likelihood of success for negotiating parties attempting to conclude a new 
judgment-enforcement convention. For example, if States are unable to reach agreement on 
the prohibited bases of jurisdiction required for a traditional double or mixed convention, the 
fourth or fifth examples above may be considered as alternative options.
138
 
 
                                                 
136
 It may be unlikely that any country would ratify such a convention: see Weintraub (note 17) 185. 
137
 Weintraub (note 17) 185. 
138
  See Chapter 4 below.  
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2 THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
The Hague Convention adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters on 1 February 1971 (hereafter the ‘1971 
Hague Convention’),139 which was the first attempt at harmonising the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments at an international level. 
 
The 1971 Hague Convention, complemented by a Supplementary Protocol of the same date, 
deals with judgments in civil and commercial matters generally. The Convention provides for 
mutual recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions rendered in the respective 
Contracting States. It does not directly regulate the assumption of jurisdiction
140
 by the 
rendering court.
141
 
 
The Convention and its Protocol have remained inoperative, however, due to the fact that the 
Contracting States have not concluded the Supplementary Agreements required by Article 21 
of the Convention, a necessary condition for the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
between State Parties.
142
 The failure of the 1971 Hague Convention to come into effect was 
most likely not due to any intrinsic qualities of the Convention, but influenced by a number 
of factors, the first of which is the complicated formal structure of the Convention 
(Convention, Protocol and Bilateral Supplementary Agreements) some aspects of which is 
explained below.
143
  
 
                                                 
139
 See note 4. 
140
 Conventions dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are generally categorised 
into two forms, based on whether they regulate the assumption of jurisdiction in the rendering (original) 
court (in which case it would be a double convention), or whether the convention only regulate the 
recognition and enforcement of the judgment, and incidentally the circumstances in which a court would 
have deemed to have had jurisdiction for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, in which case it 
would be a simple convention. See Chapter 4, para 2.  
141
 Hague Conference (note 39) 3-4.  
142
 Article 21 provides that decisions rendered in a Contracting States will not be recognised or enforced in 
another Contracting State unless the two States, being Parties to the Convention, have concluded a 
Supplementary Agreement to this effect. There are only five Contracting States to this Convention, namely 
Albania, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Kuwait: see Hague Conference ‘Convention of 1 February 
1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ available 
at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=78 (accessed 20 May 2013).  Only 
Cyprus, Netherlands and Portugal Ratified the Convention. As between the Netherlands and Portugal, the 
provisions of the Hague Convention have been replaced by those of the Brussels I Regulation: see Michaels 
R ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments’ Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (2009) 4. 
143
  See para 6 below. 
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The material scope of the Convention; the procedural requirements for recognition and 
enforcement, and the grounds for refusing to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment are now 
discussed. 
 
2.1 Material scope of application of Convention 
The 1971 Hague Convention applies to decisions rendered in civil or commercial matters by 
the courts of Contracting States.
144
 The Convention applies to all decisions given by the 
courts of a Contracting State, irrespective of the name given by that State to the proceedings 
which gave rise to the decision or of the name given to the decision itself, be it judgment, 
order or writ of execution.
145
 The Convention applies irrespective of the nationality of the 
parties.
146
 
 
It does not apply to a decision which has as its main object determining the status or capacity 
of persons or questions of family law;
147
 the existence or constitution of legal persons or the 
powers of their officers;
148
 maintenance obligations;
149
 questions of succession;
150
 questions 
of bankruptcy, compositions or analogous proceedings;
151
 questions of social security;
152
 and 
questions relating to damage or injury in nuclear matters.
153
 The Convention also does not 
apply to decisions for the payment of any customs duty, tax or penalty.
154
 
 
2.2 Procedural requirements for enforcement 
A decision rendered in a Contracting State will be entitled to recognition and enforcement in 
another Contracting State, provided that the decision was given by a court considered to have 
jurisdiction within the meaning of the Convention (indirect jurisdiction); and that it is no 
longer subject to ordinary forms of review in the State of origin. In addition, to be 
                                                 
144
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1. 
145
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 2. However, it does not apply to decisions which order provisional or 
protective measures or to decisions rendered by administrative tribunals.  
146
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 3. 
147
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1(1). 
148
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1(2). 
149
  Hague Convention (note 4) art  1(3). 
150
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1(4). 
151
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1(5). 
152
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1(6). 
153
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 1(7). 
154
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 1. 
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enforceable in the State addressed, a decision must also be enforceable in the State of 
origin.
155
 
 
Article 13 of the 1971 Hague Convention lists the documents that a party seeking recognition 
or applying for enforcement must furnish.
156
 The article further provides that no legalisation 
or other like formality may be required.
157
 
 
The procedure for the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments is governed by the 
law of the State addressed, in so far as the Convention does not provide otherwise.
158
 
 
2.3 Grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce 
Recognition or enforcement of a decision may be refused under the Convention if the 
decision is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed; resulted 
from proceedings incompatible with the requirements of due process of law; either party had 
no adequate opportunity to fairly present his case; or if the decision was obtained by fraud in 
connection with a matter of procedure.
159
 Recognition and enforcement may also be refused 
if proceedings between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same 
purpose -   
a)  are pending before a court of the State addressed and those proceedings were the 
first to be instituted;  
b)  have resulted in a decision by a court of the State addressed; or  
                                                 
155
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 4. Recognition and enforcement may nevertheless be refused in a number of 
cases, discussed in para 2.3 
156
 The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement must furnish –  
(1) a complete and authenticated copy of the decision;  
(2) if the decision was rendered by default, the originals or certified true copies of the documents required to 
establish that the summons was duly served on the defaulting party;  
(3) all documents required to establish that the decision fulfils the conditions of sub-paragraph (2) of the first 
paragraph of Article 4, and, where appropriate, of the second paragraph of Article 4; (Article 4 provides 
that a decision rendered in one of the Contracting States shall be entitled to recognition and enforcement 
in another Contracting State under the terms of this Convention – (1) if the decision was given by a court 
considered to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention, and (2) if it is no longer subject to 
ordinary forms of review in the State of origin. In addition, to be enforceable in the State addressed, a 
decision must be enforceable in the State of origin.) 
(4) unless the authority addressed otherwise requires, translations of the documents referred to above, 
certified as correct either by a diplomatic or consular agent or by a sworn translator or by any other 
person so authorised in either State: art 13. 
157
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 13. 
158
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 14. 
159
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 5. 
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c)  have resulted in a decision by a court of another State which would be entitled to 
recognition and enforcement under the law of the State addressed.
160
 
 
The 1971 Hague Convention includes rules on indirect jurisdiction, providing that in 
questions relating to the jurisdiction of the rendering court, the requested State is bound by 
the findings of fact on which the court based its jurisdiction, unless the decision was rendered 
by default.
161
 The Convention includes both grounds in which the rendering courts will be 
considered to have had jurisdiction,
162
 as well as grounds on which the requested court need 
not recognise the jurisdiction of the rendering court.
163
 The Supplementary Protocol requires 
the Contracting States to refuse recognition and enforcement of judgments based on certain 
exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction, rendered against persons located in a Contracting State.
164
 
                                                 
160
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 5. 
161
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 9. 
162
 The grounds are as follows:   
(1) If the defendant had his habitual residence in the State of origin, or, if the defendant is not a natural 
person, its seat, its place of incorporation or its principal place of business in that State;  
(2) if the defendant had, in the State of origin a commercial, industrial or other business establishment, or a 
branch office;  
(3) if the action had as its object the determination of an issue relating to immovable property situated in the 
State of origin;  
(4) in the case of injuries to the person or damage to tangible property, if the damage occurred in the territory 
of the State of origin;  
(5) if the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of origin, unless the law of the State 
addressed would not permit such an agreement because of the subject-matter of the dispute;  
(6) if the defendant has argued the merits without challenging the jurisdiction of the court except to resist the 
seizure of property or to obtain its release, or if the recognition of this jurisdiction would be contrary to 
the law of the State addressed because of the subject-matter of the dispute;  
(7) if the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was the plaintiff in the proceedings in 
the court of origin and was unsuccessful in those proceedings: see Hague Convention (note 4) art 10. 
163
 These are the following: 
(1) If the law of the State addressed confers upon its courts exclusive jurisdiction;  
(2) if the law of the State addressed recognises a different exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-
matter of the action;  
(3) if the authority addressed considers itself bound to recognise an agreement by which exclusive 
jurisdiction is conferred upon arbitrators: see Hague Convention (note 4) art 12. 
164
  Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments (1971) art 2. The grounds of jurisdiction in which instance the recognition of a judgment will be 
refused, are the following:  
a)  the presence in the territory of the State of origin of property belonging to the defendant, or the seizure 
by the plaintiff of property situated there, unless –  
– the action is brought to assert proprietary or possessory rights in that property, or arises from another 
issue relating to such property,  
– the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the subject-matter of the action;  
b) the nationality of the plaintiff;  
c) the domicile, habitual residence or ordinary residence of the plaintiff within the territory of the State of 
origin unless the assumption of jurisdiction on such a ground is permitted by way of an exception made 
on account of the particular subject-matter of a class of contracts;  
d) the fact that the defendant carried on business within the territory of the State of origin, unless the action 
arises from that business;  
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A decision rendered by default will not be recognised or enforced unless the defaulting party 
received notice of the institution of the proceedings, in accordance with the law of the State 
of origin in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings.
165
 
 
Recognition or enforcement may not be refused for the sole reason that the court of the State 
of origin has applied a law other than that which would have been applicable according to the 
rules of private international law of the State addressed.
166
 
 
Review of the merits of the decision rendered by the court of origin is not allowed.
167
 
 
3 THE HAGUE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION 
 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was finally born on 30 June 2005: a 
much narrower instrument than was originally envisaged.
168
 The Convention provides 
uniform international rules for enforcing exclusive choice of court commercial agreements 
between parties, and for the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from 
                                                                                                                                                        
e) service of a writ upon the defendant within the territory of the State of origin during his temporary 
presence there;  
f) a unilateral specification of the forum by the plaintiff, particularly in an invoice (art 4). 
165
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 6. 
166
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 7. Nevertheless, recognition or enforcement may be refused if, to reach its 
decision, the court of the State of origin had to decide a question relating either to the status or the capacity 
of a party or to his rights in other matters excluded from this Convention by sub-paragraphs (1)-(4) of the 
second paragraph of Article 1, and has reached a result different from that which would have followed from 
the application to that question of the rules of private international law of the State addressed. 
167
 Hague Convention (note 4) art 8. 
168
 The origins of the project that eventually led to the Convention can be traced to the proposal of the USA (see 
Chapter 2, para 2.1.2). After initial discussions, it was decided that a worldwide convention on jurisdiction 
and judgments, negotiated within the framework of the Hague Conference was the best way forward. 
Although the mixed convention approach originally suggested by Von Mehren was supported by the initial 
Working Group on the project, it became apparent as work proceeded that it would not be possible to draw 
up a satisfactory text for a mixed convention within a reasonable period of time. In order to draw a way 
forward, it was decided that the Permanent Bureau should prepare a text to submit to a Special Commission, 
and that the starting point for this process should be such core areas such as jurisdiction based on choice of 
court agreements in business-to-business cases, (which became the core scope of the final convention); 
submission; defendant’s forum; counterclaims; trust; physical torts and certain other possible grounds. After 
further meetings, the Informal Working Group proposed that the objectives should be scaled down to a 
convention on choice of court agreements in commercial cases. In general, the Member States viewed this 
proposed Convention as achieving for such agreements and the resulting judgments what the New York 
Convention accomplishes for agreements to arbitrate and the resulting awards: Hartley Dogauchi Report 
(note 32) 16-17. 
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proceedings based on such agreements.
169
 As Mexico is at this stage the only Contracting 
State which has ratified the Convention, it has not yet entered into force.
170
 
 
As was the case with the previous instrument, the scope of the Convention, the procedural 
requirements for recognition and enforcement of a judgment under the Convention, and the 
grounds for refusing to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment are now discussed.  
 
3.1 Material scope of Choice of Court Convention 
The substantive scope of the Convention is limited in a number of ways: it only applies in 
‘international cases’;171 ‘exclusive choice of court agreements’;172 and ‘agreements concluded 
in civil or commercial matters’.173 The placement of non-exclusive choice of court 
agreements outside the ambit of the Convention is, however, to some extent mitigated by the 
fact that the Convention presumes agreements to be exclusive unless the parties have 
expressly provided otherwise,
174
 and that Contracting States may make a declaration that they 
will recognise and enforce judgments given by courts of other Contracting States designated 
in a non-exclusive choice of court agreement.
175
 
                                                 
169
 Heiser WW  ‘The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The impact on forum non conveniens, 
transfer of venue, removal, and  recognition of judgments in United States Courts’ (2010) 31(4) University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1033. 
170
 In terms of Article 31, the Convention will enter into force on the first day of the month following the 
expiration of three months after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification. Although the EU and 
USA have both signed the convention, they have not yet ratified it.  Hague Conference ‘Status Table 37: 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (accessed 1 October 2012). 
171
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 1(1). A case is international unless the parties are resident in the same 
Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless 
of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with that State: see art 1(2). 
172
 This term is defined as an agreement by two or more parties that is concluded or documented in writing; or 
by any other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference; and designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in 
connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific 
courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. A choice of court 
agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one 
Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise: 
Hague Convention (note 5) art 3. 
173
 The concept has an autonomous meaning: it does not entail a reference to national law or other instruments. 
The limitation to civil or commercial matters is common in international conventions dealing with 
recognition and enforcement. However, certain matters that clearly fall within the class of civil or 
commercial matters are nevertheless excluded from the scope of the Convention under art 2: Hartley 
Dogauchi Report (note 32) 30. Article 2(5) however provides that proceedings are not excluded from the 
scope of the Convention by the mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency or any 
other person acting for the State is a party thereto.  
174
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 3(b). 
175
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 22; Garnett R ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or 
Much ado about nothing?’ (2009) 5(2) Journal of Private International Law 164. 
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There are additional matters specifically excluded from the ambit of the Convention,
176
 but 
art 2(3) makes it clear that these exclusions apply only where one of the matters referred to is 
an ‘object’ of the proceedings. This means that proceedings are not excluded from the scope 
of the Convention if one of these matters arises as a preliminary question in proceedings that 
have some other matter as their object or subject.
177
 The reasons for these exclusions are that 
in some cases the public interest or that of third parties is involved, so that the parties may not 
have the right to dispose of the matter between them. In such cases a particular court will 
often have exclusive jurisdiction that cannot be ousted by means of choice agreement. There 
are also cases in which other multilateral legal regimes apply; so the Convention is not 
needed on those particular matters and it may complicate deciding which instrument would 
prevail if the Convention were to cover such an area.
178
 
 
Recognition of regional economic and legal integration taking place around the world has 
resulted in the Convention specifically providing that Regional Economic Integration 
Organisations (REIOs) constituted solely by sovereign States and having competence over 
the matters governed by the Convention, may accede to the Convention.
179
 The Convention 
also provides for accession by a REIO without its Member States.
180
 
                                                 
176
 The Convention does not apply to the following matters: a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; 
b) maintenance obligations; c) other family law matters; d) wills and succession; e) insolvency, composition 
and analogous matters; f) the carriage of passengers and goods; g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for 
maritime claims, general average, and emergency towage and salvage; h) anti-trust (competition) matters; i) 
liability for nuclear damage; j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons; k) tort 
or delict claims for damage to tangible property; l) rights in rem in immovable property; m) the validity, 
nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs; n) the validity of certain 
intellectual property rights; o) infringement of intellectual property rights; and p) the validity of entries in 
public registers: Hague Convention (note 5) art 2(2)). 
177
 Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 31. 
178
 Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 31-33. Examples include the UN New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards on arbitration; the Hague Bills of Lading (‘Hague-
Visby Rules’) on carriage of passengers or goods; and the Paris Convention in Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy 1960, and its 2004 amendment, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage 1963; and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
179
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 29. This might occur if the REIO and its Member States enjoy concurrent 
external competence over the subject matter of the Convention (joint competence), or if some matters fall 
within the external competence of the REIO and others within that of the Member States (which would result 
in shared or mixed competence for the Convention as a whole). To the extent that it has such external 
competence, the REIO has the same rights and obligations as a Contracting State. 
180
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 30. This might occur where the REIO has exclusive competence over the 
subject matter of the Convention. In such a case the Member States would be bound by the Convention by 
virtue of the agreement of the REIO: Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 81. For example, the EU, who as a 
REIO signed but not yet ratified the Convention, declared in accordance with art 30 of the Convention 
‘exercises competence over all the matters governed by this Convention. Member States [excluding 
Denmark] will not sign, ratify, accept or approve the Convention, but shall be bound by the Convention by 
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3.2 Procedural requirements for recognition and enforcement 
A judgment given by a designated court must be recognised and enforced in other 
Contracting States if it is enforceable in the State of origin.
181
 Recognition and enforcement 
may be refused only on exceptional grounds.
182
 
 
A court designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement must hear the case when seized 
of a dispute, and cannot refuse to hear it on the ground that a court of another State is more 
appropriate or that such a court was seized first.
183
 The main exception is that the chosen 
court need not hear the case where the choice of court agreement is null and void under its 
law, including its choice-of-law rules.
184
 A court in a Contracting State other than that of the 
chosen court must suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court 
agreement applies, subject to specific exceptions.
185
 
 
The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for enforcement, 
and the enforcement of the judgment are governed by the law of the requested state unless the 
Convention provides otherwise, provided that the court addressed must use the most 
expeditious procedure available to it.
186
 Where the law of the requested State makes no 
provision for the recognition (as distinct from enforcement) of a foreign judgment, a foreign 
judgment will be recognised automatically by operation of law, based on art 8 of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
virtue of its conclusion by the European Community’: see EU ‘European Union Treaties Database’ available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/reserveText.do?treatyId=7662 (accessed 15 February 2013).  
181
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 8. 
182
 Hague Convention (note 5) arts 8 and 9. 
183
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 5. There are two legal doctrines on the basis of which a court might consider 
that the dispute should be decided in a court of another state: forum non conveniens and lis pendens, but 
none of these are permitted by the Convention. The forum non conveniens is mainly applied by common law 
countries, and although its precise formulation varies from country to country, it generally permits a court 
having jurisdiction to stay (suspend) or dismiss proceedings if it considers that another court would be a 
more appropriate forum. The granting of a stay or dismissal is discretionary and involves weighing up all the 
factors in the particular case. It applies irrespective of whether or not proceedings have been commenced in 
the other court, although this is a factor that may be taken into account. The second doctrine is that of lis 
pendens (see note 97 above). 
184
 Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 21; Heiser (note 169) 1034. 
185
 A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court must suspend or dismiss proceedings to 
which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless – the agreement is null and void under the law 
of the State of the chosen court;  a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the 
State of the court seized;  giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be 
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seized; for exceptional reasons beyond the 
control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed; or  the chosen court has decided not to 
hear the case: Hague Convention (note 5) art 6. 
186
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 14; Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 61.  
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Convention.
187
 The grounds on which recognition or enforcement may be refused are 
governed exclusively by the Convention.
188
 
 
Article 13(1) lists the documents that must be produced by the party seeking recognition or 
enforcement of a judgment under the Convention.
189
 If the documents are not in an official 
language of the requested State, they must be accompanied by a certified translation into an 
official language, unless the law of the requested State provides otherwise.
190
 
 
3.3 Grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce 
The Convention provides seven exceptions to the principle of recognition and where the 
exceptions apply the Convention do not require the court addressed to recognise or enforce 
the judgment, though it does not preclude it from doing so.
191
 This is indicated by the use of 
‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ in art 9.192 
 
Recognition may be refused if -  
a. the agreement was null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court;193 
b. a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the requested 
State;
194
 
                                                 
187
 Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in the Convention. There will be 
no review of the merits of the judgment given by the court of origin. The court addressed is bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by default. 
A judgment will be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin. Recognition or enforcement may 
be postponed or refused if the judgment is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for 
seeking ordinary review has not expired. However, where the chosen court had discretion as to whether to 
transfer the case to another court, recognition or enforcement of the judgment may be refused against a party 
who objected to the transfer in a timely manner in the State of origin: see Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 
62). 
188
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 8(1); Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 62. 
189
 (1) The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement must produce –  
a)  a complete and certified copy of the judgment;  
b)  the exclusive choice of court agreement, a certified copy thereof, or other evidence of its existence;  
c)  if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified copy of a document establishing that the 
document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the defaulting 
party;  
d)  any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect or, where applicable, is enforceable in 
the State of origin;  
e)  a certificate of a court of the State of origin that the judicial settlement or a part of it is enforceable in the 
same manner as a judgment in the State of origin. 
190
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 13(4). 
191
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 9. 
192
 Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 53. 
193
 The purpose of this is to avoid conflicting rules on the validity of the agreement among different Contracting 
States: they are all required to apply the law of the State of the chosen court, and they must respect any 
ruling on the point by that court: Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 54. 
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c. the defendant did not receive proper notice of the proceeding to enable him to arrange 
for his defence; or the notification was delivered in a manner that is incompatible with 
fundamental principles of the requested State;  
d. the judgment was obtained by procedural fraud;195 
e. recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy 
of the requested State;  
f. the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested State in a dispute 
between the same parties; and 
g. the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another State between 
the same parties on the same cause of action, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils 
the conditions necessary for its recognition in the requested State.
196
 
 
Some of these grounds mirror the exceptions in art 6, for example, that the choice of court 
agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court, including its 
choice-of-law rules.
197
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
194
  The wording of art 9(b) follows the wording in art 6(b), and although in both of these capacity is determined 
by the law of the forum, in art 9, unlike art 6 where it is a court before which proceedings inconsistent with 
the agreement are brought, the relevant forum is the court asked to recognise or enforce the judgment of the 
chosen court. This provision was included as the Conference considered it too ambitious to lay down choice-
of-law rules on capacity: Hartley Dogauchi (note 32) 47. Since lack of capacity would also make the 
agreement null and void in terms of art 9(a), capacity is determined both by the law of the chosen court and 
by the law of the court seized: the choice of court agreement is null and void if a party lacked capacity under 
either law: Hartley Dogauchi (note 32) 54. 
195
  Examples would be where the plaintiff deliberately serves the writ, or cause it to be served, on the wrong 
address; where the plaintiff deliberately gives the defendant wrong information as to the time and place of 
the hearing; or where either party seeks to corrupt a judge, juror or witness, or deliberately conceals key 
evidence: Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 55. 
196
 Hague Convention (note 5) art 9. Both subparagraphs (f) and (g) deal with the situation where there is a 
conflict between the judgment for which recognition and enforcement are sought under the Convention and 
another judgment given between the same parties. However, there is a difference in the way that they 
operate: sub-paragraph f) is concerned with the case where the inconsistent judgment was granted by a court 
in the requested State. In such a situation, that judgment prevails, irrespective of whether it was given first – 
the court addressed is permitted to give preference to a judgment from a court in its own State, even if that 
judgment was given after the judgment under the choice of court agreement. For this provision to apply, the 
parties must be the same, but it is not necessary for the cause of action to be the same. Sub-paragraph g) is 
concerned with the situation in which both judgments were given by foreign courts. Here, the judgment 
given under the choice of court agreement may be refused recognition and enforcement only if the following 
requirements are satisfied: first, the judgment under the choice of court agreement must have been given 
after the conflicting judgment, secondly, the parties must be the same, thirdly, the cause of action must be 
the same, and fourthly, the conflicting judgment must fulfil the conditions necessary for its recognition in the 
requested state: see Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 32) 55-6.  
197
 Article 6(a) is reflected in art 9(a); art 6(b) is reflected in art 9(b); and art 6(c) is reflected in art 9(e): see 
Hague Convention (note 5). 
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The Interim Text left a number of issues unresolved failing consensus,
198
 but it nevertheless 
contains some interesting provisions on which agreement was achievable, and which could be 
the basis for future work, such as lis pendens
199
 and exceptional circumstances
200
 for 
declining jurisdiction.
201
 
 
Although the 2005 Convention is yet to enter into force, it may nevertheless offer valuable 
lessons as to the major stumbling blocks and possible solutions in the drafting of a 
recognition and enforcement instrument: it has been criticised as being too ambitious in the 
sense that the negotiators did not adequately comprehend the fundamental cultural, historical, 
and economic differences among societies, which form a barrier to agreement, and 
specifically on the jurisdiction issue, since many countries view the adoption of pre-
determined jurisdiction rules as potential interference with their sovereignty.
202
 
 
The Special Commission in its work presumed a higher degree of consensus among the 
Hague Conference Members than existed. They ignored the full implication of the 
                                                 
198
  Areas in respect of which a lack of consensus created obstacles to progress include the internet and e-
commerce, consumer and employment contracts, intellectual property rights, the relationship with other 
double Conventions, in particular the European instruments (the Brussels and Lugano Conventions), as well 
as the question of bilateralisation, i.e. whether the treaty relations under the multilateral instrument should be 
subject to a requirement of  reciprocal acceptance between the State parties: see Hague Convention ‘Some 
reflections on the present state of negotiations on the judgments project in the context of the future work 
programme of the Conference’ Preliminary Document No 16 of February 2002 (2002) 428-435 available 
online at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd16e.pdf (accessed 15 February 2013). 
199
  Article 21 provides that when the same parties are engaged in proceedings in courts of different Contracting 
States and when the proceedings are based on the same causes of action, irrespective of the relief sought, the 
court second seized must suspend the proceedings if the court first seized has jurisdiction under [the white 
list of permitted bases for jurisdiction]  [or under a rule of national law which is consistent with these 
articles] and is expected to render a judgment capable of being recognised under the Convention in the State 
of the court second seized, unless the latter has exclusive jurisdiction and. The court second seized must 
decline jurisdiction as soon as it is presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seized that complies 
with the requirements for recognition or enforcement under the Convention: Interim Text (note 40) arts 
21(1) and (2).  
200
  Article 22 provides that in exceptional circumstances, when the jurisdiction of the court seized is not 
founded on an exclusive choice of court agreement the court may, on application by a party, suspend its 
proceedings if in that case it is clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of 
another State has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. Such application must be 
made no later than at the time of the first defence on the merits. The court must take into account, in 
particular – 
a)  any inconvenience to the parties in view of their habitual residence; 
b)  the nature and location of the evidence, including documents and witnesses, and the procedures for 
obtaining such evidence;  
c)  applicable limitation or prescription periods; 
d)  the possibility of obtaining recognition and enforcement of any decision on the merits: Interim Text (note 
41) arts 22(1) and (2). 
201
  Hague Conference (note 48) 5. 
202
 Oestreicher (note 14) 61. 
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fundamental differences in the economic, political and institutional situation that made the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions workable, and the global setting of a Hague Convention.
203
 
 
The political, economic and cultural characteristics peculiar to the region as well as 
prevailing trends in areas such as legal education, access to basic tools of legal research, legal 
scholarship and judicial decisions will play a significant role as contributing or retarding 
factors of legal harmonisation and unification.
204
 These peculiarities will need to be taken 
into account when an appropriate approach for the Southern African region is identified, 
whether or not it is one of the approaches discussed above. An approach succeeding in 
another region may not necessarily result in the same success in Southern Africa.  
 
The EU Brussels I Regulation is now discussed.  
 
4 THE EU BRUSSELS CONVENTION/REGULATION 
 
The Brussels Convention, which preceded the Brussels I Regulation on the same topic
205
 
came into force on 1 February 1973, after it was ratified by the then EU Member States. The 
Brussels Convention regulates the jurisdiction which the courts of Contracting States are 
permitted to exercise, as well as the conditions upon which judgments are to be recognised 
and enforced.
206
 The greatest novelty in the structure of the Brussels Convention was the fact 
that it provided Member States with a relatively detailed set of jurisdictional rules according 
to which a court in a Member State may assert jurisdiction over a defendant who is domiciled 
in another Member State, and in what situations it should decline to do so.
207
 
 
                                                 
203
 Von Mehren AT ‘Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments 
Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?’ (2001) 49 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 200. 
204
 Garro AM ‘Unification and harmonisation of private law in Latin America’ (1992) 40(3) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 588. 
205
 The connection and relationship between the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation is discussed 
in Chapter 2 para 4.1 above.   
206
 Nygh & Pocar Report (note 51) 5. 
207
 Oestreicher (note 77) 129. 
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The Regulation
208
 establishes common rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
for EU Member States and thereby clarifies which court has international competence in a 
cross-border dispute. The Regulation also includes rules that facilitate the enforcement of a 
judgement issued by the courts in one EU Member State in another Member State.
209
 The 
Regulation provides for the quasi-automatic enforcement of judgments with few procedural 
obstacles.
210
 A judgment given in a Member State is recognised in other Member States 
without any special procedure being required.
211
 
 
The obligation to recognise is subject to a very limited number of exceptions relating to 
public policy, insufficient service, or irreconcilability with another judgment.
212
 In particular, 
lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court is no defence.
213
 Only in exceptional cases is the 
court addressed permitted to review the jurisdiction of the original court,
214
 and it is never 
allowed to review the substance or merits of the judgment.
215
 A judgment which qualifies for 
recognition also qualifies for enforcement, provided that it is enforceable in the country of 
origin.
216
 
 
The application of the Convention/Regulation; the procedural requirements for recognition 
and enforcement, and the grounds for refusing to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment are 
now discussed.  
 
                                                 
208
 The Regulation supersedes the Brussels Convention except with respect to those territories of EU countries 
that fall within its territorial scope and that are excluded from the regulation pursuant to art 299 of the TEC: 
see Chapter 3, para 4.1. 
209
 EUROPA ‘Civil Justice: The Reform of the "Brussels I" Regulation and the European Commission's Green 
Paper on the Free Circulation of Public Documents: Frequently Asked Questions’. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/677(accessed 15 November 2012). 
210
 A judgment is defined as given by a court or tribunal in an EU country, including a decree, order, decision or 
writ of execution: Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 32. 
211
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 33. 
212
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 34. 
213
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 35. 
214
 Article 35(3) provides that subject to paragraph 1, the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin 
may not be reviewed. Paragraph 1 provides that ‘a judgment shall not be recognised if it conflicts with 
sections 3 [jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance] 4 [jurisdiction over consumer contracts], or 6 
[exclusive jurisdiction] of Chapter 2, or in a case provided for in art 72 [dealing with agreements which 
Member States undertook prior to the entry into force of the Regulation pursuant to art 59 of the Brussels 
Convention]’: Brussels I Regulation (note 6). 
215
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 36; Stone P EU private international law: harmonization of laws (2006) 
21.  
216
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 38(1): ‘A judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that State 
shall be enforced in another Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been 
declared enforceable there.’ 
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4.1 Material Scope of Brussels Convention/Regulation 
The Brussels Convention applies automatically, and covers all civil and commercial matters, 
apart from an exhaustive list of exceptions.
217
 
 
The Convention does not specify what is meant by ‘civil and commercial matters’, or 
determine the law according to which that expression should be interpreted.
218
 However, it 
follows from the text of the Convention that civil and commercial matters are to be classified 
as such according to their nature, and irrespective of the character of the court or tribunal 
which is seized of the proceedings or which has given judgment.
219
 
 
Rather than providing a positive definition of the scope of the Convention, a formula was 
adopted which excludes certain matters from the scope of the Convention, while 
acknowledging that the ideal situation would be to apply the Convention to all civil and 
commercial matters.
220
 All judgments relating to contractual or non-contractual obligations, 
excluding those which involve the status or legal capacity of natural persons, wills or 
succession, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, bankruptcy or social 
security, fall within the scope of the Convention.
221
 The scope of the Brussels Convention 
was duplicated in the Brussels I Regulation.
222
 Each of the exclusions from the scope of the 
convention is discussed in detail in the Explanatory Report on the Brussels Convention.
223
 
                                                 
217
 Jenard Report (note 91) 8. 
218
 Jenard Report (note 91) 9. 
219
 Article 1 provides that the Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters ‘whatever the nature of 
the court or tribunal’: Brussels I Regulation (note 6). 
220
 Jenard Report (note 91) 10. 
221
 Article 1 provides that: “This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of 
the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. The 
Convention shall not apply to: 1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out 
of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; 2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of 
insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings; 
3. social security; and 4. arbitration: see Brussels Convention (note 6) art 1. 
222
 Brussels Regulation (note 6) arts 1 and 2. The Brussels I Regulation is complemented by Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels II Regulation). 
Regulation II applies to civil proceedings relating to divorce, separation and marriage annulment, as well as 
to all aspects of parental responsibility. Parental responsibility refers to the full set of rights and obligations 
in relation to a child’s person or property. In order to ensure equality for all children, the regulation covers 
all judgments on parental responsibility, including measures to protect the child, independently of any 
matrimonial proceedings. 
 The regulation does not apply to civil proceedings relating to maintenance, which are covered by the 
Brussels I Regulation. The following are also excluded from the scope of the regulation: establishing and 
challenging paternity; judgments on adoption and the related preparatory measures, and annulment or 
revocation of adoption; the child’s first and last names; emancipation; trusts and inheritance; measures taken 
following criminal infringements committed by children: EUROPA ‘Jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (“Brussels II”)’ 
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4.2 Procedural requirements for recognition and enforcement 
The Convention seeks to facilitate as far as possible the free movement of judgments.
224
 This 
approach is evidenced by the simplification of the enforcement procedure which is common 
to all Contracting States to the Convention.
225
 
 
A judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that State, will be recognised in 
other Member States without any special procedure being required.
226
 Recognition is, 
therefore, automatic, and does not require a judicial decision in the enforcing State to enable 
the party in whose favour the judgment has been given to invoke that judgment against any 
party concerned. This provision means that certain legal provision which in some countries 
make the recognition of a foreign judgment subject to a special procedure will be 
abolished.
227
 This system differs from earlier conventions, according to which foreign 
judgments are recognised only if they fulfil a certain number of conditions. The foreign 
judgment must, however, in terms of the Brussels system, be enforceable in the State in 
which enforcement is sought.
228
 
 
A judgment that is given in a Member State and enforceable there will be enforced in another 
Member State when it has been declared enforceable there, on the application on any 
interested party.
229
 However, in the United Kingdom, a judgment will be enforced in England 
and Wales, in Scotland or in Northern Ireland if it has been registered in the United 
Kingdom.
230
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
available at (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil 
matters/ l33194_en.htm)(accessed 15 November 2012). 
223
 Jenard Report (note 91) 10-13. 
224
 Jenard Report (note 91) 42. 
225
 Jenard Report (note 91) 42. 
226
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 33(1). 
227
 Jenard Report (note 91) 43. 
228
 Jenard Report (note 91) 48. 
229
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 38(1). 
230
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 38(2). This requirement is inherent in countries with a common law 
tradition, and illustrates how the Brussels Regime accommodated both civil and common law legal 
traditions: see the UK Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, discussed in the following 
Chapter. 
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The Regulation also prescribes the enforcement procedure.
231
 The procedure for making an 
application for recognition or enforcement is governed by the law of the Member State in 
which enforcement is sought.
232
 
 
A party seeking recognition or applying for a declaration of enforceability must provide an 
authentic copy of the judgment. A party applying for a declaration of enforceability must also 
produce a certificate as provided for in the Regulation.
233
 
 
The judgment will be declared enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities 
described above.
234
 The application may be refused only for one of the reasons specified, and 
under no circumstances may the foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.
235
 
 
Some international developments relating to the procedural aspects of recognition and 
enforcement include the proposal made by the European Parliament in 2009 for the reform of 
the Brussels I Regulation.
236
 It was proposed to do away with the intermediary court 
                                                 
231
 The application, accompanied by the documents required under articles 53 and 54 must be submitted to the 
authority specified in art 37. The applicant must give an address for service of process or appoint a 
representative ad litem in the jurisdiction of the court applied to (art 40(2)). 
 The court applied to must give its decision without delay, and is not able to summon the other party. The 
applications may be refused only for one of the reasons specified in arts 34 and 35. 
 If enforcement is authorised - the party against whom enforcement is sought may appeal against the decision 
within one month of service of the decision (art 43); the appeal must be lodged, in accordance with the rules 
governing procedure, with the court specified in art 43; the court with which an appeal is lodged may, on the 
application of the party against whom enforcement is sought, stay the proceedings if an ordinary appeal has 
been lodged against the judgment in the Member State of origin, or if the time for appeal has not yet expired. 
The court may also make enforcement conditional on the provision of security: see Brussels I Regulation 
(note 6) art 46); the judgment given on the appeal against the decision authorising enforcement may not be 
contested by an ordinary appeal. It may be contested only by an appeal in cassation, as referred to in Annex 
IV of the Regulation (art 44); during the time specified for an appeal against the decision authorising 
enforcement, the decision authorising enforcement, the applicant may take only protective measures; the 
decision authorising enforcement carries with it the power to proceed to such measures (art 46). 
 If enforcement is refused - the applicant may appeal to the court specified in art 43; the procedure before that 
court is contentious, the other party being summoned to appear (art 47); the judgment given on this appeal 
may be contested only by the appeal referred to in Annex IV to the Convention (art 44). Annex IV lists the 
appeal which may be lodged pursuant to Article 44 and include the following: in Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, an appeal in cassation and in the United Kingdom, a single 
further appeal on a point of law.  
232
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 40(1). Reference must therefore be made to the national laws for the 
particulars which the application must contain, the number of copies which must be submitted to the court, 
the authority to which the application must be submitted and also, where necessary, the language in which it 
must be drawn up, and whether a lawyer should be instructed to appear: see Jenard Report (note 86) 49. 
233
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) arts 53-54. 
234
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 41. 
235
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 36. 
236
 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (2011) Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 28 June 2011.  
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proceedings that are still needed before a judgment from one Member State will be 
recognised in another. It was suggested that intermediary proceedings make cross-border 
litigation more cumbersome, time-consuming and costly than national litigation.
237
 The 
intermediary proceedings may take several months to occur, thereby delaying cross-border 
enforcement, and the procedure is also expensive.
238
 If the proposed revisions are accepted, 
there will in future no longer be a need to go through a special procedure for judgments in 
civil and commercial matters issued by a court in another EU Member State. The abolition of 
the intermediary proceedings for recognition and enforcement will lead to a situation where 
judgments issued in other EU Member States falling within the scope of the Regulation, will 
be treated like domestic judgments.
239
 
 
The ad hoc Working Party on the new Lugano Convention
240
 acknowledged that in a single 
judicial area a free circulation of judgments would be achieved by abolishing any 
intermediary (exequatur) proceedings required for recognition and enforcement in 
Contracting States, so that judgments could be enforced directly, without a need for a 
declaration of enforceability.
241
 They considered this possibility, but found it premature, in 
the light of the prerogatives of national sovereignty that still characterise the (non-EU) 
European States.
242
 Title III of the Lugano Convention is accordingly founded on the 
                                                 
237
 EUROPA ‘Civil Justice: The Reform of the "Brussels I" Regulation and the European Commission's Green 
Paper on the Free Circulation of Public Documents: Frequently Asked Questions’ (2010) available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/677(accessed 26 November 2012).  
238
 The average cost for straightforward cases in the EU is €2,200, ranging from €1,100 in Bulgaria to €3,800 in 
Italy. For more complex cases, the costs can reach €12,700: EUROPA (note 237). 
239
 EUROPA (note 237). 
240
  In 1997 the European Union initiated a simultaneous revision of the Brussels Convention and of the Lugano 
Convention of 1988, with the aim of fully harmonising the two Conventions and incorporating changes to 
resolve certain problems that had emerged in the course of the interpretation by the ECJ. It was felt that the 
two Conventions should be revised together in order, amongst other things, to expedite the enforcement of 
judgments: see Pocar F ‘Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, signed in Lugano on 30 October 2007’ Explanatory Report OCJ C319/1 
23.12.2009 (‘Pocar Report’) 2. At a meeting on 4 and 5 December 1997, the Council of the European Union 
set up an ad hoc working party of experts, composed of the EU Member States and representatives of the 
EFTA States that were parties to the Lugano Convention (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland); the working 
party was to examine amendments to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions that would be proposed by the 
Member States and by the European Commission, taking into account the case-law of the Court of Justice 
and certain decisions made by the national courts, with the aim of drawing up a draft convention that would 
improve on the current texts and harmonise them: see Pocar Report (note 240) para 3. 
241
  After the ad hoc working party had completed its work, the intermediary (exequatur) proceedings were 
abolished within the Community for certain types of judgments: Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of 21 April 
2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (Official Journal I 143. 30.4.2004); 
regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of  12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure 
(Official Journal I399, 30.12.2006); and Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure (Official Journal I199, 31.7.2007): see Jenard Report (note 91) 36. 
242
 Pocar Report (note 240) 36.  
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principle that the declaration of enforceability must be in some measure automatic, and 
subject to merely formal verification,
243
 with no examination at the initial stage of the 
proceedings of the grounds for refusal of recognition provided for in the Convention.
244
 A 
judgment given and enforceable in a State bound by the Convention will be enforced in 
another Contracting State when, on the application of any interested party,
245
 it has been 
declared enforceable in that State.
246
 The procedure for making the application is governed by 
the law of the State in which enforcement is sought,
247
 provided that the articles listed in art 
53
248
 must be attached to the application.
249
 At the first stage, therefore, the State of origin is 
trusted to act properly. Examination of the grounds for refusal is deferred until the second 
stage, at which a party against whom a declaration of enforceability has been obtained, and 
who decides to challenge it, must show that such grounds exist.
250
 
 
4.3 Grounds for non-recognition 
The Brussels Regulation seeks to facilitate the free movement of judgments as far as possible; 
consequently, there are a reduced number of grounds on which the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments can be refused.
251
 
 
A judgment will not be recognised or enforced -  
(i) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which 
recognition is sought;  
(ii) where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the 
document which instituted the proceedings in sufficient time and in such a way as to 
                                                 
243
  Lugano Convention (note 6) art 38(1), 39.  
244
 Lugano Convention (note 6) art 4.  
245
  Made to the court or competent authority listed in Annex II to the Convention: See Lugano Convention (note 
6) art 39(1). 
246
  Lugano Convention (note 6) art 38(1). 
247
  Lugano Convention (note 6) art 40(1). 
248
  A party seeking recognition or applying for a declaration of enforceability must produce a copy of the 
judgment which satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity. A party applying for a 
declaration of enforceability shall also produce the certificate referred to in Article 54 (the court or 
competent authority of a State bound by this Convention where a judgment was given must issue, at the 
request of any interested party, a certificate using the standard form in Annex V to the Convention.) If this 
certificate referred is not produced, the court may specify a time for its production or accept an equivalent 
document or, if it considers that it has sufficient information before it, dispense with its production. If the 
court or competent authority so requires, a translation of the documents shall be produced. The translation 
shall be certified by a person qualified to do so in one of the States bound by this Convention: See Lugano 
Convention (note 6) arts 53-55. 
249
  Lugano Convention (note 6) art 40(3). 
250
  Pocar Report (note 240) para 129. 
251
 Jenard Report (note 91) 42. 
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enable him to arrange for his defence (unless the defendant failed to commence 
proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so); 
(iii) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought; and 
(iv) if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third 
State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the 
earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State 
addressed.
252
 
 
The intervention of the requested court is limited: it is required to declare that it does not 
have jurisdiction if there are rules which give exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of another 
State.
253
 Where a defendant domiciled in one Member State is sued in a court of another 
Member State and does not enter an appearance, the court is required to declare of its own 
motion that it has no jurisdiction, unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of the 
Regulation.
254
 
 
The Brussels Regime is supplemented by the Lugano Convention.
255
 The convention entered 
into force on 1 January 2010 between the EU, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland,
256
 
and succeeded the 1988 Lugano Convention.
257
 The Convention serves as a parallel 
agreement to the Brussels I Regulation in the European Economic Area (EEA),
258
 as the 
Convention was concluded between the Member States of the European Community (now 
EU) and certain Member States of the European Free Trade Association
259
 (EFTA).
260
 The 
                                                 
252
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 34. 
253
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 25. 
254
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 26. 
255
  See note 6. 
256
 EUROPA ‘Summary of Treaty’ available online at 
http://ec.europe.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWporkspace/treaatiesGeneralData.do??step=0
&redirect=true&treatyId=7481 (accessed 16 February 2013). It has applied for Switzerland since 1 January 
2011, and for Iceland since 1 May 2011: 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/en/home/themen/wirtschaft/ref_internationales_privatrecht/ref_lugue
2007.html (accessed 16 February 2013). 
257
 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, signed in Lugano on of 16 September 1988 (‘1988 Lugano Convention’).  
258
 The EEA comprises the countries of the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It was established on 1 
January 1994 following an agreement between the Member States of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and the European Community (which became the EU), and allows these countries to participate in 
the EU’s internal Market without being Members of the EU. The EFTA is a free trade organisation between 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark that operate in parallel to the EU. One EFTA Member, 
Switzerland, has not joined the EEA, but has a similar agreement with the EU. 
259
 Norway, Iceland and Denmark. 
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Convention is in substance largely similar to the Brussels I Regulation.
261
 The rules 
applicable in EFTA Contracting States to this Convention and EU Members, party to the 
Brussels I Regulation will, therefore, be largely similar.
262
 
 
5 THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION 
The Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and 
Arbitral Awards
263
 (‘Montevideo Convention’) was ratified by ten countries in Latin 
America.
264
 The purpose of the Convention is to ensure the extraterritorial validity of 
judgments and arbitral awards in the Member Countries.
265
 
 
The Convention applies to all judgments and arbitral awards rendered in civil, commercial or 
labour proceedings in one of the State Parties. The instrument contains a set of conditions 
that, if met, gives the judgment extraterritorial effect in all the member countries.
266
 The 
preamble of the Convention acknowledges that - 
‘the administration of justice in the American States requires ... mutual cooperation for the 
purposes of ensuring the extraterritorial validity of judgments and arbitral awards rendered in 
their respective territorial jurisdictions’.267 
 
The scope of the Convention; the procedural requirements, and the grounds for refusing to 
recognise or enforce a foreign judgment are now discussed.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
260
 European Union ‘Judicial cooperation in civil matters’ available at  
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l16
029_en.htm(accessed 30 July 2012). 
261
 This is already suggested by the Preamble of the Lugano Convention which provides that ‘persuaded that the 
extension of the principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to the Contracting Parties to this 
instrument will strengthen legal and economic cooperation, desiring to ensure as uniform an interpretation as 
possible of this instrument, have in this spirit decided to conclude this Convention’. As a result, the material 
provisions are almost identical, including the scope, the rules on jurisdiction as well as the rules on 
recognition and enforcement. 
262
 Oestreicher (note 79) 142. 
263
 See note 7. 
264
 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela: OAS 
‘Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards: 
Signatories and Ratifications’ available at www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-41.htm (accessed 28 April 
2013). 
265
 Montevideo Convention (note 7) Preamble. 
266
 Oestreicher (note 16) 353. 
267
 Montevideo Convention (note 7) Preamble. 
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5.1 Material scope 
The Convention applies to the substance of ‘judgments and arbitral awards rendered in civil, 
commercial or labour proceedings in one of the State Parties’268 subject to reservations they 
may make.  
 
5.2 Procedural requirements 
Articles 3 and 5 provide the only general rules of procedure in the Montevideo 
Convention.
269
 Article 3 lists the documents that are required to request execution of 
judgments, awards and decisions.
270
 Article 5 requires the courts of the State addressed to 
recognise a declaration of the courts of the State of Origin that a party is litigating in forma 
pauperis.
271
 
 
The procedures for ensuring the validity of foreign judgments, awards and decisions are 
governed by the law of the State in which execution is sought. This includes the jurisdiction 
of the respective judges and tribunals.
272
 
 
The La Paz Convention was adopted by Member States of the OAS ‘desirous of improving 
the administration of justice through greater judicial cooperation among the American 
States’273 and considered that for the effective application of art 2(d) of the Montevideo 
Convention, provisions were necessary to prevent jurisdictional disputes among the States 
Parties.
274
  
                                                 
268
 Montevideo Convention (note 7) art 1. 
269
 Amado JD ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Latin America: An overview and update’ 
(1990) 31 Virginia Journal of International Law 106. 
270
 These documents are certified copies of the judgment; documents proving that the plaintiff has been 
summoned in due legal form and that the parties had an opportunity to present their defence; and a document 
stating that the judgment, award or decision is final or has the force of res judicata: See Montevideo 
Convention (note 7) art 3. 
271
 Montevideo Convention (note 7) art 5. Cases filed in forma pauperis (‘in the manner of the pauper’) are on 
behalf of individuals too poor to afford the usual paid advocates and amenities: Ducat CR Constitutional 
Interpretation Volume 1 (2009) 31.  
272
 Montevideo Convention (note 7) art 6. 
273
 Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of 
Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, OEA/Ser.A/39 (SEPF), 24 ILM. 468 (1985) (‘La Paz Convention’) 
Preamble. 
274
 La Paz Convention (note 273) Preamble. The La Paz Convention is primarily devoted to elaborating the 
meaning of the phrase ‘competent in the international sphere’ under art 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention. 
It lists the instances when the requirement of jurisdiction in the international sphere is deemed to be fulfilled 
(art 1: see note 276 below). Article 2 further provides that jurisdiction will be satisfied if the court in the 
state addressed believes that the State of origin ‘assumed jurisdiction in order to avoid a denial of justice 
because of the absence of a competent judicial or other judicatory authority: see Amado (note 264) 108.   
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In addition to the jurisdictional rules in terms of art 2(d), the La Paz Convention contains two 
provisions conceived to clarify the enforceability rules of the Montevideo Convention. 
Article 5 introduces a new requirement to those listed in art 2 of the Montevideo Convention: 
in order to be enforced in the State addressed, the judgment must not only be res judicata, but 
it must also be entitled to enforcement within the territory of the State of origin. Article 4 of 
the La Paz Convention, on the other hand, states that the extraterritorial validity of the 
judgment may be denied if the court in the State addressed believes that the foreign court 
infringed its exclusive jurisdiction in rendering a judgment in the matter.
275
 Article 6 further 
provides a number of instances when the La Paz Convention will not apply.
276
 
 
Oestreicher suggests that the period of time it took for the La Paz Convention to come into 
force may indicate the superiority of the simple convention model.
277
 The La Paz Convention 
was signed by thirteen countries, but was ratified at first only by Mexico in 1987, and did not 
come into effect until twenty years after its adoption by the ratification of Uruguay in 
2004.
278
 
 
5.3 Grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment 
The Montevideo Convention does not list the instances in which a foreign judgment will not 
be recognised.
279
 It instead provides a number of requirements that has to be met for a 
judgment to be enforceable under the Convention, namely that: 
 
a) they fulfil all the formal requirements necessary for them to be deemed authentic in the 
rendering State; 
b) the judgment, award or decision and the required documents280 are translated into the 
official language of the requested State; 
                                                 
275
 La Paz Convention (note 273) arts 4 and 5. 
276
 The convention does not apply to personal status and capacity of natural persons; divorce, annulment, and 
marital property; child support and alimony; decedents' estates (testate or intestate); bankruptcy, insolvency 
proceedings, composition with creditors, or other similar proceedings; liquidation of business enterprises; 
labour matters; social security; arbitration; torts, and maritime and aviation matters: art 6. 
277
 Oestreicher (note 14) 69. 
278
 Oestreicher (note 14) 69. 
279
  See Montevideo Convention (note 7). Article 2 provides that ‘the foreign judgments … shall have 
extraterritorial validity… if they meet the following conditions’, and no other article provides for any further 
conditions on which a judgment will not be recognised.  
280
  The documents of proof required to request execution of judgments, awards and decisions are as follows: 
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c) they are presented duly legalised in accordance with the law of the requested State; 
d) the judge or tribunal rendering the judgment is competent in the international sphere to try 
the matter;
281
 
e) the plaintiff has been summoned or subpoenaed in due legal form substantially equivalent 
to that accepted by the law of the requested State; 
f) the parties had an opportunity to present their defence; 
g) they are final or, where appropriate, have the force of res judicata in the rendering State; 
and 
h) they are not manifestly contrary to the principles and laws of the public policy of the 
requested State.
282
 
 
An exploration of some of the factors that contributed to the relative successes or failures of 
each of the instruments follow.  
 
6 OVERVIEW OF THE CONVENTIONS DISCUSSED 
6.1 Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
The 1971 Hague Convention is a single convention, as it does not prescribe on which grounds 
a court should assume jurisdiction in international matters, but it provides the grounds of 
jurisdiction that would be recognised for a judgment to be enforced under the Convention.
283
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(i) A certified copy of the judgment, award or decision; 
(ii) A certified copy of the documents proving that the plaintiff has been summoned or subpoenaed in due 
legal form substantially accepted by the law of the requested State; and the parties had an opportunity to 
present their defence; and 
(iii) A certified copy of the document stating that the judgment, award or decision is final or has the force of 
res judicata: Montevideo convention (note 7) art 3. 
281
  In an action in persona for a money judgment, any of the following bases will satisfy the jurisdiction 
requirement: 
(i) At the time the action was initiated, the defendant, if a natural person, had his domicile or habitual 
residence in the territory of the State Party in which judgment was rendered or, if a juridical person, had 
its principal place of business in that territory; 
(ii) In an action against a private non-commercial or business enterprise, the defendant had its principal place 
of business at the time the action was initiated in the State Party in which judgment was rendered or was 
organized in that State Party; 
(iii) In an action against a specific branch, agency, or affiliate of a private non-commercial or business 
enterprise, the activities that gave rise to such action took place in the State Party in which judgment was 
rendered; or 
(iv) In the case of non-exclusive fora permitting submission to the jurisdiction other fora, the defendant either 
consented in writing to the jurisdiction of the judicial or other adjudicatory authority that rendered the 
judgment or, despite making an appearance, failed to submit a timely challenge to the jurisdiction of that 
authority: La Paz Convention (note 273) art 1.  
282
  Montevideo Convention (note 7) art 2. 
283
  See para 2.2 above. 
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The 1971 Hague Convention has been subject to a number of criticisms: For countries to 
achieve mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, in addition to subscribing 
to the Convention, each country had to negotiate a Supplementary Agreement with every 
other country.
284
 In the Supplementary Agreement, States were able to reach agreement on a 
number of matters not regulated in the Convention.
285
 This requirement, combined with the 
extensive list of optional items which States may include in the Supplementary Agreements 
listed in art 23,
286
 has led to a complicated system.
287
 The ‘method of bilateralisation’ adopted 
by the Convention is considered as one of the major obstacles preventing countries from 
contracting the 1971 Hague Convention.
288
 
 
                                                 
284
  Hague Convention (note 4) art 21. 
285
  Article 23 of the Convention provides that in the Supplementary Agreements referred to in Article 21 the 
Contracting States may agree- (1) to clarify the meaning of the expression "civil and commercial matters", to 
determine the courts whose decisions shall be recognised and enforced under this Convention, to define the 
expression "social security" and to define the expression "habitual residence"; (2) to clarify the meaning of 
the term "law" in States with more than one legal system; (3) to include within the scope of this Convention 
questions relating to damage or injury in nuclear matters; (4) to apply this Convention to decisions ordering 
provisional or protective measures; (5) not to apply this Convention to decisions rendered in the course of 
criminal proceedings; (6) to specify the cases under which a decision is no longer subject to ordinary forms 
of review; (7) to recognise and enforce decisions upon which enforcement could be obtained in the State of 
origin even if such decisions are still subject to ordinary forms of review and in such a case to define the 
conditions under which a stay of proceedings for recognition or enforcement is possible; (8) not to apply art 
6 if the decision rendered by default was notified to the defaulting party and the latter had the opportunity to 
lodge a timely appeal against such a decision; (8 bis) that the Authority addressed shall not be bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction; (9) to consider the courts of 
the State in which the defendant has his "domicile" as having jurisdiction under art 10: (10) that the court of 
origin shall be considered as having jurisdiction under the terms of this Convention in cases where its 
jurisdiction is admitted by another Convention in force between the State of origin and the State addressed if 
that other Convention contains no special rules relating to the recognition or enforcement of foreign 
judgments; (11) that the court of origin shall be considered as having jurisdiction under the terms of this 
Convention either when its jurisdiction is admitted by the law of the State addressed relating to the 
recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments, or on grounds additional to those in art 10; (12) to define, 
for the purposes of the application of art 12, the bases of jurisdiction which are exclusive by reason of the 
subject-matter of the action; (13) to exclude, in cases where jurisdiction is based on an agreement between 
the parties, the application of sub-paragraph (1) of art 12 as well as to exclude that of sub-paragraph (3) of 
art 12; (14) to regulate the procedure for obtaining recognition or enforcement; (15) to regulate the 
enforcement of judgments other than those which order the payment of a sum of money; (16) that the 
enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused when a specified period has elapsed from its6 date; (17) 
to fix the rate of interest payable from the date of the judgment in the State of origin; (18) to adapt to the 
requirements of their legal systems the list of documents required by art 13, but with the sole object of 
enabling the authority addressed to verify whether the conditions of this Convention have been fulfilled; (19) 
to subject the documents referred to in art 13 to legalisation or to a similar formality; (20) to depart from the 
provisions of art 17 and to depart from the provisions of art 18; (21) to make the provisions of the first 
paragraph of art 20 obligatory; (22) to include within the scope of this Convention "actes authentiques", 
including documents upon which immediate enforcement can be obtained, and to specify those documents: 
art 23. 
286
  See note 285 above. 
287
 Hague Conference (note 112) 232. 
288
 Kessedjian Report (note 18) 8. This reports considers, amongst others, why the 1971 Hague Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments was unsuccessful.  
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A second factor that affected the willingness of countries to join the 1971 Hague Convention, 
was the signing of the Brussels Convention.
289
 Many of the negotiating parties to the 1971 
Hague Convention were also Members of the Brussels Convention and/or the Lugano 
Convention, and joining those two Conventions to a great extent eliminated the need for such 
an international instrument when viewed from their perspective.
290
 
 
Another suggested explanation for the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention to accomplish 
its goals is the fact that it failed to address the issue of jurisdiction, and that the European 
States objected to the idea that the Convention could not deal with provisions regulating the 
jurisdiction of each State.
291
 The Kessedjian Report compares the relative success of the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions and the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention, and suggest 
that the first two Conventions primarily regulate the direct jurisdiction of courts in the 
subjects with which they deal, treating jurisdiction as a vital preliminary to the effects 
(including recognition and enforcement) which arise from the resulting judgments; and that 
recognition and enforcement are merely the natural extension of such jurisdiction. It is 
because the court which rules on the merits of the case possesses jurisdiction,
292
 that its 
judgment will, except in limited cases, take effect in the territory of all the other States 
Parties.
293
 In contrast, the 1971 Convention sought only to regulate recognition and 
enforcement, without first regulating when the courts giving the judgment would have 
jurisdiction to which the European States objected.  
 
6.2 Hague Choice of Court Convention 
The 2005 Hague Convention may be typified as a double convention as it addresses the 
jurisdiction of the chosen court. The Convention confers jurisdiction upon the courts of a 
Contracting State; as such it does not contain a list of jurisdictional bases.
294
 
 
The following arguments, amongst others, have been raised in favour of the implementation 
of the Convention.
295
 First, the Convention will increase legal certainty and lower the risk for 
                                                 
289
  Oestreicher (note 79) 145. 
290
  Oestreicher (note 79) 145. 
291
 Oestreicher (note 79) 146. 
292
  Usually by virtue of the Convention, in the absence of some error on the part of the court seized. 
293
  See Kessedjian Report (note 18) 298; Struyven (note 58) 521-548; Juenger (note 83) 112. 
294
  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 art 5. 
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parties to international commercial transactions, both at the transaction planning and dispute 
resolution stages, as parties will be able to assume more readily that their choice of court 
agreements and resulting judgments will be enforced. Secondly, although the Convention is 
narrow in scope and contains significant exclusions, any multilateral instrument in the area of 
jurisdiction and judgments is preferable to the status quo as any harmonisation of law, by 
definition, brings greater predictability and certainty. The accomplishment of the Convention 
should also pave the way, and provide momentum, for further multilateral instruments in the 
area of jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments.
296
 Thirdly, the adoption of the 
Convention will redress the current imbalance in favour of international commercial 
arbitration as the preferred dispute resolution method for cross-border business 
transactions.
297
 The expectation is that if there is a convention with respect to choice of court 
agreements which is as equally broadly accepted as that with respect to arbitral awards, 
parties will have an alternative to choosing arbitration in their contracts. If they have the 
assurance that a judgment will be recognised and enforced in a large number of States, some 
might be more inclined to insert a choice of court clause instead of an arbitration clause.
298
 
All in all, the Convention would become the litigation equivalent of the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
299
 
 
Beaumont
300
 argues that the Convention has a real chance of success which is evidenced by 
the fact that both the US and the EC signed it in early 2009 (although they have not yet 
                                                                                                                                                        
295
 Teitz LE ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating party autonomy and providing an alternative 
to arbitration’ (2005) 53 The American Journal of Comparative Law543; Berlin M ‘Note and Comment: The 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Creating an International Framework for recognising 
foreign judgments’ (2006) 3 Brigham Young University International Law and Management Review 43; 
Black V ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Common Law (2007) Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada Civil Section 3 available at 
www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/Hague_Choice_of_Court_Convention_Common_Law_En.pdf  (accessed 5 
September 2012); Mortensen R ‘The Hague and the Ditch: The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area and the Choice 
of Court Convention’ (2009) 5(2) Journal of Private International Law 213; Garnett  (note 170) 161. 
296
 Teitz (note 290) 544; Berlin (note 295) 43. 
297
 See Chapter 1 para 4.1 where reference was made to the perspective of an international businessman who is 
faced with a choice between arbitration with an option of the award being enforceable in over 140 countries 
and litigation in a national court without any comparable enforceability option, except if the litigation is 
concentrated in countries which are parties to a multilateral instrument. 
298
 Kruger T ‘Current developments: Private International Law’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 447.  
299
 Garnett, however, argues that if the Hague Convention fails the replicate the New York Convention in at 
least three significant ways: first, there is a wider range of excluded subject matter under Article 2 compared 
to international arbitration, secondly, in the potentially wider defences to enforcement of agreements and 
thirdly, in the scope for member states to remove certain areas from the Convention by declaration under 
Article 21: see Garnett (note 175) 169. 
300
 Beaumont P ‘Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005: Background, Negations, Analysis and Current Status 
(2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 126. 
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ratified it). The strong signals of support from two of the major trading powers in the world 
would encourage many other States to become parties to the Convention. Latin America and 
other areas of the developing world will be inspired to believe the Convention is 
advantageous to them by the early example of Mexico in acceding to the Convention. The 
Convention has the potential to enhance world trade by creating the necessary legal certainty 
to parties to commercial contracts to control the risks they are exposed to in court litigation. 
They can keep costs down by being sure that any disputes between them will be resolved in 
their chosen forum.
301
 Mortensen also suggests that since the Convention was negotiated at 
the Hague Conference, it promises the broadest international adoption that a double 
convention has yet secured, and for that reason, its ratification and implementation is 
something that should be encouraged.
302
 
 
6.3 EU Brussels Regulation/Convention 
The Brussels I Regulation is a clear example of a double convention, as it provides express and clear 
rules for the assumption of jurisdiction of the rendering court under the Regulation.
303
 
 
Four factors are generally recognised as being responsible for the success of the Brussels 
Convention/Regulation:  
i. The Convention and Regulation govern both the issues of direct jurisdiction and 
recognition and enforcement, and are, therefore, double conventions. This was 
promoted by the idea that the ‘fair and reasonable jurisdiction’ of the judgment-
rendering court is the precondition for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  
ii. Recognition and enforcement can be denied only for explicitly specified grounds 
under the Convention and the Regulation, so the outcome of is highly predictable.  
iii. The ECJ was authorised to interpret the Brussels Convention and the Regulation.304 
iv. The accompanying explanatory report305 serves as a useful instrument to understand 
the Brussels Convention and is still a good reference for the Brussels I Regulation.
306
 
 
                                                 
301
 Beaumont (note 300) 126. 
302
 Mortensen (note 295) 213. 
303
  See Brussels I Regulation (note 6) Chapter II arts 2 – 31.  
304
 Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Brussels Convention, done Jun 3, 1971, 1975 
Official Journal (l204) 28.  
305
 ‘Jenard Report’: see note 91. 
306
 Huang (note 47) 25. 
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Mutual trust in the administration of justice between Member States justified judgments 
given in one Member State being recognised automatically without the need for any 
procedure except in cases of dispute.
307
 The same principle of mutual trust demands that the 
procedure for making a judgment given in one Member State enforceable in another must be 
efficient and rapid. To that end, the declaration that a judgment is enforceable should be 
issued virtually automatically after purely formal checks of the documents supplied, without 
there being any possibility for the court to raise of its own motion any of the grounds for non-
enforcement provided by the Regulation.
308
 
 
The ECJ has as a result been deemed essential for the successful operation of the Brussels 
Convention and the Regulation.
309
 In many cases, the ECJ interpreted the terms and phrases 
in the Convention and Regulation by adopting an autonomous Community definition instead 
of one favoured by a particular Member State.
310
 
 
Finally, harmonisation has been achieved with a great degree of success in the field of 
enforcement of arbitral awards,
311
 which is highly comparable with that of enforcement of 
judgments. Since harmonisation has worked well for enforcement of arbitral awards 
worldwide, it should also be able to work for enforcement of judgments, so as to 
accommodate the growing interdependence of courts
312
 and other adjudicatory bodies, as a 
result of the increase in transnational litigation.
313
 
 
6.4 Montevideo Convention 
Most pertinent is the fact that the Montevideo Convention does not regulate the issue of 
jurisdiction. The only reference to jurisdiction is found in art 2, which requires the enforcing 
                                                 
307
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) Recital 16.  
308
 Brussels I Regulation (note 6) Recital 17.  
309
 Von Mehren AT ‘Jurisdictional Requirements: To What Extent Should the State of Origin's Interpretation of 
Convention Rules Control for Recognition and Enforcement Purposes?’ in Lowenfeld AF & Silberman LJ 
(eds) The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments (2001) 34. 
310
 Reuland RC ‘The Recognition of Judgments in the European Community: the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of 
the Brussels Convention’ (1993) 14 Michigan Journal of International Law 566. 
311
 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards June 10, 1958 
330 U.N.T.S. 38 is a typical example. More than 140 States have become party to it and the success of 
arbitration worldwide has much to owe to its worldwide enforceability regime: see Chapter 1 note 147 
above.  
312
  Not only are courts often requested to enforce foreign judgments, they are also often faced with choice-of-
law clauses in international contracts requiring the application of foreign law: see Chapter 1 para 3 above. 
313
 Lussier L ‘A Canadian perspective’ (1998-1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 60-61. 
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court to verify that the rendering judge or tribunal was competent ‘in the international sphere’ 
(i.e. had international competence, or indirect jurisdiction) to provide the judgment according 
to the laws of the requested state as a condition for enforcement of the foreign judgment.
314
 
Any debate regarding the potential bases for the assertion of jurisdiction is absent.
315
 The La 
Paz Convention was subsequently adopted to ensure an effective application of this article.
316
 
 
The Organisation of American States (OAS)
317
 recognised that provisions were necessary to 
prevent jurisdictional disputes among the States Parties and consequently adopted the La Paz 
Convention to ensure an effective application of arte 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention.
318
 
The Convention lays down the circumstances under which the requirement of jurisdiction in 
the international sphere is deemed to be satisfied.
319
 It was, therefore, regarded as necessary 
to supplement the single convention dealing with only recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments with a supplementary convention regulation jurisdiction for the effective 
application of the Montevideo Convention.  
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A crucial aspect for a prospective instrument to harmonise the rules on recognition and 
enforcement in the SACU will be the identification of the most suitable type of the 
instrument to be adopted, taking into account the specific historical, political, cultural and 
socio-economic differences between the States.
320
 This aspect has contributed to the relative 
failures and successes of previous efforts.
321
  
 
A simple convention may be easier to conclude than a double convention but it will not 
address the issue of jurisdiction, with the result that much uncertainty will remain. A double 
                                                 
314
 Montevideo Convention (note 7) art 2. 
315
 Oestreicher (note 14) 69. 
316
 La Paz Convention (note 273) art 1: see para 5.3 above.  
317
  See Chapter 2 note 100. 
318
 La Paz Convention (note 273) Preamble. The judge or tribunal rendering the judgment is competent in the 
international sphere to try the matter and to pass judgment on it in accordance with the law of the State in 
which the judgment, award or decision is to take effect. 
319
 La Paz Convention (note 273) art 1. 
320
 See para 1.3 above. 
321
 See, for example, the attempt of the Hague Conference to create a mixed convention based on the Brussels I 
Regulation and ignoring the economic, political and cultural differences among negotiating parties: see para 
1.3 above. 
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convention should be the starting point for negotiations among Member States as it will offer 
litigants and traders a greater degree of legal certainty.
322
  
 
In the light of the political, cultural and social and sociological differences between Member 
States, conflicts may potentially arise in negotiating grounds of direct jurisdiction. This may 
be especially the case if the provisions of the Convention require an amendment of Member 
States’ national laws relating to international jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of 
the Convention.
323
 However, given the common grounds between SACU Member States and 
their long history of collaboration, dating from 1910,
324
 SACU Member States should from 
the outset attempt to resolve any potential conflicts in favour of unqualified acceptance or 
rejection of specific jurisdictional issues.  
 
Should States be unable to reach agreement on bases of direct jurisdiction, a single 
convention may under the circumstances be easier to agree upon.
325
 A single convention with 
indirect jurisdictional bases may pave the way for the regions to develop a mixed or double 
convention regulating both direct and indirect jurisdiction in the long run,
326
 in a manner 
similar to the Montevideo Convention which was later complemented by the La Paz 
Convention to address the issue of indirect jurisdiction.
327
  
 
The 1971 Hague Convention, despite being a in the form of a perceived single Convention, 
was nevertheless a massive failure, which suggests that other factors aside from the type of 
Convention contribute to the likelihood of success of a Convention.
328
 The downfall of the 
Convention was likely the complex form of the Convention and requirement for the 
conclusion of supplementary agreements.
329
 This should serve as warning for SACU Member 
States not to over-complicate the form and structure of any proposed instrument for the 
region.  
 
                                                 
322
 See para 1.3 above. 
323
 See para 1.1.1 above.  
324
 See Chapter 1, para 2.2. 
325
 Kessedjian Report (note 18) 138. 
326
  See para 1.3 above. 
327
 See para 5.1 above. 
328
 See para 2.1 above. 
329
 See para 2 above.  
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The 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention deals with a much narrower scope than the 
1971 Convention and with a single ratification, it has also not been a huge success. From the 
original idea of a worldwide convention on jurisdiction and judgments, the Convention now 
only applies to exclusive choice of court agreements, subject to a number of exclusions.
330
 
Although the final scope is limited, the preparatory work by the Hague Conference may be of 
great value in negotiations for a proposed instrument for the SACU region.  
 
In contrast, the Brussels I Regulation was a resounding success.
331
 As an example of a double 
convention, the Regulation provides a detailed set of jurisdictional rules according to when 
the courts of Contracting States are permitted to exercise jurisdiction, and also provides rules 
on recognition and enforcement, thereby achieving a great deal of legal certainty.
332
 In 
addition, a judgment given in a Member State is recognised in the other Member States 
without any special procedure being required.
333
 The factors that have contributed to the 
success of the Regulation should be duly noted by negotiating parties to a prospective SACU 
instrument. This includes the role of an overarching court to ensure uniform interpretation of 
the convention and the value of an accompanying explanatory report.
334
  
 
The most pertinent of the Montevideo Convention is the fact that on its own it was not 
regarded as sufficient to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and 
to prevent jurisdictional disputes among the States Parties.
335
 OAS Member States saw the 
need to complement the provisions of the Montevideo Convention, providing no rules on 
jurisdiction, with the La Paz Convention, providing a set of jurisdictional grounds ‘for the 
purposes of the extraterritorial validity of foreign judgment’.336 However, the time it took for 
the La Paz Convention to come into effect
337
 once again alludes to the difficulties associated 
with agreeing on jurisdictional bases.  
 
A comparison of the provisions of the above provisions further suggests that a recognition 
and enforcement convention should - : 
                                                 
330
 See para 3.1 above. 
331
 See para 4 above. 
332
 See para 4 above. 
333
 See para 4.2 above. 
334
 See para 6.3 above.  
335
 See para 5.2 above. 
336
 La Paz Convention (note 273) art 1; see para 5.3 above.  
337
 See para 5.3 above.  
 
 
 
 
 154 
- define the scope and exclusions from scope of the Convention;338 
- establish procedural requirements for recognition and enforcement under the 
Convention;
339
 
- determine those instances when recognition and enforcement would be refused under 
the Convention;
340
 and 
- establish the recognised bases on which the rendering court will have jurisdiction for 
the purpose of recognition and enforcement under the Convention.
341
 
 
Specific proposals for a recognition and enforcement convention for the SACU are made in 
the next chapter,
342
 following a comparison of the existing statutory regimes for recognition 
and enforcement in the region.
343
 
                                                 
338
  See Hague Convention (note 4) art 1; Hague Convention (note 5) arts 1-2; Brussels I Regulation (note 6) art 
1; Montevideo Convention art 1; see para 2.1, 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 above. 
339
  See para 2.2, 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2 above. 
340
  See para 2.3, 3.3, 4.3 and 5.3 above. 
341
  See Hague Convention (note 4) art 10 (para 3.3 above); La Paz Convention (note 273) art 1 (para 5.3 above). 
342
 See Chapter 4, para 6 below. 
343
  See Chapter 4, para 3 and 4 below. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 considered the various approaches adopted by different regional economic 
communities and concluded that the best approach at present for the SACU is the adoption of 
a multilateral double convention by all SACU Member States providing uniform rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
1
 Chapter 3 compared a number of 
international and regional multilateral conventions on recognition and enforcement in order 
to identify the principal matters that should be covered by such an instrument, and what 
lessons could be learnt from their examples.
2
 
 
                                                 
1
  See Chapter 2, para 5 above. 
2
  See Chapter 3, para 7 above. 
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This Chapter draws on the previous Chapters and proposes a draft text for proposed 
Convention for SACU Member States. The chapter sets out general principles underlying 
such a convention, as derived from the multilateral instruments discussed above, including 
the scope of a proposed instrument,
3
 the procedural requirements for enforcement,
4
 when 
recognition and refusal should be refused under a Convention,
5
 and finally measures ensuring 
uniform interpretation of the Convention.
6
 Some additional matters that a recognition and 
enforcement Convention may include are also discussed.
7
 
 
This chapter makes a comparison of the statutory instruments regulating the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in the SACU Member States. The enforcement of a foreign 
money judgment at common law generally requires the institution of an action before the 
local court.
8
 Such a step evidently involves trouble, expense and delay; therefore, many 
countries have made statutory provision to facilitate the enforcement of such foreign 
judgments.
9
 The purpose of the comparison is to determine the extent of the differences and 
similarities between the statutory regimes currently in force in the region in order to ascertain 
the feasibility of a proposed harmonisation effort. The first provisions compared are the scope 
of application of each statute, which specifies which types of judgments are enforceable 
under that statute. The requirement of reciprocity lies at the heart of many enforcement 
schemes in Africa;
10
 therefore, the reciprocity requirements under the statutes are also 
compared. The second sets of provisions that are compared are the requirements with which a 
judgment of a rendering have to comply to be enforceable in the state in which enforcement 
is sought (the requested state).  
 
Judgments are not automatically enforceable in a foreign state once they meet all the 
requirements for enforcement: the respective statutes prescribe certain procedural 
requirements for enforcement, which are also compared. Once a judgment is registered (one 
of the procedural requirements for enforcement under most of the statutes) registration of the 
                                                 
3
  See para 2.1 below. 
4
  See para 2.2 below. 
5
  See para 2.3 below. 
6
  See para 2.4 below. 
7
  See para 2.5 below. 
8
 Forsyth CF Private International Law: The Modern Roman-Dutch Law including the Jurisdiction of the 
High Courts 5ed (2012) 438. 
9
 Forsyth (note 8) 438. 
10
  See para 4.1.6 below.  
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judgment may nevertheless be set aside under a number of circumstances listed in each of the 
statutes. These circumstances are also compared.  
 
The relevant statutes that are compared are listed in the following table (in chronological 
order): 
 
TABLE 1: STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS ON THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN SACU 
Country Statute 
Swaziland Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act,1922 
Lesotho Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Proclamation, 1922 
Botswana Judgments (International Enforcement) Act, 1981 
South Africa Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act,1988 
Namibia Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act, 1994 
 
The influences of the European colonisers on the private international law regimes in 
Southern Africa remains so strong that Thomashausen notes that ‘one is left with the uneasy 
feeling that 19
th
 century European nationalism is surviving chiefly in the private international 
law and international procedures on the African continent’.11 The statutes of many of the 
former British colonies, for example, are heavily influenced by the English law: in the case of 
Achamat Essack Adam v Nairoon Adam
12
 the Lesotho High Court decided that the private 
international law rules of Lesotho are the same as those of England.
13
 The current statutory 
provisions for recognition and enforcement of the SACU States are in many instances 
analogous to those contained in earlier United Kingdom statutes, whether the 1922 
Administration of Justice Act
14
 or the 1933 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act.
15
 
 
                                                 
11
 Thomashausen A ‘The enforcement and recognition and of judgments and other forms of legal cooperation 
in the SADC’ (2005) 35(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 33. 
12
  Achamat Essack Adam v Nairoon Adam CIV/APN/327/94. 
13
  Adam v Adam (note 12) citing Webber v Webber 1915 AD 239. 
14
  See, for example, Swaziland and Lesotho.  
15
 See, for example, Botswana. The South African and Namibian statutes also contains a number of provisions 
which are analogous to the 1933 Act, such as the grounds for setting aside a registered judgment: see paras 
3.3.4 and 3.4.4 below.  
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Against this background, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the 
common law tradition in England merits some discussion,
16
 after which the relevant 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment statutes of each of the SACU Member 
States will be discussed.  
 
Once the general principles have been discussed, specific recommendations for a Draft 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the SACU are 
made in a proposed text.
17
 
 
2 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 
The earliest common law decisions held that foreign judgments were not conclusive on the 
merits but were prima facie evidence of an obligation.
18
 The common law required a foreign 
judgment creditor to bring a fresh action to enforce a judgment.
19
  
 
The general common law rule was that the law of the forum (lex fori) determines the 
procedure for enforcement of foreign judgments. Therefore, in an action upon a foreign 
judgment, the form in which the action had to be brought was covered by the local law of the 
court in which the judgment was sought to be enforced.
20
 Modes of execution were 
determined by the laws of the Forum State, often without giving regard to rights in terms of 
the foreign judgment which are comparable to domestic judgments.
21
 Since a foreign 
judgment was regarded as no more than the basis of a claim asserted in action in the forum, it 
fell into the category of evidence. It was, therefore, necessary to be pleaded and proved under 
                                                 
16
  Even though South Africa is a mixed tradition comprising both Roman-Dutch and common law, there is 
generally adherence to the common law tradition in matters on private international law: see para 3.4 below. 
17
  See para 3 below. 
18
 Sumner JD ‘The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause – Its History and Purpose’ (1954-1955) 34 Oregon Law 
Review 226; Oppong RF ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Ghana: A second look at a 
colonial inheritance’ (2008) 31(4) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 20; Barnett PR Res Judicata, Estoppel, and 
Foreign Judgments (2001) 35. 
19
 Yntema HE ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law’ (1935) 33(8) Michigan Law 
Review 1136. 
20
 Yntema (note 19) 1135. 
21
 Fowks RJ ‘Foreign Money Judgments: Enforcement by Registration’ (1972-1973) 11 Washburn Law 
Journal 375. 
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the general rules applicable to written evidence and, in particular, had to be properly 
authenticated.
22
 
 
The first English statute
23
 providing efficient enforcement procedures instituted a system in 
1801 whereby reciprocal enrolment of decrees for monetary payment was made between the 
chancery and exchequer courts of England and Ireland.
24
 When the decree of one was 
enrolled, it was to be ‘enforced as if originally pronounced in such court’.25 Direct 
enforcement by registration of money judgments was provided for in the Judgments 
Extension Act of 1868 (‘Extensions Act’), which applied to judgments rendered in any part 
of the UK. A judgment for ‘debt, damages or costs’ was to have the same effect, and be 
executed in a like manner as a judgment rendered by the Superior Court in which the 
certificate had been registered.
26
 
 
In 1908 a series of ordinances modelled after the Extensions Act were put into effect in all 
West African and various East and Central African colonies and protectorates of Great 
Britain.
27
 These provided for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments and include the Ghana 
Foreign Judgments Extension Ordinance No 4 of 1907; Gambia Foreign Judgments 
Extension Ordinance No 5 of 1908; Northern Nigeria: Foreign Judgment Extension 
Ordinance No 21 of 1908; Southern Nigeria: Foreign Judgment Extension Ordinance No VI 
of 1908 and Sierra Leone: Foreign Judgment Extension Ordinance No 4 of 1908.
28
 
 
In 1920, comparable enforcement procedures were extended to judgments rendered in British 
territories outside the UK by means of the Administration of Justice Act,
29
 which is now 
discussed. 
 
                                                 
22
 This is the case in England, where it is provided that foreign judgments shall be proved by sealed or signed 
or examined copies thereof: see Yntema (note 19) 1137. 
23
  Crown Debts Act 1801 Chapter 90 41 Geo 3, an ‘Act for the more speedy and effective Recovery of Debts 
due to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, in the right of the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland; and for the better Administration of Justice within the same’: Long title. The Preamble 
and sections 1-8 were repealed by Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (c.27), s. 54, Sch. 14. 
24
 Fowks (note 21) 376. 
25
 Fowks (note 21) 376. 
26
 Fowks (note 21) 376. 
27
 Yntema (note 19) 1157. Notably, the Union of South Africa was one of the most important parts of the 
Empire to which the Act did not apply. 
28
 Oppong (note 18) 19. 
29
 United Kingdom Administration of Justice Act, 1920; Yntema (note 19) 1151. 
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2.1 Administration of Justice Act, 1920 
2.1.1 Application 
The 1920 Administration of Justice Act establish a scheme for enforcement in the UK of 
certain judgments
30
 from colonial and Commonwealth countries to which Part II of the Act 
extends.
31
 Application of the Act to a territory was subject to a declaration by Order in 
Council,
32
 provided that UK judgments would be given reciprocal treatment in that State.
33
 
 
‘Judgment’ is defined as - 
‘any judgment or order given or made by a court in any civil proceedings, whether before or 
after the passing of [the] Act, whereby any sum of money is made payable, and includes an 
award in proceedings on arbitration if the award has, in pursuance of the law in force in the 
place where it was made, become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment given by a 
court in that place’.34 
 
The Administration of Justice Act contained a reciprocity requirement, and provided that  
‘where His Majesty is satisfied that reciprocal provisions have been made by the legislature of 
any part of His Majesty’s dominions outside the UK for the enforcement within that part of 
His dominions of judgments obtained in the High Court of England, the Court of Session 
Scotland, and the High Court in England and Wales, His Majesty may by Order in Council 
declare that Part II of the Act shall extend to that part of His dominions, and on any such 
Order being made, this Part of the Act shall extend accordingly’.35  
 
2.1.2 Requirements for Enforcement 
A judgment could not be registered under the Act if –  
a) the original court acted without jurisdiction; 
b) the judgment debtor, being the person who was neither carrying on business nor 
ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction of the original court, did not voluntary appear 
or submit to the jurisdiction of that court; 
                                                 
30
  See definition of judgment, in text above.  
31
  The Act extended to many of the States of the Commonwealth, including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
but not Namibia or South Africa: See Reciprocal Administration of Judgments Act, 1920, Pt II 
(Consolidation) Order 1984 SI 1984/129, as amended by 1985 SU 1985/1994. 
32
  Orders in Council are used by Parliament when an ordinary Statutory Instrument would be inappropriate, 
such as for transferring responsibilities between government departments. Orders in Council are issued "by 
and with the advice of Her Majesty's Privy Council". Orders in Council were used to transfer the powers 
from Ministers of the UK government to those of devolved assemblies: UK Parliament ‘Orders in Council’ 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/orders-in-council/ (accessed 28 May 2013). 
33
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 13. 
34
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 12(1). 
35
  Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 14(1). 
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c) the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings, was not duly served with 
the process of the original court and did not appear, notwithstanding that he was 
ordinarily resident or was carrying on business within the jurisdiction of that court or 
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of that court;  
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
e) the judgment debtor satisfied the registering court either that an appeal was pending, or 
that he was entitled and intends to appeal, against the judgment; or 
f) the judgment was in respect of a cause of action which for reasons of public policy or 
for some other similar reason could not have been entertained by the registering court.
36
 
 
2.1.3 Procedure for Enforcement 
The Act provided that where a judgment was obtained in a superior court to which the Act 
applied, the judgment creditor may apply to the High Court in England or Ireland or to the 
Court of Session in Scotland, to have the judgment registered in the court. The application 
must be made at any time within twelve months after the date of the judgment, or such longer 
period as may be allowed by the court. The court may, if in all the circumstances of the case 
they think it is ‘just and convenient’ that the judgment should be enforced in the UK, order 
the judgment to be registered accordingly.
37
 Section 9(2) indicated how the court was to 
assess what is ‘just and convenient’ which broadly, although not precisely, follows the 
common law.
38
 
 
A registered judgment was, from the date of registration, of the same force and effect, and 
proceedings may have been taken thereon, as if it had been a judgment originally obtained or 
entered upon the date of registration in the rendering court. In so far as it relates to execution 
the registering court had the same control and jurisdiction over the judgment as it had over its 
own similar judgments.
39
 Rules of court could provide for, amongst others, the serving of 
notice on the judgment debtor that the judgment has been registered; enabling the registering 
court to set aside a registered judgment; and for suspending the execution of a judgment.
40
 
 
                                                 
36
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9(2). 
37
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9(1). 
38
  See para 2.1.2 above.  
39
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9(3). 
40
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9(4). 
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Registration under the Act was not obligatory; the privilege of instituting a common law 
action instead of registering was reserved.
41
 
 
2.1.4 Setting aside of registered judgment 
Section 9(4) of the Act provided that Rules of court may provide for, amongst others, 
enabling the registering court to set aside a registered judgment.  
 
2.2 Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933 
England applied the direct enforcement principle to judgments rendered outside Her 
Majesty’s Dominions via the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act.42 The Act 
provided for the enforcement in the UK of judgments given in foreign countries which accord 
reciprocal treatment to judgments given in the UK.
43
 
 
2.2.1 Application 
The Act extended the possibility of enforcement to foreign judgments generally, not only to 
those from within the Empire. Its application, however, was not automatic, but depended 
upon an Order in Council of the British government,
44
 which was conditional upon the 
jurisdiction to which it was applied extending substantially equal recognition to UK 
judgments.
45
 If a judgment was not from a recognised court or tribunal, it may have been 
enforced and/or recognised according to the common law rules.
46
 
 
The Act, however, only applied to judgments as defined in the Act, namely any ‘judgment or 
order given or made by a court in any civil proceedings, or a judgment or order given or 
made by a court in any criminal proceedings for the payment of a sum of money in respect of 
                                                 
41
 Fowks (note 21) 376. 
42
 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933 (hereafter ‘Foreign Judgments Act’); Fowks (note 
21) 377. 
43
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) Preamble. 
44
  These countries include Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada (except Quebec), Guernsey, India, 
Pakistan, Tonga, Jersey, Isle of Man); non-European countries (Israel, Suriname); and European countries 
where the judgment is not otherwise enforceable under the Brussels Convention/Regulation or Lugano 
Convention (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway): Barnett (note 18) 56. 
45
 Leflar RA ‘The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act’ (1949) 24 New York University Law Review 336. 
46
  Barnet (note 18) 56. 
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compensation or damages to an injured party’.47 Section 10A48 of the Act extended the 
relevant provisions to arbitral awards.
49
 
 
The Act provided that if ‘His Majesty’ was satisfied that should the registration of foreign 
judgments be extended to judgments given in the superior courts of any foreign country, 
substantial reciprocity of treatment would be assured for the enforcement in that country of 
UK superior court judgments, he was able to direct by Order in Council -  
a) that Part I of the Act will extend to that foreign country; and  
b) that the courts of that foreign country as specified in the order will be deemed 
superior courts of that country for the purposes of the Act.
50
 
 
2.2.2 Requirements for enforcement 
To be enforceable under the Act a judgment must have been from a superior court of a 
foreign country, to which the Act extends, if –  
a) it was final51 and conclusive as between the parties thereto;52 
b) a sum of money was payable in terms of the judgment, excluding sums payable for 
taxes or similar charges or a fine or other penalty; and 
c) it was given after the coming into force of the Order in Council which made that court 
a recognised court.
53
 
                                                 
47
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) section 11(1). 
48
  Inserted by Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (c. 27, SIF [Statutes in Force] 45:3), s. 35(1), Sch. 10 
para. 4. 
49
  Section 10A provides that ‘The provisions of [this] Act … shall apply, as they apply to a judgment, in 
relation to an award in proceedings on an arbitration which has, in pursuance of the law in force in the place 
where it was made, become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment given by a court in that place. 
The definition of ‘court’ in section 11 was accordingly included to ‘include a tribunal’: Foreign Judgments 
Act (note 42) s 11. 
50
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 1(2). 
51
  In the English case Nouvion v Freeman and Another (1890) 15 App Cas 1 (HL) Lord Herschell and Lord 
Watson held that: ‘in order to establish that such a judgment has been pronounced it must be shown that in 
the Court by which it was pronounced it conclusively, finally and forever established the existence of the 
debt of which it is sought to be made conclusive evidence in this country, so as to make it res judicata 
between the parties. If it is not conclusive in the same Court which pronounced it, so that notwithstanding 
such a judgment the existence of the debt may between the same parties be afterwards contested in that 
Court, and upon proper proceedings being taken and such contest being adjudicated upon, it may be declared 
that there existed no obligation to pay the debt at all, then I do not think that a judgment which is of that 
character can be regarded as finally and conclusively evidencing the debt, and so entitling the person who 
has obtained the judgment to claim a decree from our Courts for the payment of that debt (Per Lord 
Herschell at 9). 
52
  In terms of the Act a judgment will be deemed to be final and conclusive notwithstanding that an appeal may 
be pending against it, or that it may still be subject to appeal, in the courts of the country of the original 
court: Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 1(4). 
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Section 2A, which was subsequently added,
54
 provided that the following judgments of a 
recognised court were not enforceable under the Act: 
a) a judgment given by that court on appeal from a court which is not a recognised court; 
b) a judgment or other instrument which is regarded for the purposes of its enforcement 
as a judgment of that court but which was given or made in another country; and 
c) a judgment given by that court in proceedings founded on a judgment of a court in 
another country and having as their object the enforcement of that judgment.
55
 
 
2.2.3 Procedure for enforcement 
A judgment creditor was able to apply to the High Court at any time within six years after the 
date of the judgment, or after the date of the last judgment given in appeal proceedings, to 
have the judgment registered in the High Court.
56
 A judgment will not be registered if, at the 
date of the application –  
a) it was wholly satisfied; or 
b) it could not have been enforced by execution in the country of the original court.57 
 
The effect of registration was to place a registered judgment on the same basis as an original 
judgment of the registering court in respect to execution and judicial control. A registered 
judgment was, for the purpose of execution, of the same force and effect; proceedings may 
have been taken thereon; the sum for which it was registered carried interest; and the 
registering court had the same control over the execution of a registered judgment, as if the 
judgment was a judgment ordinarily given in the registering count and entered on the date of 
registration.
58
 Execution did not issue on the judgment so long as it was competent for any 
party to have the registration of the judgment set aside, or, where such application was made, 
until after the application has been finally determined.
59
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
53
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(2). 
54
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 1(1)(2)(2A) substituted for s 1(1)(2) by Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Act (note 48). 
55
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2A. 
56
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2(1). 
57
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2(1). 
58
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s; Fowks (note 21) 377 . 
59
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2(2). 
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2.2.4 Setting aside of registered judgments 
The registration was set aside, on an application made by any party against whom a registered 
judgment may be enforced, if the registering court was satisfied that – 
a) the judgment was not a judgment to which the Act applies or was registered in 
contravention with the Act;  
b) the courts of the country of the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances 
of the case;  
c) the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings in the original court, did 
not received notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the 
proceedings and did not appear;
60
 
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud;  
e) the enforcement of the judgment would have been contrary to public policy in the 
country of the registering court; or 
f) the rights under the judgment are not vested in the person by whom the application for 
the judgment was made.
61
 
 
A registered judgment could also have been set aside if the registering court was satisfied that 
the matter in dispute in the proceedings in the original court had prior to the date of the 
judgment in the original court been the subject of a final and conclusive judgment by another 
court having jurisdiction in the matter.
62
 
 
                                                 
60
 Notwithstanding that process may have been duly served on him in accordance with the law of the country 
of the original court. 
61
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(1)(a). 
62
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(1)(b). 
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The Act stipulated the instances in which the foreign court would have been deemed to have 
had jurisdiction,
63
 as well as when it would have been deemed not to have had jurisdiction.
64
 
It expressly excepted from the rule that voluntary appearance confers jurisdiction upon the 
original court, except in cases in which the appearance is made to protect or release from 
seizure property seized or threatened with seizure, and cases in which a special appearance is 
made to contest the jurisdiction of the court.
65
 The Act also declared the original court 
without jurisdiction if the bringing of the proceedings in the original court was contrary to an 
agreement under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by 
proceedings in the courts of the country in which that court had its seat.
66
 The possible 
grounds of jurisdiction based upon citizenship or upon personal service within the jurisdiction 
were not recognised in the Act, as they were deemed to be of doubtful validity.
67
 If 
admissible at all, judgments in such situations could be registered under the Act only under 
                                                 
63
 A court would be deemed to have had jurisdiction in the case of a judgment given in an action in personam - 
a) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, submitted to the jurisdiction of that court 
by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings [otherwise than for the purpose of protecting or obtaining 
the release of property seized, or threatened with seizure, in the proceedings or of contesting the 
jurisdiction of that court] – these words in the original Act have been repealed by the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982 (c. 27, SIF 45:3), ss. 35(1), 53, Sch. 13 Pt. II para. 9(2), Sch. 14; 
b) if the judgment debtor was plaintiff in, or counter-claimed in, the proceedings in the original court;  
c) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had before the commencement of the 
proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject-matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of 
that court or of the courts of the country of that court;  
d) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, was at the time when the proceedings 
were instituted resident in, or being a body corporate had its principal place of business in, the country of 
that court; or 
e) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had an office or place of business in the 
country of that court and the proceedings in that court were in respect of a transaction effected through or 
at that office or place. 
 In the case of a judgment given in an action of which the subject-matter was immovable property or in an 
action in rem of which the subject-matter was movable property, if the property in question was at the time 
of the proceedings in the original court situate in the country of that court. In the case of a judgment given in 
an action other than any such action as is mentioned in the previous two paragraphs, if the jurisdiction of the 
original court is recognised by the law of the registering court (s 4(2)). An action is personam does not 
include any matrimonial cause or any proceedings in connection with any of the following matters, that is to 
say, matrimonial matters, administration of the estates of deceased persons, bankruptcy, winding up of 
companies, lunacy or guardianship of infants: see Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 11(2). 
64
 A court would be deemed not to have had jurisdiction if the subject-matter of the proceedings was 
immovable property outside the country of the original court; except in the cases mentioned in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (c) above, or in an action not mentioned above, if the bringing of the proceedings in the 
original court was contrary to an agreement under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise 
than by proceedings in the courts of the country of that court; or if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in 
the original proceedings, was a person who, under the rules of public international law, was entitled to 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the country of the original court and did not submit to the 
jurisdiction of that court: see Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(3). 
65
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(2). 
66
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(3)(b).  
67
 Yntema (note 19) 1163. 
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the general provision that the original court would have been deemed to have had 
jurisdiction, if its jurisdiction was ‘recognised by the law of the registering court’.68 
 
The court had the power either to set aside the registration, or to adjourn an application to set 
it aside, on such terms as it may deem just.
69
 The registration proceedings under the Act were 
obligatory for securing the enforcement of a judgment which can be registered.
70
 No court in 
the UK could entertain proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a foreign 
judgment to which the Act applied, other than proceedings by way of registration.
71
 
 
2.2.5 Analysis 
The 1933 Act is similar to the 1920 Act in that both justify the recognition, not by the 
doctrine of obligation,
72
 but by the principle of reciprocity.
73
 The 1933 Act differs from the 
1920 Act in two important respects: First, the 1933 Act provided that the court ‘shall, subject 
to proof of the prescribed matter and to the other provisions of this Act, order the judgment to 
be registered’.74 Thus, there was no ‘just and convenient’ discretion similar to the 1920 Act.75 
Secondly, while the 1920 Act facilitated registration for the purposes of reciprocal 
enforcement, it did not provide for registration for the sole purpose of procuring preclusive 
effects,
76
 the 1933 Act made provision for the preclusive effect of all judgments, including 
unenforceable judgments that cannot be registered for enforcement under Part I of the Act.
77
 
In other words, while the 1933 Act was primarily intended to facilitate enforcement foreign 
judgments, s 8 was included to ensure that preclusive effects would nonetheless obtain for 
                                                 
68
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(2)(c). 
69
 Fowks (note 21) 377. If an applicant satisfies the registering court either that an appeal is pending, or that he 
is entitled and intends to appeal against the judgment, the court may either set aside the registration or 
adjourn the application to set aside the registration until after the expiration of such period reasonably 
sufficient to enable the applicant to take the necessary steps to have the appeal. 
70
 Fowks (note 21) 377. 
71
 Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 6. 
72
  The doctrine of obligation provides the theoretical bases for recognition and enforcement at English common 
law: see Chapter 1 para 3.1 above. 
73
  See para 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 above.  
74
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2(1). 
75
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 9(1). 
76
  The rules of claim preclusion prevent re-litigation of the same claim once that claim has ‘had its day in 
court’.  
77
  The Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 8(1) provides that ‘Subject to the provisions of this section, a 
judgment to which Part I of [the] Act applies or would have applied of a sum of money had been payable 
thereunder, whether it can be registered or not, and whether, if it can be registered, it is registered or not, 
shall be recognised in any court in the United Kingdom as conclusive between the parties thereto in all 
proceedings founded on the same cause of action and may be relied on by way of defence or counterclaim in 
any such proceedings’. 
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judgments that fell within the registration scheme, and also for those non-money judgments 
that would fall within the scheme were they money judgments and therefore enforceable.
78
 
 
The rules of jurisdictional competence under s 4(2) of the 1933 Act, which are absent under 
the 1920 Act, followed the common law,
79
 except that residence (or principal place of 
business for corporate defendants)
80
 replaced presence.
81
 
 
Similarly, the requirements ‘final and conclusive’ and ‘on the merits’82 were also reflected in 
the Act, as the minimum conditions for enforcement by registration.
83
 It is, therefore, 
generally clear that once a judgment was registered under the 1933 Act, and thus verified as a 
res judicata, the judgment was treated as if it were an English judgment.
84
 
 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments according to the English common 
law, and largely reflected in the 1920 and 1933 Acts,
85
 requires -:  
(i) the foreign court to possess jurisdictional competence, which is generally satisfied if 
the defendant was present
86
 within or submitted
87
 to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court; and 
(ii) that the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive88 and on the merits.89  
 
                                                 
78
  Barnett (note 18) 57. 
79
  The bases of jurisdiction were considered in SA Consortium General Textiles v Sun & Sand Agencies Ltd 
[1978] QB 279, CA. They are exclusive: no other ground of jurisdiction will render a foreign judgment 
registerable under the Act: Societe Co-operative Sidmetal v Titan International Ltd [1966]. 
80
  ‘Residence’ in the case of corporations is not merely a requirement of carrying on business (as it is at 
common law or under the 1920 Act, but rather the principal place of business be in the foreign country: 
Barnett (note 18) 58. 
81
  See, also, Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(2)(a)(v) for the jurisdictional rules as to presence of a 
corporate defendant with an office or place of business in the foreign country: ‘if the judgment debtor, being 
a defendant in the original court, had an office or place or business in the country of that court and the 
proceedings in that court were in respect of a transaction effected through or at that office or place’: see 
Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(2)(a)(v). 
82
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2(1). 
83
  Provided that the judgment has not been satisfied: Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 2(1)(a); and the 
judgment is capable of enforcement by execution in the country of the original court: see Foreign Judgments 
Act (note 42) s  2(1)(b). 
84
  Barnett (note 18) 59. 
85
  Barnett (note 18) 35. 
86
  Barnett (note 18) 35; Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9(2)(b); Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 
4(2)(a)(iv). 
87
  Submission may be actual, contractual or voluntary: see Schibsby v Westenholz (1870) LR 6 QB 155; 
Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(2)(a)(ii); see Barnett (note 18) 36.  
88
  Blohn v Dresser [1962] QB 116; Berliner Industriebank AG v Jost [1971] 2 QB 463.  
89
  DSV Silo-und Vewaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Owners of the Sennar and 13 Other Ships [1985] 1 WLR 490, 
HL; Desert Sun Loan Copr v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847, CA.  
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In addition, there must be no defence to recognition, the main defences to recognition being 
that the foreign judgment suffered from one of the following defects: 
(i) it was obtained in breach of a jurisdiction or arbitration agreement;90 
(ii) it was procured by fraud;91 
(iii) the proceedings in which it was obtained were in breach of natural justice;92 
(iv) its subject-matter is res judicata93 in the recognising State;94 
(v) it is contrary to public policy of the recognising state;95 
(vi) the sum is in respect of a tax or a like charge,96 or a fine or other penalty;97 and 
(vii) it offends section 5 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980.98 
 
The comparison and analysis of the Acts therefore reveal that even though there are certain 
similarities between the 1920 Administration of Justice Act and 1933 Foreign Judgments Act, 
there are nevertheless noteworthy differences between these Acts.  
 
As is illustrated below, some of the SACU Member States’ statues are based on the 1920 Act, 
and some on the 1933 Act. It is therefore to be expected that the underlying differences 
between these two Acts will also come to the forefront when the relevant statutes of the 
SACU Member States is discussed, which is now done.  
 
                                                 
90
  Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act (note 48), s 32; Tracomin SA v Sudan Oil Seeds Co Ltd [1983] 1 All 
ER 404. 
91
  Sayal v Heyward [1948] 2 KB 433, CA; Blohn v Desser (note 88); Jet Holdings Ltd v Pater [1990] 1 QB 
335 CA; House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241, CA; Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 
AC 443, HL. 
92
  Adams v Cape Industries PLC [1990] Ch 433, CA; Herzberg v Manitpna (1984) 38 RF (2d) 412 (Man).  
93
  A final and conclusive judicial decision on the merits by a judicial tribunal having competent jurisdiction 
over the matter in disputes and the parties: Barnett (note 18) 31. 
94
  Verwacke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145, HL. 
95
  Foreign Judgments Act (note 42) s 4(1)(a)(v). See also General Textiles v Sun & Sand Agencies (note 79). 
96
  Government of India v Taulor [1955] AC 491; Rossano v Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co Ltd [1963] 2 
QB 352; USA v Harden (1963) 41 DLR (2d) 721 (Sup Ct Can); Commissioner of Taxes v McFarland 1965 
(1) SA 470. 
97
  Huntington v Attril [1893] AC 150, PC; USA v Inkley [1989] QB 255, CA; Raulin v Fischer [1911] 22 KB 
93; General Textiles v Sun & Sand Agencies (note 79). 
98
  Similar legislation has been enacted in South Africa: Protection of Businesses Act 1978 – see para 3.4.2 
below; Australia: Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984; Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial 
Measures Act 1984: Barnett (note 18) 37. 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
3 OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
 
This part of the Chapter compares the statutes regulating the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in each of the selected SACU Member States, in the chronological order in 
which the statutes were enacted. 
 
3.1 Swaziland 
3.1.1 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (1922) 
The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act
99
 of Swaziland was meant to facilitate the 
reciprocal enforcement of judgments and awards in the UK and Swaziland.
100
 The Act, other 
than differences in numbering and arrangement, corresponds largely with Part II (dealing 
with the reciprocal enforcement of judgments in the UK and in other parts of His Majesty’s 
dominions) of the UK Administration of Justice Act of 1920.
101
 The Act is supplemented by 
the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Rules
102
 which regulates the practice and procedure 
in respect of the enforcement of foreign judgments.
103
 
 
3.1.2 The scope of application 
The application of the Act is limited to judgments from the UK, and specifically judgments 
obtained in the High Court of England or Ireland, or the Court of Session in Ireland.
104
 
 
The definition of ‘judgment’ is identical to that in s 12 of the UK Administration of Justice 
Act 1920, discussed above.
105
 
 
                                                 
99
 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act No. 4 of 1922 (‘Swaziland Act’) came into effect on 27 January 
1922. 
100
 Swaziland Act (note 99) Preamble.  
101
 Administration of Justice Act (note 29) (Sections 9-14); para 2.1 above. 
102
 Rules of Court promulgated under Section 3(4) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, 1922, 
commenced operation on 16 June 1923 (‘Swaziland Rules’). 
103
 Schulze C On Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments (2005) 118. 
104
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3. 
105
 ‘Judgment’ is defined as ‘a judgment or order given or made by a court in any civil proceedings, whether 
before or after the taking effect of [the] Act, whereby any sum of money is made payable, and includes an 
award in proceedings on arbitration of the award has, in pursuance of the law in force in the place where it 
was made, become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment given by a court in that place’: see 
Swaziland Act (note 99) s 2.  
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The Prime Minister may only declare the extension of the Act to other Commonwealth 
countries if he is satisfied that that Commonwealth legislature has made reciprocal provision 
for the enforcement of judgments obtained in the court of Swaziland.
106
 This has been done 
by means of Notice No 97 of 1922, in terms of which if reciprocal provisions have been made 
by the legislatures for the enforcement of judgments obtained in the High Court of 
Swaziland, within the territories specified, the Act extends to judgments obtained from those 
territories in like manner as it extends to judgments obtained in a superior court in the UK, as 
from the respective dates listed in the Schedule.
107
 
 
3.1.3 Requirements for recognition and enforcement 
The requirements and procedure for enforcement are identical to those provided for in the UK 
Administration of Justice Act, 1920,
108
 and the same six defences are available against the 
registration of a judgment.
109
 
 
3.1.4 Procedure for enforcement 
The judgment creditor must apply to the High Court in Swaziland to have the judgment 
registered.
110
 Once registered under the Act, a judgment will from the date of registration be 
of the same force and effect and proceedings may be taken thereon, as if it had been a 
judgment originally obtained or entered upon the date of registration by the court. The court 
will have the same control and jurisdiction over the judgment as it has over similar judgments 
given by it, but only in so far as it relates to execution.
111
 
 
A creditor in terms of a judgment obtained from one of the stipulated High Courts must apply 
to the High Court of Swaziland within twelve months of the date of judgment, or such longer 
                                                 
106
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 5.  
107
 Notice No 97 of 1922 on the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments. The Schedule lists the territories of 
Lesotho, Botswana, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Zambia, Zanzibar, Malawi, Kenya, New Zealand, 
Western Australia, Tanzania, Uganda, New South Wales, Victoria, Territory of North Australia, and the 
Territory of Southern Australia; see also Schulze (note 103) 169. 
108
 See Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9. 
109
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(2); see para. 2.1.2 above. 
110
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(1). 
111
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(3). 
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period as may be allowed by such Court, to have the judgment registered there.
112
 The Court 
may ‘if in all the circumstances of the case it thinks it is just and convenient that the judgment 
should be enforced in Swaziland’, order the judgment to be registered.113 The Act does not 
provide any guidance as to when it would be ‘just and convenient’ to have a foreign judgment 
registered.
114
 This provision vests a considerable degree of discretion in the High Court.
115
 
However, a judgment will not be registered if it satisfies one of the grounds on which no 
judgment will be registered.
116
 
 
The Rules prescribe the procedures to be followed, and provides amongst others, that 
application must be made ex parte or by summons;
117
 the details of the supporting affidavit of 
facts which must be provided;
118
 and the requirement of service of notice.
119
 Notice of the 
registration of the judgment must be served on the judgment debtor within a reasonable time, 
after such registration,
120
 but no definition of the term ‘reasonable’ is given.121 The notice 
must state that the defendant is entitled, if he has grounds for doing so, to apply to set aside 
the registration. The notice must also state the number of days for applying to set aside the 
registration.
122
  
 
No execution will issue on a judgment until after the expiry after service on the judgment 
debtor of notice of the registration thereof of the time stated in the order giving leave to 
register. The Court may at any time order that execution be suspended for a longer time.
123
 
 
                                                 
112
  According to the wording of  s 3(1), the application may be also be made within a period longer than twelve 
months, as may be allowed by the court, but it remains unclear under what circumstances the court may 
grant a period longer than twelve months: See Schulze (note 103) 117. 
113
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(1); this is mutatis mutandis the same as the Administration of Justice Act (note 
29) section 9(1): see para 2.1.3 above.  
114
 Schulze (note 103) 117. 
115
  This does not necessarily promote the certainty and predictability of the law in general and leaves the 
judgment creditor uncertain as to whether his judgment will be registered, and thus become enforceable in 
the relevant court: see Schulze (note 103) 126. In these cases the courts will likely rely on the common law 
and decided cases to determine when it would not be ‘just and convenient’ for the judgment to be registered.   
116
  See para 3.1.4 below.  
117
 Swaziland Rules (note 102) rule 1. 
118
 Swaziland Rules (note 102) rules 2-4. 
119
 Swaziland Rules (note 102) rules 10-14. 
120
 Swaziland Rules (note 102) rules 10. 
121
 Schulze (note 103) 119. 
122
  Swaziland Rules (note 102) rules 12. 
123
 Swaziland Rules (note 102) rules 17. 
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3.1.5 Setting aside of registered judgments 
A judgment debtor may at any time within the time stated in the order
124
 apply by summons 
to the Court to set aside the registration or to suspend execution on the judgment. The Court 
may, if satisfied that one of the six defences listed is present
125
 or that or that it is not just and 
convenient that the judgment should be enforced order that the registration be set aside.
126
 
The Act does not specify on which bases a court will be deemed to have had jurisdiction for 
the purpose of enforcement.
127
  
 
An assessment of this statute and comparative analysis with the other relevant Statutes is 
given below.
128
 
 
3.2 Lesotho 
3.2.1 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Proclamation (1922) 
The Lesotho Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Proclamation
129
 was meant to facilitate 
the reciprocal enforcement of judgments and awards between the UK and Lesotho 
(previously Basutoland).
130
 The Proclamation, other than for differences in numbering and 
arrangement corresponds largely with Part II of the UK Administration of Justice Act of 
1920,
131
 as well as with the Swaziland Act discussed above. The Act is supplemented by the 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Rules of Court.
132
 
 
3.2.2 Scope of application 
The application of the Proclamation is limited to judgments from the UK, and specifically 
judgments obtained in the High Court of England or Ireland, or the Court of Session in 
                                                 
124
 Rule 12 provides that the notice of registration must state that the defendant is entitled, if he has grounds for 
doing so, to apply to set aside the registration, and must state the number of days for applying to set the 
registration: see Swaziland Rules (note 102) rule 12. 
125
 Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(2): see para 2.1.2 above. 
126
 Swaziland Rules (note 117) rules 15. 
127
 See Swaziland Act (note 99). 
128
  See para 4 below.  
129
 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Proclamation 2 of 1922 (‘Lesotho Proclamation’). 
130
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) Preamble.  
131
 See Administration of Justice Act (note 129) s 9-14; para 2.1 above. 
132
 Lesotho Reciprocal Enforcement of Rules of Court, date of commencement: 16 June 1923 (‘Lesotho Rules’). 
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Ireland.
133
 The definition of ‘judgment’ is identical to that in s 12 of the UK Administration 
of Justice Act 1920, discussed above.
134
 
 
Section 6(1) of the Proclamation empowers the High Commissioner to extend the 
Proclamation, by Notice in the Gazette to judgments in a Superior Court of other parts of Her 
Majesty’s Dominions if he is satisfied that reciprocal provisions have been made there for the 
enforcement within that part of Her Dominions of judgments obtained in the High Court.
135
 
This has been done by means of Notice No 96 of 1922 in terms of which the Act extends to 
judgments obtained from the specified territories in the same manner as it extends to 
judgments obtained in a superior court in the UK, if reciprocal provisions have been there 
made by the legislature for the enforcement of judgments obtained in Lesotho.
136
 
 
3.2.3 Requirements for enforcement 
The relevant judgment creditor must apply to the High Court in Lesotho to have the judgment 
registered.
137
 Once registered, a judgment will be of the same force and effect and 
proceedings may be taken thereon, as if it had been a judgment originally obtained or entered 
up on the date of registration by the court. The court will have the same control and 
jurisdiction over the judgment as it has over similar judgments given by it, but only in so far 
as it relates to execution.
138
 
 
The requirements and procedure for enforcement are identical to those provided for in the UK 
Administration of Justice Act, 1920,
139
 and the same six defences are available against the 
registration of a judgment.
140
 
 
                                                 
133
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(1). 
134
 ‘Judgment’ is defined as ‘a judgment or order given or made by a court in any civil proceedings, whether 
before or after the taking effect of [the] Act, whereby any sum of money is made payable, and includes an 
award in proceedings on arbitration of the award has, in pursuance of the law in force in the place where it 
was made, become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment given by a court in that place’: Lesotho 
Proclamation (note 129) s 2.  
135
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 6(1).  
136
 High Commissioner Notice No 96 of 1922 Extension of Reciprocity. The Schedule lists the territories of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, Swaziland, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Kenya, 
New Zealand, Tanganyika, Uganda, New South Wales, Victoria, North Australia and Central Australia.  
137
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(1). 
138
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(3). 
139
 See Administration of Justice Act (note 29) s 9. 
140
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(2); see para. 2.1.2 above. 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
3.2.4 Procedure for enforcement 
A creditor in terms of a judgment obtained in the High Court in England or Ireland or in the 
Court of Session in Scotland must apply to the High Court of Lesotho within twelve months 
of the date of judgment, or such longer period as may be allowed by such Court, to have the 
judgment registered there. The Court may ‘if in all the circumstances of the case it thinks it is 
just and convenient that the judgment should be enforced in [Lesotho]’, order the judgment to 
be registered.
141
 The Act does not provide any guidance as to when it would be ‘just and 
convenient’ to have a foreign judgment registered.142 
 
The Rules prescribe the procedures to be followed, and provides, amongst others, that 
application can be made ex parte or by summons.
143
 The application must be supported by an 
affidavit of the facts of the judgment,
144
 or an authenticated copy of the judgment, and stating 
that to the best of the information and belief of the deponent, the judgment creditor is entitled 
to enforce the judgment and the judgment does not fall within any of the cases in which a 
judgment cannot be properly ordered or registered.
145
 An order giving leave to register must 
be drawn up and served on the debtor unless the order is made on ex parte application, in 
which case no service is required.
146
 It must state the time within which the judgment debtor 
is entitled to apply to set the registration of the judgment aside.
147
After registration, notice of 
the registration of the judgment, containing all the particulars of the judgment registered,
148
 
must be served
149
 on the judgment debtor within a reasonable time, but no definition of the 
term ‘reasonable’ is given.150 
                                                 
141
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(1); this is mutatis mutandis the same as the Administration of Justice 
Act (note 29) s 9(1): see para 2.1.3 above.  
142
 See note 115 above, where it was stated that this affords the High Court discretion and does not improve 
legal certainty and predictability. 
143
 Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 1. 
144
  The affidavit must also, as far as the deponent can, give the full name, title, trade or business and usual or 
last known place of abode or business of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, respectively: see 
Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 2. 
145
  Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(2); see para. 2.1.2 above. 
146
  Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 5. 
147
  If the judgment debtor is ordinarily resident within twenty miles from Maseru (the capital of Lesotho), the 
time will ordinarily 14 days, any adjustment in other the time will depend on the distance from Maseru of 
the place where the judgment debtor resides and the postal facilities between Maseru and that place: see 
Lesotho Rules (note 136) rule 6. 
148
  This includes the name an d address of the judgment creditor, and must also state that the defendant is 
entitled, if he has grounds for doing so, to apply to have the registered judgment set aside, and the number of 
days for applying to have the registration set aside: see Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 10. 
149
  In the absence of an order by the court as to the mode of service thereof, the notice must be served on the 
judgment debtor in the same manner as a summons is required to be served: see Lesotho Rules (note 132) 
rule 9. 
150
 Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 10. 
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No execution will issue on a judgment
151
 until the period specified in the order has lapsed as 
from the date of serving notice of registration on the judgment debtor, provided that the Court 
may order that execution be suspended for a longer time.
152
 
 
3.2.5 Setting aside of registered judgments 
A judgment debtor may within the time stated in the order, or after such time as the Court 
allows
153
 apply by summons to the Court to have the registration of a judgment set aside, or 
to suspend execution on the judgment. If the Court is satisfied that one of the six grounds on 
which a judgment cannot be registered
154
 is present; or that or that it is not just and 
convenient that the judgment should be enforced in Lesotho; or for other sufficient reasons,
155
 
order that the registration be set aside.
156
 One of the grounds on which a registered judgment 
may be set aside is if the original court acted without jurisdiction,
157
 but the Proclamation 
does not specify when a court will be deemed to have jurisdiction for purposes of setting 
aside a registered judgment.
158
 
 
An assessment of this statute and comparative analysis with the other relevant Statutes is 
given below.
159
 
 
3.3 Botswana 
3.3.1 Judgments (International Enforcement) Act (1981) 
The Judgments (International Enforcement) Act
160
 makes statutory provision for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Botswana.
161
 The Act consolidates the 
                                                 
151
  Any party wanting to issue execution on a registered judgment must produce an affidavit of the service of 
the notice of registration: see Lesotho Rules (note 136) rule 15. 
152
 Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 14. 
153
 Rule 10 provides that the notice of registration must state that the defendant is entitled, if he has grounds for 
doing so, to apply to set aside the registration, and must state the number of days for applying to set the 
registration: see Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 10. 
154
 Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(2): see para 2.1.2 above. 
155
 No indication is given of when it would not be deemed to be ‘just and convenient’ to register a judgment, or 
what the ‘other sufficient reasons’ may be to have registration set aside, or execution suspended.  
156
 See Lesotho Rules (note 132) rule 12. 
157
  Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(2). 
158
 See Lesotho Proclamation (note 129). 
159
  See para 4 below. 
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law relating to the enforcement of judgments given in countries which accord reciprocal 
treatment to judgments given in Botswana.
162
 
 
If the President is satisfied that substantial reciprocity of treatment will be given to the 
Botswana High Court judgments in a specific country, the President may, by statutory 
instrument, order that the Act extends to that country; and the specified courts will be the 
superior courts of that country for those purposes.
163
 
 
On the other hand, if it appears to the President that the treatment in respect of recognition 
and enforcement is substantially less favourable than that accorded by the courts of Botswana 
to judgments of the superior courts of that country, the President may by statutory instrument 
order that no proceedings shall be entertained in any court of Botswana for the recovery of 
any sum alleged to be payable under a judgment given in a court of that country.
164
 
 
3.3.2 Scope of application  
The Act applies to any superior court judgment of a country to which the Act extends,
165
 
other than a judgment given on appeal from a court which is not a superior court. The 
judgment must be final and conclusive between the parties; it must provide for the payment 
of a sum of money; and it must have been given after the coming into operation of the order 
directing that the Act extends to that country.
166
 
 
The term judgment is defined as – 
‘a judgment or order given or made by a court in any civil proceedings or … any criminal 
proceedings for the payment of a sum of money in respect of compensation or damages to an 
injured party, and includes an award in proceedings on arbitration if the award has, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
160
 Judgments (International Enforcement) Act Chapter 11:04; the Act came into force on 25 September 1981 
(‘Botswana Act’). 
161
 The general principles of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the Botswana common 
law are identical with the principles under the South African common law: see Kiggundu J Private 
International Law in Botswana – Cases and Materials (2002) 343-9, 364-5; Schulze (note 103) 111. 
162
  Botswana Act (note 160) long title.   
163
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(1). 
164
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 11.  Thus, the reciprocity of treatment requirement that was already spelt out in s 
3 is reiterated in s 11: see Schulze (note 103) 113 
165
  In Elia Aminieli Mtui v Ednester Mtui Civ Appeal No 33 of 2000, for example, the court held that a decree 
from Tanzania was not enforceable under the Judgment (International Enforcement Act) Cap 11:04, but that 
the decree was recognisable and enforceable by common law of Botswana: at 6 per Lord Weir JA. 
166
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(2). 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
pursuance of the law in force in the place where it was made, become enforceable in the same 
manner as a judgment given by a court in that place’167 
 
Designation of any particular country is only possible if the President is satisfied that 
‘substantial reciprocity of treatment’168 is extended to the judgments of the High Court of 
Botswana in that country.
169
 
 
3.3.3 Requirements for enforcement 
A judgment creditor who wishes to enforce a judgment must apply to the High Court of 
Botswana to have the judgment registered and the court may so order, subject to proof of the 
prescribed matters.
170
 A judgment will not be registered if, at the date of application, it has 
been wholly satisfied; or it could not be enforced by execution in the country of the original 
court.
171
 Judgments which are eligible for registration are not enforceable by other means.
172
 
 
A registered judgment is, for the purposes of execution, of the same force and effect as if the 
judgment had been a judgment originally given in the registering court and entered on the 
date of registration.
173
 
 
With regards to the recognition of judgments,
174
 a judgment to which the Act applies or 
would have applied if a sum of money had been payable thereunder, will be recognised in 
any court in Botswana as conclusive between the parties thereto in all proceedings founded 
on the same cause of action and may be relied on by way of defence or counter-claim in any 
such proceedings.
175
 The Act does not prevent any court in Botswana from recognising any 
                                                 
167
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 2(1)). 
168
  There is no consensus on what reciprocity really means and how it should be established, and statues that 
include this requirement usually do not define it: see Juenger FK ‘Recognition of money judgments in civil 
and commercial matters’ (1988) 36 American Journal of Comparative Law 31; Botswana Act (note 161) s 
3(1). See also, for example Namibia Act (s 2(1)): para 3.4.2 below.  
169
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(1). 
170
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(1). 
171
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(2). 
172
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 9. 
173
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(3). 
174
 Declaratory orders and judgments dismissing claims, for example, do not require enforcement: see Chapter 1, 
para 2.4 above. 
175
  This would however not be the case where the judgment has been registered and the registration thereof has 
been set aside on some ground other than that a sum of money was not payable under the judgment; that the 
judgment had been wholly or partly satisfied; that at the date of the application the judgment could not be 
enforced by execution in the country of the original court; or where the judgment has not been registered, it 
is shown (whether it could have been registered or not) that if it had been registered the registration thereof 
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judgment as conclusive of any matter of law or fact decided therein if that judgment would 
have been recognised before the commencement of the Act.
176
 
 
3.3.4 Procedure for enforcement 
A judgment creditor may apply to the High Court within six years of the date of the 
judgment, or, where there have been proceedings by way of appeal against the judgment 
given in those proceedings, after the date of the last judgment given in those proceedings, to 
have the judgment registered and on the application the court may, subject to proof of the 
prescribed matters order the judgment to be registered.
177
 
 
The judgment may not be executed as long as it is possible for any party to apply to have the 
registration of the judgment set aside, or, where an application is made, until after the 
application has been finally determined.
178
 
 
Where the sum payable under a judgment which is to be registered is expressed in a currency 
other than the currency of Botswana, the judgment will be registered on the basis of the rate 
of exchange prevailing at the date of the judgment of the original court.
179
 
 
The Act stipulates that Rules of Court may provide for, amongst others, the matters to be 
proved on an application for the registration of a judgment and for regulating the mode of 
providing such proof.
180
 A notice of the registration of the foreign judgment must be served 
on the debtor, who may then apply to have the registration set aside.
181
 Rules of Court may 
also provide for the service on the judgment debtor of notice of the registration of a 
judgment; and the fixing of the period within which an application may be made to have the 
registration of the judgment set aside and the extension of the period so fixed.
182
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
would have been set aside on an application for that purpose on some ground other than one of the grounds 
specified in paragraph (a): see Botswana Act (note 160) s 10. 
176
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 10(3). 
177
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(1). 
178
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(4). 
179
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(5). ‘Original court’, in relation to any judgment, means the court by which the 
judgment was given: Botswana Act (note 160) s 2. 
180
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 6(1). 
181
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 6(1)(c). 
182
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 6(1). 
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3.3.5 Setting aside of registered judgments 
The grounds on which registration must be set aside are analogous to the 1933 UK Foreign 
Judgments Act.
183
 One of the grounds is that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the 
proceedings in the original court, did not received notice of those proceedings in sufficient 
time to enable him to defend the proceedings.
184
 A judgment may be set aside if the 
registering court is satisfied that the matter in dispute in the proceedings in the original court 
had before the date of the judgment in the original court been the subject of a final and 
conclusive judgment by a court having jurisdiction in the matter.
185
 
 
The Act sets out the ground under which, for the purposes of having a registered judgment set 
aside, the courts of the country of the original court, will be deemed to have jurisdiction.
186
 It 
also sets out when the courts will be deemed not to have had jurisdiction.
187
 
 
An assessment of this statute and comparative analysis with the other relevant Statutes is 
given below.
188
 
 
3.4 South Africa 
3.4.1 Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act (1988) 
Statutory provision to facilitate the enforcement of foreign money judgments in South Africa 
has been made by means of the Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act.
189
 The Act 
provides for the enforcement of civil judgments given in designated countries in the 
                                                 
183
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(1)(a); see para 2.2.3 above. 
184
  In Sarah Mothusi v Attorney General Civ. App. No 15/93 (1993) the court held that ‘a right to be heard must 
be meaningful, in that its exercise should involve the possibility of a change in a contemplated decision.  
185
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(1)(b). 
186
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(2); see para 2.2.3 above.  
187
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(3)(l); see para 2.2.3 above. 
188
 See para 4 below. 
189
 Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act 32 of 1988 (‘South Africa Act’). The South African Law 
Reform Commission in a review of the legislation has found that the Foreign Civil Judgments Act appeared 
to be working satisfactorily, and should be maintained. The Commission further recommended that the 
common law action should be maintained as a residual basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments. The Commission recommended that the Act must provide that the High Court should also be 
made entitled to register foreign judgments: see South African Law Reform Commission Project 121 - 
Consolidated Legislation Pertaining to International Judicial Co-Operation in Civil Matters: Report 
(December 2006) (‘SALRC Report’) 11. 
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magistrates’ courts of the Republic, and repeals the earlier Reciprocal Enforcement of Civil 
Judgments Act.
190
 
 
3.4.2 Scope of application  
The Act applies to foreign judgments from countries designated by the Minister of Justice.
191
 
‘Judgment’ is defined as:   
‘any final192 judgment or order for the payment of money, given or made before or after the 
commencement of [the] Act by any court in any civil proceedings,
193
 which is enforceable by 
execution in the country in which it was given or made, but does not include any judgment or 
order given or made by any court on appeal from a judgment or order of a court other than a 
court as defined in [the] Act, or for the payment of any tax or charge of a like nature or of any 
fine or other penalty, or for the periodical payment of sums of money towards the 
maintenance
194
 of any person’.195 
 
‘Court’, in relation to the court of the designated country, is defined as ‘the Supreme or High 
Court or any magistrate’s court (including a regional [magistrates] court) of that country.’196 
However, in relation to a local court, court is defined as:  
‘the magistrate’s court of the district where (a) the person against whom the judgment was 
given (i) resides, carries on business or is employed; or (ii) owns any movable or immovable 
property; (b) any juristic person against which the judgment was given has its registered 
office, or its principal place of business; (c) any partnership against which the judgment was 
given has its business premises or any member thereof resides’.197 
 
The fact that an expedited enforcement procedure is only available for foreign judgments 
with a value of R100,000 is a serious shortcoming and is likely to impede trade integration.
198
 
It is therefore suggested that the Foreign Civil Judgments Act be amended to provide that the 
High Court is entitled to register foreign judgments.
199
 The legislature had an option to 
                                                 
190
 Reciprocal Enforcement of Civil Judgments Act 9 of 1966: see South Africa Act (note 189) s 11. 
191
 South Africa Act (note 189) s 2(1). At this stage Namibia is the only country designated in terms of the Act: 
Government Gazette 17881 GN R 487/1997 of 1 April 1997; Schulze (note 103) 26. 
192
  The South African courts have applied the English principles laid down by the House of Lords in Nouvion v 
Freedman (note 51). 
193
  ‘Civil proceedings’ is not defined in the Act. 
194
  South Africa has enacted a separate Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act 80 of 1963, to 
consolidate and amend the laws relating to the reciprocal enforcement of maintenance orders made in the 
Republic, and proclaimed countries (preamble). Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (Countries 
in Africa) Act 6 of 1989 which provides for the reciprocal enforcement of maintenance orders made in the 
Republic and in designated countries in Africa (preamble). 
195
 South African Act (note 189) s 1. 
196
  South African Act (note 189) s 1. 
197
 South African Act (note 189) s 1: emphasis added.  
198
  See Chapter 1, para. 3.1. 
199
  See SARLC Report (note 189) 6 
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improve the current position to some extent with the drafting of the Jurisdiction of Regional 
Courts Amendment Act 2008, in which jurisdiction was conferred on regional courts in 
respect of certain civil matters;
200
 however no jurisdiction was conferred on the Regional 
Courts by this Act.
201
 Such an amendment would have made some improvements to the 
present scenario, as the jurisdiction of the Regional Courts was raised to R300,000.
202
 
 
The Act, therefore, only applies to enforcement proceedings in magistrate courts, of which 
the Minister may from time to time determine the monetary limit in civil claims.
203
 Any 
action in excess of this amount would, therefore, have to be enforced under the common law 
procedure.
204
 
 
The recognition and enforcement in South Africa is subject further to statutory limitations 
provided by the Protection of Businesses Act.
205
 The Act provides that, except with the 
permission of the Minister of Justice, no judgment, order, direction, arbitration award, letter 
of request or any other request delivered, given or issued or emanating from outside South 
Africa in connection with any civil proceedings will be enforced.
206
 The requirement of 
ministerial consent is applicable if the judgment or order is connected with the mining, 
production, importation, exportation, refinement, possession, use or sale of ownership of any 
matter or material, of whatever nature, whether within, outside, into or from the Republic.
207
 
These provisions were aimed at preventing the recovery of excessive damages awarded in 
foreign courts to externally-based companies doing business with South African citizens.
208
 
The ambit of these provisions, is so wide that it embraces almost all ranges of human activity 
and only rarely will a judgment escape the tight net of section 1(2); this means it will be 
                                                 
200
 See e.g. s 7 ‘jurisdiction in respect of causes of action’. 
201
 Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008 Schedule. 
202
 In terms of the Regional Courts Act (note 201). 
203
  The current financial limit on civil actions in the Magistrates Courts is R100,000: Government Notice R1411 
in Government Gazette 19435 of 30 October 1998; See also Malachi v Cape Dance Academy 14830/09 2011 
(Western Cape High Court) 38; Forsyth (note 8) 439. 
204
 Malachi v Cape Dance Academy (note 203) 38; SALRC Report (note 189) 11.  
205
 Protection of Businesses Act 99 of 1978. This Act has been severely criticized and it has been argued that 
the case for legislative reform in this area is overwhelming. In the absence of legislative reform the refusal of 
permission by the Minister may give rise to constitutional issues concerning the denial of fundamental 
rights, and having to obtain permission from the Minister leads to unnecessary delay: see SALRC Report 
(note 189) 21.  
 Similar legislation has been enacted in the UK: Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980; Australia: Foreign 
Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984; Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1984: see 
Barnett (note 18) 37 
206
 South African Act (note 189) s 1(1) and 1(2). 
207
 South African Act (note 189) s 1(3). 
208
 SALRC Report (note 189) 21. 
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possible to enforce only very few judgments without the permission of the Minister.
209
 South 
African courts have consistently adopted a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the 
Act;
210
 and there is no recorded instance in which the Act has been successfully invoked as a 
defence to enforcement.
211
 
 
The doctrine of reciprocity forms no part of South African law
212
 as the Act does not require 
reciprocity as a condition for recognition.
213
 The Minister designates States by means of an 
administrative process regardless of whether enforcement will be reciprocal.
214
 
 
3.4.3 Requirements for enforcement 
The Act is not exclusive, since the option of having a judgment enforced under the common 
law remains.
215
 The Act facilitates enforcement by providing for the registration of foreign 
judgments rendered in designated countries by the clerk of the relevant magistrate’s court.216 
 
A judgment (or order) must be final to be enforceable under the Act,
217
 be one for the 
payment of money, and be made in any civil proceedings by a court, as defined in the Act. It 
                                                 
209
 Schulze (note 103) 31. 
210
 Forsyth (note 8) 466. In Tradex Ocean Transportation SA v MV Silvergate 1994 (4) SA 121 (C), the court 
considered the dictionary definition of the words ‘any matter or material’, and having regard to the earlier 
words ‘mining, production, importation, exportation [and] refinement’, concluded that that ‘matter or 
material’ was limited to raw materials or substances from which physical things are made and not a 
manufactured thing’. In Jones v Krok Jones v Krok 1995 (I) SA 677 (A), the court was of the view that the 
‘act or transaction’ in section 3(1) did not apply to a contractual dispute over a joint venture which sold a 
‘ladies hair removal product’; the objective of the relevant Act was limited to what ‘may loosely be termed 
product liability claims’ (510G).  
211
 Schulze (note 103) 31; Forsyth (note 8) 466. 
212
 The predecessor of the 1988 Act, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Civil Judgments Act 9 of 1966, which was 
intended to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign civil judgments, was founded on 
reciprocity. However, the hope that the government will conclude mutually acceptable agreements 
concerning recognition and enforcement of judgments failed in the context of the Act, and this fact was 
largely, if not solely, responsible for the Act never entering into force: see SALRC Report (note 189) 23. 
213
 South African Act (note 189) s 2(1); Schulze (note 103) 26; Malan FR, Neels JL, O'Brien PH & Boshoff, A 
et al ‘Transnational litigation in South African Law (2)’ 1995 Journal of South African Law 282. 
214
 Roodt C ‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: still a Hobson’s choice among competing 
theories?’ 2005 Journal of South African Law  21. 
215
  Section 9 of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall prevent ‘any court in the Republic from 
recognising ... any judgment ... given by a court of competent jurisdiction outside the Republic’. Section 9 
therefore leaves open the possibility that enforcement at common law may be prevented by the 1988 Act. 
However, no words of the Act suggest the creation of an exclusive avenue for enforcement: see Forsyth 
(note 8) 439. 
216
 South African Act (note 189) s 3. Similar to the case in South Africa, the fact that the Act provides for 
registration of the magistrates court limits the monetary value of cases that can be registered in the court to 
that of the jurisdiction of the magistrates court, and may therefore diminish the value of the statute, as 
debtors of judgments with a significant monetary value will not have the expedited procedure available to 
them, but will have to revert to the common law procedure: see para 3.4.2 above.  
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must also be enforceable by execution in the country in which it was given or made.
218
 A 
judgment must not be given or made on appeal from a judgment other than a court as defined, 
and not be for the payment of any tax or charge or like nature; any fine or other penalty, or 
the periodical payment of sums of money towards the maintenance of any person.
219
 
 
Once a judgment has been registered in terms of the Act, it will have the same effect as a civil 
judgment of the court at which the judgment has been registered.
220
 A registered judgment 
may not be executed before the expiration of 21 days after service of the notice, or until the 
relevant court has finally disposed of an application for the setting aside of the judgment.
221
 
 
3.4.4 Procedure for enforcement 
A certified copy of a judgment given against any person by a court in a designated country 
must be lodged with a clerk of the relevant court.
222
 The clerk of the Court will register the 
judgment in the prescribed manner, in respect of –  
a) the balance of the amount payable thereunder, including the taxed costs awarded by the 
court of the designated country;  
b) the interest, if any, which is due on the amount payable thereunder up to the time of 
such registration; and 
c) the reasonable costs of, and incidental to, registration, including the costs of containing 
a certified copy of the judgment.
223
 
 
The clerk of the court registering the judgment must issue a notice directed to the judgment 
debtor informing him of the registration. This must be served on the judgment debtor by the 
judgment creditor in the manner prescribed for the service of process.
224
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
217
  A judgment will be deemed to be final notwithstanding that an appeal against such judgment is pending in a 
court of the designated country or that the time prescribed by the law of such country for appealing against 
such judgment has not expired: see South African Act (note 189) s 7(1). 
218
  South African Act (note 189) s 1. 
219
  South African Act (note 189) s 1.  
220
  South African Act (note 189) s 4(1); Roodt (note 215) 21. 
221
  South African Act (note 189) s 4. 
222
 The Magistrate’s court of the district where the judgment debtor resides, carries on business, or is employed 
or owns any movable or immovable property. If the judgment was given against a juristic person, the court 
of either its registered office or its principle place of business has jurisdiction to register the foreign 
judgment.   
223
 South African Act (note 189) s 3(1). 
224
 South African Act (note 189) s 3(2)-3(3).  
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If any amount payable is expressed in a currency other than the currency of the Republic, the 
judgment will be registered as if it were a judgment for such amount in the currency of the 
Republic, calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the judgment.
225
 The 
amount will bear interest from the date of registration of the judgment until the date of 
payment of the said amount, calculated at the rate set out in the Prescribed Rate of Interest 
Act,
226
 or at the rate fixed by the court of the designated country, whichever is the lowest.
227
 
 
If, on an application by any judgment debtor, the court at which the judgment is registered is 
satisfied that an appeal against the judgment is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction or 
that the applicant is entitled, and intends, to appeal against the judgment to a court of 
competent jurisdiction, it may postpone the execution of such judgment.
228
 
 
3.4.5 Setting aside of registered judgment 
Any application to have a registered judgment set aside must be brought within 21 days after 
the service of notice to the judgment debtor.
229
 
 
The registration of a judgment will be set aside if the court at which the judgment is 
registered is satisfied that -  
a) the judgment was registered in contravention with the Act; 
b) the courts of the designated country had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the 
case;  
c) the judgment debtor did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to 
enable him to defend the proceedings as prescribed by the designated country, or if no 
such notice is prescribed, that he did not receive reasonable notice of the proceedings 
to enable him to defend the proceedings, and did not appear;  
d) the judgment was obtained by fraud;  
e) the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in the 
Republic;
230
 
                                                 
225
 South African Act (note 189) s 3(4). 
226
 Prescribed Rate of Interest Act No. 55 of 1975. Section 1 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act provides that 
if a debt bears interest and the rate at which the interest is to be calculated is calculated at the rate prescribed 
by the Minister of Justice by notice in the Gazette (s 1(1)-(2)) which is currently 15,5% per annum: See 
General Notice R1814 in Government Gazette 15143 of 1 October 1993. 
227
 South African Act (note 189) s 3(5). 
228
  South African Act (note 189) s 6. 
229
  South African Act (note 189) s 5(2). 
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f) the certified copy of the judgment lodged was lodged at the request of a person other 
than the judgment creditor;  
g) the matter in dispute in the proceedings had, prior to the date of the judgment, been 
the subject of a final judgment in civil proceedings by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; 
h) the judgment has been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
i) the judgment has become prescribed under either the laws of the Republic or the 
designated country concerned;  
j) the judgment has been wholly satisfied;  
k) the judgment has been partly satisfied, to the extent in which it was satisfied; or 
l) the judgment is a judgment or order which in terms of any law may not be recognised 
or enforced in the Republic.
231
 
 
The Act also prescribes the instances for the purposes of setting aside a registered judgment, 
when a court shall have been deemed to have jurisdiction,
232
 as well as when the court would 
deemed not to have had jurisdiction.
233
 These are analogous to the UK Foreign Judgments  
Act of 1933.
234
 
                                                                                                                                                        
230
  A foreign judgment will not be recognised if it was obtained contrary to the rules of natural justice: see 
Forsyth CF ‘The eclipse of private international law principle? The judicial process, interpretation and the 
dominance of legislation in the modern era’ (2005) 1(1) Journal of Private International Law 111. 
231
  South African Act (note 189) s 5(1). 
232
 a) If the judgment debtor – 
i) Was the plaintiff or plaintiff in reconvention in the proceedings or submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
court by which the judgment was given voluntarily appearing in the proceedings for any purpose 
other than protecting or obtaining the release of property seized or threatened with seizure in the 
proceedings or contesting the jurisdiction of that court; 
ii) Was a defendant in the proceedings and had, before the commencement of the proceedings, agreed, in 
respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of any court of the 
designated country; or 
iii) Was a defendant and, at the institution of the proceedings, resident in, or being a juristic person, had 
its principal place of business in, such designated country, or at any time had an office or place of 
business in such designated country through or at which the transaction to which the proceedings 
relate, was effected;  
b)  If, in any action relating to immovable property, the property was at the institution of the proceedings 
situated in the designated country in which the proceedings were instituted;  
c)  if in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to in a) or b), the jurisdiction of the court by which 
the judgment was given is recognised by the law of the Republic (s 7(4)). 
233
  The court of the designated country in which the judgment was given will be deemed not to have 
jurisdiction:   
a) in proceedings relating to immovable property situated outside such designated country; 
b) except in the cases of (a)(i) and (ii) above, in proceedings instituted in contravention of an agreement 
under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in the courts of 
such designated country; or 
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With regard to submission, Schulze suggest that one seems to be left with the dilemma of 
having to decide whether the principles of domestic law or the principles of foreign law 
should be applied in determining whether there has been submission to jurisdiction to a 
particular court.
235
  Forsyth, however, emphasises that ‘since it is fundamental to this branch 
of the law that international competence does not mean complying mutatis mutandis with the 
rules for the jurisdiction of the South African court, the principles of domestic law should not 
be applied.
236
 Further, that the law relating to what amounts to submission for the purpose of 
international competence is not identical to that which deals with submission to the 
jurisdiction of the South Africa court.
237
 This is, however, not supported by case law
238
 and 
the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws is not 
conclusive. In the recent case of Foize Africa v Foize Beheer
239
  the court
240
 held that ‘it can 
now be regarded as well settled’ that a foreign jurisdiction clause does not exclude the court’s 
jurisdiction.
241
 The court held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the stage when 
a court should exercise its discretion to enforce a foreign jurisdiction or arbitration clause, but 
that in each given case much will depend upon its own particular facts and circumstances as 
well as the stage at which and the manner in which the issue of enforcement of the clause in 
question is raised.
242
 Although the court did not deal in detail with what the relevant factors 
are, it nevertheless referred to The Eleftheria
243
 where a number of matters which may be 
regarded when an action should be stayed by reason of a foreign jurisdiction clause were 
                                                                                                                                                        
c) in proceeding in which the person against whom the judgment was given was under the rules of public 
international law entitled to immunity from such designated country and did not submit to such 
jurisdiction: see South Africa Act (note 189) s 7(5). 
234
  See para 2.2.4 above. 
235
  Schulze (note 103) 21.  
236
  Forsyth (note 8) 424. 
237
  Forsyth (note 8) 424. 
238
  See Schulze (note 103) 21. 
239
  Foize Africa v Foize Beheer (752/2011) [2012] ZASCA 123 (20 September 2012). 
240
 Citing Commissioner for Inland Revenue and another v Isaacs NO 1960 (1) SA 126 (A) at 134B-H; 
Yorigami Maritime Construction Co Ltd v Nissho- Iwai Co Ltd 1977 (4) SA 682 (C); Butler v Banimar 
Shipping Co SA 1978 (4) SA 753 (SE) and Universiteit van Stellenbosch v J A Louw (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) 
SA 321 (A) at 333GH. 
241
 Parties to a contract cannot exclude the jurisdiction of a court by their own agreement, and where a party 
wishes to invoke the protection of a foreign jurisdiction or arbitration clause, it should do so by way of a 
special or dilatory plea seeking a stay of proceedings. That having been done, the court will then be called on 
to exercise its discretion whether or not to enforce the clause in question: Foize Africa v Foize Beheer (note 
239) 10.  
242
  Foize Africa v Foize Beheer (note 239) 10. 
243
  The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All ER 641 (PDA). 
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listed.
244
 The question of jurisdiction therefore has to be determined in the light of the 
principles of South African law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
245
  
 
An assessment of this statute and comparative analysis with the other relevant Statutes is 
given below.
246
 
 
3.5 Namibia 
3.5.1 Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act (1994) 
Namibia enacted the Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act
247
 to provide that civil 
judgments granted in designated countries may be enforced in magistrate courts in 
Namibia.
248
 The Act is analogous to the South African Enforcement of Foreign Civil 
Judgments Act, except that the Namibian Act requires reciprocity of treatment.
249
 
 
3.5.2 Scope of application 
The Act provides for the enforcement of civil judgments from courts in designated 
countries.
250
 
 
The definition of ‘judgment’ is similar to that contained in the South African Act,251 except 
that the Namibian Act also applies to judgments in respect of compensation or damages to an 
                                                 
244
  ‘In particular . . . the following matters, where they arise, may properly be regarded: (a) In what country the 
evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative 
convenience and expense of trial as between the (local) and foreign courts; (b) Whether the law of the 
foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from (local) law in any material respects; (c) With what 
country either party is connected, and how closely; (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the 
foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages; (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced 
by having to sue in the foreign court because they would ─ (i) be deprived of security for that claim, (ii) be 
unable to enforce any judgment obtained, (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable (locally), or (iv) for 
political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial’ (645C-E). 
245
  Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983(1) 1033 (WLD) 1037 per Van Dijkhorst J; De 
Naamloze Venootschap Alintex v Von Gerlach 1958(1) 13 (TPD) 15-16 per Bresler J; Benidai Trading Co 
Ltd v Gouws & Gouws (Pty) Ltd 1977(3) 1020 (TPD) 1038 per Viljoen J. 
246
 See para 4 below. 
247
  Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act 28 of 1994 (‘Namibia Act’). 
248
 Namibia Act (note 247) long title.  
249
 Namibia Act (note 247) s 2(a). The ‘countries’ designated under the enabling legislation are the former 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) states, as well as the various ‘self-governing 
territories’, which ‘countries’ no longer exist. South Africa therefore remains the only country designated 
under the Act: see Schulze (note 103) 116. 
250
  Namibia Act (note 247) long title.  
251
  See para 3.3.2 above. 
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aggrieved party in criminal proceedings.
252
 The definition of ‘court’, both in relation to the 
court of a designated country and in relation to a court in Namibia, is mutatis mutandis the 
same as the definition contained in the South African Act.
253
 
 
The Minister may by notice in the Gazette declare as a designated country, any country with 
which Namibia has in terms of the Namibian Constitution entered into an agreement 
providing for the reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments.
254
 This is an important 
difference from the South African Act.
255
 
 
3.5.3 Requirements for enforcement 
A certified copy of a judgment granted against any person by any court in a designated 
country must be registered with the clerk of the court in Namibia.
256
 Whenever a judgment 
has been registered in terms of the Act, it will, insofar as enforcement is concerned, have the 
same effect as a civil judgment of the court at which the judgment has been registered.
257
 
 
In order to be enforceable under the Act, a judgment must be final,
258
 for the payment of 
money, and be made in any civil proceedings, or in respect of compensation or damages by 
an aggrieved party in criminal proceedings. It must also be enforceable by execution in the 
country in which it was given or made.
259
 A judgment must not be given or made on appeal 
from a judgment other than a court as defined, and not be for the payment of any tax or 
charge or like nature; any fine or other penalty, or the periodical payment of sums of money 
towards the maintenance of any person.
260
 
 
                                                 
252
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 1. 
253
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 1; See para 3.3.2 above.  
254
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 2(a).  
255
  South Africa Act (note 189) s 2.  
256
  Namibia Act (note 247) 3(1). 
257
  Namibia Act (note 247) 4(1). 
258
  A judgment will be deemed to be final notwithstanding that an appeal against such judgment is pending in a 
court of the designated country or that the time prescribed by the law of such country for appealing against 
such judgment has not expired: Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(1). See also Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Horsch 1992 NR 313 (HC) where it was held that ‘it is essential to prove that the foreign 
judgment is final and enforceable according to the foreign law concerned and that it has been handed down 
by a court of competent jurisdiction’ (14 F- I); Bekker N.O v Kotze and Another 1994 NR 345 (HC) ‘it is 
trite law that the Namibian Courts can only recognise final foreign judgments and orders and not provisional 
orders’(348I-349B); Estate H v Estate H 1952 (4) SA 168 (C) 171A: ‘It is common cause that this Court will 
only enforce the order of a foreign Court if it is a final judgment’. 
259
  Namibia Act (note 247) 1. 
260
  Namibia Act (note 247) 1.  
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3.5.4 Procedure for enforcement 
The procedure for enforcement of a foreign judgment under the Namibian Act is the same as 
the procedure under the South African Act.
261
 
 
The clerk of the court registering the judgment must issue a notice directed to the judgment 
debtor informing him of such registration, which must be served on the judgment debtor by 
the Messenger
262
 of the Court in the manner prescribed for the service of process.
263
 
 
A registered judgment may not be executed before the expiration of 21 days after service of 
the notice, or until an application for the setting aside of the judgment has been finally 
disposed of.
264
 
 
If any amount payable under a judgment registered under the Act is expressed in a currency 
other than the currency of Namibia, the judgment will be registered as if it were a judgment 
for such amount in the currency of Namibia, calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing at 
the opening rate of exchange on the date of such registration,
265
 as advised by the Bank of 
Namibia.
266
 The amount will bear interest from the date of registration of the judgment until 
the date of payment of the required amount, calculated at the rate prescribed by section 1(2) 
of the (South African) Prescribed Rate of Interest Act,
267
 or at the rate determined by the 
court of the designated country, whichever is the lowest.
268
 
 
If the court is satisfied that an appeal against the judgment is pending or that the applicant is 
entitled and intends to appeal against the judgment to a court of competent jurisdiction, it 
may, on such conditions as it may deem fit, suspend the execution of such judgment.
269
 
 
                                                 
261
  Namibia Act (note 247) 3; see para. 3.3.4 above. 
262
  The South African Act (note 190) provides that the judgment creditor must serve the notice of registration to 
the judgment debtor (s 3(2)): see para. 3.3.4 above.  
263
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 3(2) and 3(3).  
264
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 4(2). 
265
  The South African Act provides for the calculation of the amount payable by using the rate of exchange 
prevailing at the date of judgment (s 3(4)): see para 3.3.4 above. 
266
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 3(4). 
267
  See note 226. This is a South African Act which applies to Namibia.  
268
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 3(5). 
269
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 6. 
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3.5.5 Setting aside of registered judgments 
The grounds on which the court will set a registered judgment aside is the same as those 
provided for in the South African Act.
270
 
 
The Act also provides the instances for the purposes of registration of a foreign judgment, 
when a court shall have been deemed to have jurisdiction,
271
 as well as when the court shall 
for the purposes of setting aside registered judgments, deemed not to have had jurisdiction, 
which coincides with the provisions in the South African Act.
272
 
 
Any application to have a registered judgment must be brought within 21 days after the 
service of notice to the judgment debtor.
273
 
 
An assessment of this statute and comparative analysis with the other relevant Statutes is 
given below.
274
 
 
4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The preceding paragraphs of this chapter provide an overview of the statutory provisions in 
force in each of the SACU Member States. The following analysis compares the respective 
provisions of each of the Statutes under discussion, namely the application of the different 
statutes; requirements for enforcement; procedural requirements; setting aside of registered 
judgments, and the reciprocity and designation requirement present in most statutes. This 
comparison and analysis form the basis of recommendations for harmonisation in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 Scope of application 
The application of the statutes is limited to foreign judgments from countries specifically 
provided for in the particular Act, or that have been designated under it. The Statutes of 
Botswana,
275
 South Africa and Namibia provide for their application to any country 
                                                 
270
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 5(1): see para. 3.3.5 above.  
271
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(4): see para 3.3.5 above.  
272
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(5): see para 3.3.5 above. 
273
  Namibia Act (note 247) s 5(2). 
274
 See para 4. 
275
  See para 3.2. 
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designated under the particular Act.
276
 The application of the Swaziland and Lesotho statutes 
are limited to the UK,
277
 and may be extended only to other territories of the Commonwealth 
if reciprocal arrangements have been made for the enforcement of judgments by the 
legislature of that territory.
278
 The designation of States in most instances depends on 
reciprocal treatment by the courts of that State. The South African statute is the only one 
which does not require reciprocal treatment for it to be extensible to a foreign country.
279
 
 
A major weakness of the current statutory regimes is their limited application, not as much as 
in scope as in limited number of States to which they extend. A number of the statutes for 
recognition and enforcement rely on designation,
280
 in which instances a judgment debtor 
will be able to enforce his judgment under the statutory regime only if that country is 
specifically designated by the Act.
281
 Despite their shared common legal tradition
282
 and their 
membership in the Customs Union, dating from 1889,
283
 Member States do not designate all 
                                                 
276
  South Africa Act (note 189) s 2(1); Namibia Act (note 248) s 1. 
277
 South Africa Act (note 189) s 3. 
278
  Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 6(1); Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3. 
279
  The principle of reciprocity and requirement of designation are discussed below: see para. 4.6 below. 
Despite the fact that the South African Act is the only Act which does not require reciprocity there are 
however a number of recommendations for improvement of the Act, as recommended by the South African 
Law Reform Commission: In its report the Commission also suggested that:   
(i) The concept of judgment must be redefined so as to allow for the enforcement of non-monetary 
judgments. 
(ii) Residence of juristic persons, as a ground of international competence, should be redefined so as to 
include central administration or ‘statutory seat’.  
(iii) Clarity should be given on what grounds of international competence should be deemed acceptable 
under the Act.  
(iv) The defence of failure of natural justice must be more clearly defined.  
(v) The defence of public policy should be allowed to stand unqualified since an elastic concept in this 
regard may facilitate arguments based on the Bill of Rights.  
(vi) Clarity should be given on whether the defence of fraud concept should also be left unqualified, thereby 
allowing the courts freedom to review any allegation of fraud.  
(vii) A provision is needed to determine under which law a judgment has lapsed; and   
(viii) Provision must be made for a defence of lis pendens: see SALRC (note 189) 11. 
280
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(1); South Africa Act (note 189) s 2(1); Namibia Act (note 247) s 1. See also 
Roodt (note 214) 22. The theories the author is referring to are the traditional competing theoretical bass for 
recognising and enforcing foreign judgments, namely the obligation theory, reciprocity and comity. 
However, she further suggests that nothing prevents the development of a different rationale to guide the 
revision of a recognition statute, for example codification of the foreign law. (Hobson’s choice refers to a 
situation in which there are only bad possibilities that have such poor results that there is no real choice at 
all.) 
281
  In the Swaziland case of Mamba v Mamba [2011] SZHC 43 (13 January 2011) for example the court held 
that a judgment from the Circuit Court for Montgomery Country, Maryland, USA could not be registered 
because the USA was not designated under s 5 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act of 1922. 
282
  All five SACU Member States have a Roman-Dutch legal tradition, as influenced by common law: 
Thomashausen (note 11) 34. 
283
  See Chapter 1, para 2.2 above. 
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other Member States under their statutory regimes.
284
 In Barclays Bank v Koch
285
 a judgment 
from Swaziland could not be enforced under Botswana’s Judgments (International 
Enforcement) Act since it was not registerable under the Act.
286
 The present position is a 
major impediment to the facilitation of judgments in the region and can also serve as a non-
tariff barrier to trade,
287
 which warrants immediate attention. Specific proposals are made in 
this regard below.
288
   
 
In instances where the designation of States under the relevant statute is not conditional upon 
the negotiation of bilateral agreements designation (and thus recognition) remains an 
administrative decision, taken on a discretionary basis.
289
 The respective SACU Acts provide 
that, should the relevant Minister or President be satisfied that reciprocal treatment will be 
given in a foreign country to the judgments of that country, he may extend the application of 
the Act to that country.
290
 South Africa does not require reciprocal treatment, but it provides 
that the Act only applies to judgments given in any country outside the Republic which the 
Minister of Justice has designated for the purposes of the Act.
291
 There are no further 
requirements or rules indicating on how these countries should be designated; what the 
requirements are, and how often this list should be reviewed. This severely undermines the 
purpose of the statutory procedure for foreign judgments, namely to provide an expedited 
means of enforcing foreign judgments. This means that a judgment of any country not 
designated by the Act (and Namibia and South Africa for example only designated each 
other), would have to rely on the common law procedure for enforcement, which may act as a 
non-tariff barrier to trade.
292
 To insist upon reciprocal treatment before enforcing a foreign 
judgment is denying justice to private litigants, and to prefer a certain group on the basis of 
                                                 
284
  The Swaziland Act designates Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, New South Wales, Victoria,  New 
Zealand, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Tanzania (except Zanzibar), Territory of North Australia, 
Territory of South Australia, Uganda, Western Australia, Zambia, Zanzibar (Notice No 97 of 1922). South 
Africa designates only Namibia; Namibia designates only South Africa.  
285
  Barclays Bank of Swaziland v Koch 1997 B.L.R. 1924. 
286
 In this case the plaintiff argued that it could not register its judgment under the above Judgments (External 
Enforcements) Act because no order specifying the countries to be specified under s 3 of the Act has been 
published. The court confirmed that the judgment was not one that was registered under terms of s 3 of the 
Act, and therefore it has no force as a judgment in Botswana: see Barclays Bank v Koch (note 285) 1924 H. 
Section 3 provides that the President may by statutory instrument order that the Act extend to a country 
which affords reciprocal treatment to Botswana: see para 3.2.2 above.    
287
 See Chapter 1, para 4.1. 
288
 See para 5 below.  
289
  SALRC Report (note 189) 91. 
290
 See e.g. Botswana Act (note 160) s 3. 
291
 See South Africa Act (note 189) s 2. 
292
 See Chapter 1, para. 3. 
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nationality in the (probably vain) hope that a foreign sovereign will thereby be induced to 
grant justice to future litigants in its own courts.
293
 The courts thereby become instruments of 
retaliation, and extraneous political factors can influence a state’s decision whether to grant 
reciprocal treatment. Moreover, the scope and application of reciprocity is difficult to define: 
it is unclear which party should prove reciprocal treatment and whether the reciprocal 
treatment must be de facto or de jure.
294
 
 
The designation process has been criticised of easily becoming flawed, as wide discretion 
creates opportunities for discrimination: designation singles out sovereign territories to which 
an enactment should apply and as such private litigants in non-designated countries have no 
hope of having judgments in their favour recognised.
295
 If statutory enforcement hinges upon 
bureaucratic designation of the rendering state, and this action is impeded or interrupted, 
costly common law enforcement remains the only real option in the case of civil 
judgments.
296
 While the statutory regime provides for an expedited and simplified procedure 
for enforcing foreign judgments and by designating only one or two other States, litigants 
from other States are in fact denied this expedited and simplified procedure.
297
 
 
The designation of States under the statutory regimes of some SACU States is complicated by 
the element of reciprocity,
298
 which is a requirement for designation of all SACU Member 
States, save for South Africa.
299
 Notably, globally reciprocity no longer enjoys the popularity 
it did in the nationalistic nineteenth century, and courts and legislatures increasingly reject 
this impediment. Juenger
300
 suggest that it seems unfair to penalise private litigants, who are 
neither to blame nor in a position to change matters, for the rendering state’s lack of 
comity;
301
 this is true especially if the judgment creditor is a national of the requested state.302 
                                                 
293
  SALRC Report (note 189) 91. 
294
  SALRC Report (note 189) 91. 
295
  Roodt (note 214) 22. 
296
  These standards include the grounds on which a registered judgment may be set aside, as contained in 
sections 4 and 5 of the Act: see Roodt (note 214) 26.  
297
  Oppong RF ‘A decade of private international law in African courts 1997-2007 (Part II)’ (2008) X Yearbook 
of Private International Law 393. 
298
  The mutual concession of advantages or privileges for the purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations: 
See Chapter 1, para 5.1 for a discussion of reciprocity. 
299
  See South Africa Act (note 189) s 2(1); Swaziland Act (note 99) s 5; Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 5; 
Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(1); Namibia Act (note 247) s 2(1).  
300
 Juenger (note 168) 32-3. 
301
 This is discussed in Chapter 1, para 5.1. 
302
 For example, only seven of the United States that have enacted the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act; and one that has enacted the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, have included reciprocity as a ground for recognition: specifically, Florida, Idaho, Maine, 
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The non-recognition of judgments in these States is in many cases due to the absence of 
reciprocal agreements in place for the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
303
 There is 
no consensus on what reciprocity really means and how it should be established, and statues 
that include this requirement usually do not define it.
304
 Presumably the justification for 
States adopting the reciprocity test is the pressure that it may enable them to exert on 
countries to grant recognition without revision to that State’s judgment.305 
 
The unsatisfactory present situation can be addressed by concluding a multilateral convention 
among SACU Member States to provide for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments from Contracting States if certain requirements are met.
306
 One would have 
expected, given the availability of a more simplified and expedited procedure for enforcing 
foreign judgments through the registration of judgments under national laws, that this 
procedure would have been made available to judgments from neighbouring African 
countries.
307
 This would be in accordance with States’ ‘determination to promote unity, 
solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States’.308 
However, as this is presently not the case, concluding a multilateral convention is 
recommended to bind States to make the expedited procedures for recognition and 
enforcement of judgments available to Member States.  
 
A comparison of the statutes suggests that a recognition and enforcement convention should 
address the following issues: 
 
i. What the scope and exclusions from scope of the instrument would be.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
North Carolina, Ohio and Texas make reciprocity a discretionary ground for recognition, while Georgia and 
Massachusetts make it a mandatory ground: see Brand RA Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Federal Judicial Centre International Litigation Guide (2012) 15. 
303
  Oppong RF ‘Private international law and the African Economic Community: A plea for greater attention’ 
(2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 918; Oppong (note 18) 393. 
304
  Juenger (note 168) 31. See for example Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(1): para 3.2.2; Namibia Act (note 247) s 
2(1): para 3.4.2.  
305
  Casad RC ‘Civil Judgment Recognition and the Integration of Multi-state Associations: A Comparative 
Study’ (1980-1981) 4 Hasting International & Comparative Law Review 15. 
306
  See para 5 below for proposals for a Multilateral Recognition and Enforcement Convention for the SACU. 
307
  Oppong (note 18) 394. 
308
  Preamble, Constitutive Act of the African Union reprinted in (2005) 13 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 25. 
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Conventions dealing with recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are generally 
confined to judgments arising from civil and commercial transactions.
309
 It is the practice 
of existing conventions not to specify what is meant by ‘civil and commercial matters’ or 
to determine which law is to be used to interpret that expression.
310
 Lowenfeld
311
 however 
urges abandoning the term ‘civil and commercial’, or defining the terms simply by 
excluding criminal matters, arbitral awards and matters relating to status. He does not 
believe that there is justification for excluding final judgments relating to succession, 
bankruptcy, or judgments of administrative tribunals rendered in circumstances assuring 
fairness and independent decision.
312
 The SALRC recommended that a foreign judgment 
should be defined as ‘a judicial determination of civil or commercial claim, however 
labelled, in adversarial proceedings’.313 It has been suggested that a judgment is not civil 
or commercial if it relates to an obligation between parties where one is required by the 
law to use the other’s service or equipment, and the price, place, or procedure of that 
service or equipment is unilaterally decided by the latter, or when the latter is a 
government agency or is entrusted by a government agency to exercise public power.
314
 
The statutes of some SACU Member States contain a number of exclusions
315
 while the 
Swaziland and Lesotho statutes are limited to civil judgments.
316
 According to the Hague 
Conference, it appears to be settled that the following would be excluded from a 
judgments convention: civil status and capacity of natural persons; matrimonial property 
regimes; wills; succession to the estates of deceased persons; bankruptcy and other 
similar procedures; social security and arbitration will be excluded. It further suggests 
                                                 
309
 See, for example, EU Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] Official Journal L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’); 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Feb. 1, 1971, (1971) 1144 U.N.T.S.249 (‘1971 Hague Convention’); Hague Conference on Private 
International Law Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 (‘2005 Hague 
Convention’); Hague Conference ‘International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters’ Preliminary Document No 7 of April 1997 (1997) 8, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3490&dtid=35 (accessed 14 February 
2013) (hereinafter ‘Kessedjian Report’) 12, Hague Conference ‘Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of 
Court Agreements: Explanatory Report by Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi’ 2005 (hereafter ‘Hartley 
Dogauchi Report’) 30.  
310
 Jenard P ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)’ (1979) Official Journal of the European 
Communities No. C 59/1 (5 March 1979) (‘Jenard Report’) 9.  
311
 Lowenfeld A ‘Thoughts about a Multinational Judgments Convention: A reaction to the Von Mehren Report 
(1994) 57(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 301-2. 
312
 Lowenfeld (note 311) 301-2. 
313
 SALRC Report (note 189) v. 
314
 Huang J Interregional Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: Lessons for China 
from US and EU Laws (unpublished SJD Thesis, Duke University School of Law, 2010) 261. 
315
   See para 3.3.2 (Botswana), 3.4.2 (South Africa) and 3.5.2 (Namibia) above.  
316
 Swaziland Act (s 2); Lesotho Act (s 2). 
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excluding fiscal matters, customs duties and fines, but not excluding civil suits for 
environmental damage, or suits between private parties based on a breach of competition 
law or acts of unfair competition.
317
 
 
ii. To which judgments the convention would apply, including the courts by which these 
judgments should have been rendered.  
 
It is suggested that the proposed Convention should be limited to private international 
litigation, i.e. in cases between parties who are individuals or private companies, or who 
are undertaking private law activities. This would exclude all cases involving a State or a 
State entity, or any entity acting on behalf of the State in public service mission.
318
 Unlike 
the other statutes, as listed in the respective articles 2 of the statutes, the Botswana Act 
only applies to judgments given after the coming into operation of the order directing that 
the Act extends to a specific State.
319
 Whereas the other statutes apply to superior courts, 
the South African and Namibian statutes apply to judgments of both superior and inferior 
courts.
320
 
 
iii. Whether it will be limited to civil judgments or include criminal judgments.  
 
The limitation of civil or commercial is primarily intended to exclude criminal law and 
public law.
321
 However, proceedings should not be excluded from the scope of 
Convention, by the mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency 
or any person acting for a State, is a party thereto.
322
 The Botswana and Namibia statutes 
are the only ones that apply to judgments in criminal proceedings for the payment of a 
sum of money for compensation or damages to an injured party. The Swaziland, Lesotho 
and South African statutes do not apply criminal judgments.
323
 
 
                                                 
317
 See Kessedjian Report (note 309) 18-24; Weintraub RJ ‘How substantial is our need for a judgments 
recognition convention and what should we bargain away to get it?’ (1998-1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 216. 
318
 Kessedjian Report (note 309) 12; Huang (note 314) 325. 
319
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(2). 
320
 South Africa Act (note 189) s 1; Namibia Act (note 247) s 1. 
321
 Lussier L ‘A Canadian perspective’ (1998-1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 62. 
322
 For example, the Hague Choice of Court Convention; Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 309) 30. 
323
 Swaziland (note 99) s 2, Lesotho (note 129) s 2, South Africa (note 189) s 2, Botswana (note 160) s 2(1) and 
Namibia (note 247) s 1. 
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iv. Whether it will exclude money payable in respect of taxes, or other charges of a like 
nature.  
 
It is recommended that these be excluded from the scope of the convention. Taxes, fines, 
and monetary penal judgments serve to raise revenue for public purposes, and they are 
considered in most countries to be matters of public law and therefore outside the scope 
of recognition and enforcement of judgments in private civil suits.
324
 The non-
enforcement of revenue and penal laws follows from the territorial application of such 
laws.
325
 
 
v. Whether it will include arbitration awards.  
 
Three of the five statutes, namely Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana apply to arbitral 
awards, provided that it has become enforceable in the rendering State in the same 
manner as a judgment given by the Court in that place.
326
 
 
The ideal solution contained in a recognition and enforcement instrument would be to apply 
to all civil matters. As a practical matter, consensus may often be reached more easily by 
excluding controversial areas; therefore, a convention which seeks to alter the diverse legal 
relationships of States generally contains a number of exclusions from the scope of the 
instrument. If, however, the exclusions become too numerous, any convention will be 
deprived of a good deal of its usefulness.
327
 
 
There are various reasons why specific matters are excluded. In some cases, the interests of 
the public, or that of third parties,
328
 is involved, so that the parties may not have the right to 
dispose of the matter between them - in such cases, a particular court will often have 
exclusive jurisdiction that cannot be ousted by means of a choice of court agreement.
329
 
                                                 
324
 Brand (note 302) 12 
325
 See Chapter 1, para 5.1 above. See also, for example Brussels I Regulation (note 302) art 1, which also does 
not extend to revenue, customs or administrative matters. 
326
  Swaziland (s2), Lesotho (s 2) and Botswana (s2). 
327
  Borchers PJ ‘A few little issues for the Hague judgments negotiations’ 24 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law (1998-1999)165. 
328
  See Chapter 4 para 3.1 above. 
329
 Article 21 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention makes it possible for a Contracting State to extend the 
list of excluded matters by means of a declaration specifying the matter that it wants to exclude, provided it 
defines it clearly and precisely. Where this is done, the Convention will not apply with regard to that matter 
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Exclusions may, in other cases, be a practical solution to conflicting national laws where 
agreement is impossible, or excluded because they raise particular problems and thus require 
a special regulatory framework of their own;
330
 or other multilateral legal regimes already 
apply; so the Convention is not needed, and it would sometimes also be difficult to decide 
which instrument prevails if the Convention were to cover such an area.
331
 
 
4.2 Requirements for enforcement 
None of the statutes of SACU Member States provide for the automatic enforcement of 
relevant judgments, but rather facilitate enforcement by providing for the registration of 
judgments at the relevant local (enforcing) court.
332
 The majority of the statutes provide for 
the registration of a judgment if the court is satisfied that all the requirements have been 
met,
333
 but the Lesotho and Swaziland Statutes afford the courts discretion to register a 
judgment if it is ‘satisfied that it is just and convenient’.334 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the State making the declaration. However, under art 32, any such declarations must be notified to the 
depositary, which will inform the States. If the declaration is made after the Convention comes into force for 
the State making it, it will not take effect for at least three months. It will therefore be possible for the parties 
to know in advance whether their legal relationship will be affected. Art 21(2) further provides that, where a 
State makes such a declaration, other States will not be required to apply the Convention with regard to the 
matter in question where the chosen court is in the State making the declaration (principle of reciprocity): 
see Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 309) 25.   
330
 Bartlett LS ‘Full faith and credit comes to the Common Market: An analysis of the provisions of the 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1975) 24 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49. 
331
  Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 309) 31. An example is contracts for the national and international carriage 
of passengers (including passenger luggage) and goods. This includes carriage by sea, land and air, or any 
combination of the three, excluded from the 2005 Hague Convention (note 302) art 2(f). The reason for their 
exclusion is subject to a number of other conventions, for example the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading 
(adopted in 1928 and amended by the Brussels Protocol of 1968; sometimes referred to as ‘Hague-Visby 
Rules’). By excluding these matters, the possibility of a conflict of conventions is avoided. Further examples 
include nuclear liability (excluded by art 2(i) of the Hague Choice of court Convention), as it is the subject 
of various international conventions, which provide that the State where the nuclear accident takes place has 
exclusive jurisdiction over actions for damages for liability resulting from the accident: Paris Convention on 
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy 1960; Convention Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention 1963; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1997; the Joint 
Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Parris Convention 1988. A further 
example is the Montevideo Convention be followed: See Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, OEA/Ser.A/2818 ILM 1224 (1979) 
(‘Montevideo Convention’) (see Chapter 4 para 5.1 above), which applies to arbitral awards in all matters 
not covered by the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, signed in Panama 
on 30 January 1975 UNTS 1438 No I-24384: art 2(a). 
332
 See paras 3.1.4 (Swaziland); 3.2.4 (Lesotho); 3.3.4 (Botswana); 3.4.4 (South Africa) and 3.5.4 above. 
333
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 5(1); South Africa Act (note 189) s 3; Namibia Act (note 247) s 3(1).  
334
  Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(1); Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(1): see paras 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 above.  
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The requirements that a court will have to be satisfied of include the element of finality: a 
foreign judgment will be enforced only if it finally and conclusively decides the dispute 
between the parties.
335
 The principle of finality requires that, generally speaking, there should 
be no distinction between foreign and domestic judgment so far as their conclusiveness in 
terminating litigation is concerned. In principle, a party in whose favour a judgment has been 
rendered by a competent tribunal should not be compelled to re-litigate the merits of the 
cause of action in order to procure execution, whether in the courts of the state in which the 
judgment was originally given or in the courts of any other state; and that a defendant who 
has been successful in a prior litigation, domestic or foreign, should be able to rest upon the 
judgment in his favour as a valid defence to any subsequent action upon the same cause.
336
 A 
judgment is final and conclusive if it is shown that  
‘in the court by which it was pronounced337 it conclusively, finally and forever established the 
existence of the debt of which it is sought to be made conclusive evidence in this country, so 
as to make it res judicata between the parties’.338  
 
Such finality is not affected by the fact that there is an appeal pending, unless a stay of 
execution has been granted in the foreign country pending the hearing of the appeal. Where it 
is shown that the judgment is subject to such an appeal, or that such an appeal is pending, the 
requested court enjoys discretion and in the exercise thereof may, instead of giving judgment 
in favour of the plaintiff, stay the proceedings pending the final determination of the appeal in 
the foreign jurisdiction. As a rule, the recognising court will refuse to assess the merits of the 
appeal and its prospects of success in the foreign court.
339
 The onus of proving that a foreign 
judgment is final and conclusive rests upon the party seeking to enforce it.
340
 Where this onus 
has been discharged, it is up to the defendant to place before the court the facts relating to the 
impeding appeal and such other relevant facts as may persuade the court to exercise its 
discretion in favour of granting a stay of proceedings.
341
 
 
                                                 
335
  See paras 3.1.3 (Swaziland); 3.2.3 (Lesotho); 3.3.3 (Botswana); 3.4.3 (South Africa) and 3.5.3 (Namibia) 
above. 
336
  Yntema (note 19) 1145-6. 
295 
 Nouvion v Freedman (note 51). The court also emphasised that under English law it is accepted that the 
requirement of finality means the judgment must be final in the particular court which pronounced it: At 9 
per Lord Herschell.  
338
  Nouvion v Freedman (note 51) 9 per Lord Herschell. 
339
 Jones v Krok (note 201) 692 per Corbett J. 
340
  The English rule is that the onus of proof that the judgment is final and conclusive lies on the parties 
asserting it, and Commonwealth parties practicing the common law appear to have adopted the same 
principles: see Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keelr Ltd and Other (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 536 (H) 560I & 
587 D-E, relying on textbooks from Canada, Australia, the United States of America and Scotland.    
341
  Jones v Krok (note 211) 692 per Corbett J. 
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The Member States’ statutes also specify when a judgment is ripe for recognition and 
enforcement:  the enforcing State normally mirrors the circumstances in the rendering State - 
if the judgment is subject to immediate enforcement where rendered, it should be enforced 
elsewhere. If enforcement is susceptible to a stay where it was rendered, whether 
automatically or on appeal, enforcement should be suspended elsewhere.
342
 
 
A foreign judgment will be enforceable in SACU Member States once it has been registered 
at the relevant court. A proposed Convention for SACU Member States should, consequently, 
include the following provisions:  
i. That an applicable judgment from a Contracting State is enforceable in other 
Contracting States, once it has been registered there.
343
 
 
ii. The requirements for enforcement, including that it must be –  
a. final and conclusive as between the parties thereto,344 and  
b. be enforceable by execution in the country of the original court.345 
 
iii. Whether the convention creates an exclusive avenue for enforcement of judgments 
which are eligible for registration under the Convention.  
 
Whether the procedure is exclusive or not may be significant where the disputed 
grounds on international competence are in issue. For example, disputed grounds such 
as ‘presence’ or ‘domicile’ are not deemed grounds of jurisdiction under the South 
African Act and so could not be argued by a judgment creditor forced to proceed 
under the 1988 Act. Further, under the 1988 Act, if the foreign judgment is expressed 
to be payable in a foreign currency, that judgment shall be registered as if it were a 
judgment for such amount in the currency of the Republic, calculated at the rate of 
                                                 
342
  Weintraub (note 317) 206; See, for example Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation (note 302) which 
provides for recognition and enforcement of ‘any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting 
State, but states that the enforcing court ‘may stay the proceedings’ if an appeal is pending. 
343
  See, for example, the Brussels I Regulation which provides for that judgments will be enforceable upon a 
declaration of enforceability, except in the UK, where a judgment shall be enforced in England and Wales, in 
Scotland, or in Northern Ireland when, on the application of any interested party, it has been registered for 
enforcement in that part of the United Kingdom: see Brussels I Regulation (note 309) art 38. 
344
 See paras 3.1.3 (Swaziland); 3.2.3 (Lesotho); 3.3.3 (Botswana); 3.4.3 (South Africa) and 3.5.3 (Namibia) 
above. It would be undesirable if the foreign court’s judgment were enforced where after the foreign 
judgment was set aside or altered by the court which handed it down in the first place: See Schulze (note 
103) 28. 
345
  See paras 3.3.3 (Botswana); 3.4.3 (South Africa) and 3.5.3 (Namibia) above. 
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exchange prevailing at the date of judgment’ (emphasis added).346 Under the common 
law judgment may be given in foreign currency and conversion into rand for the 
purpose of enforcement takes place on the date of payment.
347
 
 
4.3 Procedural requirements 
The purpose of the procedural requirements that must be met to qualify for recognition and 
enforcement is to convince the requested court that the judgment at issue is indeed what it 
purports to be, and that there are no other proceedings that can or ought to affect the 
enforcement proceedings.
348
 Procedural requirements would include matters such as that the 
enforcing party has to provide a true, correct and authenticated copy of the judgment at issue 
to satisfy the court. This rule, with which it is easy to comply, makes it straightforward for 
people to have judgments recognised and enforced in foreign countries. Once this 
requirement has been fulfilled and established that a judgment should be recognised and 
enforced, the opposing party will have to prove that there is a legitimate reason for the court 
addressed to refuse the recognition or enforcement of the judgment. Other examples include 
translation of the judgment into the local language in the enforcing jurisdiction; and the 
requirement that a judgment be final and conclusive for it to be recognised.
349
 It is one of the 
fundamentals of private international law that foreign laws and proceedings that differs from 
one’s own rules are to a large extent respected.350 The longer the list of elements to be 
established, the less the Convention would be of interest in terms of one of its objectives, 
namely much greater ease in circulating judgments within the States that are parties to the 
Convention.
351
 
 
For the same reasons that the Lugano ad hoc working party decided not do away with 
intermediary proceedings and provide for the automatic enforcement of judgments: they 
found it premature, in the light of the prerogatives of national sovereignty that still 
                                                 
346
  See para 3.4.4 above. 
347
 Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) 777D): see Forsyth (note 8) 
461.   
348
 Kramer XE ‘Harmonisation of civil procedure and the interaction with private international law’ in Kramer 
XE & Van Rhee CE (eds) Civil Litigation in a Globalising World (2012) 11. 
349
 Oestreicher Y ‘The Rise and Fall of the “Mixed” and “Double” Convention Models Regarding Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 360-1. 
350
 Kramer (note 348) 11. 
351
 Hague Conference ‘Synthesis of the work of the Special Commission of March 1998 on international 
jurisdiction and the effects of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters’ Preliminary Document No 
9, July 1998 (1998) 17. 
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characterise the (non-EU) European States the same finding may apply to the SACU Member 
States, which have achieved a far lesser degree of economic and legal integration that that of 
the EU, and it is therefore recommended that the proposed convention include intermediary 
proceedings before a judgment is enforced.
352
  
 
Based on an analysis of the above statutory provisions,
353
 it is recommended that a 
prospective convention should include the following:  
i. That any judgment to which the Convention applies will be enforceable only once it is 
registered, after an application to that effect has been made to the relevant court in the 
Contracting State.  
ii. Details of the relevant courts (whether superior or inferior) to which an application for 
registration should be made. 
iii. By whom an application for registration must be made. 
iv. The time within which the application is to be made. 
v. The procedure for making an application for registration, including the matters to be 
dealt with, and documents to be furnished (which should include a certified copy of 
the judgment) on an application for the registration of a judgment
354
 as well as the 
mode of compliance with the requirements;
355
 or alternatively that this shall be 
governed by the law of the Member State in which enforcement is sought.
356
 
vi. Notice of the registration to be provided to the judgment debtor informing him of such 
registration;
357
 and the method for serving the notice. 
vii. The method for determining the rate of exchange, or alternatively leaving this to be 
determined by the law of the requested court. 
                                                 
352
  Pocar F ‘Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, signed in Lugano on 30 October 2007’ Explanatory Report OCJ C319/1 23.12.2009 
(‘Pocar Report’) 36; para 4.2 above. 
353
 See paras 3.1.4 (Swaziland); 3.2.4 (Lesotho); 3.3.4 (Botswana); 3.4.4 (South Africa) and 3.5.4 (Namibia) 
above. 
354
  See, e.g., Swaziland Rules of Court which provide that the application must be supported by an affidavit of 
the facts exhibiting the judgment or a verified or certified copy of the judgment, and stating that to the best 
of the information and belief of the deponent the judgment creditor is entitled to enforce such judgment and 
that such judgment does not fall with any of the cases in terms of the Act under which a judgment cannot be 
registered (Rule 2), as well as the full name, title, trade or business, and the usual or last known place of 
abode or business of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor respectively (Rule 3); Lesotho contains the 
same requirements to be provided (see Rule 2). 
355
  See Botswana Act (note 160) s 6(1)(b). 
356
  See Brussels I Regulation (note 309) art 40. 
357
  South Africa Act (note 189) s 3(2); Namibia Act (note 247) s 3(2); Botswana Act (note 160) s 6(1)(c); 
Lesotho Rules (note 132)  9; Swaziland Rule (note 102) Rule 10. 
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viii. A requirement that the requested court may stay execution of a judgment in certain 
circumstances, if an application to this effect is made to the registering court. 
ix. The effect of registration which should generally have the same effect as a civil 
judgment of the court at which the judgment has been registered; provided that in 
certain circumstances a registered judgment may not be executed before the 
expiration of a prescribed period of time.
358
 
 
4.4 Setting aside of registered judgments 
Most existing regimes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments base the 
decision to extend recognition on the presence or absence of certain specific conditions.
359
 In 
traditional international practice, States make recognition of a foreign judgment conditional 
on a number of considerations, which include: the positive evaluation of the rendering court’s 
jurisdiction, the fairness of its procedures, possibly a review of the corrections of the 
rendering court’s decision in substance and as a matter of conflicts of law; révision au fond, 
which implies that requested courts re-examine the merits of a foreign judgment, possibly 
also on the existence of reciprocity. These are all measured by the standards of the lex fori, 
and ultimately depend on the absence of objections on local public policy grounds.
360
 There 
are a number of requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments that are universally 
recognised,
361
 in the absence of which a judgment will not be recognised. Some of them are: 
if the court rendering the original judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so;
362
 the judgment 
debtor received insufficient notice of the proceedings to enable him to prepare a defence;
363
 
                                                 
358
  In terms of Botswana’s Statute, execution may not be issued so long as it is possible for any party to apply to 
have the registration of the judgment set aside: see para 3.2.4 above. In South Africa and Namibia, until the 
expiration of 21 days after service of the notice on the judgment debtor: see paras 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 above; in 
Lesotho and Swaziland, the expiration of the time limited by the order giving leave to register after service 
on the judgment debtor of notice of registration: see paras 3.1.4 and 3.2.4 above.  
359
  Casad (note 305) 12-16. Particular impediments to recognition and enforcement may either be found as 
requirement for enforcement or defences, i.e. grounds on which a registered judgment will be set aside: 
Juenger (note 168) 12. See, for example, the application to have a judgment registered by the judgment 
creditor which is included as part of the procedural requirements, as discussed above, but a number of 
statutes includes the absence of this element as one of the grounds on which a registered judgment must be 
set aside: See Botswana s 7(1); South Africa s 5(1); Namibia s 5(1). The Swaziland Act and Lesotho Acts 
are the only Statutes which does not include this as one of the grounds on which a registered judgment will 
be set aside. Other examples include the requirement/defence of a judgment that has been wholly satisfied 
(see for example South Africa s 5(1)). 
360
  Hay P ‘The development of the public policy barrier to judgment recognition within the European 
Community’ (2007) 6 The European Legal Forum 290. 
361
 Oestreicher (note 349) 374. 
362
  See para 4.5 below.  
363
  See para 4.4.1 below.  
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fraud in obtaining the judgment,
364
 and if enforcing the foreign judgment would be against 
the public policy of the requested state.
365
 The statutory grounds of all SACU Member 
States
366
 for setting aside a registered judgment or the instances in which a judgment will not 
be registered correspond with these, and are now discussed.  
 
4.4.1 Insufficient Notice 
In order to be recognised or enforced, the judgment should not have been rendered contrary 
to natural justice.
367
 Natural justice means justice that is the result of procedural justice. It 
requires that the hearing take place before an impartial tribunal, that the defendant have due 
notice of proceedings against him and that he has been given an opportunity to present his 
case.
368
 A foreign judgment will generally not be accorded recognition unless it satisfies the 
‘international’ standards as to notice.369 The exercise of the right to be heard presupposes 
notice sufficient to inform the defendant of the fact that an action is pending. It is therefore a 
universally accepted principle that a judgment rendered against a party who was not properly 
notified of the proceeding, for example in the case of service by mere publication, will not be 
recognised.
370
 A judgment given in default of appearance is generally not recognised if the 
application or equivalent document instituting the proceedings before the original court was 
not ‘duly’ served on the defendant.371 
 
The ultimate purpose of notice is to enable a party to effectively contest a lawsuit. Mere 
service of process does not necessarily safeguard the right of defence; the rendering state’s 
domestic law may fall short of providing a full and fair hearing, which would deprive the 
defendant of a realistic opportunity to litigate. A defendant must, at the very least, be 
adequately informed of the nature of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to 
                                                 
364
  See para 4.4.2 below. 
365
  See para 4.4.3 below. 
366
  Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(2); Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(2); Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(1)(a); 
South Africa Act (note 189) s 5(1); Namibia Act (note 247) s 5(1). 
367
  The term ‘natural justice’ has reference to the procedure rather than to the merits of a particular case: Lissack 
v Duarte 1974(4) SA 560 (NPD) 564 per Leon J. 
368
  Jones v Krok (note 210) 551 per Kirk-Cohen J. 
369
 Casad (note 305) 14. 
370
 Juenger (note 168) 17. 
371
  Provisions of this kind lay down two conditions, the first of which, that service should be duly effected, 
entails a decision based on the legislation of the State of the rendering court and on the conventions binding 
on that State in regard to service, whilst the second, concerning the time necessary to enable the defendant to 
arrange for his defence, implies appraisals of a factual nature, as it has to be determined whether the period 
calculated from the date on which service was duly effected allowed the defendant sufficient time to arrange 
for his defence: Pocar Report (note 335) 37. 
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protect his rights.
372
 In Lissack v Duarte
373
 a defendant was given notice but the foreign court 
did not inform him of the correct procedure to adopt when the defendant wrote a letter to the 
court denying liability but gave judgment against him instead. The court held that the 
defendant had been unfairly deprived of the opportunity of presenting his side of the case and 
enforcement was consequently denied.
374
 If, however, the defendant’s inability to participate 
in the foreign proceedings is a consequence of his own misconduct, the judgment may be 
recognised, and the exception will not apply.
375
 
 
With regards to whether it is sufficient to review only the period of notice or whether there 
should also be a requirement that notice be properly carried out, some suggests that if the 
defendant has appeared before the court of origin and was given sufficient time to organise 
his defence, it would not matter if he had not been properly notified; while other suggests that 
reviewing the fact that proper notification occurred and that sufficient time was allowed for 
preparing a defence need only take place when the judgment of origin was delivered by 
default.
376
 The Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia statutes provide that ‘the judgment debtor did 
not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the 
proceedings and did not appear’ whereas Swaziland and Lesotho requires that the judgment 
debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings, was ‘not duly serviced with the process of the 
original court’ and did not appear.377  
 
It is suggested that the proposed Convention follow the approach of the Hague Choice of 
Court Convention.
378
 It provides that a judgment will not be recognised if the notice of 
proceedings was not brought to the defendant’s attention in sufficient time and in such a way 
to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant entered an appearance and 
presented his case without contesting notification in the court of origin. Similarly, whereas 
the 1988 Lugano Convention, for example, provided that where judgment was given in 
default of appearance, it will not be recognised if the defendant was not duly served with the 
document which instituted the proceedings ‘in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his 
                                                 
372
 Jeunger (note 168) 21. 
373
  See note 367. 
374
  Lissack v Duarte (note 367) 566-7 per Leon J.  
375
 Jeunger (note 168) 21. 
376
 Hague Conference (note 351) 20. 
377
 See paras 3.1.5 (Swaziland); 3.2.5 (Lesotho); 3.3.5 (Botswana); 3.4.5 (South Africa) and 3.5.5 (Namibia) 
above. 
378
 2005 Hague Convention (note 309) art 9(c). 
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defence’,379 the 2007 Lugano Convention adds the following proviso: ‘unless the defendant 
failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to 
do so’.380 Therefore, even if service was not effected in sufficient time and in such a way as 
to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence, the judgment is to be recognised if the 
defendant did not challenge it in the State of origin. The protection of a defaulting defendant 
in the event of defects in the notification should not extend to cases where the defendant 
remains inactive, and the rule seeks to overcome the problem by requiring him, if he can, to 
raise any objection in the State of origin, and to exhaust all remedies there, rather than 
keeping them in reserve for the following stage when the judgment has to be recognised in 
another State bound by the Convention.
381
 As a result, art 34(2) of the 2007 Lugano 
Convention no longer expressly requires service in due form, but treats the question in 
connection with the opportunity given to the defendant to arrange for his defence, in the same 
way as the time that may be needed, and uses the same wording that is used in the Brussels I 
Regulation.
382
 The aim is to protect a defaulting defendant’s right to a due notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard.
383
  
 
4.4.2 Fraud 
A recognised ground for refusal to recognise or enforce foreign judgments relates to fraud by 
the judgment creditor in obtaining the judgment.
384
 The term ‘fraud’ covers 
misrepresentations addressed to the court or the opposing litigant.
385
 It is generally 
recognised that a judgment obtained by fraud may be denied recognition and enforcement in 
the second addressed forum.
386
 
 
A minimum of four types of possible fraud can be distinguished, namely:  
a) fraud as to the jurisdiction of the court of origin;  
b) fraud in relation to the applicable law; 
c) fraud concerning prior notification to the defendant in the original proceedings; and  
                                                 
379
 2005 Hague Convention (note 309) art 27(2).  
380
 2005 Hague Convention (note 309) art 34(2). 
381
 Pocar Report (note 352) 38. 
382
 2005 Hague Convention (note 309) art 34(2). 
383
 Pocar Report (note 352) 38. 
384
  Joffe v Salmon 1904 TS 317, 319 per Innes CJ. 
385
 Juenger (note 168) 23. 
386
 Juenger (note 168) 23. 
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d) fraud committed in the submission of evidence to the court of origin.387 
 
Fraud,
388
 according to Hartley and Dogauchi
389
 is ‘deliberate dishonesty or deliberate 
wrongdoing’. A distinction is also made between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud 
refers to the judgment-rendering court’s jurisdiction, or a matter of procedure that deprived 
the losing party of adequate opportunity to present his or her case to the court. A foreign 
judgment is liable to be challenged if it was obtained by practicing upon the foreign court 
fraud of such a kind as would entitle a South African court to set aside its own final 
judgment.
390
 Intrinsic fraud, by contrast involves matters upon by the original court had 
passed judgment, such as the reliability of testimony and the authenticity of documents, and 
would include circumstances where a witness in the foreign proceedings gave false testimony 
or introduced a forged document in the foreign proceeding.
391
 Generally, a foreign judgment 
can be impeached only for extrinsic fraud, which deprives the aggrieved party of an adequate 
opportunity to present its case to the court. If a foreign plaintiff withheld material evidence 
that was favourable to the defendant from the foreign court, this would be considered 
extrinsic fraud sufficient to deny recognition.
392
 A judgment cannot, in most cases, be 
impeached for intrinsic fraud.
393
 Where, however, the fraud is intrinsic, in other words it has 
been raised before and rejected by an internationally competent court, then to avoid retrying 
the merits of the case the court should refuse to go into the matter and should recognise the 
                                                 
387
 Hague Conference (note 334) 23. 
388
  Fraud is a defence against recognition and enforcement in US law (see Brand (note 302) 22-3) and the 
Hague Choice of Court Convention (art 9(d) provides that recognition or enforcement may be refused ‘if the 
decision was obtained by fraud in the procedural sense’; but the Montevideo Convention (note 331) does not 
contain a fraud exception; nor does the Brussels Convention/Regulation or Lugano Convention. 
389
 Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 309) 55. Examples would be where the plaintiff deliberately serves the writ, 
or causes it to be served, on the wrong information as to the time and place of the hearing; or where either 
party seeks to corrupt a judge or witness, deliberately conceals key evidence, or submits counterfeit or 
falsified documents.   
390
  Schulze (note 103) 30. Examples are forgery or perjury in the course of the proceedings; fraudulent 
suppression of material documents; obtaining a foreign judgment without the defendant’s knowledge and 
contrary to a prior agreement between the parties; and fraudulently inducing the defendant not to appear 
391
  Although this distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud has been criticised as being fuzzy, particularly 
when the intrinsic fraud tainted a fair trial of the case.  However, this distinction has been endorsed by 
international law, such as the 1999 Hague Draft Convention, and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court 
Convention.  These two conventions state that the requested court may deny recognition and enforcement if 
the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.  This can be interpreted as 
extrinsic fraud. The benefit of this distinction is to prevent the requested court from reviewing the merits of 
the judgment, which is explicitly forbidden by art 8(2) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention: see Huang 
(note 314) 325. 
392
 Brand (note 302) 23. 
393
 Brand (note 302) 23. 
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judgment; the defendant may then avail himself of the remedy of an appeal from the decision 
of the foreign court within that foreign system.
394
 
 
All the SACU statutes include fraud as one of the bases on which a judgment has to be set 
aside.
395
 It is, therefore, recommended that this should be included as one of the basis on 
which recognition and enforcement under the proposed Convention would be denied.
396
 
 
4.4.3 Public Policy 
The rendering court’s jurisdiction may be beyond doubt and the judgment debtor may have 
had the opportunity to be heard, but the foreign judgment may still be ‘unjust’.397 The public 
policy exception aims to provide countries with a mechanism that will enable them to refrain 
from recognising and enforcing foreign judgments, even though all other requirements were 
met.
398
 
 
There seems to be a consensus on the need for a public policy exception in the international 
sphere,
399
 and this provision is also traditionally found in all national laws and international 
conventions dealing with judgments and recognition enforcement, whether single or 
double.
400
 The rationale is that protection of the fair procedure must be more far-reaching 
                                                 
394
  Forsyth (note 8) 433. 
395
 See paras 3.1.5 (Swaziland); 3.2.5 (Lesotho); 3.3.5 (Botswana); 3.4.5 (South Africa) and 3.5.5 (Namibia) 
above.  
396
  See para 3, proposed art 5(1)(c) below. 
397
 Juenger (note 168) 21. 
398
 Oestreicher (note 349) 370. 
399
  In negotiations surrounding the New Lugano Convention, the European Commission proposed that the 
public policy of the requested State as a ground for refusal of recognition be deleted, amongst others because 
it had been applied only very rarely in the judgments of national courts with regard to the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions: Pocar Report (note 352) 37; Lugano Convention (note 309) art 34(1). The Lugano ad 
hoc Working Party however objected that the State addressed had to be able to protect its fundamental 
interests by invoking a principle such as public policy, even if the principle was rarely applied. In order to 
emphasise the exceptional nature of recourse to this ground for refusal, the provision now specifies that 
recognition may be refused only when it would be ‘manifestly’ contrary to public policy, which is similar to 
the wording used in the Brussels Regulation: Pocar Report (note 352) 37; Lugano Convention (note 309) art 
34(1). 
400
 Kessedjian Report (note 309) 21; Oestreicher (note 349) 368. The Brussels I Regulation states that ‘a 
judgment shall not be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member 
State in which recognition is sought’ (art 34(1)). The exception a limited role: it mainly functions as a ‘safety 
net’ that enables a state not to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment (or to apply foreign law) that goes 
against fundamental principles upheld by its legal system: see Kramer (note 348) 7. Public policy as used in 
the Brussels Regulation is subject to interpretation by the ECJ, under art 234 of the Treaty of Rome, which 
has ruled that recourse to the concept of public policy can be envisaged only where recognition would be at 
variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought, 
inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. The infringement would have to constitute a manifest 
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than proper service, because there should be fair trial ‘after its commencement, not just notice 
at its beginning’.401 
 
The requested State’s public policy may be offended either by procedural irregularities, such 
as the lack of a fair hearing, or by substantive deficiencies, such as the violation of 
fundamental principles of equal protection. In its broadest sense, this reservation 
encompasses practically all impediments to recognition, including for instance the lack of due 
notice and fraud.
402
 The public policy exception is to a certain extent a protection mechanism 
that enables countries to protect the very basic ideas and principles that guide them.
403
 A 
foreign decision can be recognised despite the fact that the law on which it is based clashes 
with important forum policies, so long as the result that the rendering court reached is not 
repugnant
404
 to the requested forum’s fundamental notions of justice.405 
 
The determination of what exactly constitutes public policy is not done in the international 
sphere, but rather in the national sphere, i.e. national courts. In deciding whether a foreign 
decision is against a public policy, the rules of the requested State are decisive.
406
 Different 
countries may have different interpretations of this term, and what is considered to be public 
policy in one country is not necessarily public policy in another.
407
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of that State: ECJ Case C-7/98 Krombach 
[2000] ECR I-1935, paras 23 and 37. EU courts are unanimous that a violation of public policy only occurs 
when basic, essential norms and values of the forum’s legal system would be violated by the recognition of 
the foreign judgment: see Hay (note 360) 291.   
 Article 5 of the 1971 Hague Convention provides that recognition or enforcement of a decision may be 
refused if recognition or enforcement of the decision is ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the public policy of 
the State addressed or if the decision resulted from proceedings incompatible with the requirements of due 
process of law: see Hague Convention (note 309) art 5. 
 See e.g. also Lugano Convention (note 309) art 34(1); Montevideo Convention (note 302) art 2(h) and New 
York Convention, art V(2)(b) (holding that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be 
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: ... 
the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country”). 
401
 Hay (note 360) 292-3. 
402
 Juenger (note 168) 22. 
403
 Oestreicher (note 349) 370. 
404
  Not every provision of a foreign law which runs counter to a mandatory provision of some tenet of internal 
public policy should be excluded. There must be something fundamentally offensive about the application of 
the foreign law before public policy would exclude it. Foreign judgments will not be recognised if obtained 
contrary to the rules of natural justice: see Forsyth (note 230) 110. In Ncgqobela v Sihele (1893) 10 SC 346, 
352 De Villiers CJ spoke of a result ‘entirely opposed’ to the public policy and institutions of South Africa; 
and in Lourens v NO v Van Hohne 1993 (2) SA 104 (W) 121B-C Schutz J confirmed that the foreign law 
must ‘fly in the face of some deep-rooted conception of good morals’ before it will be denied recognition.  
405
 Juenger (note 168) 22. 
406
 Kramer (note 348) 7. 
407
 Oestreicher (note 349) 370. 
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Where a foreign judgment is regarded as being contrary to a State’s notions of public policy, 
it will not be recognised or enforced.
408
 It would not seem advisable to hamper the requested 
State’s discretion by requiring greater specificity, especially among States with basically 
shared values. However, a definition of public policy should be very narrowly drawn
409
 - 
public policy should not become a major loophole in the Convention’s mechanism for 
enforcement.
410
 It has been suggested that the use of public policy exception should be 
strictly restrained,
411
 and that only when the effects of recognition and enforcement, rather 
than the law on which the judgment is based, will manifestly infringe the fundamental 
interest of a State, should a requested court be able to deny recognition and enforcement.
412
 
Where the foreign judgment is contrary to a distinct public policy principle of the local court, 
it will also not be recognised or enforced. Mere inconsistency with a domestic rule does not 
mean that a judgment will be refused enforcement. Rather, it must violate a fundamental 
policy of the law.
413
 
 
Enforcement of foreign judgments should be denied on the basis of public policy only where 
enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.414 
 
A convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for the SACU should, 
therefore, list the circumstances when a judgment will not be registerable for the purpose of 
enforcement under the Convention. The negotiators of a recognition and enforcement 
instrument would need to determine what grounds for refusal should be allowed.
415
  
 
One of the reasons why countries may be hesitant to accede to a recognition and enforcement 
convention is a fear of having to surrender elements of their sovereignty and independence.
416
 
One of the goals of a recognition and enforcement convention should be to make it attractive 
enough for all prospective (SACU) Member States to the Convention to be willing to be 
                                                 
408
  Schulze (note 103) 29; Forsyth (note 8) 431. 
409
 Juenger (note 169) 23; Lowenfeld (note 168) 291. 
410
  See para 3, proposed art 5(1)(d) below.  
411
 Hague Conference on Private International Law ‘Preliminary Draft Convention on jurisdiction and foreign 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, adopted by the Special Commission and Report by P. Nygh & F. 
Pocar’ Preliminary Document No 11 of August 2000 (2000) 27 (hereafter ‘Nygh & Pocar Report’) 309. 
412
 Nygh & Pocar Report (note 411) 309. 
413
  Schulze (note 103) 30. 
414
 Nygh & Pocar Report (note 411) 309. 
415
 Traynor M ‘An introductory framework for analysing the proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: US and European Perspectives’ (2000) 6 Annual 
Survey of International & Comparative Law 8. 
416
 Oestreicher (note 349) 361. 
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bound by it. A recognition and enforcement convention should contain very broad exceptions 
to the general rule of enforceability. A convention by doing so would more easily convince 
hesitant countries that they can comfortably join the convention, because, if a need arises, 
they can find refuge by utilising one of the broad exceptions provided therein to refuse the 
recognition or enforcement of the specific judgment.
417
 
 
It is suggested that, based on a comparison of the relevant provisions in the statutes of the 
SACU Member States and the foregoing discussion, the proposed convention should include 
the following circumstances when judgment would not be registered for the purpose of 
enforcement:  
i. if the courts of the state of origin lacked jurisdiction;418 
ii. if the judgment debtor did not receive sufficient notice of the proceedings;419 
iii. if the judgment was obtained by fraud;420 and 
iv. if the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to law or public policy421 in the 
recognising state.
422
 
 
The grounds for refusal have to be interpreted strictly, as these grounds can constitute an 
obstacle to the fundamental objectives of the convention, which is to facilitate, to the greatest 
                                                 
417
 Oestreicher (note 349) 361. 
418
  International jurisdiction is discussed in paragraph 4.5 below.  
419
  While Botswana requires the judgment debtor must have received ‘sufficient notice’ of the proceedings in 
the foreign court (see para 3.3.3 above) the South African Act provides that the notice prescribed by the law 
of the designated country is sufficient: (see para 3.4.5 above). Plainly the sufficiency of the prescribed notice 
will need to be investigated before a country is designated: Forsyth (note 8) 411; see generally para 4.4.1 
above.  
420
  See para 4.4.2 above. 
421
  See para 4.4.3 above. 
422
  Other grounds for non-enforcement include contained in one or more of the statutes include: if the judgment 
debtor satisfied the court either that an appeal is pending, or that he is entitled and intends to appeal against 
the judgment: Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(2)(e); if the judgment is not a judgment to which the respective 
Acts apply as it does not fall within the definition of ‘judgment’ or was excluded from the scope of 
application of the Act, or was registered in contravention of the Act: Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(1)(a); 
South Africa Act (note 189) s 5(1)(a); Namibia Act (note 247) s 5(1)(a); if the judgment has been set aside 
by a court of competent jurisdiction: South Africa Act (note 189) s 5(1)(h); and Namibia Act (note 247) s 
5(1)(h); if the judgment has been become prescribed under the laws of the designated country in which it 
was given: South Africa Act (note 189) s 5(1)(i); Namibia Act (note 247) s 5(1)(h). This also includes an 
instance when the judgment has become prescribed under the law of the requested State. The Statute of 
Botswana afford the courts discretion to set aside a registered judgment if the registering court is satisfied 
that the matter in dispute in the proceedings in the original court had prior to the date of the judgment in the 
original court been the subject of a final and conclusive judgment by a court having jurisdiction in the matter 
(s 7(1)(b); but the South African Act includes this as a ground on which a registered judgment must be set 
aside: A registered judgment must also be set aside if the cause of action upon which the judgment was 
given had at the date of that judgment been the subject of a final and conclusive judgment of a court having 
jurisdiction (s 10(2)(e)). 
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possible extent, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid 
enforcement procedure.
423
 
 
4.5 International competence 
When requested to enforce a foreign judgment, the enforcing court will generally ask whether 
the court rendering the judgment was entitled to assert jurisdiction under the rules of a 
relevant international convention or under the internal rules of the requested court if no 
convention is applicable.
424
 That the rendering court must have had jurisdiction is one of the 
conditions regarded as essential in all judgment recognition systems, and can be found as one 
of the grounds for non-enforcement of foreign judgments in most single regional instruments 
on the topic.
425
 All the SACU Member States’ statutes provides that a court will set aside a 
registered judgment if it appears that the court of the rendering State lacked the international 
competence, or jurisdiction to decide the case, as determined by the law of the enforcing 
State.
426
 
 
Unless some higher law, such as the constitution of a federal system, a treaty, or a convention 
establishes rules binding on both the rendering and the requested States, each legal system is 
free to determine which jurisdictional bases are acceptable for recognition purposes.
427
 
Exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction have resulted in few legal systems considering it 
sufficient that the rendering court could claim jurisdiction pursuant to its own law; most 
countries measure the foreign court’s jurisdiction by reference to the bases found in their own 
laws.
428
 Recognising the problems of measuring jurisdiction for recognition purposes by 
recourse to domestic or rendering State rules,
429
 the English courts have taken the position 
                                                 
423
 Kramer XE ‘Enforcement under the Brussels Convention: Procedural Public Policy and the Influence of 
Article 6 ECHR’ (2002) 7 available at http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/10824/2003_Int-
l_Lis_Annotation_Maronier-Kramer.pdf  (accessed 9 September 2012). 
424
 Oestreicher Y Recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments: analysis and 
guidelines for a new international convention (Unpublished SJD Dissertation, Duke University School of 
Law, 2004) 126. 
425
 See, for example, Montevideo Convention (note 331), Article 2(d); 1971 Hague Convention (note 309) art 
4(1). The Brussels, Lugano and 2005 Hague Conventions are all double conventions, and for the recognition 
and enforces provisions to apply, the court had to have jurisdiction under the Convention. For example, 
Article 8(1) provides that a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive 
choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States’. 
426
  See para 4.4 above.   
427
 Juenger (note 168)15. 
428
 Casad (note 2305) 13; Forsyth (note 8) 431. 
429
  The complexity and sensitivity of the jurisdiction issue may be illustrated by the unsuccessful attempt of The 
Hague Conference to conclude an international convention on the topic. Instead of a comprehensive 
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that the efficacy of a foreign judgment ought not to depend on the internal law of either 
country: instead, they seek to ascertain whether the foreign court had ‘jurisdiction in the 
international sense’.430 
 
Weintraub
431
 suggests that it is almost certain that the bases that will be approved for general 
jurisdiction are the domicile, or habitual residence of an individual, and the principal place of 
incorporation of a company,
432
 as well as knowing and voluntary consent either before or 
after suit is brought (‘submission’).433 
 
An analysis of the statutory provisions for enforcement indicates that the grounds for 
international competence of the Botswana, South African and Namibian Acts
434
 are similar, 
and analogous to those contained in the 1933 UK Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act.
435
 It is suggested that these grounds form the basis of the grounds on 
which a court would be deemed to have had jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement.
436
 
 
Should negotiating parties be unable to agree on all the proposed grounds of jurisdiction, and 
only be able to reach consensus on a limited number of specific grounds of jurisdiction,
437
 
these specific grounds of jurisdiction could be used as building blocks for a comprehensive 
new instrument. An alternative solution may be for the bases of jurisdiction to be separated 
into optional chapters. This would complement a uniform regime on recognition and 
enforcement and would apply only as between States that have accepted each jurisdictional 
basis. This option may provide an option that would give Contracting States the ability to 
‘pick and choose’ from the acceptable list of jurisdictional grounds if they are unable to agree 
                                                                                                                                                        
judgments recognition and enforcement convention, negotiating parties at The Hague Conference were only 
able to conclude a narrow convention focusing on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement in express 
choice of law agreements, in such a way that the Convention has been described as ‘the elephant that gave 
birth to a mouse’: Talpis J & Krnjevic N ‘The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of June 
30, 2005: The elephant that gave birth to a mouse’ (2006) 13(1) Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in 
the Americas 1. 
430
 This is similar to the wording used in other common law countries: see Juenger (note 168)16. 
431
 Weintraub (note 317) 198. 
432
  Weintraub (note 317) 198. 
433
  It is widely recognised that submission by the defendant to the jurisdiction of the foreign court grants to that 
court international competence: see Forsyth (note 230) 395. 
434
  Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(3); South Africa Act (note 189) s 7(5); Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(5). 
435
  See para 2.2.3 above. Swaziland and Lesotho’s Acts do not include any references as to when a rendering 
court would be deemed to have jurisdiction for the purposes of registering a foreign judgment. 
436
  See para 5 below. 
437
 Hague Conference ‘Ongoing work on international litigation and possible continuation of the Judgments 
Project’ Preliminary Document No 5 of March 2012 (2012) 16.  
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on the bases of jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention. Such an agreement may 
encourage a wider acceptance of a future instrument.
438
 However, it is submitted that in light 
of the similarities for the grounds of jurisdiction for enforcement in the statutes of the SACU 
Member States, that this option should not be necessary. 
 
4.6 Other matters the Convention may include 
4.6.1 Interpretation of the Convention 
Uniformity of interpretation has been suggested to be an ideal of judicial process which aims 
to achieve uniformity of result in private international law cases.
439
 The adoption of a 
uniform interpretation across all relevant legal systems requires the further step of the 
unification of the interpretation process.
440
 
 
Formal unification of the rules on recognition and enforcement by means of an international 
convention alone does not mean that there will be uniformity of decision - the courts of the 
legal systems, although applying identical rules, may apply them differently and disharmony 
of decisions will result.
441
 For example, in the absence of a supranational institution capable 
of ensuring uniform interpretation, there is always a risk that it will be interpreted differently 
in each State.
442
 
 
There are a number of ways in which uniform interpretation may be achieved:
443
 One method 
is to create an international court or tribunal, similar to the International Court of Justice, 
designed to finally determine the ‘true’ interpretation of the law. This may require national 
                                                 
438
 Hague Conference (note 416) 16. 
439
 Forsyth (note 230) 108. 
440
 Forsyth (note 230) 108. 
441
 Forsyth (note 231) 104. 
442
 Interpretation of the language of the harmonising instruments is one of the major problems EU Member 
States have to face; and it was also foreseen that the Hague Convention would have to face similar if not 
bigger problems, since there are considerably more members in the Hague Conference.  Added to this 
problem would be the cultural, legal and social diversity among the Member States that could complicate the 
interpretation process by creating the risk of conflicting judgments: see Woestehoff K The drafting process 
for a Hague Convention on jurisdiction and judgments with special consideration of intellectual property 
and e-commerce (Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Georgia School of Law) available online at 
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/54 (accessed 5 September 2012) 37-8; Bonell MJ ‘International 
Uniform Law in Practice – Or where the real trouble begins’ (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative 
Law  867.  
443
 Felemegas J 'The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and 
Uniform Interpretation' (2001) available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas.html(accessed 
26 November 2012). 
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courts to postpone their decisions until the international body has decided the ‘true’ 
interpretation and then decide the case in accordance with that judgement. This is for 
example the approach that has been adopted in the EU, namely the final settlement by the 
ECJ of a disputed interpretation of the Brussels Convention/Regulation for all Member 
States: The 1968 Brussels Convention achieved this as it was accompanied by an Additional 
Protocol and a Joint Declaration on Interpretation. Member States recognised the importance 
of uniformly applying the Convention and expressed concern that each Member State might 
apply or interpret provisions differently, which would undermine the usefulness of the 
Convention, which was intended to remove inconsistencies among Member States. They 
concluded that there was a need to ensure a uniform interpretation of the Convention and 
decided to give the ECJ jurisdiction to interpret the Convention: The ECJ decisions that deal 
with problems of interpretation of the Brussels Convention/Regulation contribute to the 
clarification of the Brussels Regime and make it more dependable, workable and fully 
developed.
444
 This method may be ill-suited to commercial law where businessmen prefer 
quick, efficient and less costly means of settling disputes.
445
 
 
Alternatively, the Convention may include a section of defined terms: the drafters of the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
446
 favoured a 
decentralised enforcement mechanism whereby the interpretation and application of the 
uniform law is entrusted to national courts and international arbitrators without transnational 
review.
447
   
 
Elaborate arrangements for uniform interpretation are made within the Lugano Convention, 
amongst others, the Contracting Parties did not wish to entrust the interpretation of the 
Convention to the ECJ.
448
 The similarities between the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano 
Convention, on the other hand, suggested there was clearly a strong case for ensuring that 
diverging interpretations of these very similar texts did not create confusion and destroy 
                                                 
444
 Woestehoff (note 442) 12; Forsyth (note 230) 108; Russel KA ‘Exorbitant jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments: the Brussels system as an impetus for the United States action’ (1993) 19 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 65; Bonell (note 442) 868. 
445
 Osborne PJ ‘Unification or harmonisation: A critical analysis of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale Of Goods 1980’ (2006) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/osborne.html#int (accessed 26 November 2012). 
446
 Convention on the International Sale of Goods signed at Vienna, 1 April 1980 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
447
 Gerhart PM 'The Sales Convention in Courts: Uniformity, adaptability and adoptability' in Sarcevic P 
&Volken P (eds) The International Sale of Goods Revisited (2001) 77. 
448
 Forsyth (note 230) 105. 
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uniformity between the EU and EFTA. It was also felt that a judge grappling with the 
difficult point of interpretation of the Lugano Convention should not be denied the guidance 
available from decisions of other Contracting States on that point or the decisions of the ECJ 
deciding similar points under the Brussels Convention.
449
 Accordingly, the Convention is 
accompanied by Protocol 2 on the Uniform Interpretation of the Convention.
450
 The Protocol 
provides that the courts of each Contracting State must, when applying and interpreting the 
provisions of the Convention, pay due account to the principles laid down by any relevant 
decisions delivered by courts of the other Contracting States concerning provisions of the 
Convention, as well as by the ECJ.
451
 The Protocol also provides for a system for the 
exchange of information on ‘judgments delivered pursuant to this Convention as well as 
relevant judgments under the Brussels Convention’.452 The system of exchange of 
information is based essentially on transmission by each Contracting State to a central body, 
which it was decided should be the Registrar of the Court of Justice, of judgments delivered 
under the Lugano Convention and the Brussels Convention; classification of those judgments 
by the central body; and communication of the relevant documents by the central body to the 
competent national authorities of the Contracting States and to the European Commission.
453
 
The Protocol also set up a Standing Committee consisting of representatives of the 
Contracting States to review the operation of the Convention and to make 
recommendations.
454
 
 
Uniformity of interpretation may be promoted by the use of the increasingly common 
practice of inserting provisions in international conventions or uniform laws requiring the 
national judge to take account of their international character and of the need to promote their 
uniform application when interpreting them, and in the case of lacunae, to refer in the first 
place to the ‘general principles’ to be derived from the text of the uniform law itself, and to 
resort only in the last instance to their own or any other State’s domestic law.455 
 
                                                 
449
 Forsyth (note 230) 105. 
450
  Lugano Convention (note 302) Article 65. Protocol available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/lug02-idx.htm  (accessed 26 November 2012). 
451
 Lugano Protocol (note 450) art 1(1). 
452
 Lugano Protocol (note 450) art 2. 
453
  Jenard Report (note 310) 54.  
454
 Lugano Protocol (note 450) art 3. 
455
 Bonell (note 442) 867. See, for example Article 23 of the 2005 Hague Convention which provides that ‘In 
the interpretation of this Convention, regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application’. 
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In LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol Case 29/76) [1976] the 
ECJ was requested whether, for purposes of interpreting the term ‘civil and commercial 
matters’, reference should be made to the law of the State where the judgment was rendered 
or to the law of the State where enforcement is sought. The ECJ held that an autonomous 
definition should be given to this phrase:  
‘The concept in question must…be regarded as independent and must be interpreted by 
reference, first to the objectives and scheme of the convention and, secondly, to the 
general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems’.456 
 
It is clear that the ultimate aim towards which uniform laws are directed, namely the setting 
up of uniform legal regimes in respect of the subject matter covered by them, would be 
seriously compromised if the uniform laws were applied differently within the different legal 
systems, once accepted by the contracting States.
457
 While as a general rule there should be a 
tendency to apply the prevailing interpretation arising at a regional level, there may however 
well be valid reason to depart from foreign precedents and to look for more accurate and 
progressive solutions in the national laws of Member States.
458
 
 
A further example of a regional economic organisation which has awarded the interpretation 
function to a regional court is OHADA, which consist of a Council of Ministers and a 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). The Council of Ministers is assisted by a 
Permanent Secretary Office, to which is attached a Regional High Judiciary School 
(ERUSMA).
459
 The OHADA Treaty awards the interpretive function of Uniform Acts to the 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). Legal harmonisation is effected through 
the issuing of Uniform Acts, the adoption which requires unanimous approval of the 
representatives of the Contracting States.
460
 Uniform Acts are directly applicable and 
overriding in the Contracting States, notwithstanding any conflict they may give rise to in 
respect of previous or subsequent enactment of municipal laws.
461
 The effect of this article is 
to abrogate and prohibit any future national legislative or regulatory provisions which has the 
                                                 
456
  LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol, (Case 29/76) [1976] 1541, 1550. 
457
 Bonell (note 442) 879. 
458
 Bonell (note 442) 879. 
459
  Treaty on the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (JO OHADA N° 4), 1 November 1997 available at 
http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/HTML/legal_review/Annexes/Annexes%20III/Annex%20III-
06.pdf  accessed on 17 April 2013 [‘OHADA Treaty’] art 3. 
460
 OHADA Treaty (note 459) art 8. 
461
 OHADA Treaty (note 459) art 10. 
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same purpose as the Uniform Acts, and which conflict with these.
462
 This is a complete 
judicial system that is supranational within the OHADA territory and operates parallel to the 
national systems. The CCJA offers a forum for international arbitration, and also serves as the 
court of laws for judgments rendered and arbitrations instituted within member states.
463
 The 
CCJA represents a transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational authority, because it 
preserves the uniformity of the OHADA laws through its final say on matters concerning the 
application thereof.
464
 OHADA represents an example of the willingness of African 
governments to relinquish sovereignty to promote economic development, as Member States 
have given up some degree of national sovereignty in order to establish a single regime of 
uniform business laws.
465
 
 
It is recommended that the mandate of the SACU Tribunal be extended to include 
interpretation of the proposed Recognition and Enforcement Convention.
466
 The 2002 SACU 
Agreement provides for an ad hoc Tribunal, composed of three members, except as otherwise 
determined by the Council, to settle any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of 
the Agreement, or any dispute arising thereunder at the request of the Council.
467
 
 
4.6.2 Conflicting Judgments 
The proposed Convention should ideally indicate which of two conflicting foreign judgments 
are entitled to recognition and enforcement.
468
 The laws of the SACU Member States do not 
include a provision regulating conflicting judgments in their recognition and enforcement 
statutes.
469
 Mortensen,
470
 however, suggest that for any scheme that categorises litigation 
between courts exclusively of their own discretion, a simple statutory direction for the 
                                                 
462
  Martor B Business law in Africa OHADA and the harmonisation process (2002) 21. Uniform Acts enter into 
force 90 days after their adoption, and may be relied upon against any party 30 days after publication in the 
OHADA official journal (art 9). 
463
 Dickerson CM ‘OHADA calls the tune’ (2005) 44 Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 56. 
464
 Dickerson (note 463) 56. 
465
 Dickerson (note 463) 56. 
466
  See para 3 art 7 below. 
467
 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of 
Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa and the 
Kingdom of Swaziland signed on 21 October 2002 in Gaborone, Botswana art 13; See Chapter 1 para. 2.2. 
468
  Weintraub (note 317) 217. 
469
  See Chapter 2, above. 
470
  Mortensen R ‘The Hague and the Ditch: The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area and the Choice of Court 
Convention’ (2009) 5(2) Journal of Private International Law 228.   
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treatment of incompatible judgments would seem a worthwhile precaution.
471
 Countries 
differ as to whether the judgment that prevails is the first or the last in time.
472
 The common 
law rule is that the court (with a recognised jurisdiction) that rendered the judgment first is 
the court that makes the issue in dispute res judicata, and subsequent judgments should give 
way to its judgment.
473
 This may discourage post-judgment attempts by disappointed litigants 
to obtain better result in another forum.
474
 Another possibility is to select the judgment 
resulting from the suit first filed in order to ‘discourage multiple lawsuits between the same 
parties’.475 
 
Most legal systems allow the court addressed to refuse to give effect to a foreign judgment if 
it is irreconcilable with a previous judgment. The Brussels Regulation
476
 selects the earlier 
judgment - a judgment will not be recognised if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a 
dispute between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought; or if it 
is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third State 
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier 
judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State 
addressed.
477
 
 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention
478
 gives separate treatment to the case where the 
conflicting judgment is from the same State as that in which proceedings are brought to 
enforce the judgment of the chosen court, and where the conflicting judgment is from another 
State. In the former case, the existence of a conflicting judgment as such constitutes a ground 
on which recognition of the judgment of the chosen court may be refused. In the latter case, 
the conflicting judgment must have been given before the judgment of the chosen court; it 
must also involve the same cause of action and fulfil the conditions required for its 
recognition in the requested State. In neither case, however, is the court obliged to recognise 
the conflicting judgment or to refuse recognition to the judgment of the chosen court.
479
 
 
                                                 
471
  Mortensen (note 470) 228.   
472
  Juenger (note 168) 25. 
473
  Mortensen  (note 470) 228. 
474
  Weintraub (note 317) 217. 
475
  Juenger (note 168) 25. 
476
  Brussels I Regulation (note 309) art 34(4) and (5). 
477
  Brussels I Regulation (note 309) art 34(4) and (5). 
478
  2005 Hague Convention (note 309) art 9. 
479
  Hartley Dogauchi Report (note 309) 22. 
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The Trans-Tasman Regime has been criticised as it is silent on the point.
480
 The Working 
Group took the view that there was no need to legislate for incompatible judgments.
481
 
 
Although none of the SACU Member States include a provision pertaining to conflicting 
judgments in their recognition and enforcement statutes, based on the above discussion, it is 
recommended that the proposed Convention should include a provision dealing with 
conflicting judgments.
482
 
 
Having set out the main principles, following is a proposed text for a convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments for SACU Member States. The 
recommended provisions are based on comparisons of the statutory provisions currently in 
force in all SACU Member States. In certain instances where the present situation is 
unsatisfactory, recommendations are made for improvement.  
 
5 PROPOSED TEXT FOR A CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
 
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT  
OF FOREIGN CIVIL JUDGMENTS 
 
 
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, THE 
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO, THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, THE REPUBLIC 
OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND 
 
RECOGNISING the obligations of Member States to facilitate the cross-border 
movement of goods between the territories of the Member States;
483
 
  
RECALLING their commitment to promote the integration of Member States into 
the global economy through enhanced trade and investment;
484
  
 
                                                 
480
  This is because the Australian scheme, which has been extended to New Zealand to form the Trans-Tasman 
Scheme, is silent on the point: Mortensen (note 470) 228. 
481
 Australia (Attorney-General’s Department) and New Zealand (Ministry of Justice) Trans-Tasman Court 
Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement – A Report by the Trans-Tasman Working Group Common 
Wealth of Australia, Canberra 2006 (referred to as ‘Trans –Tasman Working Group Report’) 18. 
482
  See para 3, proposed art 5(2)(b) below.  
483
 2002 SACU Agreement (note 469) art 2(a). 
484
 2002 SACU Agreement (note 469) art 2(f). 
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RECOGNISING that certain differences between national rules governing 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement hamper the facilitation of trade  
 
FURTHER RECOGNISING the need to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction 
and to simplify the formalities governing the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments from Member States
485
  
 
Hereby agree as follows: 
 
1. Scope 
 
(1) This Convention shall apply to judgments rendered in civil proceedings from any 
court
486
 of a Contracting State, for the payment of an amount of money not being 
for the payment of any tax, duty or charge of a like nature or of any fine or other 
penalty,
487
 provided -  
 
(a) it is final and conclusive as between the parties thereto,488 and  
(b) it is enforceable by execution in the Contracting State where the judgment was 
given.
489
 
 
(2) A judgment shall be deemed to be final and conclusive notwithstanding that an 
appeal may be pending against it, or that it may still be subject to appeal in the 
courts of the State of origin.
490
 
 
(3) Contracting States may declare, when ratifying the Convention that it shall also 
apply to judgments ordering compensation for damages resulting from an 
offence.
491
 
                                                 
485
 See Brussels I Regulation (note 309) Recital 1. 
486
  The Botswana (s 3(2), Swaziland (s 3) and Lesotho (s 3(1)) the statutes only apply to judgments which were 
rendered by superior courts. The South African (s 1) and Namibian (s 1) statutes applies to judgments from 
superior or inferior courts. In order to facilitate the enforcement of judgments in the SACU, it is 
recommended that the Convention apply to judgments rendered by inferior or superior courts, provided the 
other requirements under the Convention are met. 
487
  See para 4.1 above. 
488
  See para 4.2 above. 
489
  See para 4.2 above. 
490
  See Botswana Act (note 160) s 3(3); South Africa Act (189) s 7(1) and Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(1). 
491
  The South African, Swaziland and Lesotho statutes only include civil proceedings, while the Namibia (s 1) 
and Botswana s 2(1); statutes include payments in respect of compensation or damages to any aggrieved 
party in any criminal proceedings’. South Africa’s Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 for example provides 
that where a person is convicted by a superior court, a regional court or a magistrate’s court of an offence 
which has caused damage to or loss of property (including money) belonging to some other person, the court 
in question may award the injured person compensation for such damage or loss: art 300(1). Payment of 
money for damages and compensation falls within the area of civil law, and it is therefore possible to include 
these in a Convention dealing with ‘civil and commercial matters’. Bartlett further suggests that it is not 
uncommon for a criminal court to decide civil issues along with criminal ones, especially in the case of 
automobile accidents: see Bartlett (note 330) 48. 
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(4) The Convention shall not apply to - 
(a) orders for the periodic payment of maintenance492 and 
(b) awards rendered by an arbitral tribunal.493 
 
 
2. Recognition and Enforcement 
 
(1) A judgment given in a State bound by this Convention and enforceable in that 
State shall be recognised and enforced in another State bound by this Convention, 
once it has been registered there.
494
 
 
(2) Any judgment to which the Convention applies will be registered, after an 
application to that effect has been made by the judgment creditor,
 495
 including a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 It is suggested that if parties are unable to reach agreement on whether they are willing to include or exclude 
payments for compensation or damages, the approach of the Montevideo Convention be followed: see 
Montevideo Convention (note 317) art 1.  
492
 The South African (s 1) and Namibian (s 1) Acts exclude periodical payment of sums of money towards 
maintenance. The view of the SALRC is supported in this regard, namely that instead of including 
maintenance awards in an instrument on recognition and enforcement, States should accede to the Hague 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations: see  
SALRC Report (note 189) 7. 
 The Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to 
Maintenance Obligations entered into force on 1 August 1973. It currently has 24 Contracting States none of 
which are SACU Member States: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=85 
(accessed 21 February 2013). The Convention applies to decisions of judicial administrative authorities in 
Contracting State in respect of maintenance obligations arising from a family relationship, parentage, 
marriage or affinity, including a maintenance obligation towards an infant who is not legitimate (art 1). The 
Convention provides that a decision rendered in Contracting States shall be recognised or enforced in other 
Contracting States, provided it was rendered by an authority that has jurisdiction under the Convention, and 
it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review in the State of Origin (art 4). Recognition or enforcement 
may only be refused on the grounds of public policy, fraud in connection with a matter of procedure, 
pending litigation in the requested State; and incompatibility with an earlier decision between the same 
parties on the same cause of action (art 5). 
493
  The Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana Acts include arbitration proceedings: See para 4.1. It is suggested 
that for the purposes of international uniformity, the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards should 
continue to be governed by the established international regime, the New York Convention, and therefore 
not included in the scope of the proposed instrument. States which are not party to the New York 
Convention – in this instance Swaziland and Namibia – should be encouraged to accede to that Convention: 
UNCITRAL ‘New York Convention – Status’ available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (accessed 4 
October 2012). 
494
  See para 4.2 above. See further, for example, the Brussels I Regulation which provides for that judgments 
will be enforceable upon a declaration of enforceability, except in the UK, where a judgment shall be 
enforced in England and Wales, in Scotland, or in Northern Ireland when, on the application of any 
interested party, it has been registered for enforcement in that part of the United Kingdom: Brussels I 
Regulation (note 309) art 38. 
495
  The Statutes differ on the time period within which an application to have a judgment registered should be 
made: The Botswana judgment provides that the application should be made within six years after the date 
of judgment (s 5(1); see para 3.2.4 above). In terms of Swaziland and Lesotho’s Statutes, however, the 
application must be made within twelve months after the date of the judgment, or such longer period as the 
Court may allow (Swaziland s 3(1); Lesotho s 3(1)). The South African and Namibian Acts do not expressly 
provide for a time in which a judgment creditor may apply to have a judgment registered, but a judgment 
will be set aside if ‘that the judgment has become prescribed either under the laws of [the enforcing State] or 
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person in whom rights under the judgment has become vested
496
 to the relevant 
court in the Contracting State in which enforcement is sought.
497
 
 
(3) The relevant court in of the Contracting State in which enforcement is sought shall 
be determined by the rules of jurisdiction of that State.  
 
(4) The procedure for making an application for registration, including the matters to 
be provided on an application for the registration of a judgment and mode of 
providing those matters;
498
 shall be governed by the law of the Member State in 
which enforcement is sought.
499
 
 
(5) Notice of the registration shall be provided to the judgment debtor,500 provided 
that the method by which the notice shall be served on the debtor shall be 
governed by the law of the Contracting State in which enforcement is sought.
501
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the designated country concerned’: see South Africa s 3(1); Namibia s 3(1). It is recommended that a 
judgment should be enforced under the Convention as long as it is enforceable in the rendering state: see art 
1 of the proposed Convention, above.  
496
  All the statutes either provide that the application to have a judgment registered must be made by the 
judgment creditor under a judgment to which the Act applies (Swaziland s 3(1); Lesotho s 3(1); Botswana s 
5(1)), or that the registration of a judgment will be set aside if the rights vested under the judgments are not 
vested in the person who applied for its registration: Botswana (s 7(1)); South Africa (s 5(1)); Namibia (s 
5(1)). In terms of the current statutory provisions, an application to be set aside must be made by the 
judgment creditor, including a person in whom rights under the judgment have become vested. 
497
 The current statutory provisions provide for registration with the High Courts of Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Botswana, but the magistrate’s courts of South Africa and Namibia: See para 4.3 above. As a result of the 
limited jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Courts in South Africa and Namibia, it is recommended that the 
proposed Convention not be limited to magistrate’s courts, but apply to High Courts, as is the case with the 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In terms of the Namibian and South African statutes, the court of a 
designated country, include the Supreme or High court or magistrate’s court (including a regional court) of 
that country (South Africa s1; Namibia s 1).  
498
  See, e.g., Swaziland Rules of Court which provide that the application must be supported by an affidavit of 
the facts exhibiting the judgment or a verified or certified copy of the judgment, and stating that to the best 
of the information and belief of the deponent the judgment creditor is entitled to enforce such judgment and 
that such judgment does not fall with any of the cases in terms of the Act under which a judgment cannot be 
registered (Rule 2), as well as the full name, title, trade or business, and the usual or last known place of 
abode or business of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor respectively (Rule 3); Lesotho contains the 
same requirements to be provided (see Rule 2). 
499
  See, for example, Brussels I Regulation (note 309) art 40. 
500
  South Africa s 3(2); Namibia s 3(2); Botswana s 6(1)(c); Lesotho Rule 9; Swaziland Rule 10. 
501
  See eg. Swaziland Rules of Court which provide that notice in writing of the judgment must be served on the 
judgment debtor within a reasonable time of such a registration, provided that such notice shall (in the 
absence of an order by Court as to the mode of service thereof) be served on the judgment debtor by personal 
service, but the Court may at any stage of the proceedings authorise or direct some other mode of service, 
and if it does so the service shall be effected in accordance with such authority: Rule 10. The Lesotho Rules 
of Court also provides for notice in writing of the registration of the judgment within reasonable time; but 
provide that notice must be served in the same manner as a summons is required to be served, but the court 
may at any time otherwise direct: Rule 9. The South African (s 3(3) and Namibian (s 3(3)) Acts provide that 
the notice must be served on the judgment debtor by the judgment creditor in the manner prescribed for the 
service of proceedings, except that the Namibian Act provide that the notice must be served by the 
Messenger of the Court. It is recommended this should be left to be determined by law of the State in which 
enforcement is sought, as once a judgment is registered, as a judgment will be for the purposes of execution, 
be of the same force and effect as if the judgment had been a judgment originally given in the registering 
court and entered on the date of registration (not the date of application). This is in line with the current 
provisions in Member States’ statutes.  
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3. Effect of registration 
 
(1) A registered judgment will have the same effect as of the date of registration, as a 
civil judgment of the enforcing court,     
(a) proceedings may be taken on a it;  
(b) the sum for which a judgment is registered shall carry interest, as determined 
by the law of the requested State;
502
 and 
(c) the registering court shall have the same control over the execution of a 
registered judgment as it has over any civil judgment of its own.
503
 
 
(2) If any amount payable under a judgment registered under the Convention is given 
in a currency other than the currency of the State in which enforcement is sought, 
the judgment shall be registered as if it were a judgment for such amount in the 
currency of the requested State, calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing at the 
date of the judgment.
504
 
 
 
4. Stay of execution of a registered judgment 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, the execution of a judgment may be 
stayed on an application by the judgment debtor to the registering court, if the 
                                                 
502
  The South African (s 3(4)) and Namibian (s 3(4)) Acts provide that the interest shall be calculated at the rate 
prescribed under s 1 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act, 1975, or the rate fixed by the court of the 
designated country, whichever is the lower (emphasis added). Section 1 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest 
Act provides that if a debt bears interest and the rate at which the interest is to be calculated is calculated at 
the rate prescribed by the Minister of Justice by notice in the Gazette (s 1(1)-(2)) which is currently 15,5% 
per annum: See General Notice R1814 in Government Gazette 15143 of 1 October 1993. The matter is 
governed in Botswana by the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act (Cap 11:05), which commenced on 25 August 
1978 and in Lesotho by the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act No.55 of 1975. 
503
  Botswana (note 160) s 5(2)(d); see also South Africa Act (note 189) s 4(1); Namibia Act (note 247) s 4(1); 
Swaziland Act (note 99) s 3(3); and Lesotho Proclamation (note 129) s 3(3), the latter two Acts which also 
provide that reasonable costs of an incidental to the registration of the judgment (including the costs of 
obtaining a certified copy thereof from the original court and of the application for registration) shall be 
recoverable in a like manner as if they were sums payable under the judgment.  
504
  The fact that most statutes requires a judgment to be ‘for the payment of an amount of money’, provision is 
made for the method of calculating the exchange rate, if the amount is expressed in a currency other than that 
of the enforcing state. Swaziland and Lesotho’s Acts are silent on the matter.  Botswana and South Africa’s 
Acts provide that the the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the judgment of the original court will be 
used to calculate the sum payable (Botswana s 5(5); South Africa s 3(4)), but the Namibian Act provides that 
the amount shall be calculated at the rate of exchange on the date of the registration (s 3(5)). It is 
recommended that the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the judgment is used, so as to prevent the 
judgment creditor who is seeking enforcement, and who is the will have to apply for registration and 
therefore determine the time at which to apply, not to use the fluctuations in the exchange rates to the 
detriment of the judgment debtor and to prevent him from applying for registration at a time where he will 
benefit most from the prevailing exchange rates.    
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judgment debtor satisfies the court either that an appeal is pending, or that he is 
entitled to and intends to appeal against the judgment.
505
 
 
 
5. Refusal of recognition or enforcement 
 
(1) A judgment will506 not be recognised or enforced under this Convention if 507 –  
 
(a) the courts of the Contracting State that rendered the judgment had no 
jurisdiction to hear the case, as determined by this Convention;
508
 
(b) the notice of proceedings was not brought to the attention of the defendant in 
the original proceedings in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him 
to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant entered an appearance and 
presented his case without contesting notification in the court of origin, 
provided that the law of the State of origin permitted notification to be 
contested;
509
 
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud, or deliberate dishonesty or deliberate 
wrongdoing;
510
 and 
(d) the enforcement of the judgment would be manifestly contrary to law or 
public policy in the State where enforcement is sought.
511
  
 
(2) A judgment will also not be recognised or enforced –512 
 
a) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same 
parties in the Contracting State in which enforcement is sought; 
 
b) if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Contracting 
State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the 
                                                 
505
  This is in line with existing provisions in Member States’ states. Although art 1 of the proposed Convention 
requires that a judgment should be final and conclusive as between the parties thereto, the statutes of Lesotho 
(s 3(2)), and Swaziland (s 3(2)) provide that a judgment will not be registered if the court is satisfied either 
that an appeal is pending, or that he is entitled to and intends to appeal against the judgment; the South 
African (s 6) and Namibian Acts (s 6) also provide that execution may be stayed if the court is satisfied that 
an appeal is pending, or that the applicant is entitled and intends to appeal against the judgment: see para 
3.4.4, and 3.5.4 above. This provision is therefore included to satisfy this requirement and afford parties an 
opportunity to stay proceedings if they are entitled to and intends to appeal against the judgment.  
506
 It is recommended that in order to promote the greatest degree of legal certainty, States should not be 
afforded discretion but should be required to refuse recognition and enforcement based on the provisions of 
the Convention as negotiated and agreed to by Member States.  
507
  The Convention should state explicitly that recognition and enforcement may only be refused for the 
grounds listed in the Convention. It is suggested that an overriding principle should be that if the procedures 
in the rendering court were fair, which should be presumed among states willing to enter into a judgments 
convention, the judgment should be recognised and enforced: Lowenfeld (note 168) 291. 
508
  See para 4.5 above.  
509
  See para 4.4.1 above.  
510
  See para 4.4.2 above. 
511
  See para 4.4.3 above.  
512
 This recommendation is based on art 34 of the Brussels I Regulation (note 309).  
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same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions 
necessary for its recognition in the State where enforcement is sought.
513
 
 
 
6. Jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement514 
 
(1) The court of the Contracting State which rendered the judgment shall be 
considered to have had jurisdiction for the purposes of recognition and 
enforcement under this Convention, if -:
515
 
 
(a) the judgment debtor- 
i. was the plaintiff or plaintiff in reconvention in the proceedings or 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment was 
given by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings for any purpose 
other than protecting or obtaining the release of property seized or 
threatened with seizure in the proceedings or contesting the jurisdiction 
of that court; 
 
ii. was a defendant in the proceedings and had, before the commencement 
of the proceedings, agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the 
proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of a court of the Contracting 
State having jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the 
proceedings, in accordance with its domestic laws; or 
 
iii. was a defendant and, at the institution of the proceedings, resident in, 
or being a juristic person, had its principal place of business in, such 
Contracting State, or at any time had an office or place of business in 
such Contracting State through or at which the transaction to which the 
proceedings relate, was effected; 
 
(b) in any action relating to immovable property, or in an action in rem of which 
the subject matter was movable property,
516
 the property is situated in the 
Contracting State in which the proceedings were instituted; 
                                                 
513
  The provision that the court addressed may refuse to give effect to a foreign judgment if it is irreconcilable 
with a previous judgment is usually subject to several conditions: First, a definition of what is meant by 
‘irreconcilable decisions’: these will be two decisions providing contradictory rights and obligations for the 
parties to the case. Secondly, if the decision with which the foreign judgment concerned cannot be 
reconciled also comes from abroad, both judgments must have successfully passed the tests for the 
verification of foreign judgments, either under the ordinary law of the State addressed, if the judgment 
comes from a non-Contracting State, or under the Convention itself if the judgment comes from a court in a 
State Party: Kessedjian Report (note 302) 50-1; see also para 4.6.2 above. 
514
  Based on the similarities in the grounds of jurisdiction in SACU Member States’ national laws, it is 
recommended that a strict double convention be used, containing a white and a black list, and that no other 
grounds for assuming jurisdiction should be permitted: See Chapter 2, para 5.1 above. 
515
 Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(2); South Africa Act (note 189) s 7(4); Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(4). These 
provisions are analogous to those contained in the Foreign Judgments Act (note 42).  
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(c) in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), 
the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment was given is recognised by 
the law of the Enforcing State. 
 
(2) The court of the Contracting State in which the judgment was given shall, for  the 
purposes of section 5, be deemed not to have had jurisdiction- 
 
(a) in proceedings relating to immovable property situated outside such 
Contracting State; 
 
(b) except in the cases referred to in subsections (1)(a)(i) and (ii), in proceedings 
instituted in contravention of an agreement under which the dispute in 
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in the courts of such 
Contracting State; or 
 
(c) in proceedings in which the person against whom the judgment was given was 
under the rules of public international law entitled to immunity from 
jurisdiction of the courts of such designated country, and the person did not 
submit to such jurisdiction.
517
 
 
 
7. Interpretation 
 
(1) The Southern African Customs Union Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to give 
rulings on the interpretation of this Convention.
518
 
 
(2) The High Court of a Contracting State may request the Southern African Customs 
Union Tribunal to give a ruling on a question of interpretation of the Convention 
if judgments given by the courts of that State conflict with the interpretation given 
either by Southern African Customs Union Tribunal or in a judgment of one of the 
courts of another Contracting State. 
 
(3) The interpretation given by the Southern African Customs Union Tribunal in 
response to such a request shall not affect the judgments which gave rise to the 
request for interpretation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
516
  See Botswana Act (note 160) s 7(3). 
517
 Botswana (note 160) s 7(3); South Africa Act (note 189) s 7(5); Namibia Act (note 247) s 7(5) contain 
similar provisions in this regards, which is similar to the jurisdiction provisions contained in the Foreign 
Judgments  Act (note 42). 
518
  See para 4.6.1 above. 
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(4) The head of the judiciary or other competent authority of the Contracting State519 
shall be entitled to request a ruling from the Southern African Customs Union 
Tribunal on interpretation in accordance with paragraph 3. 
 
(5) The Registrar of the Southern African Customs Union Tribunal shall give notice 
of the request for interpretation to Contracting States, to the Southern African 
Customs Union Commission; the parties so notified shall then be entitled within 
two months of the notification to submit statements of case or written observations 
to the Tribunal.  
 
(6) No fees shall be levied or any costs or expenses awarded in respect of the 
proceedings provided for in this Article.  
 
(7) The Rules of Procedure of the Southern African Customs Union Tribunal shall, if 
necessary, be adjusted and supplemented in accordance with Article 13
520
 of the 
Southern African Customs Union Agreement.
521
 
 
 
8. Final Clauses 
 
This Convention shall not affect other Conventions relating to the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments to which the Contracting States are already parties.  
 
 
9. Signature 
 
This Convention shall be open for signature by all Member States of the Southern 
African Customs Union.  
 
                                                 
519
 It is proposed that this be specified by Member States and listed in an Annexure to the Convention.  
520
 Article 13 of the SACU Agreement provides that:  
‘1. Any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement, or any dispute arising 
thereunder at the request of the Council, shall be settled by an ad hoc Tribunal.  
2. The Tribunal shall be composed of three members, except as otherwise determined by the Council.  
3. The Tribunal shall decide by majority vote and its decision shall be final and binding.  
4. The Tribunal shall, at the request of the Council, consider any issue and furnish the Council with its 
recommendations.  
5. In any matter referred to the Tribunal, the parties to the dispute shall choose the members of the Tribunal 
from amongst a pool of names, approved by the Council, and kept by the Secretariat.  
6. Member States party to any dispute or difference shall attempt to settle such dispute or difference 
amicable before referring the matter to the Tribunal.  
7. The Tribunal shall be assisted by the Secretariat in its work.  
8. The Tribunal shall determine its own rules of procedure’: see para 4.6.1 above. 
521
  See protocol of 3 June 1971on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 
1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters: arts 4 and 5. 
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This Convention shall remain open for accession by any other State.
522
 The 
instrument of accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the 
Southern African Customs Union.  
 
This Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the 
second instrument of ratification with the General Secretariat of the Southern African 
Customs Union.  
 
This Convention shall enter into force for each State which ratifies it subsequently on 
the sixtieth day after the deposit of its instrument or ratification.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
Some States may have concerns and reservations to joining a judgments recognition 
convention and thereby sacrificing some of their sovereignty.
523
 That attitude may be 
influenced by political reasons, but it has to be kept in mind that the requirements to be met 
for a judgment to be recognised and enforced
524
 still ensure that accession to a judgments 
Convention will not result in the automatic recognition and enforcement of all judgments 
from all Contracting States.
525
 It will, however, imply that debtors in terms of judgments 
given in one of the SACU Member States will have an expedited registration and 
enforcement procedure available to them, provided that certain requirements are met.
526
 
 
Challenges that are likely to be experienced with the introduction of a uniform law into the 
national laws of SACU Member States include challenges relating to interpretation,
527
 the 
need to provide translations of the text of the uniform law into the languages of the SACU 
Member States and the risk that these translations might not accurately reflect the original 
                                                 
522
 Whether the instrument should be open for ratification by any other State, or only AU, or even only SADC 
Member States will depend on the objectives of the instrument and priorities of Member States. If the 
facilitation and promotion of international trade is the main objective, then it is suggested that the instrument 
be open for accession to any State. However if the instrument is seen as a building block towards regional 
integration within the African continent, and specifically a building block in the development of the SADC 
(see Chapter 1, para 2.2), then accession should be open to SADC Member States.     
523
  See Chapter 1 para. 6.1 for a discussion of the sovereignty doctrine.  
524
  See par 4.2 above; arts 2 and 5 of the proposed text of the Convention. 
525
  The application of the Convention is limited by its scope (see art 1 of the proposed Convention), as well as 
the requirement for registration (art 2), and the grounds on which recognition and enforcement will be 
refused (art 5).  
526
  See para 4.4 above.  
527
  See para 4.6.1 above for suggestions how the challenges relating to interpretation may be addressed.  
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translation of the text.
528
 Further challenges may include reservations
529
 by SACU Member 
States when ratifying internationally negotiated agreements, which would limit their unifying 
effect from the outset.
530
 Furthermore, the different techniques employed to translate uniform 
law into domestic law and the possible distortions as a result of their incorporation into 
national legal systems;
531
 and finally the various bureaucratic obstacles which often stand in 
the way of a rapid ratification of internationally agreed rules.
532
 However, as a result of the 
shared legal tradition of the Contracting States to the proposed Convention, the similarities of 
their national statutes governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as 
well as the similarities between the text of the proposed Convention and the national 
statutes,
533
 it is expected that these challenges should not be significant.  
 
Non-governmental organisations, academic institutions and scholars have important roles to 
play in the negotiating process. To ensure the practical workability of any proposal for 
regional harmonisation, the cooperation and participation of international traders, business 
groups, trade associations and other business interests in the negotiating processes should 
also be obtained, and ensured that the concerns and views of these groups are aired and 
                                                 
528
 As a result of the common colonial heritage of SACU Member States and the fact that all SACU Member 
States recognise English as an official government or business language suggest that this challenge may be 
less significant than other regions with diverse languages: See Nations Online ‘Official and Spoken 
Languages of African Countries’ available at http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/african_languages.htm  
(accessed 28 May 2013).  
529
  Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 ILM 679 
defines a reservation as ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a state when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that estate.  
530
  A state may become a party to a multilateral treaty while maintaining a reservation which excludes or 
modifies the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State, provided that the 
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty: Dugard J International Law: A South 
African Perspective 3 ed (2005) 410.  
531
  In this regard, a distinction should be made between the monist and the dualist approaches to the place of 
international law in municipal law: the monist school argues that municipal courts are obliged to apply rules 
of international law directly without the need for any act of adoption by the courts or transformation by the 
legislature. For them, international law is incorporated into municipal law without any act of adoption by the 
courts or transformation by the legislature. Dualists, on the other hand, see international law and municipal 
law as completely different systems of law, with the result that international law may be applied by domestic 
courts only of ‘adopted’ by such courts or transformed into local law by legislation: See Dugard (note 530) 
59; Roodt C ‘National Law and Treaties’ (1987-8) South African Yearbook of International Law 72. The 
Constitution of South Africa, a dualistic state, for example provides that ‘the negotiating and signing of all 
international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive’ (s 231(1)); and ‘an international 
agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces’ (s 231(2)): Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
532
 Bonell (note 442) 867. 
533
  See para 4 and 5 above. 
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reflected in any proposals. Southern African trade organisations
534
 should participate in and 
effectively contribute to the development of commercial practices and customs in the region, 
as illustrated by the major role trade organisations had to play in Europe.
535
 
 
A comparison of the relevant recognition and enforcement statutes of SACU Member States, 
namely Swaziland,
536
 Lesotho,
537
 Botswana,
538
 South Africa
539
 and Namibia
540
 reveal a close 
similarity between them,
541
 and in many instances resemble to the 1920 UK Administration 
of Justice Act
542
 and the 1933 UK Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act.
543
 
 
The similarities in the statutes do not, however, guarantee a free-flow of judgments in the 
region – this is impeded by the requirement present in all statutes for a foreign state to be 
designated by the Executive under the domestic statute, which in turn often hinges on 
reciprocity.
544
 It is peculiar that a number of these statutes contain great similarities, and 
share a common legal heritage, but yet they do not designate each other under the respective 
statutes.
545
 
 
The current situation in which judgments from SACU Member States do not enjoy the benefit 
of the expedited enforcement of registration under the respective statutes, can be addressed 
by either designating all SACU Member States and each Statutory regime, or concluding a 
multilateral convention to which all SACU Member States would become Contracting 
Parties, which is recommended.
546
 Based on a comparison of the provisions contained in the 
respective statutes regarding the application or scope of the statute,
547
 the requirements for 
                                                 
534
 Such as Business Unity SA (BUSA); Business Leadership South Africa; South African Chamber of 
Commerce; (South Africa); the Namibia Chamber of Commerce; Namibian Agricultural Trade Forum 
(Namibia); Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Lesotho); Federation of Swaziland Employers and 
Chambers of Commerce; Swaziland Sugar Association (Swaziland); Botswana Chamber of Commerce, 
Industry and Manpower (Botswana). 
535
 Bamodu G ‘Transnational law, unification and harmonisation of international commercial law in Africa’ 
(1994) 38 Journal of African Law 137. 
536
  See para 3.1 above. 
537
  See para 3.2 above. 
538
  See para 3.3 above. 
539
  See para 3.4 above. 
540
  See para 3.5 above. 
541
  See para 4 above.  
542
  See para 2.1 above. 
543
  See para 2.2 above. 
544
  See para 4.1 above.  
545
  See para 4.1 above.  
546
  See para 4.1 above. 
547
  See para 4.1 above. 
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enforcement,
548
 the procedural requirements
549
 and the grounds on which registration will be 
refused,
550
 a proposal was made for a Draft SACU Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments.
551
 
 
 
                                                 
548
  See para 4.2 above. 
549
  See para 4.3 above. 
550
  See para 4.4 above. 
551
  See para 5 above. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT – THE NEED FOR A 
HARMONISED RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT REGIME 
 
While the European Union has the sophisticated Brussels Regime for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments;
1
 the European Free Trade Areas has the Lugano 
Convention;
2
 the United States of America has the full faith and credit clause;
3
 Australia and 
New Zealand has the Trans-Tasman Judicial System;
4
 and Latin America has the Montevideo 
and La Paz Conventions
5
 to regulate the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 
Southern Africa, or more specifically the SACU,
6
 has none.
7
  
 
The absence of a regional enforcement treaty means that the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in the SACU is left to the diverse national laws of Member States.
8
 The 
need for a harmonised recognition and enforcement regime in the SACU stems from the fact 
that different approaches to the recognition and enforcement and the risk of non-enforcement 
lead to legal uncertainty and increase transaction cost for prospective traders, which 
                                                 
1
  See Chapter 2, para 3.1. 
2
  See Chapter 2, para 3.1. 
3
  See Chapter 2, para 3.2. 
4
  See Chapter 2, para 3.3. 
5
  See Chapter 2, para 3.4. 
6
  See Chapter 1, para 2.2. 
7
  See Chapter 1, para 3.2. 
8
  See Chapter 1, para 3.2. 
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ultimately acts as a non-tariff barrier to trade. Trade is critical to Southern Africa, and all 
developing regions, and the ideal is that barriers to trade, of which uncertainty concerning 
recognition and enforcement of judgments is one, should be removed.
9
 Certainty, 
predictability, security of transactions, effective remedies and cost are important 
considerations in investment decision-making; and clear rules for allocating international 
jurisdiction and providing definite and expedited means of enforcing foreign judgments will 
facilitate inter-regional trade.
10
 
 
In addition to trade facilitation, a harmonised recognition and enforcement regime will 
consolidate economic and political integration in the SACU.
11
 An effective scheme for the 
mutual recognition and enforcement of civil judgments has been regarded as a feature of any 
economic integration initiative ‘likely to achieve significant integration’.12  
 
2 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HARMONISATION EFFORTS 
 
Chapter 2 considered the past and present international and regional harmonisation efforts, 
with a view to identifying a suitable approach for the SACU. This Chapter firstly considered 
the current international harmonisation efforts, specifically those of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, and found that despite the on-going efforts since 1992 to conclude 
a global recognition and enforcement convention, the Hague Conference has not succeeded in 
this regard.
13
 International organisations such as UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL have 
contributed to the harmonisation of private international law in the area of international trade, 
including in particular New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Awards.
14
 Despite the on-going work of international organisations towards 
harmonisation the current position persists where there is no global convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, analogous to the New York Convention in 
the field of arbitration awards.
15
  
 
                                                 
9
  See Chapter 1, para 4.1. 
10
  See Chapter 1, para 4.1. 
11
  See Chapter 1, para 4.2. 
12
  Casad RC ‘Civil Judgment Recognition and the Integration of Multi-state Associations: A Comparative 
Study’ (1980-1981) 4 Hasting International & Comparative Law Review 1. 
13
  See Chapter 2 para 2.1.  
14
  See Chapter 2 para 2.2.1. 
15
  See Chapter 1, para 3.1. 
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The Chapter further considered the approaches followed by various regional economic 
communities or groupings. The first regional economic community discussed is the Brussels 
regime of the EU, which, in the form of a Regulation, became directly applicable in all 
Member States as soon as it was enacted. It provides clear and detailed rules to its Member 
States on jurisdiction in transactions falling within its scope, and the quasi-automatic 
enforcement of the ensuing judgments under the Brussels I Regulation. The success of the 
instrument is generally attributed to amongst others, the supranational elements of the EU 
law, the direct applicability of EU laws in EU Member States and the ECJ which ensures a 
uniform interpretation of the Regulation and Convention.
16
 SACU Member States are far less 
integrated than those of the EU Member States. Further, SACU does not contain similar 
elements of a supranational institution to that of the EU, and also does not have an existing 
supranational court analogous to the ECJ to ensure uniform interpretation. While the Brussels 
model has operated with great success in Europe, its civil law origins meant that it may not be 
considered as the best model for countries with a shared common-law heritage or mixed legal 
heritage.
17
 These factors, suggests that a regulation may not be the most suitable approach to 
follow to harmonise the laws on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the 
SACU.
18
 
 
The second model considered was that of a federal system, specifically the full faith and 
credit approach of the USA which creates an overarching recognition and enforcement 
scheme binding on every sister-State through the presence of a constitutional requirement that 
each State recognise and enforce judgments of sister-States.
19
 This approach presupposes the 
existence of a single politico-legal community for purposes of recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments. SACU Member States, at present, do not constitute a single political 
community, but rather a group of sovereign States. The full faith and credit approach may not 
be the optimal approach to follow to harmonise the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in the sub-region; but the approach will likely become more appropriate as 
political integration in Africa progresses, at the height of political integration and at a time 
where it resembles a federal system.
20
  
                                                 
16
  See Chapter 2 para 3.1. 
17
  Trans-Tasman Working Group ‘Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement: A public 
discussion Paper by the Trans-Tasman Working Group’ Attorney-General’s Department (Australia) and 
Ministry of Justice (New Zealand) August 2005 (2005) 12. 
18
  See Chapter 2 para 4.1. 
19
  See Chapter 2 par 3.2. 
20
  See Chapter 2 para 3.2. 
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Thirdly, the approach in the Trans-Tasman Judicial System is that the recognition and 
enforcement regime for inter-state judgments of the Australian federal state is extended to a 
foreign State, New Zealand, with whom it shares a common legal heritage and similar legal 
system.
21
 This system therefore goes further than the USA model by treating a foreign 
judgment of the State party to the agreement as a sister-State judgment, while continuing to 
treat the judgments of other States not party to the agreement in a different manner. Although 
SACU Member States share a common legal heritage, which is required by this approach, it 
would not be possible to replicate this system to the SACU, as none of the SACU Member 
States is a federation whose federal rules on recognition and enforcement can be extended to 
other SACU Member States.
22
 As the Australian federal scheme probably manifests the 
purest presentation of a common law model for a double convention that is presently 
available,
23
 it may nevertheless offer some lessons to the SACU if a multilateral treaty in the 
form of a double convention is adopted in the SACU.
24
  
 
The final regional approach considered is that of the Latin-American States parties to the 
OAS, which are far less integrated than the USA or the EU. These States nevertheless have a 
well-developed regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments based on 
the Montevideo and La Paz Conventions, which facilitate the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments amongst Contracting States.
25
  
 
This Chapter concludes that a multilateral recognition and enforcement agreement is the most 
suitable method to harmonise or unify the rules of SACU Member States;
26
 and finally that 
the presence of a number of factors in the region points toward the feasibility of the proposed 
harmonisation efforts. These factors include the use of comparative law and reliance by 
courts on courts of other Member states; the availability of legal literature indigenous to the 
region; the fact that law reporting and access to legal materials is fairly up to date in the 
                                                 
21
  See Chapter 2 para 3.3.  
22
  See Chapter 2 para 4.3. 
23
  It is a ‘double convention’ because there are common principles of jurisdiction that help to address litigation 
between courts across the federation.  
24
  For example the requirements that a judgment have to meet to be registrable under the judicial system (of the 
Australia Trans-Tasman Act 35 of 2010 s 66), and when a judgment would not be registrable under the Act 
(s 66(2)); application requirements (s 66(5); setting aside registration (s 72); effect of registration and notice 
of registration (s7 3 and s 74). 
25
  See Chapter 2 para 4.3. 
26
  See Chapter 2 para 5.1 and 5.2. 
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major States of the region; a number of tertiary initiatives towards the study and 
harmonisation and laws of the region, and finally the availability of research tools in the 
region.
27
  
 
3 OVERVIEW OF SOME OF THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL RECOGNITION 
AND ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS 
 
What will be of critical importance for the negotiators of a possible recognition and 
enforcement convention is choosing the most suitable form of the instrument for the Member 
States of the SACU, taking into account the specific historical, political, cultural and socio-
economic differences between the States. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the traditional 
convention types, namely a single convention regulating only recognition and enforcement 
and indirect rules of jurisdiction,
28
 and a double convention regulating both direct jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments ensuing from those courts.
29
  
 
Comparatively speaking, a single convention may be easier for States to agree upon than 
concluding an arrangement on direct jurisdiction. This is because it leaves direct jurisdiction 
to national laws, and it can use denying recognition and enforcement to discourage parties 
from litigating on exorbitant direct jurisdiction grounds.
30
 There is a likelihood of tensions in 
reaching agreement upon the exclusive list of jurisdictional bases that a true double 
convention requires, which is linked to the differences between the social, sociological, 
political, and economic cultures of the legal orders in question, which may render reaching 
agreement on a list of jurisdictional bases on which courts would be allowed to assume 
jurisdiction challenging.
31
 A single convention with indirect jurisdictional bases may pave the 
way for the regions to develop a mixed or double convention regulating both direct and 
indirect jurisdiction in the long run.  
 
Whatever the type of convention adopted, it will present a dramatic improvement of the 
current recognition and enforcement regime in the SACU, as States’ legal obligations will be 
                                                 
27
  See Chapter 2 para 5.3.  
28
  See Chapter 3 para 1.1. 
29
  See Chapter 3 para 1.2 
30
  Hague Conference ‘International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ 
Preliminary Document No 7 of April 1997 (1997) (‘Kessedjian Report’) 138. 
31
  See Chapter 3 para 1.3. 
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based on international law and not the arbitrary designation of States by the administrative 
under that State’s national law.32 
 
Many challenges that will be experienced in the harmonisation of recognition and 
enforcement rules are likely to have already been experienced, and possibly addressed, by 
previous attempts to harmonise such rules on an international or regional level. The rich 
jurisprudence in these areas may be able to provide insights for the SACU in its efforts to 
establish a multilateral recognition and enforcement regime. Two international conventions, 
namely the 1971 Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement in Civil and 
Commercial Matters,
33
 and the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements,
34
 as 
well as two regional examples, namely the EU Brussels I Regulation/Convention
35
 and the 
1979 OAS Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and 
Arbitral Awards (Montevideo Convention)
36
 are considered.  
 
In terms of types of Conventions, the 2005 Hague Convention
37
 and the Brussels I 
Regulation
38
 are double conventions as they address the issue of the assumption of 
jurisdiction by the rendering court; while the 1971 Hague Convention
39
 and Montevideo 
Convention (read with the La Paz Convention)
40
 are examples of single conventions, which 
nevertheless provide rules of indirect jurisdiction for the purpose of recognition and 
enforcement under the Convention. It is therefore expected that the provisions of especially 
the latter two conventions will be of significance to the SACU when negotiating a recognition 
and enforcement convention for the SACU.
41
 
 
A comparison of the above provisions suggested that a recognition and enforcement 
convention would contain the following provisions:
42
 
- Scope and exclusions from scope of the Convention 
                                                 
32
  See Chapter 4 para. 4.1 for a discussion of the requirement of reciprocity and designation under the national 
laws of SACU Member States; and Chapter 4 para 5 for proposals for a recognition and enforcement 
convention for the SACU. 
33
  See Chapter 3 para 2.  
34
  See Chapter 3 para 3.  
35
  See Chapter 3 para 4.  
36
  See Chapter 3 para 5. 
37
  See Chapter 3 para 3. 
38
  See Chapter 3 para 4. 
39
  See Chapter 3 para 2. 
40
  See Chapter 3 para 4.  
41
  See Chapter 3 para 7.  
42
  See Chapter 3 para 7. 
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- Procedural requirements for recognition and enforcement under the Convention 
- Instances when recognition and enforcement would be refused under the Convention 
- The recognised bases of jurisdiction of the rendering court for the purpose of 
recognition and enforcement under the Convention. 
 
The next Chapter, Chapter 4 firstly considered the statutory provisions currently in force in 
SACU Member States, before making specific proposals for a recognition and enforcement 
regime for the SACU. 
 
4 STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS CURRENTLY IN FORCE IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
 
A comparison of the relevant recognition and enforcement statutes of SACU Member States 
reveal a close similarity between them,
43
 and in many instances they resemble to the 1920 
UK Administration of Justice Act
44
 and the 1933 UK Foreign Judgments Act.
45
  
 
A major weakness of the current statutory regimes is that recognition and enforcement often 
rely on designation, whereby a judgment debtor will be able to enforce his judgment under 
the statutory regime only if the foreign country is specifically designated by the Act. This 
requirement is further complicated by the fact that despite their shared common legal 
tradition and their membership in the Customs Union, all SACU Member States are not 
designated under each other’s regimes.46  
 
The application or scope of the current statutes was firstly compared.
47
 Although the ideal 
would be to extent the scope of the Convention to all civil matters, it is proposed that certain 
matters should nevertheless be excluded from the convention. It may be easier to reach 
agreement by excluding controversial areas; therefore, a convention which seeks to alter the 
diverse legal relationships of States generally contains a number of exclusions from the scope 
                                                 
43
  See Chapter 4 para 4.  
44
  See Chapter 4 para 2.1. 
45
  See Chapter 4 para 2.2. 
46
  See Chapter 4 para 5.  
47
  See Chapter 4 para 4.1. 
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of the instrument. If, however, the exclusions become too numerous, any convention will be 
deprived of a good deal of its usefulness.
 48
 
 
Based on a comparison of the provisions regarding the application or scope of the statute,
49
 
the requirements for enforcement,
50
 the procedural requirements
51
 and the grounds on which 
registration will be refused,
52
 a proposal is made for a Draft Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments for the Southern African Customs Union.
53
  
 
The Draft Convention deals with the scope of the proposed convention;
54
 recognition and 
enforcement;
55
 the effect of registration;
56
 stay of execution of a registered judgment;
57
 
refusal of recognition or enforcement;
58
 jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement under the 
Convention;
59
 interpretation;
60
 and final clauses and signature.
61
  
 
In order to facilitate the enforcement of judgments in the SACU the Draft Convention applies 
to judgments rendered in civil proceedings by both inferior and superior courts provided the 
other requirements are met.
62
 Further, while it is recommended that parties reach consensus 
on whether it should extend to judgments ordering compensation for damages resulting from 
an offence at the time of concluding the Convention, the Draft Convention leaves open the 
opportunity for States to declare at the time of ratification whether the Convention will also 
extend to judgments ordering compensation.
63
 The Draft Convention does not apply to orders 
for the periodic payment of maintenance and arbitral awards.
64
 Instead, Member States are 
                                                 
48
  Borchers PJ ‘A few little issues for the Hague judgments negotiations’ 24 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law (1998-1999)165. 
49
  See Chapter 4 para 4.1. 
50
  See Chapter 4 para 4.2. 
51
  See Chapter 4 para 4.3. 
52
  See Chapter 4 para 4.4. 
53
  See Chapter 4 para 5. 
54
  See article 1. 
55
  See article 2. 
56
  See article 3. 
57
  See article 4. 
58
  See article 5. 
59
  See article 6. 
60
  See article 7. 
61
  See articles 8 and 9. 
62
  See article 1(1). 
63
  See article 1(3). 
64
  See article 1(4). 
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encouraged to join the existing instruments in this regard in order to promote international 
uniformity.
65
  
 
In line with the existing instruments in force in the SACU Member States, a judgment given 
in a Contracting State will be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States once it has 
been registered there.
66
 The procedure for applying for registration is governed by the law of 
the Member State in which enforcement is sought.
67
 A judgment will not be registered or 
enforced if it satisfies one of the grounds listed in the Convention, which includes lack of 
jurisdiction of the rendering court; improper notice; fraud; public policy and irreconcilability 
with certain earlier judgments.
68
 The Draft Convention further specifies the instances when a 
rendering court would be considered to have had jurisdiction for the purposes of recognition 
and enforcement under the Convention.
69
  
 
The SACU Tribunal is mandated to give rulings on the interpretation of the Draft 
Convention.
70
 The Draft Convention is open for signature by all SACU Member States, and 
remains open for accession by any other State, or alternatively, to all SADC Member States.
71
 
 
Adoption of the Draft Convention will significantly improve the present situation where 
Member States are not necessarily designated under other Member States’ statutory regimes, 
thereby denying them the opportunity to access the simplified and expedited procedure for 
recognition and enforcement. The provisions of the Draft Convention generally do not 
represent a major departure from the existing provisions in force in SACU Member States but 
include a number of recommendations for improvements.  
 
With this in mind, if Member States take seriously their commitments to facilitate the cross-
border movement of goods between the territories of Member States and to promote the 
                                                 
65
  Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations 
(1973) and the UNCITRAL Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(1958): see Chapter 5 notes 492 and 493.  
66
  See article 2(1). 
67
  See article 2(4). 
68
  See article 5. 
69
  See article 6. 
70
  See article 7. 
71
  See Chapter 5 note 499. 
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integration of Member States into the global economy through trade and investment,
72
 it is 
envisaged that this Draft Convention will have a real likelihood of success.  
 
5 FINAL COMMENTS 
 
The thesis, as a first step in the process, considered the applicable statutes in force in selected 
States that apply the common law and Roman-Dutch law, and concluded that the differences 
between them are, in many instances, minor, and that harmonisation should, therefore, be 
feasible. A bigger concern is the fact that many statutes only designate a very small number 
of States under their regimes, which is further complicated by a reciprocity requirement 
inherent in most schemes.    
 
States may be hesitant at first, or lack the political will, to adopt uniform laws to replace their 
own national laws, even though the position may in some instances be similar to that of their 
own laws. The progress of regional integration and legal integration may result in States 
becoming more comfortable with the idea of harmonising their laws and in the light of the 
benefits of regional integration, which includes the removal of trade barriers and as a result 
an increase in trade, be more willing to unify their laws. 
 
‘The pursuit of harmony is the principle task of those who make it their concern to think about 
private international law... An immense intellectual effort has been invested in this discipline for 
many centuries. If any result commensurate with this effort is ever to be achieved, a clear vision 
of the ideal of harmony must be combined with an equally clear insight into the social facts 
which will ever prevent it from being attained. ... Many will never be able to see more than a tilt 
at windmills... sometimes they may even be right. But one hopes that there will always at least be 
some who can see that these hazards are giants of injustice and who will, as best they can, try to 
overcome them.’73 
 
 
Word Count: 111 372.
                                                 
72
 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of 
Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of 
Swaziland signed on 21 October 2002 in Gaborone, Botswana art 2(a) and (d). 
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  Kahn-Freund O General Principles of Private International Law (1976) 323. 
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